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Foreword and Acknowledgments:
About the STUDY SPACE Project
Colin Crawford
Study Space: Evaluations of Human Habitats and Habits in the 2 1st Century, is an intensive series of workshops,
held at diverse locations around the world, the goal of
which is to acquire a deeper understanding of the legal,
policy and human challenges posed by the global growth of
megacities. Study Space intends, at various times and in
different places, to provide a vehicle for progressive scholars and graduate students from varied backgrounds and
disciplines to study, learn and seek to understand experientially this trend in all of its implications - for identity and
self-determination, for participatory democracy, for equality and social justice, for human health, for the environment, for livable cities and for manageable land use.
To that end, Study Space 1: Entering the 21st Century:
Challenges and Opportunities of Panama's Explosive
Urban Growth, was held in La Ciudad de Panamt, Panamd, from December 9-15, 2007. Its primary sponsors
were the Center for the Comparative Study of Metropolitan
Growth, Georgia State University College of Law (CMG),
and Latina & Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc. (LatCrit).
In addition, this first Study Space was blessed with the cosponsorship of the Rosenstiel School of Marine & Atmospheric Science, University of Miami. Study Space I could
not have happened without the benefit of the conceptual
and organizational work of Dr. Daniel Suman, a member of
the Rosenstiel faculty. Dr. Suman's deep and broad knowledge of Panamd, its people, culture and environment
helped inform every aspect of Study Space I and for his
tireless work to make the week a success, he deserves hearty thanks. In addition, it would be remiss not to thank Dean
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Steven J. Kaminshine and the Georgia State University
College of Law for the institutional and financial support
that helped launch Study Space I and the entire Study
Space project.
It is anticipated that the co-sponsorship model will continue
to characterize the Study Space project. Study Space I:
Property, the Environment, and Cultural Diversity in
Colombia, was held in Bogotd, Colombia, from March 915, 2008, under the joint sponsorship of the CMG and LatCrit, along with the Faculty of Law at the Universidad de
los Andes; those proceedings will be published in an edition of Inter-American Law Review at the University of
Miami. Study Space III is planned for Denver, Colorado,
USA, in December 2008, with the joint sponsorship of its
Sturm College of Law; Study Space IV is scheduled for
Medellin, Colombia, in March 2009, in collaboration with
the law and other faculties at the Universidad EAFIT in that
city. Through this cooperative, cross-national, and crossinstitutional model, the Study Space project seeks to build
a body of comparative law and related disciplinary scholarship addressing -in the broadest sense -the consequences
of global urbanization and related social, economic, and
environmental change. Study Space is, moreover, by no
means, a closed project. It is one that aims constantly to
reach out and create new institutional partners and crossnational working relations to address its central themes. On
behalf of those previously and currently involved in the
collaborative Study Space project, let me conclude by
saying that we look Foreword to your comments, criticisms, and future participation.
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FOREWORD

INTERRUPTIONS AND INTERSECTIONS: JOURNEYS TO THE
CENTER OF THE AMERICAS

FranciscoValdes*
Introduction
In December, 2007, a diverse group of scholars and
students from various regions and institutions inaugurated a

new project in knowledge production, the Study Space
Seminar Series.' Devoted to critical perspectives in comparative and international studies, the Study Space Seminar
Series follows a decade-long history of collaboration
among legal scholars and friends associated with critical
outsider jurisprudence. As outlined below, this new project
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law, and Co-Director,
Center for Hispanic and Caribbean Legal Studies. I begin by thanking
Dr. Daniel Suman for spearheading the development of this inaugural
Study Space program and Professor Colin Crawford for spearheading
the organization of the Study Space Seminar Series as an ongoing
project. I thank also the many local hosts and participants, who made
the study schedule spectacularly fruitful and the contingent of diverse
scholars noted below who participated in the program, and whose
essays capture its essence. I likewise thank the LatCrit community of
scholars around the world, whose imaginative labors make possible this
type of collaborative experiment in knowledge production. I am also
grateful for assistance from the Center for the Comparative Study of
Metropolitan Growth at the Georgia State University College of Law,
which helped make my participation possible. I thank also the editors

of the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY and especially Stevie
Phillips and Ashley Musselman, for the work and support that not only
help us to disseminate this knowledge, but that also improve our efforts
with their talents. Finally, I thank Richard Cornier for his consistent
assistance in all aspects of this work. All errors rest with me.
1 The participants in the Study Space I program include Elvia Arriola,
Colin Crawford, Jorge Esquirol, Sheila Foster, Carmen Gonzalez, Ruth
Gordon, Ileana Porras, Eric Rogers, Daniel Suman, Robert Westley,
Tiffany Williams, and myself.
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both reflects and expands the rich record in democratic
knowledge-production undertaken by "OutCrit" scholars of
2
various stripes in previous years.
The Study Space Series was designed to create opportunities for scholars and students interested in critical
and comparative studies to share in a programmatic experience designed both to exchange and to produce knowledge.
More particularly, the Study Space Series was designed to
bring together scholars from the Global South with those
from the Global North in a one-week immersion program
focused on the study of a particular geographical location.
The week-long program schedule was structured to expose
the participants to localized insights in venues that permitted an exchange of impressions, views, and insights. In
addition, the program schedule included daily readings and
reflection periods to generate rich, substantive discussion
each evening. Through this process of exposure, reflection,
and exchange, the Study Space experience allowed all
participants to learn from each other even as we were learning from and about our local environment. 3 This synergis2 Critical

outsider jurisprudence, or "OutCrit" theorizing, is one way of

describing the commonalities shared by varied genres of contemporary
legal discourses that are defined both by outsider positionality and a
critical stance. Among these are feminist legal theory, critical race
theory, critical race feminism, queer legal theory, and LatCrit theory.
These overlapping and intersecting genres share a common lineage
with critical legal studies and realism. See generally Francisco Valdes,
OutsiderScholars, Legal Theory and OutCritPerspectivity:Postsubordination Vision as JurisprudentialMethod, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 831
(2000).
3 The Study Space Seminar Series was conceived as an immersion-style
workshop combining varied approaches to the study of law and society.
The concept calls for a relatively small group of scholars and students
to embed themselves in a particular locale and to examine local conditions through interaction with the environment and local actors with
specific areas of knowledge or expertise. These interactions are preceded and followed by readings tailored to the program schedule. In
addition, the participants engage in intensive discussion of daily experiences, events, and readings. The aim each day is to build and
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tic process aims to produce new insights and new trajectories in critical studies of law, policy, and society, as reflected in the symposium essays presented below.
As with other collaborative efforts of this sort, the
community of scholars spearheading the Study Space Seminar Series aims to make this process of knowledge exchange and knowledge production socially relevant from an
antisubordination perspective. 4 Thus, we hope that the
expanded opportunities for intellectual interaction created
through the Study Space Seminar Series will facilitate enduring relationships and networks committed to the promotion of social justice action. Of course, the translation of
theory into action can take many forms and many turns;
our aim, in creating the Study Space Seminar Series, therefore was to provide a collective platform for individual
scholars to do their social justice work in diverse yet programmatic terms. In this way, the Study Space Series provides another illustration of academic 6activism 5 as we, in
the "LatCrit" community, understand it.

expand on the learning and reflection of previous days, such that each
participant gradually develops a viewpoint on a particular aspect of the
program. After the schedule concludes, participants compose short
essays like the ones presented in this symposium. These efforts, we
hope, will inform the participants' teaching and scholarship in manifold
ways, and the essays, we hope, will become a resource both for scholars and teachers in the areas of critical and comparative studies. For
more information on the Study Space concept and project, visit
www.latcrit.org.
4 See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Angela P. Harris & Francisco Valdes, Subject Unrest, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2435 (2002) (on antidiscrimination and
antisubordination).
5 For an elaboration of academic activism as a LatCritical concept, see
Margaret E. Montoya & Francisco Valdes, Afterword-Latinas/os and
Latina/o Legal Studies: A Criticaland Self-CriticalReview of LatCrit
Theory and Legal Models of Knowledge Production,FLA. INT'L U.L.
REV. (forthcoming 2008).
6 See generally Francisco Valdes, Latina/o Ethnicities, CriticalRace
Theory, and Post-IdentityPolitics in Postmodern Legal Culture: From
Practicesto Possibilities,9 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1996) (discussing the
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As the symposium essays reflect, the inaugural
Study Space program focused on Panama City, Panama.
We chose this location because it symbolizes and represents the epicenter of the Americas in many different ways.
Geography, history, and commerce place Panama City
squarely at the center of the micro and macro processes
leading to the construction of what we today know as the
Americas. Panama City is a relatively small location
through which much of the world (still) travels. Today,
Panama City embodies the myriad vectors and valences
resulting from the human and natural forces that converge
precisely there. It is a place defined by interventions and
interruptions-interventions mainly from Europe and the
North, which repeatedly interrupt the aspirations, struggles,
and accomplishments of local communities. As the symposium authors note in their essays, Panama is both symbol
and site of hemispheric, if not global, convergences and
contestations; today, it reflects and projects the cumulative
record of humanity on these lands during the past half millennium, and beyond.7 No better place existed for the inauguration of the Study Space Seminar Series.
The eight essays presented below capture the observations and insights of most of the contingent that helped to

colloquium at which the "LatCrit" subject position was conceived);
Francisco Valdes, Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, OutsiderJurisprudence and Latina/o Self-Empowerment, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 1
(1997) (discussing the First Annual LatCrit Conference, held in 1996,
and the circumstances leading up to it). For current and historical
information on LatCrit projects and publications, visit Latina and
Latino Critical Legal Theory, Inc., www.latcrit.org.
7 For example, "In 1519, the Spaniards founded Panama City, the first
permanent European settlement on the Pacific coast, locating it at the
lowest and narrowest point of the landmass that separated the Atlantic
from the Pacific. From its inception the city's fate had been intimately
linked to its function in facilitating international trade." Ileana Porras,
PanamaCity Reflections: Growing the City in the Time of Sustainable
Development, 4 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 360-61 (2008).
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inaugurate this new project. 8 These essays not only reflect

our approach to knowledge exchange and production as
noted above, but also set out several substantive themes
drawn from the program and readings in Panama that build
upon many of the lines of critical inquiry previously pursued in OutCrit legal studies. Outlining these broad substantive themes, how they are represented in these papers,
and how they contribute to the ongoing development of
OutCrit legal studies, provide the purpose and framework
for this Foreword.
The Foreword is divided into two main parts, each
devoted to a trio of thoughts or themes that recur in the
essays, and both of which follow a prefatory note on LatCrit theory, community, and praxis. In Part I of this Foreword, the focus is on the recurring salience of history, the
relevance of history, and the exacerbation of historical
legacies by corporate globalization. The discussion of these
three inter-related points in Part I, as reflected in the symposium essays, set the stage for the three insights or lessons
spelled out in Part II of this Foreword. In Part II, attention
shifts to the persistent yet multifaceted linkage of "class" to
other categories of identity, to the complex role of law (or
its absence) in the construction of social and material realities, and to the promise and limits of knowledge-production
in the struggle toward complete de-colonization. The trio
of lessons extrapolated from the symposium essays in Part
II of this Foreword in effect confirm, deepen, and expand
the ongoing work of LatCrit and other OutCrit scholars
toward a post-subordination society. 9 We thus begin with a

LatCritical preface to help contextualize the Study Space
Seminar Series and the symposium essays that help to inaugurate it.
8 Additional

essays from the Study Space I program participants will be

published in another upcoming symposium.

9 For a discussion of postsubordination vision as jurisprudential method, see Valdes, supra note 2.
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Situating the Study Space: A LatCritical Preface
As the introduction notes, the Study Space Seminar
Series is a project conceived and organized by a diverse
group of legal scholars. Based in different universities
across the hemisphere, the Study Space Seminar Series is a
joint project specifically of the LatCrit community and the
Center for the Comparative Study of Metropolitan Growth
at the Georgia State University College of Law, where the
project is principally based. 10 The Study Space Seminar
Series therefore is one of the "critical partnerships" organ-

ized by LatCrit-identified scholars in collaboration with
other institutions of legal education in the United States and
beyond. This brief preface thus aims to situate the Study
Space Seminar Series within the context of LatCrit theory,
community and praxis, as undertaken specifically in the
form of various critical partnerships, to conduct joint projects of academic activism.
Based principally within the academy of the United
States and other academic institutions around the world, the
far-flung LatCrit community of multiply diverse scholars
has devoted much of its time and energy to the production
of knowledge in the form of traditional texts published in
scholarly journals.1 ' However, we have understood and
approached this traditional work in both traditional and
nontraditional ways. We have understood the core mission
10For more information on the Center and its work, visit

http://law.gsu.edu/metrogrowth/.
1 Twenty-some LatCrit symposia have been published, both in mainstream academic journals, as well as in specialty journals devoted to
difference and social justice. A list of these publications, as well as
information on LatCrit theory, including the full text of most of the
LatCrit symposia based on our Annual Conferences or other academic
events (such as the International and Comparative Colloquia and the
South-North Exchanges) can be obtained at the LatCrit website, available at http://www.latcrit.org.
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of knowledge-production in ways that recognize yet transcend traditional paradigms of academic work. To capture
this difference, we sometimes describe our approach as
"academic activism" to underscore the joinder of critical
theory and antisubordination action in all that we do.12
While elaborated fully in other texts, the basic LatCrit approach to knowledge-production and academic activism aims consciously to unite the work of theory with
the work of community-building through collaborative or
coalitional group efforts.1 3 This general description applies
to the varied projects in the "Portfolio of Projects" that
constitutes the kinds of "collective personal praxis" that
LatCrit scholarship has carefully cultivated during the past
dozen or so years. 14 However, the blending of theory,
community and praxis in the context of any particular project, event or publication can take many different forms.
Indeed, this flexible, imaginative, and nimble approach to
innovation in diverse situations has become a hallmark of
LatCrit5 projects, as the Study Space itself so richly illustrates.'
This earnest and proactive embrace of innovation
has incrementally lead LatCrit scholars toward our own
16
particular version of democratic knowledge production.
To us, as explained more fully in other LatCritical texts,
democratic models of knowledge-production tend to be
generally open to participation across diverse categories of
12 See

Montoya & Valdes, supra note 5 (elaborating the concept of

academic activism).
13 E.g., Berta Hemindez-Truyol, Angela P. Harris & Francisco Valdes,
Beyond the FirstDecade: A Forward-LookingHistory of LatCrit
Theory,
Community and Praxis, 17 LA RAZA L.J. 167 (2006).
14
Id. at 194-96 (on LatCrit theory and personal collective praxis); see
also www.latcrit.org (describing the projects in the LatCrit portfolio).
15 See supra note 5 and infra notes, 70-73 and accompanying text (on
knowledge
production models and their combination).
1
6 Montoya & Valdes, supra note 5 (on the LatCrit version of the democratic model).
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discipline, perspective, geography, or professional status.
In addition, democratic projects focus on the development
of "safe zones" constituted through various academic projects or programs that span the entire year and thereby
enable numerous opportunities for myriad interactions
among individual scholars in the pursuit of their respective
scholarly agendas. 17 Finally, democratic models tend to
emphasize both community-building and institutionbuilding to create the conditions for knowledge-production
unlimited by the constraints of mainstream institutional
politics within legal academia. 18 These characteristics lead
democratic experiments toward interdisciplinary and interdevelopment that combine theory and
generational paths of 19
action in varied ways.
In the LatCrit context, as noted above, these various
ways of combining theory and action are grounded in the
antisubordination principle and its promotion through academic activism. Our adherence to the principle of antisubordination trains our attention on analyses and solutions
that spring from the "shifting bottoms" of diverse sociolegal situations across the globe. 20 In other words, the
grounding of "academic activism" in LatCrit theory, community and praxis means that our work is informed and
guided first and foremost by the insights to be drawn from
the bottoms and the margins of society, rather than the

17 Id.

(elaborating the relationship of safe "space" and safe "zone" in

the context of different knowledge-production models).
18 Id.; see also Hemandez et al, supra note 13, at 196-99 (on LatCrit
community and institution-building efforts).
19See generally supra note 5 and infra notes, 70-73 and accompanying
text (on strategic combinations of different aspects of knowledge production models to maximize the impact of scholarship as a form of
activism).
academic
20
See Athena D. Mutua, Shifting Bottoms and Rotating Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and the Black/White Paradigm,53 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1177 (1998-99).
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privileged bromides of "enlightened" elites. 21 With this
emphasis on academic activism LatCrit scholars do not
question the centrality of knowledge-production in the
totality of our labors. Instead, this emphasis provides an
insistent reminder to each and all of us that knowledgeproduction can be conceived and practiced in and through
many different ways and means. And, of course, different
ways and means serve different ends or purposes; 22 hence,

our normative grounding in antisubordination values and
our methodological grounding in democratic knowledgeproduction.
The important point in these prefatory notes regarding academic activism and knowledge-production as LatCritical practice is that our work as "academics" must
transcend traditionalist paradigms in both method and substance if our work is to have antisubordination bite. We
must not only re-imagine and re-conceive the project of
knowledge production; we must also practice knowledgeproduction in innovative ways that enable persons and
groups to challenge systems of subordination in diverse yet
specific contexts. In other words, the fundamental substantive purpose of our knowledge-production work as academics must be to enable the self-determination of individuals
and communities on egalitarian terms.
In method, the scope of our work as academics consequently must include efforts, projects, and work products
not limited by or tailored to the elegant articles of mainstream academic journals. Academic activism should thus
embrace a multidimensional set of practices against social
injustice, both in the politics of knowledge-production as
well as in the social and material construction of society at
21 See

generally Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal

Studies and Reparations,22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987).
22 See Jean Stefancic, The Law Review Symposium Issue: Community of
Meaning or Re-Inscription of Hierarchy?,63 U. COLO. L. REv. 651
(1992) (offering a good overview of basic possibilities).
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large. This approach and grounding entails an appreciation
23
for both the necessity and difficulty of collective action.
If nothing else, collaboration must be understood as a
pragmatic imperative of antisubordination work: as the
Civil Right and Labor Movements of the past century have
demonstrated, collective action is necessary to challenge
entrenched elites successfully. This insight is no less true
when applied to academic elites in control of the institutions and processes that produce the knowledge through
which individuals and societies understand their personal
and collective realities.
However, OutCrit jurisprudential experience teaches that a key challenge in the initiation and maintenance of
a robust antisubordination agenda is to root collective action in shared substantive principles, and in their principled,
egalitarian practice. 24 Only when participants in collective
action believe that collective principles are the object of
their actions will a sense of collectivity endure and grow.
In the long run, only principled transparency can provide
the solidarity to overcome adversity. Without a shared and
transparent commitment to a normative grounding, collective action will tend to be fleeting and minimally effective.
The lessons of jurisprudential experience thus counsel
community-building and democracy in the construction and
development of scholarly formations and discourses dedicated to legal reformation as a vehicle toward social justice
transformation.25
23 Coalitional collaboration is also a hallmark theme and practice

among LatCrit scholars. See, e.g., Hernandez et al, supra note 13 at
193-99 (on coalition-building as LatCrit praxis).
24
See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Theorizing "OutCrit"Theories: CoalitionalMethod and ComparativeJurisprudentialExperienceRaceCrits,QueerCritsand LatCrits,53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265 (199899) (outlining varying outsider approaches to theory-making, and
detailing LatCrit practices as a synthesis).
25 Id.; see also supra note 11 and sources cited therein (on LatCrit
experience in this area).
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Oftentimes, the first impulse toward collective so-

cial justice action is to seek the likeminded within our
"home" institutions or local communities. These connections are no doubt helpful, even indispensible. But alone,
local connections do not suffice. If we stop there--or focus
only on those immediate connections-we will remain
forever defined, encased, and delimited by those pools of
possibility. Our efforts and horizons will be shaped by
local vagaries and institutional politics. Because local
politics oftentimes reduce us to a "society of one" (or two)
within our home institutions, we must reach out if we are to
realize the benefits of collective action as part of our
work.26

Thus, to ensure the integrity of knowledgeproduction in the service of self-determination, academic
activists interested in collective action oftentimes must
focus first on the creation of alternative and autonomous
formations, organizations, or associations that avoid replication of traditionalist imperatives and dysfunctions. 27 We
must, in short, create alternative support mechanisms for
the incubation and sustenance of academic activism in
tandem with critical theory. For me, and for many of the
other scholars spearheading this innovative project, the
LatCrit community has become this "home space" for principled and liberational academic activism. This LatCrit
26

See Rachel Moran, Commentary: The Implicationsof Being a Society

of One, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 503 (1985-86) (elaborating the "society of
one" concept).
27 LatCrit scholars began this process about a dozen years ago. See,
e.g., Francisco Valdes, Under Construction:LatCritConsciousness,
Community, and Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997) and Francisco
Valdes, Poisedat the Cusp: LatCritTheory, OutsiderJurisprudence
and Latina/o Self-Empowerment, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997).
28Lawrence supra note 9; see Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Who
Are We? And Why Are We Here? Doing CriticalRace Theory in Hard
Times, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE

THEORY (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris, eds., 2002) xi, xvii (explicating the safe space context).
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community is not the only possible home space for aca-

demic activists today, but I am grateful to the scholars
behind the Study Space Seminar Series and similar projects
for helping to expand the horizon of critical possibility.
With these prefatory remarks as background, we can now
turn to the program and papers that inaugurated this latest
exemplar of academic activism in the service of antisubordination knowledge production.
I.

Past, Present, and Future: Engineering the
Structure of Social Inequality

A basic tenet of OutCrit jurisprudence is that context matters and, therefore, history matters. 29 History, in
other words, provides the context for critical analysis of
social realities as presently structured. This avoidance of
ahistorical study is very much manifest in the symposium
papers presented here: most authors weave into their essays historical sketches to set the stage for a comprehensible critique of present-day legacies.
In my view, this uniformity is remarkable. I find it
remarkable because this high level of consistency is not a
result of programming on the part of the Study Space organizers. Instead, this educated coincidence flows organically from the individual choices that each scholar made in
mapping out the text she or he had in mind. Thus, each
author, with her or his set of compositional choices, illustrates and confirms the fundamental tenet of critical studies
in favor of historicizing all analyses. These choices point
to the first substantive theme recurring in the symposium
essays.
29

Consequently, law school courses devoted to social justice studies

typically begin with, or feature, a historical component that similarly
helps to contextualize the specific areas of study and discussion. See,
e.g., Francisco Valdes, OutsiderJurisprudence,CriticalPedagogy and
SocialJustice Activism: Marking the Stirrings of CriticalLegal Education, 10 ASIAN L.J. 65 (2003).
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The Salience of History: Colonialism and
Imperialism as Context

In the instance of Panama City, the history that the
symposium authors sketch pivots on the processes of Spanish colonialism and (mostly) North American imperialism
dating back to the 1500's.30 This enormous historical expanse is thick with nuance, complexity, and contradiction-a thickness that continues to define specific and
prevalent conceptions of the "Latina/o" today. 3 1 The combined works of these eight authors similarly teach that we
cannot fully understand this modem-day location without
first comprehending the histories of colonialism and imperialism that incrementally lead up to the present moment.
Perhaps the essay by Osvaldo Jordan, focusing on
the status of land taken from indigenous communities during colonial and imperial periods, provides the most extensive discussion of history as context. 32 His focus trains
critical attention on the uses of indigenous lands, sometimes in violation of legal instruments or political compromises, in ways that further damage indigenous communities
to expand wealth or comfort for the successors-in-interest
to colonial and imperial legacies. In this essay, Professor
Jordan makes plain that the current structure of land allocation cannot be addressed, much less redressed, without a
careful exposition of its colonial and imperial underpinnings. This essay pointedly demonstrates the salience of
history in contemporary law and society.
For a historical overview, see generally, Francisco Valdes, Race,
Ethnicity and Hispanismo in TriangularPerspective: The "Essential
Latinalo" and LatCritTheory, 48 UCLA L. REV. 305 (2000-01).
31 These histories inevitably produce resilient legacies for the construction of Latina/o identities and communities today. See id.
32 Osvaldo Jordan, "I EnteredDuring the Day and Came Out During
the Night". Power,Environment and Indigenous People in a Globalizing Panama,4 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 467 (2008).
30
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In addition, the essay by Professors Carmen Gonzalez, focusing on the current expansion of the Canal facilities, 33 and the essays by Professors Jorge Esquirol, 34 Ileana
Porras,35 and Daniel Suman,36 all of which focus on various
aspects of housing and the re-development of properties,
also provide historical background to analyze local presentday circumstances. Each of them explains how today's
difficulties stem from historical decisions and actions taken
during colonial and imperial regimes, and how the viability
of potential policy solutions are defined by the possibilities
for reform that those legacies have since established. Although each of these authors focuses on a different or particular subset of local histories in order to set the stage for
their focused analysis of a specific topic, the composite
conclusion derived from their common methodology is that
history serves as an indispensable key to a critical comprehension of the present. These authors, each in her or his
own way, illustrate and demonstrate the salience of history
to antisubordination analysis and critical theory.
The brief historical snapshots presented in these papers indicate a long and multifaceted process of contestation, manipulation, exploitation, interruption, and
interference. While not the exclusive focus of any paper in
this symposium, this historical record nonetheless helps to
provide a context for comprehension of modem-day realities. Without this background in mind, the present might
seem random, but that would be mistaken, as the papers so
33

Carmen Gonzalez, EnvironmentalImpact Assessment in Post-

ColonialSocieties: Reflections on the ProposedExpansion of the
Panama Canal,4 TENN. J. L. & POL'Y 303 (2008).
34 Porras, supra note 7 at 357.
35 Colin Crawford, Saving Biodiversity at the Crossroadsof the Americas, 4 TENN. J. L. & POL'Y 199 (2008).
36 Daniel Suman, Tamales & Bollos - Patrimoniode la Humanidad
/
World Heritage: ChallengesFacedby RestorationEfforts in Panama
City's San FelipeHistoricDistrict,4 TENN. J. L. & POL'Y 403 (2008).
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clearly demonstrate. Thus, the relevance of the past to the
present, as elaborated in the essays, points to the second
recurring substantive theme outlined here.
B.

The Present Relevance of History: Still
Living the Past

As mentioned above, the authors in this symposium
present their historical sketches not merely as an exercise in
learning about the past, but as a step in the process of learning about the present. Thus, the authors use their historical
sketches as a point of departure for their analyses of more
specific and concrete contemporary realities in and around
Panama City. Whether their focus turns to the allocation of
land, the structuring of formal democracy, the nonregulation of "development" or the preservation of cultural
and environmental assets from erosion or erasure, the authors all show us that today's landscape is the cumulative
result of the historical processes they have sketched for us.
In repeatedly demonstrating the present relevance of
history, the symposium authors provide us a salutary reminder of a basic and crucial insight: it took centuries for
the forces of oppression to engineer the structure of present-day inequalities, 37 and it should come as little (if any)
surprise to learn that the project of dismantling these structures of subordination presents a similarly intergenerational struggle. This realization implies a scale and
depth of struggle that cries out for collaborative and coalitional exertions rather than only individual, atomized actions.38 This reminder effectively reinforces the basic
lesson that underscores the need for individual yet concerted acts of will if the journey toward a postsubordination
37 See Valdes, supra note 30 (on colonial and imperial histories).
38

The point to emphasize is the need for both personal and collective

actions, or "personal collective praxis." See supra note 13 and accompanying text (on personal collective praxis as a LatCritical norm).
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These papers show that

individuals must take the initiative to resist the momentum
of an entrenched status quo, but that to succeed, motivated
individuals must connect and combine to create and mutually sustain successful social justice interventions.
As noted above, the authors represented in this
symposium each felt a substantive need to provide historical context to elaborate their analysis of a particular aspect
or topic relating to contemporary Panamanian society.
History, then, is the point of departure for critical analysis
of present-day realities. Professor Gonzalez has perhaps
phrased this point most aptly: "Even after the colonial
power departed, the institutional and ideological vestiges of
colonialism were not easily eradicated., 39 Similarly, Professor Jordan roots his analysis of land and identity on "the
persistence of colonial relations between indigenous peoples and the descendants of the colonizers." 4° Focusing on
North American imperialism, Professor Porras notes the
"legacy of the U.S. controlled canal zone' 4 1 while Professor Colin Crawford focuses on the continuing impact of the
lands "reverted" to Panamanian control upon the departure
of U.S. forces from precisely that zone. 42 As a set, these
essays underscore the substantive, analytical need to historicize contemporary law and society in order to understand-and reform--it.
In each of these examples, the symposium author
shows us that contemporary inequalities are the proximate
if not direct consequence of historical injustices. They
show us, in effect, the social constructedness, and therefore
contingency, of modem day societies. They show us the
power of entrenchment, and the adversity facing individuals who seek to challenge the injustice of that power today.
39 Gonzalez, supra note 33 at 304.
40 Jordan, supra note 32 at 468.
41Porras, supra note 7 at 357.
42 Crawford, supra note 35 at 199.
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They show us that individuals who band together with
others to undertake principled antisubordination action face
daunting odds, yet sometimes succeed in denting the structures of subordination. In this way, they show us a microcosm of social justice work not only in Panama but also
across the globe.
C. Corporate Globalization: Exacerbating Historical Legacies of Subordination
As an exercise in comparative scholarship, these
symposium essays also suggest that the salience of history,
and the relevance of history in present-day societies, are not
phenomena isolated to Panama alone. Rather, they reflect
larger historical patterns of domination and subordination,
similarly carried out during the eras of colonialism and
imperialism in varied regions of the hemisphere and globe,
that shape much of the past several centuries in human
affairs. In this way, the local focus of this Study Space
program also serves to illuminate the larger processes, and
effects, of corporate globalization today.
More specifically, the symposium essays effectively
illustrate how historical legacies established by colonial
and imperial enterprise help to structure the operations and
imperatives of corporate globalization. These papers show
how the "winners" under colonial and imperial regimes are
best situated to remain "winners" in the corporate-oriented
organization of globalization as we know it today. These
papers also pointedly show how corporate globalization
mirrors the dynamics of colonialism and imperialism. To
some, these observations may lead to the suspicion that
globalization is, in many ways, a structural extension of
colonial and imperial power dynamics in both local and in
global terms.
As with the prior two points and linkages, the relationship of corporate-style globalization to the legacies of
colonial and imperial histories is made, sometimes explic-
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itly and sometimes implicitly, in the symposium essays.
An apt example of explicit linkage is provided in the essay
by Eric J.D. Rogers, whose analysis focuses on the impact
of housing issues specifically for the middle class in Panama City.43 Viewing the various factors that serve as
catalysts for the "unprecedented growth in all sectors" of
that economy, and especially in the trafficking of property,
Rogers notes that, "much of this housing development is
aimed at "baby boomer" retirees and second home buyers
from the US, Canada and Europe. '4 4 Similarly, he notes,
"foreign investors see a great deal of potential in Panama
City as both a hub of shipping and industry, as well as' 4 a5
retirement mecca for North Americans and Europeans.
The local, in other words, is driven by the global.
Professor Porras similarly notes that this influx of
capital, persons, and development is "playing havoc with
all sense of urban scale," which she notes brings into question whether or not sustainable development can be a coherent policy concept in this economically globalized local
context.4 6

Conversely, Professor Porras reminds us ex-

pressly that sustainable development requires us to analyze
"our new understanding of the interrelationship between
economic activity, environmental impact and issues of
intra- and inter-generational equity."4 7 These explicit and
specific examples thus illustrate a point that travels though
the symposium essays as a whole: the powerful forces of
corporate globalization today not only affect localities
everywhere, but also do so in ways that materially and
structurally reinforce the legacies of colonial and imperial
rule. The essays show how colonial and imperial baselines
43

Eric J. D. Rogers, Out with the Old in with the New: Housing Issues
for the Middle-Class in Panama City, Panama,4 TENN.J.L. & POL'Y

507 (2008).

44Id. at 513.
45
46

Id. at 514.
Porras, supra note 7 at 360.

47 d. at

392.
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effectively create the structural platforms from which vari-

ously-positioned persons or communities can (and cannot)
participate in the promised benefits of globalization processes. Thus, history is not only salient, and not only relevant to the present, but it also serves as a point of staging
for the skewed politics of corporate globalization that continue to reinforce unjust legacies.
As these illustrative examples show, corporate globalization-like colonialism and imperialism before it -is
a complex and powerful process of contestation and exploitation. It is a human phenomenon structured to generate
"winners" and, therefore, "losers." The structure of this
stratification is the structure of society, both yesterday and
today. The resulting architecture is always local, and yet
always representative of larger patterns. These patterns
lead to critical substantive insights reflected also in the
symposium essays, and outlined below in Part II of this
Foreword.
II.

Identity, Law and Knowledge: Pivots of Power
and Action

As outlined in Part I of this Foreword, the symposium essays reflect three recurrent and inter-related themes
drawn from the Study Space in Panama during December,
2007. These three themes focus on the salience of history,
the present relevance of history, and the continuation of
historical legacies through the dynamics of corporate globalization. These three themes in turn suggest three lessons
or conclusions: the strong relationship between "class" and
other forms of identity, the complex yet central role of law
(or its absence) in the construction of social and material
realities, and the promise and limits of knowledgeproduction in the quest toward a de-colonized reality.
These three lessons or conclusions, as sketched below, both
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confirm and build on the body of literature that OutCrit
scholars have produced in recent years. 48
A.

Beyond the Dichotomy: The Interconnection of "Class" to (Other) Social Identities

In the United States, class-based identities are oftentimes viewed as somehow oppositional to identities based
on other social constructions, such as race, gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation. 49 In comparative South-North
studies, class-based identities are oftentimes emphasized as
markedly disconnected from other social identities, such as
those based on race, or ethnicity. 50 As an exercise in experiential and immersion study, this Study Space program
brought into sharp view the limitations inherent in both of
these propositions. The symposium essays corroborate that
class, in fact, is oftentimes co-constitutive of other social
identities, and vice versa. 51 The lesson, in other words, is
48

See, e.g., supra note 11 and sources cited therein (listing the LatCrit

symposia of the past decade or so).
49 See, e.g., Hernandez et al, supra note 13 at 193-99 (on the
mutuallyreinforcing relationship of class and other axes of sociolegal identity as
understood by LatCrit theorists); see also Elizabeth M. Iglesias &
Francisco Valdes, LatCrit at Five: Institutionalizinga Postsubordination Future, 78 DENy. U. L. REv. 1249, 1270-73 (2000-0 1) (making the
same point).
50 See generally, Tanya Hemandez, An Exploration of the Efficacy
of
Class-BasedApproaches to Racial Justice: The Cuban Context, 33
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1135 (1999-2000) (focusing on Cuba to explore,
and debunk, the popular claim that color and class are not systemically
correlated in the Caribbean and southern or central American societies).
51 Building on early concepts like intersectionality and antiessentialism,
various OutCrit-identified scholars have developed this point during the
past decade or so, steadily mapping the mutually-constructed nature of
"different" identity categories. See, e.g., E. Christi Cunningham, The
Rise of Identity PoliticsI: The Myth of the ProtectedClass in Title VII
DisparateTreatment Cases, 30 U. CONN. L. REv. 441 (1997-98); Peter
Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosythesis of Categories," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257 (1997); Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal
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that class correlates to race, gender, ethnicity and other
categories of identity in flexible and variegated yet systematic ways, rather than simply in idiosyncratic ways. This
correlation is a key feature in the structure of stratification
that defines many societies today, whether in the Global
South or in the Global North.
This correlation of class and other forms of identity,
both in the Global South and in the Global North, is made
most vividly in the symposium essays by the contribution
from Tiffany D. Williams, which focuses on a comparative
study of three large cities that span the hemisphere: Atlanta, Panama City, and Rio de Janeiro. 52 Examining the
demolition of public housing projects in these different
geographical and sociopolitical contexts, Williams notes
repeatedly how "poor" areas slated for demolition typically
are neighborhoods populated by indigenous people, African-descent populations, and other traditionally marginalized groups. 53 Empirically, each of these social groups
shares two things in common with the others, despite their
different geographical and sociopolitical particularities:
none are white in the European sense, and all are poor in
the economic sense.
This structural, far-reaching correlation between
class and other categories of sociolegal identity is also
reflected in the essays by Professors Porras, Crawford and
Jordan: in each instance, they note in the analyses of their
respective topics how issues of material or environmental
injustice oftentimes can be mapped along the lines of suCulture: Ruminaitons on Identities and Inter-Connectivities,5 So. CAL.
REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 25 (1995); see also infra note 58 and
sources cited therein (on the multidimensional nature of social and
legal identities).
52 Tiffany D. Williams, The Ties that Bind: Capitalizingon the Existing
Social Fabricin Public Housing to Revitalize Neighborhoods and
Avoid Displacementin Panama City, Panama,4 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y
535 (2008).
53 Id.
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premacist identity politics based on race, ethnicity, class

and similar identity axes. Professor Porras, for example,
explains that re-development and gentrification of the old
city of Panama was made possible only through the "displacement of the poor and mostly black community" that
previously inhabited it.54 Professor Crawford takes the
point deeper into history, noting that "historically, the Spaniards left the wet forests and swamps of the Caribbean to
the Indian and Black communities" and that this history has
been "characterized by great social and economic inequality that persists to this day.",55 Professor Jordan's analysis,
focused on the vexing relationship of indigenous communities and the descendants of white settlers or colonizers,
similarly notes the identity-inflected distribution of land
and related material resources along racial and ethnic categories: 56 "This historical legacy of uneven wealth distribution, that was associated with class, race and ethnicity," he
observes, was the catalyst for "an increased mobilization of

indigenous peoples, peasant leagues, labor unions, student
federations, and other popular organizations" in the latter
half of the present century. 57 Thus, the authors as a whole
provide a bill of particulars that concretely illustrates and
establishes the correlation of class to other forms of identity
in various physical and political settings; in other words,
time and again they make clear the interlocking relationship
of material or economic identity with "other" identities
based on race, ethnicity and similar categories of law, policy and society-a relationship that resists all efforts to
sever one from the other in a comprehensive analysis of
present-day realities.
As these brief illustrations indicate, critical analyses
of class that seek to isolate this category from other social
54Porras, supra note 7 at 359.
55Crawford, supra note 34 at 230.
56
57

Jordan, supra note 35 at 474.

id.
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identities will likely overlook aspects of local and global
relations that are interactive, dynamic and mutually reinforcing. Put plainly, these essays indicate that efforts to
segregate "class" from its relationship to other identity
categories will lead to analytical blunders. Ideally, these
essays will help to motivate multidimensional analyses of
the interlocking nature
social realities that take into account
58
politics.
identity
of multi-category
B. Law and the Social Construction of Formal
Democracy: The Power of the Absence
OutCrit legal scholars have long explored the indeterminate, complex, limited, yet powerful role of law in the
creation of social systems and structures. 59 In addition,
backlash politics preaches the evils of law and of legal
regulation in modem day societies, whether in the Global
South or in the Global North. 60 Thus, from all sides, it
seems that the role of law, and its complexity, is understood
to be a relevant, if not essential, element in the construction
of social realities. The papers presented in this symposium
Again, the multidimensional nature of sociolegal identities is a point
developed in prior works by various LatCrit and OutCrit scholars. See,
e.g., Berta Esperanza Hemandez-Truyol, Building Bridges -Latinas
and Latinos at the Crossroads:Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement,
25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369 (1993-94); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal
Theory and PoliticalDiscourse,29 CONN. L. REV. 561 (1997); Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for
Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory and Politics of "Sexual Orienta",48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1315-18 (1996-97).
tion
59
For a recent sampling, see CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp &
Angela P. Harris, eds., 2002).
60 For a critical unpacking of backlash jurisprudence, see Francisco
Valdes, "We Are Now of the View": Backlash Activism, Cultural
Cleansing,and the Kulturkampf to Resurrect the Old Deal, 35 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1407 (2004-05) and Francisco Valdes, Culture by Law:
Backlash as Jurisprudence,50 VILL. L. REV. 1135 (2005).
58
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contribute to this discourse by painting a vivid portrait of a
particular location in today's world of globalized commerce in which the absence of Law (or its principled enforcement) looms large.
In general, the symposium essays present a picture
wherein formal law is oftentimes either absent or impotent,
and wherein formal or customary practices help to fill to
void. This dynamic, of course, is not unique to Panama.
Yet, these papers do provide a vivid lesson in the dangers
associated with the impotence or absence of formal law in
the context of a formally democratic state.
In Panama, as the authors explain, formal law establishes a set of rules and rights that read quite reasonably,
and that establish the parameters for a formal democracy.
However, powerful figures and forces too often render
them operationally null. Additionally, colonial and imperial legacies oftentimes leave in their wake grave gaps in
legal structures and traditions, and powerful figures or
forces step into this void as well. The sociopolitical bottom
line is a set of laws on the books that read mighty nice but
in fact exert very little influence on the dynamics of human
affairs. The results for human communities and natural
environments, as the essays suggest, are not only unjust but
also alarming, and ultimately not only undemocratic but
also self-destructive.
The various symposium essays focusing on issues
relating to housing, property, land and re-development, all
help to illustrate this point concretely. For example, Professor Esquirol's essay is an extended untangling of the
complicated relationship between "formal" and "informal"
types of law, or law-like customs, and the powerful effects
of each on the human beings subject to both. 6 1 As he so
piercingly shows, neither approach-formality or informality-serves a panacea to historical and contemporary injus61 Esquirol,

Titling and Untitled Housing in Panama City, 4 TENN. J.L.

& POL'Y 243 (2008).

43

4:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 191

tices. However, as he and other symposium contributors
help to illustrate, the absence of law altogether-or of principled law enforcement-oftentimes favors the biggest
animals in the social, political and economic jungles of any
given locality.
Thus, formal law can be a tool of justice-oriented
reforms, but is oftentimes misused, or is absent altogether.
By way of example, Professor Suman notes the fitful and
laborious yet incremental real progress that legal regulation
of redevelopment in the old city center has achieved, yet
concludes that "the dizzying growth of Panama City also
presents numerous challenges" due precisely to the pressures of globalization that formal (or informal customs)
simply cannot withstand.6 2 The loss of cultural patrimonies
is the result of this status quo, he observes: with a lack of
effective and comprehensive legal protection for historical
preservation, key areas within Panama City "are rapidly
being altered and lost" in the local growth "explosion,"
driven by globalized forces. 63 Shifting attention from the
cultural to the natural, Professor Crawford, after reviewing
available rules of formal law for environmental protection,
notes that "these are powerful tools if applied intelligently
and deliberately to the resolution of particular conflicts". 4
Once again, the question raised in these essays regarding
the role of law (or its absence) in local affairs is complex:
the question extends not only to the existence of formal
law, but also to its practical and principled enforcement in
daily practice.
Professor Gonzalez raises the very same point with
respect to the legal process-and its limitations--designed
to control the billion-dollar expansion of the Panama Canal
already underway. 65 As she so eloquently spells out, the
62

Suman, supranote 36 at 465.

id.
64 Crawford, supra note 35 at 218.
65 Gonzalez, supra note 33 at 303.
63
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gap between law on the books and law in practice can be
exploited, usually by the privileged, to manipulate and
hijack legal processes, and thereby to bootstrap existing
power hierarchies into even greater personal wealth for the
already rich.66 In each of these scenarios, this legal subversion of Law itself is the common thread mapped by the
respective essays.
As a set, the symposium essays illustrate how the
absence of formal law creates opportunities for informality,
as in the case of housing discussed in Professor Esquirol's
essay. In other instances, as in the essays by Professors
Suman, Crawford and Gonzalez, the main problem is not
the absence of formal law, but the absence of its principled
enforcement. In these instances, we oftentimes see the
embodiment of noble assertions and aspirations in the form
of formal law, which are honored mostly in their breach,
mostly by the rich and powerful. Thus, Law seems a central factor-whether viewed in formal or informal termsand depending, also, on actual practices of non- or underenforcement.
Once again these examples are brief. Yet, they
capture both the centrality and complexity of Law-or its
absence-in the construction of social realities or political
decisions attributed to democratic self-govemance. Moreover, they illustrate how the powerful dynamics of corporate globalization interact with a local status quo
entrenched through colonial and imperial histories that
inhibit the capacity for local democracy in actual, as opposed to merely formal, terms. More particularly, these
brief examples help to show how the interaction of corporate globalization today helps to reinforce the socioeconomic hierarchy of a Euro-American heteropatriarchy, a

66

See generally id.
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decidedly undemocratic
legacy erected during colonial and
67
imperial rule.

C.

Knowledge-Production and DeColonization: The Promise, the Limits and
Beyond

As noted at the outset, the Study Space Seminar Series is designed to be an exercise in scholarly activism. As
such, the program is designed both to exchange and to
produce knowledge. The ultimate objective, however, is
to employ knowledge to catalyze antisubordination action.68 In this instance, the aim of action is to de-colonize;
that is, to attain a truly post-colonial social reality.
The points developed in these essays, as sketched
above, certainly should be sufficient to raise consciousness
and motivate action responsive to the inequalities and injustices not only found in Panama, but all around us as
well. The particularities mapped in the essays help us to
become more aware not only of local issues, but of global
patterns that structure local struggles for a post-colonial,
post-subordination society. In effect, then, these acts of
study, exchange, reflection and composition represent important but limited initial steps towards the development
of an informed and coalitional antisubordination agenda
without borders. 69

67

For an elaboration of "Euro-American heteropatriarchy" as an ideo-

logical package deal, see Francisco Valdes, Unpacking HeteroPatriarchy:Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender and Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161 (1996) and Francisco
Valdes, Identity Maneuvers in Law and Society: Vignettes of a EuroAmerican Heteropatriarchy,71 UMKC L. REv. 377 (2002-03).
68 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (on the Study Space
concept and knowledge production).
69 See supra notes 10-28 and accompanying text (on the Study Space
concept, and knowledge production).
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Thus, publication of these essays is but a part of a
larger process, a process that requires continuing acts of
initiative and collaboration to advance and sustain. These
kinds of follow-up efforts, again, amount to academic activism designed to ensure not only the initiation but also
the continuation of antisubordination knowledge and action. 70 And, as with all acts of academic activism, they
will require imagination and persistence, as well as careful
choices in the design of programs and events, to ensure
productive encounters that nurture ongoing alliances.
These pending choices will help to determine the potency,
trajectory and durability of our ongoing efforts and experiments in LatCritical praxis.
In general, LatCrit scholars have designed our projects in democratic terms based on the lessons and insights
we have drawn from other OutCrit experiments in legal
scholarship. 71 However, as the design of the Study Space
Seminar Series illustrates, and as LatCrit scholars have
previously urged, democratic approaches to scholarship
can be combined strategically with other traditions or
models of knowledge-production to help maximize antisubordination efficacy.72 In this instance, the small and
intensive design of the Study Space Seminar Series is
reminiscent of the "safe space" (or "vanguard") model of
knowledge production, a model that emphasizes precisely
this kind of focused and tight-knit grouping based on
common reading lists and critical reflection to generate

70

See supra notes 10-28 and accompanying text (introducing the con-

cept of academic activism in LatCritical work).
71 See Montoya & Valdes, supra note 5 (describing the three main
models of legal knowledge production and their general characteristics).
72 Id. (concluding that, although democratic approaches provide the

sturdiest frameworks for antisubordination theory and action, scholars
should combine aspects of all models in conscious and strategic ways
to maximize the material impact, or social relevance, of our work).
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new insights and texts. 7 3 This vanguard-style project
within a fundamentally democratic academic community
thus illustrates how LatCrit (and other) scholars can and
should "mix and match" methods or models or knowledge-production in creative ways to maximize antisubordination punch.74 In this way, the variety and richness of
the papers produced by the small band of scholars that
helped to inaugurate the Study Space Seminar Series in
Panama during December, 2007, also serve to confirm that
hybrid or combined approaches to knowledge-production
can balance democratic elements with other scholarly traditions to generate piercing and illuminating texts designed for social justice relevance.
Such flexibility, moreover, helps to facilitate relationships and networks that hopefully will endure beyond
the limited span of any given program or event. The immersion-style aspects of the Study Space design, coupled
with the attendant opportunities to publish papers and plan
future collaborations, ideally will help to nurture intellectual, political and human relationships among and between
the diverse groups of Study Space participants. Through
the planning and development of follow-up programs,
these relationships can ripen into expanded networks of
academic activists working collaboratively on various intersecting, synergistic projects. In time, the growth of relationships into networks can create the necessary
conditions for communities and institutions devoted to this
work-communities and institutions similar to the LatCrit
Portfolio of Projects. 75 This attention to the long term, if
cultivated and implemented in a principled, democratic
and transparent manner, can help us stretch the reach and
73 Id. (describing the safe space or vanguard model of legal knowledge

production).
74 id.

75 For more information on the LatCrit Portfolio of Projects, visit

www.latcrit.org.
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limits of our immediate efforts. Only through this sort of
programmatic and substantive continuity can we, as academic activists, hope to sustain the historical struggles
that the symposium auagainst the legacies of injustice
76
thors examine in their essays.
Conclusion
This brief Foreword is dedicated to highlighting
some common themes in method and substance reflected in
the following symposium essays, which in turn are based
on the inaugural Study Space program of December, 2007,
in Panama City, Panama. The brevity of this Foreword
cannot do justice to the rich detail and nuance embedded in
these diverse and thoughtful essays. Nor can the effort to
link these essays and project to the larger record or corpus
of LatCrit and other OutCrit works be fully unfolded here.
Nonetheless, the summary sketch of highlights unfolded
above, and amplified in the essays below, do help to confirm, as well as to enrich, the substance and methodology
associated with critical outsider jurisprudence generally,
and with the LatCrit approach to democratic knowledgeproduction specifically. In this way, the authors presented
below demonstrate not only the continuing vitality of OutCrit legal studies, but also the promise of the Study Space
Seminar Series as an exercise in critical approaches to
comparative scholarship and academic activism.

76

This attention to continuity and long term planning is consistent with

LatCrit praxis and OutCrit lessons in jurisprudential experiments. See
supra notes 5, 6, and 13 and sources cited therein (on continuity as an
element of effective and sustainable academic activism).
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ESSAY
SAVING BIODIVERSITY AT THE CROSSROADS OF THE
AMERICAS

Colin Crawford*
This paper will examine the ecological status and
prospects of Panama's reverted areas, meaning those areas
returned to the country with the reversion of sovereignty
over the Panama Canal lands. Following an introductory
Part I that highlights Panama's biological diversity, Part II
will isolate some of the development pressures facing the
reverted areas and those closest to central Panama City in
particular. In addition, Part II will describe the extent of the
reverted areas and identify their biological, environmental,

* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for the Comparative Study
of Metropolitan Growth, Georgia State University College of Law.
Thanks to Deans Steve Kaminshine and William Prigge for their support of the Study Space project, to Dr. Daniel Suman for lending his
energy, expertise, organizational skills and encyclopedic knowledge of
Panama to help make this inaugural Study Space possible, and to Stevie
Phillips, Editor of the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY, for

her receptiveness to undertake publication of this first set of Study
Space research papers, and to her successor, Ashley Musselman and
this article's editor, Chris Hayden, for their patience and assistance.
Scholars, activists, and government officials in Panama were exceptionally generous with their time, energy, and knowledge. I hope some
of what we learned from them is reflected in these pages. Jad Atallah,
Georgia State College of Law Class of 2008, and Georgia State College
of Law Librarian Michael Davis provided essential research assistance
for which I am grateful. Daniel Suman and Jacqueline Howard both
provided useful comments that made this paper a better one, but are not
responsible for any of its faults.
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social and economic value both to Panama City and the
Republic. Part III will discuss the importance of protecting
the reverted areas in light of global accords on biodiversity
and tropical forest protection. Part III will additionally
consider existing legal protections under Panamanian law
and identify other examples of the legal protection of protected areas and biodiversity in the region by suggesting
ways in which the Panamanian legal protections might be
strengthened. Finally, Part IV will consider the prospects
for successful protection of the reverted areas and will
conclude with justifications and recommendations for a
successful strategy to ensure the long-term viability of the
reverted areas as protected areas and biodiversity havens.
I.

Introduction: Panama's Threatened Reverted
Areas

In Panama City, Panama, construction is underway
for a Biodiversity Museum. This is unsurprising; tropical
Panama constitutes a biodiversity "hotspot", a place distinguished by the richness of its flora and fauna, and therefore
meriting special protection.' Panama City, along with the
Panama Canal, sits at the center of one of the world's most
biologically diverse areas: Southern Central America. The
area has more forest bird species than any other region in
the world, except Amazonia and the northern and central
Andes, each of which is vastly larger than southern Central
America. Furthermore, Panama has as many plant species
per 10,000 km 2 as any region in the world, more than Ama-

1The phrase is typically credited to the British ecologist Norman
Myers. See, e.g., John C. Kunich, FiddlingAround While the Hotspots
Burn Out, 14 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 179 (2001) (explaining that the
country is estimated to be the home to 10,000 species, of which 1,500
are endemic). See also Mireya Correa, Diversidad en la flora de Panamd, in Panama: Puente Bioldgico 70-73 (Stanley Heckadon-Moreno,
ed. 2001).
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This biological richness

results largely from the geographic distinctiveness of the
nation's location. As a bridge between the American continents, the country sits at the bottom territory of many species in the northern hemisphere and
the top territory of
3
many southern hemisphere species.
The effort to build a Biodiversity Museum in this
truly and symbolically central location must be recognized
as both appropriate and laudable. The museum, designed by
the world famous architect Frank Gehry, who has visited
the country for years with his Panamanian wife,4 will be the
architect's first project in Latin America. It will sit on a
spit of land known as "la Calzada de Amador," a tongue of
land created during Canal construction with fill material, at
the Canal's Pacific entrance. 5 The museum's design will
reflect the sinuous curves and organic shapes for which
Gehry is famous, and is to be richly colored in keeping with
its tropical setting. Advance publicity for the Biodiversity
Museum promises that the institution "[i]ntends to reflect
the growing global concern for the environment and conservation, and at the same time explain6 to the world Panama's extraordinary natural patrimony."
2

Robert Condit et al., The Status of the Panama Canal Watershed and

its Biodiversityat the Beginning of the 21st Century, 51 BIOSCIENCE

389 (2001).
3 The

Nature Conservancy, About Panama,
http://www.nature.org/wherewework/centralamerica/panama/work/art 1
9165.html?src=search (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
4 This is only the most recent of many projects Gehry has imagined
for
Panama. See Colin Crawford, Stop the Locks Schlock, Salon.com, Oct.
5, 1999, http://salon.com/people/feature/1999/10/05/panama/print/html
(last visited Oct. 12, 2007) (describing an architect's vision for the
design of the third set of locks on the Panama Canal).
5 Bertilda Herrera, Museo de la Biodiversidad: un Puente de Vida, LA
ESTRELLA PANAMA, Dec. 3, 2007, at D- 1.
6Id. ("Pretende reflejar la creciente preocupaci6n mundial por
el medio
ambiente y su conservaci6n, y a la vez difundir al mundo el extraordinario patrimonio natural de Panami.")
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On the other hand, the effort to build a Biodiversity
Museum in Panama City might be seen as oddly sentimental, a tribute to a value that the country's planners and its
foreign investors do not in fact support. Despite the glamorous attention the subject of biodiversity may garner in the
capital city's waterfront, with its dizzying high-rise growth
and the promise of a larger development of a greenbelt of
which the Biodiversity Museum will be but one feature 7,
urban biodiversity is not receiving the attention and public
concern one would hope for in a country blessed with Panama's biodiversity riches.
This is lamentable in the wake of the transfer of
power for the Panama Canal because even in its most urbanized and densely settled corridor-the stretch of land
surrounding the Canal, from Panama City on the Pacific to
Col6n on the Caribbean side-includes a largely untouched tropical forest, itself rich in biodiversity. These are
part of the so-called "reverted areas" (6reas revertidas)-the
lands returned by the United States government to the Republic of Panama along with the Panama Canal in 1990.'
II.

Panama's Reverted Areas

As a small country in a strategic location, it is impossible to consider the treatment of the reverted areas without
keeping in mind the national policy for management of the
country's major commercial asset, the Panama Canal. This
is especially true considering the environmentally sensitive
reverted areas, which surround this important economic
resource. The future construction of a third set of locks for
7 Urania Cecilia

Molina, Cinta Costera Va, LA PRENSA PANAMA, Mar.
17, 2007, at IA.
8 See Sarah N. Whitney, Will GoalsBe Met? An Examination of ARI's
Generaland Regional Plans With Respect to ProtectedAreas Within
the Inter-OceanicRegion, Panama,in, PROTECTING WATERSHED
AREAS: CASE OF THE PANAMA CANAL 93, 93-94 (Mark S. Ashton,
Jennifer L. O'Hara & Robert D. Hauff, eds., 1999).
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the Canal promises to further damage Panama's biodiversity: "[t]he destruction and fragmentation of some 490
hectares of forests will result in the loss of terrestrial ecosystems, particular species and genetic diversity of flora
and fauna." 9 This is significant because habitat reduction
not only reduces territorial size, but also impairs genetic
diversity and weakens populations. 1° Given that the construction of the third set of locks is now afait accomplil" is
all but more reason to emphasize the importance of protecting the biological riches in the other reverted areas. As
many Panamanian commentators have noted, it is regrettable that the movement, supported by the Panama Canal
Authority and President Martin Torrijos, to build the third
set of locks did not proceed "with the insertion of a national
development plan" 12 that would have, among other factors,
considered long-term environmental sustainability.
a. Extent
The territory constituting reverted areas-returned
to Panama after the departure of the U.S.-controlled Panama Canal Authority in 199013-includes land that is both
public and private, causing extreme protection challenges.
In 1952, 85% of the land in the Panama Canal Watershed
was forested. However, with development, some of this
land has been converted to pasture and agricultural use. By
1993, the government undertook the creation of a system of
9 Fernando Manfredo, Canal de Panamdy Medio Ambiente, 126
TAREAS 103, (May-Aug. 2007) (the author is the ex-Administrator of
the Panama Canal Commission).
10Id.
11 Carmen G. Gonzalez, EnvironmentalImpact Assessment in PostColonialSocieties: Reflections on the ProposedExpansion of the
Panama Canal, 4 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y 303 (2008).
12 Presentaci6n, 123 TAREAS 3, (May-Aug. 2006) (introducing
a series
of articles on the Panama Canal).
13

Id.
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national parks to protect some of this land. As of 1999,
231,000 hectares had "protected status" while slightly less
than half of that was characterized as "protected forest."
One explanation for this differential is that 30% of the land
is privately held, making administration and enforcement
much more difficult. 14 The Canal itself is surrounded by a
swath of land 50 miles long and 10 miles wide, still mostly
untouched, owing both to the creation of the national parks
and because it was under U.S. military control15 and as a
result was not subject to development pressures.
The reverted areas also contain Panama City's Metropolitan Park (Parque Metropolitano), a precious forest
and biodiversity reserve of 190 hectares in the heart of the
city. "Park" is, in this context, a deceptive term, since it
may conjure up the image of an urban oasis that serves
multiple needs-such as recreation, family picnics and
walks on paved trails. In fact, Panama City's Metropolitan
Park consists of largely untouched tropical forest, despite
its location in the heart of the most densely populated area
in the Republic of Panama. The Park alone contains fifty14

Jennifer L. O'Hara, Introduction: The Panama Canal Watershed

Area, in PROTECTING WATERSHED AREAS: CASE OF THE PANAMA
CANAL, 5-6 (Mark S. Ashton, Jennifer L. O'Hara and Robert D. Hauff,
eds., 1999) (noting that the Panamanian decision to privatize the reverted lands dates back to 1993 as the country prepared to assume
control of the Canal lands). See International Monetary Fund, IMF No.
01/41, PANAMA: RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 21, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2001/cr0141 .pdf (last visited
Feb. 11, 2008).
15 Whitney, supra note 8, at 5. These areas constituted an especially
important habitat for migratory birds. See, e.g., Office of the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Security) and the National

Fish and Wildlife Foundation, THE KEY ROLE OF SPECIFIC LANDS IN
THE PANAMA CANAL AREA IN PRESERVING THE VALUE OF PANAMA'S
NATURAL HERITAGE:A REPORT OF THE PARTNERS IN FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP FOR THE PRESERVATION OF MIGRATORY AND
RESIDENT BIRDS, PANAMA CITY, PANAMA, Mar. 14-15 (1996),

http://www.dodpif.org/data/keylands.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2008).
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one different bird species. I6 By way of illustrating the
threats to the park and other reverted areas, it faces the
threat of development and partial or total destructioneither by squatters or by construction for public and private
uses.
The reason for this oddity-a tropical forest amidst
a bustling city-rests in an odd and unintentionally fortuitous legacy of the U.S. presence in Panama. Specifically,
what became the reverted areas were off limits to the Republic of Panama during the colonial control of the Canal
Area, not for biodiversity protection reasons, but to protect
U.S. activities.
a. Development Pressures and a False Economic Choice
As noted elsewhere in this volume, Panama City is
undergoing a real estate boom of epic proportions, one that
threatens to wreak huge social transformations in Panamanian society, if it has not already done SO. 1 7 In at least one
prominent case-that of the Metropolitan Park-this development threatens the integrity and long term values
served by protected areas rich in biodiversity. The Metropolitan Park was the first reverted area of significance.18 In
the early 1980s, a battle began over a highway, the "Northern Corridor" (CorredorNorte) that would run through the
park. This helped mobilize the Panama Audubon Society
(until then primarily a birder's club) and other nascent
environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
16
17

Condit et al., supra note 2, at 393, Table 1.
See, e.g., Eric Rogers, Out with the Old in with the New: Housing

Issues for the Middle Class in Panama City, Panama, 4 TENN. J. L. &
POL'Y 507 (2008).

Interview with Rosabel Mir6, Executive Director, Audubon Society,
Panama, William and Ester Adsett, Board Members, Audubon Society,
and Dionara Viques, Director of the Metropolitan Park (Dec. 12, 2007)
(notes on file with author).
18
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who were ultimately promised a longer road that would not
run through the park and, it was said, benefit more communities. Initially, the NGOs were promised a study that
would examine the impact and best route for new highway
construction. 19 The project was to be financed as a part of
a World Bank highway development project, which included a proposed highway to connect national parks at
Boquete and Cerro Punta. The NGOs subsequently sought
and were promised a law from the National Assembly that
would specify what exactly could and could not be done
with the park.2 1 At the same time, in 1994, the government
sought bids for the construction of a "Southern Corridor"
(Corredor Sur) highway, without specifying the route.

Environmental NGOs, including the Audubon Society,
went to the National Assembly and sought to block the
construction of the Northern Corridor, which would have
run through the Metropolitan Park. They were unsuccessful in this and the highway was built and runs off to one
side of the Metropolitan Park, but entirely within its boundaries: "[t]he first thing anyone knew about the change of
route was when the park guards found surveyors cutting
down trees [in the Metropolitan Park] and laying out the
route for the highway," according to Audubon Society

19 Id. The Panamanian history of promising such studies and not
performing them sadly continues until the present as examined by
Carmen Gonzalez in her study on the Environmental Impact Assessment process-or lack thereof-in the amplification of the Canal. See
Gonzalez, supra note 11.
20 Interview, supra note 18. The World Bank has funded several
highway construction and rehabilitation projects in Panama since the
1980s. See IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (CPL-36860 SCL3686A) ON A LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF $60 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC
OF PANAMA ON A ROADS REHABILITATION PROJECT, http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/200
4/06/25/000090341_2004062510551 1/Rendered/INDEX/28372.txt
(last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
21 See O'Hara, supra note 14.
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representatives. 22 In the words of a former U.S. military
contractor who had been there, before and after the road
went in, it constituted
"an irreversible wound in the middle
23
of the forest.,
This method of the highway's construction provides
a litany of examples of exactly what most laws and proposed protected area management plans seek to avoid.
Trees were felled without consideration of their ecological
value. The principal water source for the park's many
animal species, the Rio Curundfi, was cut off, leaving many
animals to die of thirst. 24 In other words, the project appears to have been driven by purely economic considerations and not by a comprehensive vision of protected areas
as having distinct environmental, social and economic
functions.
Subsequently, the Park management initiated a civil
action against the firm responsible for the construction of
the Northern Corridor, in light of "the loss of land, flora
and fauna", seeking to have the company "mitigate the
harms caused in the Park., 25 This led, in October 1996, to
the signing of an agreement for species conservation, scientific investigation, environmental education and economic
compensation resulting from the damages caused by the
company in the construction of the Northern Corridor.26
Subsequently, in June 1998, the Park management submitted a demand for US $3.44 million, plus interest, in economic compensation. 27 In 2001 and 2005, Panamanian
courts issued decisions in favor of the Park management

22

Id.

23

Letter from Jaqueline Howard to author (May 1, 2008) (on file with

author).
24 Id.

Patronato del Parque Natural Metropolitano, Communicado a la
Ciudadania (Communication to the Citizenry) (on file with author).
25

26
27

Id. at 1.
Id. at 3
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and its demands. 28 Despite further judicial wrangling and
hearings favoring the position of the Park, however, their
financial demands "for the devastation that affects approximately 33 hectares" of Park territory2 9 remains unsatThe sorry saga of the Park management's
isfied.
unsatisfied effort to recover for environmental damage to
this reverted-and protected-area underscores how important it is to prevent such damage from happening, rather
than trying to impose liability after the fact.
In this and other reverted areas, developmentrelated pressures threaten the long-term integrity of protected areas. For example, in 1995, the government reduced tariffs on some imported agricultural goods in an
attempt to enter the World Trade Organization. Some
commentators noted a negative, unsurprising reaction by
the representatives of workers in the agricultural and livestock industries who worried that this would lead to "an
increase in the already elevated number of displaced residents from the interior." 30 At the same time, the InterOceanic Regional Authority (Autoridad Regional Interocednica, or ARI), the entity created specifically to administer the reverted areas, aggressively sought to attract capital
investments to generate employment opportunities in the
reverted areas, to the extent that it appeared to "be evidence
of the Government policy, conscious or not, to promote
accelerated migration in these areas of the Metropolitan
Region of the City of Panama where the pending negative
physical, economic and social effects [to] its population
28

29
30

Id. at 4 and 5.
Implementation, supra note 20.
Alan Smith Waite, Municipio, Modernizaci6nAdministrativay

Desarrollo,in PLANIFCACION DEL DESARROLLO EN PANAMA: ENSAYOS
CRITICOS CONSTRUCTIVOS EN RETROSPECTIVAR, DEL PRESENTE Y DE

PROYECCION FUTURA 41 (2000) ("[C]ontribuird al aumento del nflmero
ya elevado de desocupados residentes en el interior del pais (The Panamanian author worked at the Organization for American States in the
area of housing, development and urban affairs for nearly thirty years.)
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were already considered beyond proposals and solutions.
The consequence would be to contribute "to the increase in

unemployment and underemployment and, as a result, to
poverty." 3 1 As Smith Waite notes, "[e]xcessive rural-urban
migration has been identified by multiple investigative
sources as one of the major economic and social problems
for economies in development." 32 Thus, as elsewhere in
" Id. at 41-42 ("Aquella decisi6n, paralela a la agresiva promoci6n de
la Autoridad Regional Interocednica (ARI) para atraer inversiones de
capital que generan oportunidades de empleos en las ireas a la Regi6n
Metropolitana de la ciudad de PanamA donde su poblaci6n ya considera
insostenibles los efectos fisicos, sociales y econ6micos negativos
pendientes afin de propuestas y soluciones. Estas acciones, fuera de un
amplio marco de referencia nacional, contribuirfin al aumento de
desempleo y subempleo y por consiguiente a la pobreza."). From the
start, despite perfunctory acknowledgements of the importance of
"sustainable development",the ARI's planning was marked by a desire
for intense economic development that appeared aimed principally to
secure immediate capital infusions. See ARI, DEVELOPMENT OF REVERTED AREAS WITH PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION (TC-96-04-2 1),
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum-461260
(last visited Feb. 10, 2008) (stating ARI's focus on "efficient utilization
of the assets and long term job creation"). See also Whitney, supra note
8, at 97 ("ARI's focus is on economic development in the InterOceanic Region... although it also includes natural resources protection as a guiding principle."), Keely B. Maxwell and Christopher J.
Williams, Working Toward Effective Policy Processes in Panama
Canal Watershed National Parks, in Ashton, O'Hara & Hauff, supra
note 14, at 151 (noting the ARI's focus on increasing economic opportunities for an international investment in the reverted areas and concluding that
"[d]evelopment of reverted lands in the Watershed will place
additional pressures on existing protected lands by increasing habitat fragmentation and water consumption."),H. Bradley Kahn, The Prospectsfor Integrated Watershed
Management in the Panama Canal Watershed, id. at 168n
(characterizing the two primary values of the ARI as "wealth
and [the desire to receive institutional] respect.").
32 Alan Smith Waite, Politicasde DesarrolloContradictorias,supra
note 30, at 46 ("La excesiva migraci6n rural-urbano ha side sefialado
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the developing world, ill-considered government policies
that prompted increased urban migration would put special
undeveloped lands, such as Papressure on previously
33
areas.
reverted
nama's
Furthermore, Panamanian commentators feel that
the promises of economic riches said to come with the
construction of the third set of locks for the Panama Canal
will only increase the country's social inequities. Research
"appears to confirm that the extremely optimistic, long
term projections of the ACP [the Panama Canal Authority,
or Autoridad del Canal de Panam] . .will not maintain
this level of dynamism for various reasons." 34 These reasons include, first, the likely decline in the commercial
trade between China and the United States, "which has
been the principal driver of movement through the Canal
for the last decade." 35 Second, global warming threatens to
make trade through previous closed routes-due to icepossible; these routes are preferable since passage through
them will be free.3 6 Third, an increase in the development
of multi-modal shipping in the United States will threaten
the Canal's viability; "this is the Panama Canal's principal
rival with regard to transit coming from Asia in the direction of the East Coast of the United States. 37 How is the
por mfiltiples fuentes investigadoras como uno de los problemas econ6micos y sociales mejores de las economias en desarrollo.").
33This is famously true, for example, in Rio de Janeiro, where remaining sectors of the Atlantic Rainforest are under threat from occupation
by poor migrants. See, e.g. Favelas em expansdojd cercam Parquede
Tijuca [Expanding shantytowns come close to Tijuca National Park], 0
GLOBO, Dec., 19, 2007, at 1.
34 Roberto N. M~ndez, Viabilidadfinancierade un tercerjuego de
esclusas, 123 TAREAS 89, 90 (May-Aug. 2007).
IId. at 90.
36 Id. at 91.
17 Id. "Multi-modal" refers, for example, to the receipt of a cargo ship
in a port like Long Beach, California, that is then broken up into containers that are sent by rail or truck across the North American conti-

nent to the East Coast. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)
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decision to construct a third set of locks related to the efforts to turn reverted areas into protected-and biodiversity-protecting areas? It reveals the need to incorporate
environmental considerations into planning for truly sustainable, long-term economic development. Yet this appears not to have happened.
Moreover, the example of the treatment of the reverted area that became Panama City's Metropolitan Park
and, more generally, of government policies that put pressure on development of the untouched forests surrounding
the Canal, does not bode well for future efforts to manage
reverted areas. It therefore merits identifying some of the
values served by maintaining preserved areas. Part of the
solution for sound future management rests in public education regarding the value of establishing and maintaining
protected areas.
b. Values Served by the Reverted Areas
If a country is poor or developing, it merits asking why
areas should be protected from development. It is not unreasonable to wonder whether even short-term economic
gains may be worth sacrificing the arguable luxury of protected ecosystems. More specifically, one must ask what
exactly it means to have a "protected" area. A protected
area is not necessarily one that is untouchable. It is one for
which there exists a management plan that recognizes the
ecosystem services that make the area deserving of protection, such as the rich biodiversity that characterizes much
of Panama.
In Panama, this biodiversity deserves protection for various reasons, including possible scientific uses of its bio(defining "multimodal shipping" as "The transportation of freight using
more means of carriage and usuing more than one carrier. For example,
a cargo may be carried first by air or sea, then by rail or truck to its

destination.").
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riches in the future. It is conceivable that in the longer term
the intellectual property (and specifically pharmaceutical)
benefits of such areas could prove more powerful sources
of income for a country like Panama than an invasion of
condominium developments or agricultural uses in the
reverted areas. 38 Panama also stands poised to develop
protected areas for carefully managed tourism, as has happened in neighboring Costa Rica.39
In addition, the tropical forests within protected areas like Panama's reverted areas also merit protection because of the essential ecosystem services they provide.
These tropical forests typically serve as carbon sinks.4 °
They are also important repositories of freshwater in areas
where the surface water supplies may be inadequate. 4 1 "The
construction of highways in elevated reservoirs [i.e. tropiSee, e.g., John Copeland Nagle & J.B. Ruhl, THE LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, 27-29 (2002) (discussing the
38

countless benefits of biodiversity in the curing and prevention of diseases and contributions to human health).
39 Id. at 29. (indicating that aesthetic value of beautiful animals and
plants produce economic benefits by attracting ecotourism). On Costa
Rican ecotourism, see, e.g., Katherine Lieberknecht, Jennifer Papazian
and Andrea McQuay, Balancing Conservation and Economics: The
Development of an Ecotourism Planfor Panama,in Ashton, O'Hara &
Hauff, supra note 14, at 111-14.
40 Id. See also, James Salzman, CreatingMarketsfor Ecosystem
Services: Notes From the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 870, 872-73 (2005)
(discussing the critical services provided by healthy ecosystems such as
water purification).
41 See, e.g., Salzman, supra note 40, at 872.
See also Salom6n Aguilar, Bosques de la Cuenca del Canal de Panamd, in Heckadon-Moreno,
supra note 1, at 91-97 ("Ubicados en la parte central y mins angosta del
Istmo, los bosques de la Cuenca del Canal contribuyen gracias a su
ciclo de vida a producir dgua para la via interocedmica y para las plantas
potabilzadores que abastacen de agua a las polaciones de las ciudades
de Panamd y Col6n"). ("Located in the central and narrowest part of the
isthmus, the Canal Watershed's forests contribute thanks to their life
cycle to produce water for the interoceanic waterway and for the potablizing plants that store water for the populations of Panama and Col6n
cities.").
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cal forests that retain water] and land clearing that interferes with drainage and obstructs water movement can
permanently interfere with biological cycles and the productivity of adjacent ecosystems.' 42 In a country like Panama that is prone to flooding and has a low water table,
forests serve the important function of protecting against
the more extreme effects of flooding. 43 It should be emphasized that the importance of this water retention ecosystem service is both social and economic. Water is essential
for Canal operations and the country has staked much of its
future development on Canal expansion. Therefore, destruction of these forests for short-term interests like highway construction is foolhardy.
The forests within the reverted areas also serve as
an important habitat for sustainable food species.44 As
noted above, protected areas also help preserve habitat and
genetic diversity, which helps maintain healthy flora and
fauna populations less susceptible than non-diverse gene
pools to disease and depletion.45
Development in protected areas, particularly in hot,
humid tropical environments with a history of insect-borne
infections like malaria, yellow fever and dengue, can also
have negative consequences for human health: "[g]eneral
operations for the construction of the third set of locks,
roads and drainage canals, construction of encampments,
42

Manfredo, supra note 9, at 105.

43 See James Salzman, Barton H. Thompson, Jr. & Gretchen C. Daily,

ProtectingEcosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 319 (2001) (indicating that heavy vegetation
serves to prevent flooding by reducing peak flows, and discussing the
relationship between watershed preservation and flood control).
44 Id. at 323-25 (describing the significant impacts of deforestation in
Costa Rica and Australia. For instance, due to deforestation, the loss of
native tree cover in Australia has allowed naturally occurring salts in
the soil to rise up to the surface and damage large areas of agricultural
and grazing lands).
45 See also Nagle & Ruhl, supra note 38; See generally, Manfredo,
supra note 9.
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along with other activities, has the potential to increase the
breeding grounds of plagues or illness vectors" such as the
malaria-and dengue-bearing mosquitoes.4 6 An ecosystem
service provided by a tropical forest can act as a damper to
limit the proliferation of environments conducive to healthdamaging pests.
This recognition of the benefits of ecosystem services derives from a perspective that aims to take into account the long-term sustainability of a growing society. As
one Panamanian commentator has written, in a developing
country like Panama, "it is fundamental . . . in terms of
social security and access to adequate protection in front of
labor risks, [to assure] an environment adequate to this end.
Again, this is to prioritize in this case the right of the current and future population to enjoy an extensive and sufficient benefit of ecosystem services that maintain and permit
the enjoyment of life. This is also here to recognize the
'4 7
intrinsic rights to nature and that of all living things.
III.

Legal and Regulatory Protections for the Reverted Areas

There are many models for protected and biodiversity protection areas at both the international and national
levels. The remainder of this section will look at some of
the more prominent examples, including regional models
that could be easily adapted to the Panamanian reality.
a. Global Biodiversity and Protected Area
Regulation
At a global level, there are numerous instruments
designed to promote biodiversity protection. The best
46

Manfredo, supra note 9, at 105.

47 Juan Jovan6, Hacia una estrategiaalternativade desarrollo,TAR-

EAS 78, May-Aug. 2007.
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known of these is the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity ("CBD"), which was signed and opened for ratification at the decennial U.N. Convention on Environment and
Development, in Rio de Janeiro, in 1992.48 The CBD creates an umbrella framework for biodiversity protection,
including a requirement for research and training (Article
12), Technology Transfer (Article 18) and the creation of a
Financial Mechanism to assist state parties in preservation
activities. 4 9 The companion protocol, namely the Cartagena Protocol for Biosafety, 50 although more specifically
designed to address issues such as genetically-modified
organisms and their legal treatment, also has provisions to
address capacity-building (Article 22), public awareness
and participation (Article 23) and contains its own financial
mechanism. All of these provisions might have the result
of benefiting biodiversity and protected areas as well.5'
Panama signed the CBD in June, 1992, and became a party
in 1995 with ratification; it signed the Cartagena Protocol
in 2001 and became a party with ratification in 2003.52
The World Heritage Convention ("WHC"), adopted
by the United Nations Education, Cultural and Scientific
Organization in 1972, protects both "cultural and natural
heritage around the world considered to be of outstanding
48

Philippe Sands and Paolo Galizzi,

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL

691-92 (2004).

49 The text of the Convention is available at
http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml (last visited Apr. 13,
2008).
50 The Cartagena Protocol was opened for signature on January 29,
2000. Background on the Cartagena Protocol available at
http://www.cbd.int/biosafety/background.shtml (last visited Apr. 13,
2008).
51 The Text of the Protocol is available at
http://www.cbd.int/biosafety/protocol.shtmIl (last visited on Apr. 13,

2008).

List of parties for both documents available at
http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list.shtml (last visited Apr. 13,
52

2008).
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value to humanity. 53 Panama ratified its participation in
the WHC in March, 1978. 54 The World Heritage List, a
document issued pursuant to the WHC, contains five Panamanian sites, three of them natural sites (none of the
55
natural sites are in the Panama City metropolitan area.)
Like the CBD, the WHC exists in part to encourage education and what is today called capacity-building to insure the
preservation of listed sites. 56 However, despite efforts to
argue that the WHC or other such international instruments
could present a promising option to increase international
biodiversity monitoring,57 at present most commentators
seem to agree that because this and similar international
accords have no teeth and the pressures to develop many
protected areas rich in biodiversity are now so powerful,
these documents offer little in the way of guaranteed gains
in biodiversity and protected areas conservation. 8 This
work makes clear that there is no reason to think that they
will effectively change behavior worldwide, except perhaps
in individual cases.
One way in which international instruments have
been hugely effective, however, is in shaping national legislation about biodiversity protection that is enforceable at
the state level. The potential importance of this tool cannot
be underestimated.
53

About World Heritage, http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/ (last visited

Apr. 13, 2008).
54 States Parties: Ratification Status,
http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2008).
55 See http://whc.unesco.org/en/list (last visited Apr. 13,
2008).
56 See About World Heritage supra note
53.
57 John Charles Kunich, World Heritage in Dangerin the Hotspots,
78
IND. L.J. 619 (2003) (arguing that "[t]he World Heritage Convention
could become an effective tool in the struggle to save the Earth's biodiversity, given the right concatenation of circumstances and decisions.")
58 See, e.g., Alexander Gillespie, ThreatenedAreas of International
Significance, 22 N.Z.U. L. REV. 432 (2007) (survey of increasing
biodiversity protection threats and failures of international instruments), Kunich, supra note 1.

69

4:2

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

217

b. Panamanian Law: Existing Instruments
and Protections
Panama benefits from a number of legal protections
that stand to serve the country. However, laws on paper are
not enough; a significant portion of Panama's citizens and
their allies need be mobilized to enforce Panamanian law,
regulation and policy.
i. Constitutional Protections.
Like many countries in Latin America of relatively
recent vintage, Panama's 1978 Constitution (amended in
1983, 1994 and 2004) contains a chapter dedicated to the
environment. The chapter does more than merely guarantee as a "fundamental right that the population live in a
clean environment free from contamination, in which the
air, water and food satisfy the requirements for adequate
development for human life," although it does that.59 More
importantly for the purposes of this paper, it also provides
that "[t]he State and all of the inhabitants of the national
territory have the right to enjoy social and economic development that prevents environmental contamination, maintains ecological equilibrium and avoids the destruction of
ecosystems. ' 6° The other two articles in the chapter pro-

59 Constituci6n Politica de la Rep6blica de Panami, Ch. 7, Art. 118.
("Es deberfindamentaldel Estadogarantizarque la poblaci6n viva en
un ambiente sanoY libre de contaminaci6n,en donde el aire, el agua Y
los alimentos satisfagan los requerimientos del desarrolloadecuado de
la vida humana," available at the Political Database of the Americas,
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Panama/constitucion2004.pd
f (last accessed October 11, 2008)
60 Id. at Art. 119. "'ElEstado y todos los habitantes del territorio nacional tienen el deber de propiciar un desarrollo social y econ6mico que
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vide that the State shall assure access to environmental
resources for all in such a way that avoids their destruction
and sustainability 6 1 and also requires that the law of nonnot create social, economic and
renewable natural resources
62
harms.
environmental
These are powerful tools if applied intelligently and
deliberately to the resolution of particular conflicts.
Among these conflicts is the proper treatment of the reverted areas. In the first instance, the guarantee to protect
ecosystems would apply to the reverted areas since they
constitute biodiversity "hotspots ' 63 and would surely satisfy any definition of ecosystem. By this measure, the
construction of the Northern Corridor Highway may have
constituted a constitutional violation, providing the loss of
habitat, wildlife and tree species alleged by Audubon and
related groups could be established to a satisfactory level of
legal proof. In short, this constitutional provision is the
essential starting point for any protected areas or biodiversity protection action in Panama.

prevenga la contaminaci6n del ambiente, mantenga el equilibrio ecol6,ico y evite la destrucci6n de los ecosistemas."
Id. at Art. 120. "El Estado reglamentard ... las medidas necesarias
para garantizar que la utilizaci6n y el aprovechamiento de la fauna
terrestre, fluvial y marina, asi como los bosques, tierras y aguas, se
lleven a cabo racionalmente, de manera que se evite su depredaci6n y
se asegure su preservaci6n, renovaci6n y permanencia."
62 Id. at Art. 121. La ley reglamentard el aprovechamiento de los recursos naturales no renovables, a fin de evitar que del mismo se deriven
perjuicios sociales, econ6micos y ambientales."
63 See Kunich, supra note 1.
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ii. National Environmental Laws
1. Law 23 of 2003: "Special
Treatment Areas"
Law 23 of 2003 modified Law 21 of 1997, which
had established a special development zone for the former
Canal Zone. Law 23 is relevant for the reverted areas because it created "special treatment areas" for designated
development within the former Canal Zone. This can include, for example, "urban and cultural resources areas"
and "tourist and eco-tourist areas." Although Law 23 is not
specific about what these terms mean, it does at least identify them as worthy (if competing) values and provides for
a procedure to seek such designations. 64 At a minimum,
what this suggests is that the reverted areas might be usefully selected as meriting an eco-tourist designation, which
could provide a usable framework for development that
would preserve some of the ecosystem values of the reverted areas but also provide a bulwark against pressures to
develop for other uses. The fact, however, that Law 79
provides the opportunity for special "urban" uses reflects
how immediate this conflict is for Panama, although Law
21, which this law amends,
includes "green urban areas" as
65
category.
urban
one

64 Law 79 of 2003, "CONCEPTO: El concepto de drea de tratamiento
especial sobrepuesto se aplicard en las dreas con usos del suelo regulados por esta Ley, que permite la flexibilidad del sistema para analizar
oportunidades de desarrollo en dreas especificas del Plan Regional para
el Desarrollo de la Regi6n Interoceinica."
65 Law 21 of 1997, Annex I, Part II (Categorias de Ordenamiento
Territorial).
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2. Law 41 of 1998: Framework Legislation Including
Provision for Protected Areas
Panama's framework national environmental policy
also enumerates protection for protected areas. Law 48 of
1998, which also created the national environmental agency
and requires national environmental planning and the preparation of environmental impact statements, 66 addresses
protected areas and biodiversity protection in the context of
a statutory title dedicated to natural resources protection
and use. Although this is not uncommon-indeed, many
U.S. states do exactly this-it is arguably unfortunate,
because the commitments to protection are juxtaposed with
provisions devoted to resource exploitation, creating an
inherent conflict that is difficult to resolve. Thus, the natural resource chapter sets forth as its "objective the desire to
incorporate the concept of sustainability and rationality in
the enjoyment of natural resources, as well as to assure that
environmental protection shall be a permanent component
of the policy and administration of such resources., 67 A
desire to do something, of course, amounts to less than a
guarantee that it will be done.
Nonetheless, Law 48 does create a National System
of Protected Areas, which can exist on either public or
private land.6 8 Law 48 at least contemplates, whether
through law, regulation or decree, the creation of such areas
with a special emphasis on the use of economic incentives
66 Titles III and IV of Law 48 of 1998.
67 The

original sentence reads in full: "Las normas sobre recursos
naturales contenidas en la presente Ley, tienen el objetivo de incorporar
el concepto de sostenibilidad y el de racionalidad en el aprovechamiento de los recursos naturales, asi como asegurar que la protecci6n del
ambiente sea un componente permanente en la politica y administraci6n de tales recursos." Law 48 of 1998, Tit. V, Ch. I, Art. 62.
68 See Arts. 66 and 68 of Law 48.
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and financial incentives to do so. 6 9 To be sure, the formal
creation of such a system of protected areas is a step in the
right direction. As intimated here, however, such a system
would likely have greater integrity if, as in the Dominican
and Brazilian examples discussed below, the law actually
detailed the nature of the system and the areas it created.
Ideally, it should do so not in a framework environmental
protection law but in a freestanding law dedicated to protected areas only. As it is, Law 48 sandwiches protected
areas between chapters dedicated to natural resource use
and forest management; this arguably suggests a weak
national commitment to special protected areas. In short,
while Law 48 represents a useful foundational commitment
to protected area creation, the law's special protected areas
provision needs to be further detailed and elaborated with
norms capable of being enforced.
3. Law 21 of 1997: Development Plan for InterOceanic Region
Law 21 of 1997, which creates the authority to plan
for the use, conservation and development of the InterOceanic Area (the former Canal Zone), including the reverted areas, is something of a mixed bag for environmental protection. The initial paragraphs of Law 21 focus
primarily on economic development, although this must be
done "in accordance with principles of efficiency, equity
and social justice." 70 Only in the final paragraph of the
introductory section does Law
21 express a commitment to
"sustainable development." 71
On the other hand, Law 21 provides that the reverted areas shall be understood as public lands that may
69

70

71

See, e.g., Arts. 68 and 71 of Law 48.
Law 21 of 1997, 2.
Id. at 8.
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not be appropriated for private use. This provides a legal
basis for opposing the private concession that benefited
from the construction of the Northern Corridor. That is, the
concession should be scrutinized to ensure that it does not
become a profit center for a private entity, which could
constitute a misuse of this provision protecting public
lands.
More importantly, Law 21 creates named "wild protected areas" that include the Metropolitan Park of Panama
City-the particular reverted area of focus here. The section of Law 21 treating this and other "wild protected areas" specifically provides that the Metropolitan Park shall
be preserved to provide more opportunities for the population to enjoy "open air" and opportunities for "guided recreation., 72 At the same time, Law 21 provides for the
"demarcation of the servitudes necessary for the proposed
routes as well as the corresponding [needs] for the necesOnce again, Panamanian environsary public services.
mental law evidences a strong tension between a desire to
develop reverted areas and recognition of the need to protect them.
In sum, while the Panamanian Constitution and
some environmental laws contain provisions that could be
used in support of claims favoring the protection of the
reverted areas, they could be strengthened by yet more
explicit protections. This lack of clarity has been a concern
since the reversion of the Canal areas to Panama.74 However, one need not look far within Latin America to identify
strong legal examples that could usefully serve as models
for Panama.

72 Law 21 of 1997, Annex I (Areas Silvestres Protegidas).
73 Id.
74 Whitney, supra note 8, at 104 (commenting that the ARI's "plans

lack specificity and clarity about how the natural protection efforts will
be implemented and evaluated.").
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Comparative Look: Locating Panamanian Protected Areas Legislation in a Regional Context

As a relatively small country, Panama might do
well to look to the examples of laws and regulations implemented elsewhere in its region. The national examples
below might serve the Panamanian nation well by virtue of
the fact that they were drafted in light of environmental,
social and economic conditions comparable to Panama's.
In particular, each of the national laws described below
were produced by nations rich in biodiversity, marked by
extreme social and economic inequality and facing severe
pressures of urbanization and agricultural development.
a.

Brazil

Like Panama, Brazil is a country that is highly forested and possessed of rich biodiversity. Its National System of Conservation Units ("SNUC" is the Portuguese
acronym for "Sistema Nacional das Unidades de Conserva9ao") was enacted into law in 2000.75 The law is a model
of the form since it seeks to balance the widest possible
range of human interventions into environmentally sensitive areas, including human intervention for economic
development, 76 as Panamanian Law 21 apparently seeks to
do 77 . As such, SNUC provides a detailed scheme that
would usefully serve Panama as it seeks to more precisely
define in law the needs its environmental laws seek to balance.

75 Lei No. 9,985 de 2000.
76

SNUC's various categories are discussed in exhaustive detail in

Colin Crawford and Guilherme Pignataro, The Insistent (and Unrelenting) Challenges of ProtectingBiodiversity in Brazil: Finding "the Law
That Sticks, " 39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv 1 (2007).
77 Supra notes 70-74.
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b. Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic, like many lessindustrialized countries with a high incidence of biodiversity, enacted a comprehensive protected areas law that
permits a wide range of uses. Enacted in 2000, this law
permits some of the goals implied in Panama's environmental laws-namely human activity for economic development, but in a strictly controlled and highly regulated
fashion. 78 The sort of detailed scheme in the Dominican
law could easily be copied and adjusted to the specifics of
Panamanian ecology and society. The great advantage is
that it would provide a clear scheme that balances different
demands but also clearly commits areas such as the Metropolitan Park, already designated for special protection, 79 to
protection under detailed terms and specific requirements.
For example, the Dominican framework law follows a
schematic model first introduced by the International Union
for the Conservation of Nature ("IUCN"), first in the late
1970s, and refined into the 1990s. The IUCN taxonomy
...identifies six possible categories of protected
area, embracing a wide range of possible social,
economic and cultural aspects. IUCN Category I
affords the highest possible degree of protection
for scientific research, and demands a minimum of
human intervention. Category II refers to national
parks, whether merited for environmental protection or for human use and enjoyment over time.
Category II protects national monuments, and spe78 Colin Crawford, ProtectingEnvironmentally-Sensitive Areas and

PromotingTourism in "The Back Patio of the United States ": Thoughts about SharedResponsibilities in Ecosystem and BiodiversityProtection
25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. 41, 64-82 (2007) (discussing the

Dominican framework law in detail).
79

Interview, supra note 18.
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cifically 'areas that may contain one or more natural, specific features that may have an outstanding
or unique value, owing to their intrinsic rarity,
their representative aesthetic qualities or cultural
significance.' Category IV protects wildlife habitat.8"
The Dominican law further elaborates upon and adjusts
these categories to the Dominican reality. The important
point to stress here is that strong, comprehensive models
exist that can easily and appropriately be adapted for use in
Panama.
c. Colombia
Of course, having model statutes is only half the
battle. As Brazilians say, it is also important to find the law
that "sticks"' 81. This is possible only with vigorous enforcement. The continuing deforestation of the Brazilian
Amazon demonstrates the challenges facing 82the effective
application of its system of conservation units.
One regional model for serving the larger goals of
protected area creation and maintenance in a country with 83a
high rate of biodiversity can be identified in Colombia.
Like Panama, Colombia's environmental laws are not as
highly articulated as those in some other South American
or Caribbean countries like Brazil and the Dominican Republic. However, recent challenges in the Colombian

8

o No.21, Gaceta Oficial, 2 July 1997.
Crawford, supra note 78.
82 See, e.g., Leonardo Coutinho & Jose Edward, Reporte Especial,
81 See

Amaz6nia: A Verdade Sobre a Saade da Floresta,VEJA, Mar. 26,
2008, at 95, 101 (reporting an increase in deforestation of 30% "in
recent months").
13INSTRUMENTOS ENCONOMICOS PARA LA GESTION AMBIENTAL
EN
COLOMBIA.
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courts reveal the power of citizens to enforce what environmental laws exist--even with relatively small resources.
In August 2006, the Public Interest Law Group at
the University of the Andes ("GDIP", for "Grupo de Derecho de Interns Pfiblico"), in Bogotd, formed an alliance
with an environmental group, the Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense (Asociaci6n InterameriThe groups
cana para la Defensa del Ambiente).
subsequently brought a case in the Colombian Constitutional Court, alleging constitutional violations of the national forestry law. 84 Specifically, the non-profit groups
insisted that the law be enforced to serve the goals of a
clean environment and sustainable development. They
were subsequently supported in their lawsuit by other civil
society groups, notably those representing indigenous and
The lawsuit also had an
Afro-Colombian populations.
environmental justice goal, namely the need to consult with
indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups residing in the
forests. 85 On January 23, 2008, the Constitutional Court
Law 1021 Apr. 20, 2006, D.O. on Apr. 24. In the part that was
eventually challenged as not being enforced constitutionally, Law 1021
provided that the actions to stop deforestation and the illegal cutting of
forests, also as a way to promote the sustainable development of the
forestry sector, should be adopted and executed in a joint and coordinated manner by the State, civil society and the productive sector,
tending therein to assure equal access to resources and their integrated
use, within a framework of the basic requirements for conservation of
ecosystems and their diversity. (Las acciones para detener la deforestaci6n y la tala ilegal de los bosques, asi como para promover el desarro1lo sostenible del sector forestal, deberdn ser adoptadas y ejecutadas de
manera conjunta y coordinada entre el Estado, la sociedad civil y el
sector productivo, propendi~ndose al acceso equitativo a los recursos y
a su aprovechamiento integral, en el marco de los requerimientos
bAsicos para la conservaci6n de los ecosistemas y su diversidad biol6gica.)http://www.lexbase.biz/lexbase/normas/leyes/2006/L 1021 de2006.
html (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
85 GDIP website, Summary on high impact litigation
http://gdip.uniandes.edu.co/contenido/litigio.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2008).
84
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declared Law 1021 of 2006-the Forestry Lawunconstitutional, in light of the "recognition of ethnic and
cultural diversity as a constitutional and fundamental principle of Colombian nationality." Moreover, the Court said
that Colombia is by definition "a democratic, participatory
and pluralistic State and it is established with finality that
the state is to facilitate the participation of everyone in the
86
decisions that affect them."
Even for a relatively small nation like Panama,
where civil society groups typically operate with limited
funds, this Colombian example is promising since it provides a successful model-in a neighboring and historically
connected country--of a constitutional challenge to a law
affecting the environment that served socially and environmentally positive ends. 87 The Panamanian Constitution
protects every citizen against ecosystem damage. 88 The
Colombian example suggests just how effective a tool such
a protection might be in the face of future challenges to
develop reverted areas like the Northern Corridor project, 89
when linked to provisions like those creating "special
treatment areas" under Panamanian Law 23 of 2003.90

86Presidencyof the Colombian ConstitutionalCourt, COMMUNICADO
DE PRENSA No. 01 de 2008 ("reconocimiento de la diversidad 6tnica y

cultural como principio constitucional y fundamento de la nacionalidad
colombiana.... define a Colombia como un Estado democrdtico,
participativo y pluralista ..... que establece como finalidad del estado
la de facilitar la participaci6n de todos en las decisiones que los afectan; ....
")(on file with author).
87 See, e.g., Press Release, Lucia Lasso, Executive Director
of the
Alianza para la Conservaci6n y Desarrollo (ACD), Situaci6n Actual del
Proyecto Hidroel6ctrico Chan-75: construcci6n avanza gracias a la
fuerza policial y no al didlogo (2008) (protesting at the lack of inclusion of affected indigenous communities in the construction of a major
hydroelectric plant) (on file with author).
88 See Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblica de Panamd, Ch. 7, Art. 119.
89 See Interview, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
90 See No. 21, Gaceta Oficial, 2 July 1997, supra note 80.
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V.

Conclusion: Prospects for Preserving the Reverted Areas

In sum, the above examples provide regional models for enhancing and strengthening Panama's legal mechanisms to defend the Metropolitan Park in Panama City and
other reverted areas, and in the process to protect biodiversity. These examples come from countries that are similarly situated to Panama both with regard to the range and
importance of their biodiversity and also with respect to
many of their social and economic challenges. However,
as the above example from Colombia suggests, it is not
sufficient merely to have efficient laws on the books. It is
also important to strengthen capacity in civil society to
exploit available legal protections, as was imaginatively
done by GDIP in Bogoti. The Study Space visit that gave
rise to this paper suggests that this possibility exists in
Panama. 91 Furthermore, it is essential to educate the public
within and outside Panama about the importance of preserving protected areas and biodiversity in the crossroads of
the Americas. A Biodiversity Museum is a fine idea and
may itself serve an important environmental educational
role, but the real exhibits should be protected outside the
walls of a fantastic Frank Gehry creation.
In closing, therefore, having noted the need to enhance and deepen the reach of Panamanian environmental
laws, it merits iteration of justifications and strategies for
assuring protection of the environmentally valuable reverted areas within Panama.
a. Justifications

91See Lasso, supra note 87 (referring to the efforts of the Patronato del
Parque Metropolitano and the non-profit ACD).

81

4:2

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

229

Two central justifications exist that support the argument to commence vigorous efforts to protect Panamanian reverted areas.

i. Ecosystem Services
As noted above, there are many values and functions served by ecosystems, 92 In Panama, they serve both
broader environmental health goals, such as genetic diversity, and shorter-term human health goals, such as protecting water quality. Thus, for example, in Panama this means
providing the water supply essential to both urban residents
and Canal operations and, thus, assuring the nation's economic stability in the future. In the case of Panama, in fact,
an irony of the U.S. military occupation of the Canal Zone
is that it left much of the surrounding forests, and their
ecosystem services, largely intact. That is, however much
suffering the U.S. occupation may have wrought, the presence of the colonial power resulted in an unexpected environmental bonus. 93 Consequently, before it is too late and
these relatively pristine areas undergo further development
for urban or agricultural use, there is an urgent need to
recognize and seek to protect the potential economic benefits contained within the reverted areas. These benefits
exist in the form of patentable products to be developed
from rainforest plant and animal matter. As the examples
of the laws of Brazil and the Dominican Republic demonstrate, well-crafted laws are an important starting point to
help secure those goals. However, comprehensive laws
92

See Nagle, supra notes 38-40, Salzman, supra notes 40-41, Agvilar,

supra note 41, Manfredo, supra note 42, Salzman, supra notes 43-44.
93 Bruce A. Stein, Cameron Scott, & Nancy Benton, FederalLands
and EndangeredSpecies: The Role of Military and OtherFederal
Lands in SustainingBiodiversity, 54 BIOSCIENCE 339 (2008) (noting

that a recent geographic survery of U.S. military lands noted the exceptionally high biodiversity on U.S. military lands).
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detailing essential environmental values are not enough.
The application of legal provisions must also be linked to a
sustained commitment to the social and economic implications of environmental protection decisions for the entire
society. Environmental justice principles provide an analytical framework to do so.
ii. Environmental Justice
Given Panama's history, it is essential to understand
the creation and maintenance of protected areas and biodiversity protection as serving the broader interest of all segments of Panamanian society to truly assure "the adequate
development of human life."94 Equality of opportunity and
quality of life have not been characteristic features of
Panamanian history. 95 First, the Pacific coast proved more
attractive to foreign powers, whether Spanish, French or
North American. "Historically, the Spaniards left the wet
forests and swamps of the Caribbean to the Indian and
Black communities." 96 They preferred to settle, instead, in
the "drier central highlands and the Pacific coast," thus
97
creating an ethnically and racially heterogeneous mix.

94

See Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblica de Panamd, Ch. 7, Art. 118.

Available at the Political Database of the Americas,
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Panama/constitucion2004.
vdf (last accessed October 11, 2008).
See, e.g., Consejo Acadrmico de la Universidad de Panamd, Tareas
sobre la marcha: Reflecci6n en torno de la coyuntura, in 123 TAREAS,
122 (May-Aug. 2006) (describing modest gains for some economic
sectors through education since beginning of Panamanian republic, now
imperiled by global capitalism).
96 Stanley Heckadon-Moreno, Spanish Rule, Independence, and the
Modern Colonization Frontiers,in CENTRAL AMERICA: A NATURAL
AND CULTURAL HISTORY
97 id.

179 (Anthony G. Coates, ed. 1997).
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This mixture, however, was one characterized by great
social and economic inequality that persists to this day.
In Panama, the historic inequality in the distribution
of economic benefits and environmental burdens has been
especially characteristic of the manipulation of the environment in and around the Canal. The Canal became reality with the obliteration of several towns submerged by the
creation of Lake Gatfin. 99 Early Canal workers suffered
high rates of morbidity and mortality because of malaria
and yellow fever. 100 With the eradication of yellow fever
in 1905, workers came from around the world, although
with distinctly different privileges. North Americans arrived to be paid in U.S. currency up to three times the salaries earned by other workers, while islands like Barbados
supplied tens of thousands of mostly Afro-Caribbean workers to do the heavy lifting.' 0 1 These workers were housed
in "deplorable" accommodations, poorly fed and badly
paid:
In sum, the North Americans organized in the
Canal Zone a society based on racial discrimination in an imitation of that which ruled in the
southern United States. As a consequence, the
services and the facilities of white Americans
were prohibited to blacks, who remained mar-

98 See, e.g., Benjamin Gardner, Mutual Incomprehension or Selective
Inattention? CreatingCapacityfor Public Participationin Natural
Resource Management in Panama,in Ashton, O'Hara and Hauff, supra

note 14, at, 137 (reporting extreme income stratification in Panama by
early 1970s), CIA, The World Factbook-Panama,

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/print/pm.html (documenting that the highest 10% of household incomes have 35.7% of national wealth while lowest 10% have
1.2% of national wealth).
99 Celestino Andr~s Ara-dz, Un sueho de siglos: el Canal de Panamd,
123 TAREAS 5, 33 (May-Aug. 2006).
' Id. at 30.
101Id.
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the life of the
ginalized from the activities and
10 2
roll.'
"gold
the
on
white men
David McCullough, the Canal's popular historian,
estimated that there were 500 deaths per kilometer along
the 80 kilometer Canal route.1 0 3 Of these, during the period
of North American control, it is estimated that of 5,609
By contrast, only
deaths, 4,500 were of African descent.
04
1
died.
Americans
350 white North
This is a heavy toll and is appropriately classified as
an environmental justice issue since it related to acts of
great environmental consequence for all Panamanians, with
disproportionate burdens suffered by the most vulnerable
segments of the population. 10 5 This historical burden demands consideration of future manage of the environmental
resources in and around the Canal. The long-term consequences of that history should be redressed by implementing environmental protection strategies benefitting all
Panamanians. An added difficulty, however, is that for
many years, Panamanian sovereignty was tied to acts that
102

Id. at 35 ("En definitiva, los norteamericanosorganizaronen la

Zona del Canaluna sociedadbasada en la discriminaci6ny la segregacin racialesa imitaci6n de lo que imperaba en el sur de los Estados
Unidos. En consecuencia, los servicios e instalacionesde los blancos
estadounidenses estaban vedados para los negros, que permanecian
marginadosde las actividadesy de la vida de los hombres de gold
roll.")
103See generally David McCullough, PATH BETWEEN THE SEAS:
THE
CREATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL, 1870-1914 (1978).
104 Supra Lasso note 87.
105See Principles of Environmental Justice, proceedings, The First
NationalPeople of Color Environmental Leadership Summit xiii (Oct.
24-27, 1992), in Clifford Rechtschaffen & Eileen Gauna, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY & REGULATION 22-24 (2002) (for one
early list defining environmental justice principles); See, e.g., THE
LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO
ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS (Sheila Foster & Michael B.

Gerrard, eds. 2d. ed. 2008) (discussing environmental justice generally).
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sought to control and manage the tropical forest, specifi10 6
cally through forest clearing and agrarian expansion.
Perhaps partly as a consequence, environmental protection
strategies that would protect the forests are now often
viewed by the poorest actors in the agrarian sector as
107
strategies to keep them impoverished.
Yet as a former Panamanian official of the U.S.
controlled Panama Canal Commission, which preceded the
Panamanian-controlled Panama Canal Authority, wrote
about the use of the Panama-operated Canal: "[w]e must
demand of those who, at present govern and make laws
affecting us, that the funds coming from the operation of
the Canal must be destined to projects that will better the
condition of all Panamanians. ' 08 The same must be said
of the management of biodiversity conservation and preservation within the reverted areas. Just as the Canal provides direct economic resources to the Panamanian treasury
in the form of transit fees that should be used for the benefit
of all, so too the reverted areas should be recognized for the
economic resource they are to Panama-resources that
should be protected and used intelligently for the benefit of
all Panamanian people.
b. Strategies and Possibilities
The question, then, is how best to assure the protection and sound management of the protected areas. That is,
how should the discussion about use of ecosystem resources proceed? How can the organizing principle of
106 Gardner, supra note 98, at 135.
107 Heckadon-Moreno, supra note

96, at 212.

108
Humberto R. Legnadier, Retos al Canal de Panamd, 123 TAREAS

55, 59 (May-Aug. 2006) ("Debemos exigirles a los que, en elpresente,
nos gobiernany legislan, que losfondosprovenientes de la operaci6n
del Canal sean destinados a proyectos que mejoran la condici6n de
todos los panameos").
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environmental justice be secured? At least three strategies
can be identified.
i. Education
Environmental education is of central importance.
This principle has been articulated at the international level
in instruments like the Convention on Biological Diversity10 9 and, within Latin America, in instruments like the
Brazilian" 0 and Colombian Constitutions."' Such provisions are an important step towards assuring protection of
the reverted areas and other environmentally sensitive
lands, but they are not enough. These provisions need to be
fleshed out to include detailed education about the functions and values of ecosystems, so that the population understands that preserving protected areas is not merely a
109 Convention on Biological Diversity, Art. 13,
http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml (last visited Apr. 17,

2008).
110 Article 79 of the 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Colombia
provides, in relevant part, that "[i]t is the obligation of the State to
protect the diversity and integrity of the environment, to conserve areas
of special ecological importance and support education for the
achievement of these ends." ("Es deber del Estadoproteger la diversidad e integridaddel ambiente, conservarlas dreas de especial importancia ecolgicayfomentar la educaci6npara el logro de estos
fines."), available in the Political Database of the Americas of Georgetown University,
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Colombia/col91.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2008).
1 Article 225 § VI of the 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic
of Brazil provides that all people have the right to "an environment in
equilibrium," achieved in part by "promoting environmental education
at all levels of study and raising the consciousness of the public for the
preservation of the environment.") (". . .promovera educaqdo
ambiental em todos os niveis de ensino e a conscientizaqdopzblica
para a preservaqdodo meio ambiente.... ."), available at the Political
Database of the Americas of Georgetown University,
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Brazilibrazil05.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2008).
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matter of providing the relative luxury of an urban oasis for
recreation. 112 Examples of environmental education in
Panama exist that are both noteworthy and exciting in their
potential for replication.1 13 The point is that there exists
value in systematizing and institutionalizing these activities
at the national level, and to begin to do so in Panama City,
with the highest population concentration in the country
and thus, arguably, the greatest immediate threat to biodiversity protection. However, this must be done by recognizing and taking into account the historical class and other
social divisions of a "highly stratified society in which
policy decisions are most responsive to values and demands
articulated by its wealthy and politically powerful
classes." ' 1 4 In short, there are considerable obstacles to
overcome in achieving a situation where there is informed
115
public participation based on mutual trust.
ii. Public Participation
Broad-based public participation, following upon
the heels of historically informed and socially aware environmental education is also essential. This will mean implementing a process that includes all stakeholders affected
by a proposal in the process of deciding how a reverted
area (or a particular resource existing within it) is to be
112

See Nagle, supra notes 38-40, Salzman, supra notes 40-4 1, Agvilar,

supra note 41, Manfredo, supra note 42, Salzman, supra notes 43-44.
1 See, e.g., Jorge Ventocilla & Valkrio Nfifiez, Experiencias de
educaci6n ambientalen Kuna Yala, in Heckadon-Moreno, supra note 1,
at 228-32 (describing an environmental education project of the
Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute in Caribbean coast indigenous
settlement), Loyda E. Sdnchez, Rosabel Mir6, Rosa Montaftez & Norita
Scott-Pezet, CONSTRUYENDO UNA EXPERIENCIA PARTICIPATIVA DE
CONSERVACION 67-68 (2007) (describing one portion of a community
participation program in monitoring for Panama Bay).
114 Gardner, supra note 98, at
137.
115Maxwell & Williams, supra note 31, at 159 (describing
difficulties
in establishing community participation in Panama).
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used. As shown elsewhere in this volume, that principle of
public participation is not one that has always been widely
supported in Panama." 16 Such participation is an essential
first step to insure that reverted areas are protected in a way
that benefits all Panamanians. To guarantee long-term use
beneficial to all, participation needs to be incorporated into
an elaborated management scheme like those in the cited
South American and Caribbean laws described above. The
process of participation needs, furthermore, to incorporate
education about the economic and environmental value of
protected areas.
In this, the discipline of ecological economics could
prove of vital use to Panama. As the ecological economists
explain, the discipline is a "transdisciplinary way of looking at the world ... essential if we are to achieve the three

interdependent goals of ecological economics," namely
"sustainable scale, fair distribution, and efficient allocation."1 17 In other words, sophisticated metrics exist both to
value and defend the creation of protected areas and biological diversity. The use of such metrics will make it
possible to avoid the suggestion that the environment is a
luxury available only to the rich. They can also be applied
to help explain to a population that environmental protection of spaces like the reverted areas is a necessity for all.
The remaining question is how to link these goalthat is, how to tie the effort to secure broad public participation to a deeply informed, inter-disciplinary analytical
framework for understanding environmental problems.
One possibility would be a participatory technique comparable to the participatory budgeting used in southern Brazil
and copied elsewhere.118 The idea is simple: to establish an
116Gonzalez, supra note 11, at 321-33.
117 Robert

Costanza, John Cumberland, Herman Daly, Robert Goodland

& Richard Norgaard, AN INTRODUCTION TO ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
79 (St. Lucie Press 1997).
118
See, e.g. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, ParticipatoryBudgeting in
PortoAlegre: Toward a RedistributiveDemocracy, in Boaventura
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organized system of social administration that gives communities at small, manageable levels the power to participate in the articulation and implementation of strategies to
address the social challenges they face. A central feature of
such participatory budgeting is to assure such grassroots
participation at the outset of the decision making process,
so that local decisions actually contribute to the final actions taken by larger units of social organization-whether
cities, states or national governments. In this way, the
participation is truly democratic. Such a model could be
used, similarly, for participatory ecosystem management.
iii. Financial Support
As a small country with limited financial resources,
Panama cannot do this alone. Therefore, financial assistance is crucial. One means to provide assistance is
through international legal mechanisms. Indeed, one would
be hard pressed to find a more compelling example demanding United States participation in the CBD than Panama. As the principal creator and beneficiary of the area's
principal economic resource for over the last hundred
years, the U.S. bears a continuing financial obligation to
help protect the biological integrity and sound ecosystem
management of the reverted areas it once controlled. In
fact, shortly before the end of the U.S. colonial presence,
the need to protect the reverted areas and other parts of the
Panama Canal watershed was recognized by the U.S. Congress in considering appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999.119
Such financial support should be continued as both an exSousa Santos, DEMOCRATIZING DEMOCRACY: BEYOND THE LIBERAL
DEMOCRATIC CANON 305-276 (Verso 2005).
119 United States Agency for International Development, U.S. CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION: PANAMA (1999) (discussing proposed

Congressional appropriations and "short-term" commitment to preserving reverted areas prior to Canal reversion), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp99/lac/pa.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).

90

4:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 238

pression of U.S. interest in sound environmental management and economic growth policies that respect the bio-

logical integrity of the geographical region in which we
live. The problem is that direct financial assistance rarely
comes without conditions that benefit the donor. Given the

long and tortured history of the two nations, one dominated
by the stark power and economic imbalances between
them, direct financial aid could likely impose conditions
unacceptable to 2 1st century Panamanians.

Adoption of the CBD would thus help protect biodiversity hotspots like Panama without the complications of
bilateral assistance agreements. 120 Of course, funds would
not specifically go from the U.S. to Panama. However,
given Panama's richness in biodiversity, it would surely be
an indirect beneficiary of U.S. participation in the CBD. In
addition, U.S. membership in the CBD would affirm to
Panama and its citizens the recognition by an important and
respected ally of the importance of protecting Panama's
greatest environmental assets.
Another option that would involve more direct investment in protecting reverted areas is a model already
used by the two nations. As noted, given the extended
colonial relation between the U.S. and Panama, any direct
investment need be accepted with caution by virtue of the
continued and future control they imply. Importantly,
however, a recent example of such investment appears to
have been structured in such a way as to reduce the possibility for the imposition of conditions benefitting the donor
only. In July 2007, the Panamanian Environmental Authority (Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente, or ANAM) and the
U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S. AID)
announced the creation of "a fund to finance biodiversity
conservation programs in the watershed of the Panama
See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 111, Art. 20, 21
(detailing the financial responsibilities and mechanisms created by the
Convention).
120
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Canal.' 12 1 Initially funded with $ 2.4 million to focus "sustainable development and poverty reduction" programs in
several national parks and their watersheds, on its face this
fund at least represents a promising, if modest, beginning. l12 A key aspect of this funding is that it is administered by the private non-profit Natura Foundation
(FundacidnNatura). This is important in that such independent management can help insure that decisions benefitting Panama are, in the end, made by Panamanians. It
should be noted, however, that the fund is not focused specifically on the reverted areas. 123 Nonetheless, the model
offers evidence of a strategy linking environmental protection and economic development in the broadest sense for
the benefit of all Panamanians.
Furthermore, and, again given the long, complex
and unequal relationship between the two countries, it is
important that any such assistance not only be administered
by non-profit, local recipients, but also that any conditions
linked to the administration of such aid be imposed to benefit all Panamanians. Specifically, such aid should be given
contingent upon a Panamanian commitment to environmental justice. Domestically, the United States government committed itself to environmental justice as a federal
responsibility with the 1993 signature by President Bill
Clinton of Executive Order 12,898.124 When there is direct
U.S. assistance for protection of biodiversity in Panama and
121

See ANAM, Press Release, available at

http://www.anam.gob.pa/notas%20de%20prensa/julio2007.htm (last
visited
Feb. 11, 2008).
122
Id.

123

See Fundaci6n Natura Panama, Fondopara la Conservaci6nv

Recuperaci6nde la Cuenca Hidrogr6ficadel Canalde Panama,available at
http://www.naturapanama.org/index.php'?option=com-content&task-vi
ew&id=6&Itemid = 10 (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
124 See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Executive Order 12,898, in Foster &
Gerrard, supra note 105, at 103-07.
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other countries, a similar requirement could be imposed. In
this way, the U.S. can assure that it does not again help the
Panamanian elite perpetuate the inequalities that it both
tolerated and benefitted from for so long.
To be sure, there is a place for bilateral cooperation
of the type that has long existed in and benefitted Panama.
Most prominently, the Smithsonian Tropical Research
Institute in Panama has since 1923 conducted extensive and
important biological diversity work there.' 25 In addition,
smaller institutions like the Missouri Botanical Garden
played a central role in the early decades of the last century
in documenting and thus seeking protection of the nation's
biological riches126 The above emphasis on local Panamanian control is not meant to suggest that such U.S. and
other foreign-based institutions should not continue to play
valuable research roles in protecting biodiversity in Panama's reverted areas and elsewhere in the isthmus. The
point, on the contrary, is that these institutional examples
are admirable precedents of cooperation that worked and
continues to work on behalf of Panama in ways that both
respect its sovereignty and also seek to protect its environmental resources.

As the prominent Panamanian rural sociologist
Stanley Heckadon-Moreno has noted, environmental consciousness is on the rise in Panama and throughout Central
America. With it, people are "demanding greater account-

125See

Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute, About STRI, available

at http://www.stri.org/english/aboutstri/index.php (last visited Apr.
18, 2008).
126See, e.g., Stanley Heckadon-Moreno, Exploraciones
botdnicas de
Robert Woodson en Panam (1935 y 1938), in SELVAS ENTRE Dos
MARES 280-96 (2006) (documenting the role of the Missouri Botanical
Garden).
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ability of governments and private enterprises.' 2 7 This is
reflected in the fight of the Panamanian-led chapter of the
local Audubon Society against the Northern Corridor and
its consequences. 128 The development of national parks
throughout the region, beginning in the 1970s, has experienced growing pains but nonetheless shows signs of increasing sophistication. 129 In brief, in Central America,
"[t]he new model must seek harmony between man and
nature through the substantial conservation and appropriate
exploitation of biodiversity."'' 30 Panama's reverted areasand notably the Metropolitan Park - are an ideal opportunity to put that commitment to the test. A Frank Gehrydesigned Biodiversity Museum could thus become merely
the portal through which to enter, begin to understand and
appreciate Panamanian biodiversity. Exhibits in the real
museum, income generating and environmental-health
protecting tropical forests rich in ecosystem services, could
then be visited and used responsibly for generations to
come.

127 Heckadon-Moreno, supra note 96, at 213.
128 See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
129 Heckadon-Moreno, supra note 96, at 213-14.
130

d.at 214. In the particular Panamanian context, these challenges
are discussed in a paper written on the eve of the transfer of the Canal
properties by Eileen Petzold-Bradley, Panama'sNon-Traditional
Security Concerns:Approaching the 21st Century (1997), available at
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/lasa97/petzoldbradl.pdf
(last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
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ESSAY

TITLING AND UNTITLED HOUSING IN PANAMA CITY
Jorge L. Esquirol*
I.

Introduction

Panama City is experiencing a luxury condominium
building explosion. A wall of high-rises now dominates the

city's coastal skyline, and more are underway despite
mounting supplies of unsold units. This type of development seriously impacts its surroundings. Public utilities

struggle to meet the demand for new installation and high
load services. Single family neighborhoods are choked by

towers rising all around them. And, an already deteriorating
environment and creaky infra-structure strain against the

competing goals of increased development, quality of life,
urban transportation, and environmental protection.
At the same time, migration to the city from the Pa-

namanian countryside continues unabated, and population
growth continues to press on the stock of affordable housing. The over-sized construction is targeted to the luxury

and international markets. As a result, most local housing
needs are satisfied by privately-developed tract housing
* Professor of Law and Director of International and Comparative Law
Programs, Florida International University. I would like to thank Aya
Gruber, Daniel Suman, and Catalina Villegas for their helpful comments on this paper and Marisol Floren-Romero for her expert research
assistance. I would also like to thank Colin Crawford and Daniel Suman for coordinating our research trip to Panama in December 2007.
My gratitude to the Georgia State University Center for the Comparative Study of Metropolitan Growth for its financial support and to the
Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University for an
enriching research stay.
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in the city's outskirts for those who can afford it; substandard housing in the older parts of the city; and squatting on
public or private land. Strikingly, at the very moment that a
fleet of residential skyscrapers appears on the waterfront,
many Panamanians continue to build makeshift homes and
neighborhoods on squatted land.
This Essay examines the role of law in promoting
different housing patterns, especially low-income options.
A common form of the latter is squatting on public land,
known as a type of "informal" housing. Over the past two
decades, development professionals have urged the legal
formalization of these arrangements, arguing their great
economic potential. On public land, property is to be privatized and titled. On "invaded" private land, the state is to
negotiate and pay for the transfer of ownership from the
original titleholder. This titling agenda has received the
overwhelming support of international development institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. The government of Panama, along these
same lines, has instituted a robust titling program. One of
its express objectives is reducing the incidence of informality.
"Informality," as described in law, sociology, and
economics, can have a number of different meanings, ranging from the underground economy to outright illegality.
Informality, in legal theory, can also mean different things.
It can refer to legal standards as interpreted by courts, areas
of discretion exercised by government officials, legal deference to customary business practices, social norms different from official law, governmentally tolerated areas of
legal non-enforcement, and the like. Legal informality in
housing has its own particular forms. It can refer to legal
yet unregistered ownership, illegal occupation of land,
unauthorized subdivision of property, legally documented
sale of squatted land, "squatters rights," illegal sale of collective land, on-going violations of building and housing
regulation. It also encompasses less commonly considered
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examples such as official discretion in zoning codes and
processes, standards in laws and legal judgments, indeterminacy in the interpretation of legal rules, and other possibilities.
This essay examines the concept of "legal informality" in the context of several Panama City neighborhoods.
The discussion leads to five basic points. First, it maintains
that the notion of informality has been instrumentalized as
an argument for development-sponsored legal reform. It
has been used, with different jurisprudential meanings, to
advance one or another conception of private property,
either subordinate to public regulation or paramount and
inviolable. In either case, the existence of informality has
been marshaled to demonstrate the need for legal change.
Second, the currently-prevailing, rhetorical use of
informality supports government titling programs for squatters on public land. These internationally-supported efforts
reinforce a classical and uniform conception of private
property. The latter is promoted as informality-reducing
and thereby in the best interests of low-income residents:
i.e., squatters' informal assets are to be converted into formal legal and economic value. When analyzed more
closely however, the switch is not so clearly advantageous.
Additionally, titling this particular conception of private
property legitimates its societal singularity and significantly
forecloses alternative property conceptions.
Third, the specific situation of untitled housing on
public land is more usefully understood as an alternative
within law and not separate from it. Untitled homeownership is a product of the combination of existing private
property law, administrative regulations, and de facto government policy. Its existence can be seen as purposeful as a
political matter. My claim that this type of "informality" is
part of the legal system is neither an endorsement nor a
denunciation of any existing practice labeled informal. For
example, it does not suggest that any grab of public land
should be unconditionally condoned or that other practices
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labeled informal should be automatically proscribed. Rather, it is limited to providing a more realistic assessment of
property regimes in which one of its elements is untitled
housing on public land. I leave for another day the discussion of illegal occupation of private land.
Fourth, "informality," in a different sense, is no less
a dimension of titled property regimes. Classical private
law, for example, assigns significant legal interests to titled
owners. It provides a range of privileges, affording considerable amounts of discretionary private power. This allows
title-holders to externalize a number of social costs and
capture public benefits more effectively than under untitled
conditions. In this way, a single model of classical property
may primarily benefit large financial interests able to accumulate significant holdings.
Fifth, the relative indeterminacy of legal rules provides less predictability than ordinarily assumed of the
official legal system. A significant amount of variability in
the application of zoning codes and indeterminacy in the
interpretation of property rules are inherent and common
aspects of liberal legal regimes. As a result, focusing on
housing informality as foremost a question of titling squatters is misleading.
All of these ideas, however, are more fruitfully considered in disaggregated fashion as demonstrated in the
examples of Panama City neighborhoods discussed in more
detail below.
II.

Background

Panama gained its national independence not from
Spain but rather from Colombia.1 At the beginning of the
twentieth century, negotiations between the United States
1See Robert Freeman Smith, Latin America, The United States and the
European Powers, 1830-1930 in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN
AMERICA, VOL. IV C.

1870-1930, 101,101.
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and Colombia to build a trans-oceanic canal in Central
America through Panama came to a head.2 After the Colombians proved difficult negotiators, the U.S. extended
support to local Panamanian leaders eager for greater
autonomy. 3 With U.S. warships anchored off the coast,
Panama declared its independence in 1903, immediately
recognized by the United States.4 Shortly thereafter, the
new Republic of Panama granted the U.S. a concession to
build the Panama Canal and, along with it, a ten-by-fifty
mile swath of land across the middle of the national territory.5 The Canal was completed in 1914.6 It was, throughout the twentieth century, considered vital to U.S. national
security interests, and during this period the Canal and the
Canal Zone were effectively under U.S. sovereignty. 7 Even
off-base residential housing remained the property of the
U.S. government
and was centrally assigned and leased to
8
its occupants.
After World War II, Panamanians became increasingly resentful of the U.S. presence, punctuated by bloody
riots in 1964. 9 Responding to the rising demands of Pana-

2id.

3 See DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA:
A
NATION IN SPITE OF ITSELF 152-54 (1993) (noting that the Colombian

Senate voted unanimously against ratification of the previously negotiated Hay-Herrin Treaty, presumably on the grounds the permanent
grant of control to the U.S. over the canal zone offended Colombian
sovereignty).
4 See Freeman Smith, supra note 1.
5Id.; Convention between the United States and the Republic of Panama for the construction of a ship canal to connect the waters of the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans, 33 Stat. 2234 (Nov. 18, 1903).
6 PETER M. SANCHEZ, PANAMA LOST? U.S. HEGEMONY, DEMOCRACY
AND THE CANAL 79 (2007).
7See David G. Hanrahan, Legal Aspects of the Panama CanalZone In Perspective, 45 B.U. L. REV. 64, 80-81 (1965).
8 See Sinchez, supra note 6, at 67.
9 See WALTER LAFEBER, THE PANAMA CANAL: THE CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 108-09 (1989); see also OMAR JAtN SUAREZ, LAS
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manian officials, in 1977 Jimmy Carter began the return of

the Canal Zone and the Canal to the Republic of Panama, to
extend over a twenty year period.10 Before the hand-over
was complete, in December 1989 George H.W. Bush ordered a military invasion under the pretext of self-defense,
arguing Panamanian aggression and protection of the Canal.11 Thereafter, with past Panamanian president and army
general Manuel Noriega imprisoned in the U.S., the final
transfer was made in 1999 to local civilian authorities. The
Panamanian Defense Forces, the country's highly politicized military, was turned into a police force after the U.S.
invasion. 12 A few years later13it was officially disbanded by
a constitutional amendment.
The Canal Zone was under effective U.S. government control for nearly a century.' 4 By the time it was
completely returned to Panama, it was home to two remaining U.S. military bases, as well as a number of residential
areas, neighborhoods, schools and stores. Branches of U.S.
universities such as Florida State University and Texas A &

M have satellite campuses there, formerly serving military
personnel, their children, accompanying civilians, and
affluent Panamanians. Shortly after reverting to Panama,
most residential properties in the Zone were sold or auc-

NEGOCIACIONES SOBRE EL CANAL DE PANAMA:

1964-1970 125-53

(2002).
10See Sinchez, supra note 6, at 151-58.
11See John Quigley, The Legality of the United States Invasion of
Panama, 15 YALE J.INT'L L. 276 (1990) (discussing the illegality of the
invasion under international law).
12 ROBERT C. HARDING, THE HISTORY OF PANAMA 120-22
(2006).
13 Id.; see MAX HILAIRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND U.S. MILITARY
INTERVENTION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 115-23 (1997); JOHN
LINDSAY-POLAND, EMPERORS IN THE JUNGLE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY

OF THE U.S. IN PANAMA, 188

(Duke University Press 2003).

The Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1021 (setting up
the terms for reversion to Panama).
14
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tioned off to individuals, corporations, and organizations.' 5
Government sales of these properties transferred full formal
title to successful bidders. The properties themselves range
from typical middle class ranch houses found in any U.S.
suburb to the more Mediterranean style of Coral Gables,
Florida.' 6 Although there is no longer a barbed wire fence
or check point to get through, the change from one side to
the other is still dramatic. The aesthetics and zoning preferences of U.S. occupation contrast with the denser Panama
City and more crowded building patterns right beyond the
former fence. 17 In fact, the funnel-like configuration of
Panama City is directly related to the U.S. presence, cutting
off lands to the north and the west and forcing the city to
grow east and northeast.'8
This Essay makes reference to several neighborhoods in and around Panama City subject to different regulatory regimes, both de jure and de facto. 19 The discussion
of different housing patterns is meant to highlight differences among operative conceptions of property in Panama
15See LINDSAY-POLAND,

supra note 13, at 177-82. ("The commercial

or neoliberal vision has generally dominated Panamanian policy and
actions for the reverted areas."), Sarah N. Whitney, Will the Goals be
Met? An Examination of ARI's Generaland RegionalPlans with respect to ProtectedAreas within the Inter-oceanicRegion, Panama, in
PROTECTING WATERSHED AREAS: CASE OF THE PANAMA CANAL 93105 (March S. Ashton, Jennifer L. O'Hara, & Robert D. Hauff, eds.
1999) (referring to the Panamanian Inter-oceanic Region Authority
("ARI") which is now defunct: "ARI's leadership feels that the key to
its success is international investment in the inter-oceanic region.")
16 See Stephen Frenkel, Geographicalrepresentations
of the 'Other':
the landscape of the Panama CanalZone. 28 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 85,
91-96 (2002).
1 d. at 94-95.
18 See Sdnchez, supra note 6, at 64-65.
19These descriptions are based, for the most part, on personal observation during a group research trip to Panama City in December 2007,
organized by Daniel Suman and Colin Crawford, and sponsored by the
Georgia State University Center for the Comparative Study of Metropolitan Growth.
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City. It is also meant to describe the relationship of the
different classes of property holders. Panamanian law provides flexible zoning regulations and tax incentives for
titled construction. At the same time, the city continues to
experience growth of squatter settlements. It would seem
that shiny skyscrapers are a sign of progress and development while self-built homes on public land recall an enduring third-worldness. Pointedly, however, some of the titled
construction is greatly exacerbating the city's urban problems, while some of the squatter settlements actually reflect
certain positive, public policy objectives.
Indeed, the regime of squatter settlements is nothing
other than a different state regulatory scheme. It has wellknown drawbacks, but it also has some potential benefits
less commonly considered. Conversely, titled ownership of
classical property rights has a number of known benefits,
but it can also have significant disadvantages that are not so
commonly acknowledged. Moreover, the different alternatives balance competing rights and regulatory claims in
different ways. Formally titled classical property merely
represents one line of demarcation of the relationship with
the state and with other right holders. Specifically, the
neighborhoods considered in this Essay consist of: (1) the
former U.S. Air Force officers' residences in Albrook auctioned to private purchasers after the return of the Panama
Canal Zone; (2) high rise condominiums in the city center;
(3) tracts of titled "popular" (low income) housing by private developers; and, (4) several untitled settlements within
the metropolitan area.
A.

Ciudad Jardin Albrook

The Ciudad Jardin Albrook consists mostly of former U.S. Air Force officers' quarters, now privately
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owned. 20 The area consists of approximately 400 homes
built primarily in the 1950's.21 These are typically large
two-story, single family residences, many of them abutting
pristine shared tropical gardens and parks. They exemplify
the "garden city" model of residential living. The area is
nicely manicured with quiet neighborhood streets-at least
until recently-connecting the several blocks of two-story
homes. This is not the scenario of most development models. The typical model contemplates the titling of land occupied by squatters, so as to provide occupants with full
ownership rights to finance and sell their holdings. The
Albrook case consists of public land previously used as
military housing now converted to private property. In this
case, government property was sold to the highest bidder.
The example raises some interesting questions about titling
programs, but its role here is rather by way of illustration of
the frustrated expectations of Albrook's titleholders, discussed in detail further below.
B.

High-Rise Condominiums in the City
Center

Another example of title-holding is the Panama City
condominium buildings mentioned above. Several waterfront areas, such as Punta Pacifica and Punta Paitilla, have
been prime zones for developers. 22 These projects are internationally marketed and are particularly targeted to U.S.
retirees, Colombians, and Venezuelans. As of the end of
2007, approximately 40,000 new units were being con-

20

Lina Vega Abad, De base militara "collage", LA PRENSA, Mar. 13,

2005 (noting the "Panamization" of Albrook).
21See About Aprojal, http://albrook.org/html/sobre aprojal.html.
22 See generally Mario Lungo, Land Management and UrbanPlanning
in San Salvador and Panama City, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLicY, 26 (2004) (two thirds of housing investment occurs in two zones,
the financial center and downtown).

104

4:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 252

structed.23 One of the major appeals of investing in Panama
real estate is the generous 20-year, transferable property tax
exemption. Owners of property with values over $75,000
would otherwise pay 2.1% in annual taxes.24 Not all of
these areas were previously residential. They include waterfront zones earlier inhabited by the urban poor and local
fishermen. Still other developments are built on filled in
land along the water's edge. In any case, most of these high
rises hug the crescent of Panama Bay, between the Bella
Vista neighborhood and the ancient remains of the first
settlement of Panama City. High-rises are increasingly
being erected in middle class and upper middle class lowrise family neighborhoods. The main districts threatened in
this way are the Bella Vista, La Exposici6n and San Francisco neighborhoods, the former with its 1920's art deco
houses particularly cherished by local architects and citizen

23

IS the party in Panama over? Panama'sdevelopers hoped to lure

U.S. retirees with cheap prices. Then came speculators, 380 tower
projects representingmore than 40, 000 condos, risingprices and the
possibility of a bust, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 21, 2007.
24 Tax liability can actually be as low as one percent if eligible for the

alternative tax which requires having submitted a property value "selfappraisal" by December 31, 2007. Combined with the exemption
provisions exempting the owner from annual property taxes for twenty
years, an over-valued self-appraisal also lowers tax liability upon resale. See Articulo 81 de la ley No. 6 de Feb. de 2005 (granting a twenty
year exemption on property taxes for new construction with permits
obtained prior to August 31, 2005), amended by Ley No. 34 de 9 de
Nov. de 2005, Gaceta Oficial nfimero 25,424 (extending the exemption
to new construction with permits obtained prior to September 1, 2006)
(On March 10, 2008, the Panamanian National Assembly once again
passed - after a Presidential veto the first time-an additional extension, not yet signed by the President as of this writing, to the 20 year
exemption for building permits obtained prior to July 1, 2009 and
occupation permits secured by December 31, 2011. Properties valued
over $250,000 and not meeting the deadlines only enjoy the default 5
year tax exemption).
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preservation groups. 25 Large homes on proportionallysuited lots have been bought and then razed in order to
erect large skyscrapers in their place.
C.

Working-Class Tract Housing

A third example of titled property is the working
class tract housing developed by private capital. These are
constructed by private developers. They are typically built
on a several acre plot of land with several long, grid-like
streets. Astride each street are rows of identical, small
square townhouses. They are tight one-story structures with
very little, if any, greenery. These developments usually
have one access road into and out of the neighborhood
feeding onto the main highway. Many of these projects are
built several miles out, along main arteries to Panama City.
Homes are offered at prevailing market prices with full
title, and thus-if purchasers qualify-are eligible for
mortgage financing.
D.

Three untitled neighborhoods

Three examples of squatter settlements are the
neighborhoods of Felipillo, Loma Cobd, and Boca La Caja.2 6 The discussion here is limited to title-less occupation
of state land-the case emphasized by development professionals.27 The first two examples were both mass unauthor25

See Lina Vega Abad, Creanforo ciudadanopara defender la ciu-

dad, LA PRENSA, Oct.27, 2006; see also Alianza ProCiudad,
www.alianzaprociudad.org.
26 See RAUL LEIS, LA CIUDAD Y LOS POBRES 121-37, (1980) (discussing
the history of squatter settlements in Panama); See, e.g., Alvaro Uribe,
La integraci6n del drea del canaly la expansi6n de la Ciudadde
Panamd(Lincoln Institute Research Report No. LPOOz2O, 2000).
27 See THOMAS MCKINLEY LUTZ, SOME ASPECTS OF COMMUNITY
ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS OF
PANAMA CITY (Land Tenure Center Library, University of Wisconsin,
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ized occupations of state land. 28 On the eastern end of
Panama City, Felipillo was a state-owned sugar mill subsequently controlled by the Panamanian military in the
1970's. After the U.S. invasion in 1989 and the abolition of
Panama's national army, squatters settled on the unmaintained land and over a period of fifteen months built a
neighborhood of over 1000 houses on 120 hectares.
Loma Cobd is located in the Canal Zone. It is considered an example, by some, of the poor's integration in
the reverted areas. The area is a complex of neighborhoods
located on the west side of the Canal, next to the communities of Arraijdn and Veracruz that, although not officially
part of Panama City, are functionally part of it. It was initiated in 1986 on lands that had reverted to Panama since
1979 but remained vacant. The process of settlement was
slow but unceasing and produced a self-constructed housing complex with a population of nearly 25,000 inhabitants.29 The land was leveled and individual plots were
traced for individual home construction. Notably, regular
plots were laid out with room for streets and sufficient yard
space for the installation of utilities. In particular, space
was sufficiently allocated to allow for septic tank installation. Furthermore, residents organized committees dedicated to education, health, garbage disposal, streets, water,
women, work and elections. 30 As such, some of the practiMadison 1972) (discussing squatter settlements in Panama City circa
1966).
28

Would be squatters routed, THE PANAMA NEWS, Mar. 16-29, 2003

("Panama tends to be tolerant when squatters invade public lands, often
at the urging of construction material vendors. When private lands are
taken and the owners show title and complain, as COFINA did, the
police usually move in.")
29 While "pirate" developers of informal settlements are not common in
Panama, incidents of politician incited land grabs on private and indigenous lands have however been widely reported. See, e.g., Legislator incites Darienland grab, and Representante organizes Chorrera
land
grab, THE PANAMA NEWS, Aug. 3 (2003).
30
See generally LINDSAY-POLAND, supra notel3, at 181.
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cal realities of living in this area and in this way were integrated into the building configuration. These settlements
are comprised of low income residents generally lacking
the possibility of accessing the private housing market.
Boca La Caja is one of the oldest squatter settlements in Panama City dating from the 1930's. Approximately 600 families currently live there. 31 Many of them
depend on fishing for their livelihood. The neighborhood
was first settled approximately seventy years ago on the
waterfront just east of the city Center, when the San Francisco area surrounding it was hardly developed. It is adjacent to Punta Pacifica, one of the main areas of high-end
condominium development. It is a low lying zone prone to
flooding. In some cases building has taken place on mud
flats and within the tidal basin. Parts of this neighborhood
have been titled, with estimates ranging from 25% to 60%
of lots titled.32 As noted, the City's building boom has
grown all around them, and developers are now interested
in this land.
III. "Informality" in Law and Development
As noted above, the meaning of informality can
take different forms. 33 In relation to economic develop31Yaritza

G. Mojica, No quieren salirde Boca La Caja, EL PANAMA

May 12, 2007.
Id. See also Mario A. Mufioz, Boom inmobiliarioIlega a San Sebas-

AMERICA,
32

ticin y Boca La Caja, LA PRENSA, May 12, 2007.
33 See Rogelio Perez Perdomo & Teolinda Bolivar, Legal Pluralismin
Caracas,Venezuela, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, (Ed~sio Fernandes & Ann Varley, eds.,
1998); see also Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New
Developments and Old Regulations, 103 YALE L.J. 2289, 2291 (1994)
(arguing that the informal sector is not limited to third world immigrants coming to the United States but is due to a shift in the political
economy), Richard A. Epstein, The Moral and PracticalDilemmas of
an UndergroundEconomy, 103 YALE L.J. 2157 (1994), Jane E. Larson,
Informality, Illegality, and Inequality, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 137,
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ment, specifically, the concept of informality was report-

edly popularized in the 1970's in relation to rapid urban
growth and the accompanying rise of an excess labor supply. 34 The term has loomed large in development assistance
circles since then. One observer notes:
The concept of formalization policy stems from
the introduction 30 years ago of the term informal
sector into development discourse by the International Labor Organization (ILO), giving rise to a
new type of assistance to developing35countries: the
formalization of the informal sector.

In the housing context, the notion of informality was first
employed to describe and rebut then common views about
squatter settlements as sites of social backwardness, iso36
lated indigenous communities, outlaws, and communists.
141 (2002) ("within our [U.S.-Mexico] borderlands, more than 400,000
people now live in informal housing settlements known as colonias"),
Ed~sio Fernandes and Raquel Rolnik, Law and Urban Change in
Brazil, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, 140-56 (Ed~sio Fernandes & Ann Varley, eds., 1998). See
generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A
PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (describing the vast
informality attendant contractual relations in a sampling of Wisconsin,
manufacturing industry insiders, despite the formalization of terms and
presumptive predictability expected of doctrinal contract law), Alejandro Portes & Richard Schauffler, Perspectiveson the Latin American
Informal Sector, 19 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 33, 33-48 (1993) (dethe "structural approach").
scribing
34
Alejandro Portes & Richard Schauffler, Competing Perspectives on
the Latin American Informal Sector, 19 Population and Dev. Rev. 33,
38 (1993).
35Julio Calder6n Cockburn, Property and Credit: PropertyFormalization in Peru, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY 1 (June 2007).
36 See William Mangin, Latin American SquatterSettlements: A Problem and a Solution, 2 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 65, 85 (1967) (arguing
against their radical politicization: "At present they seem capable of
mobilization only as a group to defend their homes."); Thomas
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Developmentalists, instead, attributed economic growth
potential to squatter settlements and their informal norms.
It was part of a larger diagnosis of state law's formalistic,
backward, and socially unresponsive condition in Latin
America. Informal law was perceived as an intelligible
popular reaction to official legal under-development. In that
era, the "informal" represented an adaptation of formal
state law that was more contextual, responsive and pragmatic. It showed how squatters, for example, turned official
legal categories into a system of land holding, conveyancing, and ultimately community organizing that responded to their actual circumstances.
Pursuing similar methodologies, commentators relied on personal interviews and surveys to describe the
inner workings of social groups purportedly governed by a
separate, informal law.3 7 A classic in this genre is Kenneth
Karst's study on the non-state law of Caracas barrios. 38 In
it, he discovered that, with the exception of legal title, residents operated essentially under the national legal system.
Karst principally followed the stages of squatter settlements

McKinley Lutz, Self-Help Neighborhood Organizations, Political
Socialization, and the Developing Political Orientations of Urban
Squatters in Latin America: Contrasting Patterns from Case Studies in
Panama City, Guayaquil, and Lima, 297-98 (1970) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Georgetown University).
37 See Kenneth Karst, Rights in Land and Housing in an Informal
Legal
System: The Barriosof Caracas,19 AM. J. COMP. L. 550 (1971); Lutz,
supra note 27; Lutz; supra note 36; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The
Law of the Oppressed: the Constructionand Reproduction of Legality
in Pasagrada,12 LAW AND SoC'Y REv. 5 (1977).
38 Compare Karst, supra note 37 (throughout the article, Karst
argues
polemically against the prototypical formalist Venezuelan lawyer-and
middle class stereotypes - who would maintain that there is no law in
the barrio), with Rogelio P&rez-Perdomo and Pedro Nikken, The law
and home ownership in the barriosof Caracas,in URBANIZATION IN
CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA

(Gilbert, Hardoy, & Ramirez, eds.,

1982).
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39
and survey responses from its residents. He defended the
thesis that the sense of security felt by residents in their
tenure reflected an informal legal system of property - not
dependent on formal land titles: "Ownership of the land
seems not to be significant in this process."4O Still, these
communities he observed operated in strict relation with the
state law of contracts, inheritance, etc. The lesson to be
learned, he maintained, was a model for more pragmatic
state law better suited to promote development in contextually appropriate and participatory ways. The "informal"
thus provided a working example for development planners
of legal flexibility and demonstrated a source of legal creativity-or "development mentality"--driven by povertydriven necessity.
In the 1990's round of development reform, the informal occupied a different position. Informal regimes were
also conceptualized as compensating for the failings of
formal law. 41 This time, however, the image was not the
socially or culturally discordant nature of law and society
in Latin America: the social demanding of more flexibility
in conceptions of property. In the 90's, the existence of an
informal sector and informal land holding were an argument to turn the informal into the formal in the case of
property, and in other cases to de-regulate the sphere of
government regulation.42 This more current use of the turn
to the informal, all the while, is premised on a rejection of

3 See, e.g., id. at 563 ("Thus the central fact about a squatter-owner's
rights is that nothing happens to disturb his occupancy.").
40 See id. at 569. But see Mangin, supra note 36, at 75 ("Land titles play
a major role in investment in housing, and in places where a title or
some assurance of permanence is thought to exist constructions are
more elaborate than in those without titles.").
41 See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE
REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD (2002).
42 See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a DistantMirror: Why the
West has Misperceived the Grameen Bank's Vision of Microcredit,41
STAN. J. INT'L L. 217, 278 (2005).
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official state law. It is advanced as an alternative source of
legal rules. Indeed, for neo-liberals, the transactional modes
and operations presumably outside the ambit of government regulation
are deemed a more suitable model for state
43
law itself.
Considering both periods of law-and-development
work on squatter settlements in Latin America, "informality" generally has been invoked as a phenomenon outside
the legal system. It has meant, principally, social norms
separate from state law and, alternatively, self-help deregulation by the poor prompted by the high costs of legal compliance. In the first period of law and development in the
1960-70's, the concept was primarily employed to loosen
claims to vested private rights to property. In the second
1990's moment the opposite was true. Informality became
an argument to reinforce an expansive and inviolable conception of private rights. In this more recent era, untitled
housing is considered the epitome of informality, and titling is the primary goal of most formalization programs.
The law-and-development usage of informality is
not so different from the productive tension in the distinction between law and society, historically used to facilitate
legal reform. 4 The latter was mobilized by legal realists,
sociological jurisprudes, and law and society practitioners
for a number of changes in the U.S. legal system. The turn
to social reality, in U.S. legal history for example, was
prevalent as a reaction to Lochnerism. 45 This mode of arguing for legal change also has a long pedigree in continental

43Epstein, supra note 33 (arguing that the reduction of government and

regulation reduces informality by reducing the possibility of running
afoul of law or government.).
44 Jane E. Larsen, Informality, Illegality, and Inequality, 20 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 137, 142-43 (2002).
41 See MORTON J. HORWlTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW

1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 33-34 (1992).
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Europe and Latin America. 4 6 The general idea is that focusing on social realities would reveal the need for laws to
protect society from the abuses of unchecked industrial
capitalism. The plight of the masses would thus support
social legislation and more government action against
vested property rights anchored in the constitution. By
comparison, in the development versions, the "informal"
has represented, by turns, a model of legal pragmatism and
a substitute set of norms.
Describing a practice as "informal" has thus provided a space for re-considering its legal status. Labeling
that which is legally suspect, or outright prohibited, as
informal signals the possibility that it may be "formalized."4 7 One way to conceptualize this is as an argument
about the constituitive elements of a legal norm. So, for
example, where municipal ordinances permit licensed retailers to operate and, correspondingly, repress unpermitted street vendors, characterizing the latter as "informals" - rather than law-breakers full stop-opens the
possibility of re-drawing the lines. The street vendors may
be afforded greater legal rights through formalization, but

46

See DIEGO L6PEZ-MEDINA,

TEORiA IMPURA DEL DERECHO: LA

TRANSFORMACION DE LA CULTURA JURIDICA LATINOAMERICANA 235340 (2004); ANDRt-JEAN ARNAUD, LES JURISTES FACE A LA SOCIETE
DU 19tME SIECLE A NOS JOURS 154-90 (1975); see also Duncan Kennedy & Marie-Claire Belleau, FranqoisGdny aux Etats-Unis,in FRANQoIs GtNY, MYTHE ET REALITES 1899-1999 CENTENAIRE DE MTHODE
D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVt POSITIF, ESSAI CRI-

295-320 (Claude Thomasset, Jacques Vanderlinden & Philippe
Jestaz, eds., Editions Yvon Blais, 2000); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE

TIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SItCLE 92-96 (1997); Marie-Claire
Belleau, The "JuristesInquiets:" Legal Classicism and Criticism in

Early Twentieth Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 379 (1997).
47 See, e.g., Rogelio Perez Perdorno & Teolinda Bolivar, Legal Pluralism in Caracas, Venezuela, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND URBAN
CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 123-39 (Ed~sio Fernandes & Ann

Varley eds. 1998).
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just as logically plausible more onerous conditions could be
imposed through greater formality.
Additionally, the notion of informality-separate
from the reality of illegal land occupation or any other
practice-has been repeatedly pressed in the context of
development reform in Latin America as an argument for
one or another reform proposal. The continual discursive
reproduction of the "informal" by scholars and commentators and its reputed extraordinariness in Latin America
reinforces this trope. 48 Its exceptional extensiveness in the
region is rather automatically accepted. To such extent, it
appears as if state law was limited49to the elites and then
only as cover for backroom politics.
In similar fashion, the purportedly extraordinary
gap between law on the books and law in action in the
region is another incarnation of this same idea. 50 Informality and the gap-within development literature-have been
firmly established as defining deficiencies of law in Latin
America. 5' If law in the region were better functioning, this
perspective suggests, there would be no eruption of informality and informal norms-springing from local communities-to fill the void. The continuing existence of
informality is offered as proof of official law's failure.
Quixotically, the guiding star for reform is eliminating
informality-either by absorbing it within state law or
making it itself the formal law.52 However, as common to
liberal legal systems, examples of informality and of different types of informality are always abundantly observ48

See Jorge L. Esquirol, ContinuingFictionsof Latin American Law,

55 FLA. L. REv. 41 (2003).
49 Id.

50 See Jorge L. Esquirol, The FailedLaw of Latin America, 56 AM. J.

COMP. L. 75 (2008).
51 id.
52 See, e.g., Julio Calder6n Cockburn, Considerationson Illegal and
Informal Urban Land Markets in Latin America, LINCOLN INSTITUTE
OF LAND POLICY 2 (July 2006).
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able.53 As such, they are perennially available as grounds
for new rounds of reform. Described below are the ways in
which this concept has been marshaled to promote titling
programs for untitled housing on state land.
IV.

Titling as a means of reducing informality

The reduction of informality is a principal argument
for titling squatters on state lands. The case has been forcefully made by neo-liberal reformers using this rhetoric. In
the context of Latin America, specifically, this argument
promotes privatization and strong property rights. 54 Internationally-supported, development reform has targeted land
registry offices and land plotting technologies. 55 Monies
have been lent to improve the efficiency of these offices
and to make clear the rightful property owners at any
time. 56 According to the World Bank loan documents supporting Panama's titling program:
Informality is one of the main issues of both, the
urban and rural sector. To address some of these
53

Id. (considering urban land specifically independent of housing
policy). See generally Karst, supra note 37; DE SOTO, supra note 41;
Sassen, supra note 33, see Dyal-Chand, supra note 42; David Kennedy,
Laws and Developments, in CONTEMPLATING COMPLEXITY: LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY (Amanda Perry-Kessaris & John
Hatchard
eds., 2003).
54
See Thomas T. Ankersen & Thomas Ruppert, Tierray Libertad: The
Social Function Doctrineand Land Reform in Latin America, 19
TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 69 (2006) (arguing the significant elimination of
social conceptions of property as a result of neo-liberal reforms).
55 See, e.g., The World Bank, Poverty and SocialDevelopment in Peru,
1994-1997 (1999).
56 World Bank, Panama Land Administration Project http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/extemal/defaultiWDSContentServer/W'DSPIB/200
1/01/12/000094946_001 2 2 9 05 3 2 03 6 9/Rendered/PDF/multipage.pdf
(last visited Sept 5, 2008) (granting a $58.7 million loan to be administered by Panama's Programa Nacional de Administraci6n de Tierras).
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problems, the Government has developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy in which land tenure security is a fundamental issue. The proposed Project
will help the Government to implement this strategy.57
In short, in its latest law-and-development iteration,
the "informality" argument purports to turn the existing
legal interests of squatters into classical property rights.
This position, it bears noting, supports the neo-liberal
agenda of de-regulation, privatization, and free markets. At
the same time, the argument strikes a populist tone by asserting that "informals" will be better off. This is essentially the position advanced by Hernando de Soto and his
followers. 58 The formula has become a generalized if unproven mantra. Again, the structure of the argument is not
unlike early twentieth century legal theories advocating the
"social" or social relations as a determinate source of legal
norms. 59 The "informal" comes to occupy a similar role
within the prescriptions of neo-liberal reformers. Indeed,
turning to this domain has much the same flavor of sociolegal projects. It appears to offer a determinate, nonpolitical source of legal rules and a populist one at that.
The promise of titling is providing greater access to
home values. The premise is that these settlements are, for
all intents and purposes, permanent. As such, settlers are at
a minimum in possession of the land and most likely are so
World Bank, Panama Land Administration Project,
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/LAC/PALandAdmin/Doclib.nsf/4145
387661f08830852565a3005f4a64/41 lb2ffa283aafcd85256a02005b3aa
b/$FILE/P050595.pdf (last visited May 9, 2008) (projecting 45,000
titles to be granted within Panama's urban centers).
58 See generally DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 41; HERNANDO
57

DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN

THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (Basic Books 2000).
59
See Kennedy, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION supra note 46; see also

Belleau, The "JuristesInquiets,"supra note 46.
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indefinitely. Yet, this form of land tenancy and the economic value that it represents are not available for circulation in the economy. So, if vested with a more cognizable
property interest, de facto right-holders would be able to
draw on the equity of their interests. This could take the
form of borrowing against home equity or more freely
alienating, leasing or otherwise disposing of the value in
the full bundle of property rights. Promoted as being primarily beneficial to the poor, the preferred bundle of rights
the
and privileges-urged by Developmentalists-are
classical and neo-liberal elements of full legal title. In fact,
the argument is that this recognition merely cashes out the
economic transfer of stable tenure already granted by the
state.
In Panama City, several factors are salient: an overcrowded city, low incomes, high unemployment, lowskilled workers, short supply of affordable housing, and
relative lack of government money for low income housing. Reporting on illegal occupations in 2002, the Panamanian press noted that the state at that point offered no
housing programs for these low income groups. 60 The
Panamanian Ministry of Housing currently reports four
different government housing programs: public housing for
500 families in the interior of the country, a total of 1,000
awards of a $2,000 subsidy for families obtaining commercial mortgages for properties under $16,000; neighborhood
infrastructure improvement projects and job training; and
the sale of three large public lots to private developers for
$300/month) and
the building of mixed low income (under 61
lower income (over $300/month) housing.
The Ministry also claims that the national government between 2004 and 2006 issued a total of 30,095 titles
60

Jos6 Arica, Camino alprecarismo,LA PRENSA, May 8, 2002.

61 See

Repfiblica de PanamnA, Ministerio de Vivienda, Programas,

http://www.mivi.gob.pa/paginasprincipales/programaso7.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2008).
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to property nation-wide. 62 Funded by the World Bank and
the Inter-American Development Bank, the Panamanian
agency charged with land titling is the Programa Nacional
de Administraci6n de Tierras (PRONAT).6 3 The World
Bank fund targets 25,000 new titles issued in urban areas
and 12,000 more nationally, between 2006 and 2009. 64
Over the same period, the Inter-American Bank fund aims
at 150,000 new titles. 65 Clearly, with the scant public investment in the sector, the Panamanian government is primarily counting on the titling of squatted land as the
centerpiece of its housing policy. Whether or not titling
self-built housing on public land is the best alternative for
the poor, however, is a question best answered by analyzing the positives and negatives of the different legal options.
A. Questionable benefits
The position in favor of strong private rights has in
the not so distant past been firmly championed by the propertied classes. 66 Indeed, one of the generally accepted reasons and diagnoses of the deficiency of Latin American
democracies has been attributed to the unequal concentration of private land holding, represented by the striking
67
image of the vast latifundios in the hands of an elite few.
The principal remedy for this concentration of power and
wealth proposed throughout most of the twentieth century-although not very widely achieved except possibly in
62

Id.

63

Decreto Ejecutivo No. 125, Repfiblica de Panamd, Sept. 12, 2001.

PRONAT, Objetivos y Metas,
http ://www.pronatpanama.org.pa/web/index.php?option=com-content
&task=view&id=14&Itemid=44 (last visited May 8, 2008).
64

65

66

Id.
Joseph Thome, The Process of Land Reform in Latin America, 1968

67 WIs.

L. REv. 9, 20-22 (1968).
Id. at 10-14.
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Cuba (and there by abolishing private property)-has been
agrarian reform. In effect, the process requires expropriating land from large landholders, not making productive use
of their property, and transferring it to landless agricultural
workers. There have also been movements, notably in
Brazil, to extend this same procedure for the benefit of
urban dwellers. In any case, the principal legal obstacle to
land reform has been the figure of vested rights. If anything, the plight of the property-less and squatters has been
understood as worsened by the restrictions on government
policy imposed by an unyielding conception of private
rights. Such formal rigidity has had the effect of impeding
either imaginatively or constitutionally (or both) the ability
of governments to more equitably redistribute legal entitlements.
Curiously, this more recent re-alignment of strong
property rights as a benefit to the poor raises some questions about this one-time government transfer.6 s It is not
clear that these programs fulfill their own stated objectives
of increasing mortgage credit, improved lending conditions,
greater investment in home improvement, and a deeper
secondary home sales market. 69 Some scholars have noted
the wide support for these efforts even though its benefits
remain unproven:

68

See Copello, Mercedes & Smolka, infra note 91 (stating that prelimi-

nary estimates in various places indicate that property values increase
post titling by approximately 30%).
69 Compare Cockburn, supra note 35, at 43-44 (In Peru these projects
have been most far-reaching. There is some evidence of increased
investment in housing and increases in prices of titled housing. However, note that formalization is only one among explanatory factors in a
list including "various public and social policies, formalization and its
diffusion, the subsidized credits of the Materials Bank, the initiatives of
public services providers, and the assistance of multilateral institutions."), with Karst supra note 37, at 569 ("the key motivation to investment in barrio housing appears to be the occupant's ownership of
the house [not the land]").

119

4:2

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 267

Analysts associated with the World Bank argue
for legalization on the grounds that it increases
land and housing values and provides access to
credit for housing improvements. They do so in
spite of growing evidence that tenure legalization
is not required for investment in housing improvements. Squatters may even consolidate their
houses faster than those with formal tenure. Both
the advocates of legalization and the more skeptical, however have concentrated their attention on
"technical" questions, and overlooked the political
uses of illegality. v
In Peru, where mass titling programs since 1996 have been
widespread, "[a]ccess to mortgage loans by virtue of owning registered property has been negligible" and "there is
no evidence that formalization is leading to the development of formal land markets among the low income population., 7 1 At the end of the day, these programs may not
advance their own much vaunted goals. Instead, their only
effect may be to consolidate a more rigid conception of
private property rights. Furthermore, it is not clear that a
monolithic slate of property rights is preferable in all cases
to different modes of asset allocation. At a minimum, the
overwhelming push for titled property rights limits possibilities for other alternatives.
B. The mystifying effect of arguments based on
informality
As noted above, there are many different sorts of
legal informality. They are common to modem legal sys70

Ann Varley, The Political Uses of Illegality: Evidencefrom Urban

Mexico, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES, 172 (citations omitted).
71 Cockburn, supra note 35, at 44-45.
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tems. 72 For example, socio-legal scholars have amply demonstrated the variation, adaptation, and only partial relevance of legal rules to social relations generally. 73 As such,
legal informality is the common experience of life in law
and society. In addition, the legal realists showed us that
legal rules, by themselves, provide no static guarantee of
individual expectations on the meaning of property.74 The
latter are subject to regular changes in the law, the competing forces of economic exchange, and plain legal nonrecognition. 75 Thus, there is no autonomous separate private (or informal) domain independent of legal regulation
and non-regulation combined. Moreover, classical private
law property contains a variety of different legally protected interests-not solely grants of actual rights. 76 These
different legal relations can vary in terms of formalization.
Either way, these alternatives to the single logic of formal
rights are equally options within law. As a result, the representation of informality and other legal interests as nonofficial law is misleading. The formal-informal distinction
primarily demarcates alternative legal devices. As such, the
concept of legal informality needs to be disaggregated if it
is to mean anything at all.77

72

See Macaulay, supra note 33.

73 Id.

See Robert Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38 Political Science Quarterly 470 (1923), reprinted in
THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 106-07 (David Kennedy &
William W. Fisher III, eds., 2006) (discussing the inescapable exposure
to vicissitudes of "legitimate expectations" framed as legal rights).
75 Id.
76 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
77 See generally Alejandro Portes & Manuel Castells, World
Underneath: The Origins,Dynamics, and Effects of the Informal Economy, in
74

THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES IN ADVANCED AND LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 12 (Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells & Lauren A.

Benton eds. 1989).
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Defining informality symptomatically as either separate social norms or self-help deregulation obscures the
pre-reform legal relations among squatters, the state, and
third parties. Conversely, it unjustifiably equates formalization with classical property rights. 78 This convoluted reasoning advances the cause of broad rights and privileges to
title-holders.79 The sleight of hand is that the claimed
source of the new proposed rights derives from areas where
the state applies a different de facto property regime or
80
where the state tolerates regulatory non-compliance.
Therefore, the change propounded is, in effect, either a
change to a different form of property and!or the expansion
of regulatory exemptions.
The classical rule of adverse possession provides a
useful example here. This conventional legal doctrine regularly turns illegal trespassers into legal owners and thus
routinely validates past periods of irregular-or informalpossession. In Peru, the period for adverse possession was
shortened to one year, on the strength of this same argument characterizing squatters as "informals." 81 There may
indeed be good policy reasons to shorten the period of
adverse possession. For example, it may lead to greater
See Horwitz, supra note 45, at 163-67(describing Hohfeld's and
Hale's understanding of the bundle of legal relations constituting property).
79 See generally Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the
Age of Globalization,39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (2006); Hohfeld,
supra note 76 (describing more precisely some of the "rights," "privileges," "immunities," and "powers" bestowed by law to property titleholders).
80 See, e.g,. George L. Priest, The Informal Economy: The Ambiguous
Moral Foundationsof the UndergroundEconomy, 103 YALE L.J. 2259
(1994) (highlighting the high levels of informal activity in the U.S.,
distinguishing among types of informal activity, and defending the
preference for aggregating moral justification and value of informal
markets).
81 Winter King, Illegal Settlements and the Impact of Titling Programs,
44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 433 (2003).
78
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tenure security, regulatory compliance, social justice, per-

sonal savings, and the like. Alternatively, there may be
good reasons against quickly increasing the stock of titled

property rights. The latter permit a number of excesses, if
not outright abuses, by titleholders often externalizing social costs, such as the harms associated with over-building,
reduced quality of life to neighbors, and pollution. Commoditization of titles encourages practices of financial
speculation on assets serving multiple needs, like sufficient
housing. 82 An expansive allocation of property rights may
frustrate other public policy goals. However, the force of
arguments based on "reducing informality" has the effect of
pre-empting more transparent consideration of the various
pros and cons.
Accordingly, in relation to the housing context in

particular, it may be more useful to speak in terms of different legal relations and distributional rules rather than
formal and informal law. 83 For neo-liberals, the preferred
84
rules are expansive interests for private property holders.
It is not clear whether or not this reduces or raises the actual aggregate amount of legal non-compliance across society. 85 Irrespectively, by claiming to end informality through
titling, the law is changed and government regulation,
planning, and more significant redistribution are made
more difficult. Marshalling the argument of informality
either to reinforce property rights-as in the 1990's neo-

development-or to loosen vested property rights - as in
the 1960's law and development, however, obscures the

82 See generally Claire Priest, Creatingan American PropertyLaw:
Alienability and its Limits in American History, 120 HARV. L. REv.
385 (2006).
83 See Hale, supra note 74.

84 See Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 54.
85See Alejandro Portes & Richard Schauffler, Perspectives on the Latin
American Informal Sector, 19 Population and Dev. Rev. 33 (1993)

(discussing measures of informality).
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multiple policy decisions and regulatory options represented by these categories.
Indeed, marshalling informality as a stand-alone
argument in favor of titling classical property rights
eclipses the range of other policy questions implicated by
squatter settlements. The latter involve not merely asset
transferability, liquidity, mortgage-ability and the type of
security provided by registered titles. They also include

questions about access to housing, building requirements,
safety, habitability, disclosure, transportation, public health,
environment, and the like. These other objectives need to
be better addressed, possibly even with international development assistance. Moreover, the possibilities for reform
advanced by the concept of informality-advocating a
change in the law-are never fully extinguished by title
formalization. As the examples below will show, legitimate
expectations and democratic will can be frustrated despite
rights to legal title. New legislation, ministry regulations,
and judicial pronouncements can reinterpret rules, apply
standards, under-enforce regulations, or simply presume
entitlements in favor of one right-holder versus another.
These points are more fully addressed further below.
V.

An alternative conception of property

A common way of conceptualizing untitled property, as argued above, is as a failing of the formal law. This
form of "informality," it is argued, is a malfunctioning of
state legal systems. Its very existence is advanced as the
rationale for law reform. Recent reforms, furthermore, seek
to formalize a particularconception of property. Within the
neo-liberal program, this
conception is a neo-classical ver86
sion of property rights.
By contrast, a more precise understanding of untitled property holding unveils the operation of a different
86 See

Ankersen & Ruppert, supra note 54.
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type of legal relationship. Shorn of the negative connotations of "informality," untitled housing on state land simply
constitutes a different set of legal relations. It reveals the
exercise of a privilege to build and reside on state land,
informally yet still officially recognized by the government. 87 This form of tenancy is both subordinate to certain
superior rights of the state, and the subject of a number of
legal privileges. 88 It responds to demands for affordable
housing at the expense of other public uses and proper
regulatory compliance. Describing the Mexican context, for
example:
Land tenure regularization in Mexico may be understood primarily as a means for routine, lowcost, state intervention in the production of urban
land and housing for the low-income population... regularization programmes give clear ex-

pression to the predominant laissez-faire approach
to housing the poor: official tolerance of illegal
subdivision ensuring an abundant supply of inexpensive housing plots, and the post hoc legitimization of this89 process in tenure regularization
programmes.
Indeed, the defacto government policies that enable
this form of tenancy reflect implicit policy decisions. This
is not to say that in a context of more or different resources,
policy makers would not affirmatively make different
choices and regulations in the area of housing. Of course, it
87 See generally Nrez-Perdomo and Nikken, supra note 38.
88

See generally Hohfeld, supra note 76 (for example, the privilege to

exclude other non-right holders from possession and de facto immunity
from building code enforcement action).
89 Antonio Azuela & Emilio Duhau, Tenure Regularization,Private
Property and Public Order in Mexico, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW AND
URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

157, 168 (Ed~sio Fernan-

des & Ann Varley, eds., 1998).
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is not in reality simply a matter of limited resources. The

latter could be diverted from other uses were this a foremost priority. Under different political conditions and combinations of forces, different choices about housing and the
economy could be made. Likewise, it is also not simply a
matter of competing political priorities as against some
unchangeable background of rules of private property and
government regulation. At base, the workings of property
law-more difficult to perceive and to modify-directly
contributes to the housing stock actually made available.
Accepting that untitled property on public land fulfills certain objectives does not mean that either government regulation or private property law should remain
unchanged. In fact, a more transparent appraisal of the
political and legal nature of this arrangement may make it
possible to better tailor housing law and policies. 90 Some
aspects of the relaxed regulatory environment may continue
to be part of the mix; others may be recalibrated better to
meet other public policy needs. The perspective advanced
here, it should be noted, neither supports the "invasion" of
public lands by would-be squatters nor does it advocate the
automatic eviction of existing squatters in all cases. More
importantly still, it does not hold out the promise of a titled
piece of land post hoc-as the current titling policies in fact
do. Rather, it recognizes the legal and economic dimensions that give rise to self-help housing settlements and
proposes to tailor a more effective government response. It
suggests, as part of the mix, the reform of private law for
the purpose of public welfare, the environment, and government provided infra-structure.
Surely, there are comprehensible reasons why existing property owners may want expanded and reinforced
90

See generally Ugo Mattei & Femanda Nicola, A "SocialDimen-

sion " in EuropeanPrivateLaw? The Callfor Setting a Progressive

Agenda, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2006) (describing the stakes involved
with the harmonization of European private law).
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rights. Additionally, titling currently-untitled property
holders appears to extend these same benefits to them.
However, those with large titled holdings are especially in a
position to reap the sum of the rewards. The broad array of
rights and privileges under a broad definition of private
property disproportionately benefits large owners. By contrast, shantytown dwellers will not effectively enjoy much
more under their newly titled holdings than what they had
before. The most notable exception would be possibly the
privilege to apply for a home equity loan.
Yet, other property configurations are not impossible. In Colombia, for example, the Municipality of Bogota
is experimenting with dividing the right to build from a
monolithic conception of ownership rights, particularly for
land planned for low-income housing. 91 Since 1997, Colombia has had a national law allowing municipalities to
recover 30-50% for increases in land value resulting from
public investment. 92 The primary means for recapturing this
"socially-created" value is through a capital-gains-type
tax. 93 Additionally, both property owners and "pirate"
subdividers acting ahead of government action on lowincome developments are in a position to extract the expected value of public investment and regulatory change.
Separating out the right to build and transferring it to qualifying beneficiaries, it is suggested, would reduce the speculative value of land. However, "the policy faces enormous
resistance because of the civil law tradition that unitary and
91 See

Maldonado Copello, Maria Mercedes & Martim Smolka, Las
plusvalias en beneficio de lospobres, elproyecto Usme en Colombia,
LAND LINES, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY, July 2003; see also
Mario Lungo, Land Management and Urban Planningin San Salvador
and Panama City, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY, 44 June 2006.
92Law 388, Law of Land Development, July 18, 1997, Republic of
Colombia.
93 See, e.g., Liliana Bonilla Otoya & Juber Galeano Loaiza, Application
of New Land Value Capture Instruments in Colombia: Desepaz Case
Study, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY, June 2006.
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absolute rights are associated with private land ownership."94
This is one form of tinkering with the background
rules. Granted, it is not suited for every issue, and may not
be particularly transferable to Panama where "pirate developers" do not appear to be a big concern. 95 However, it
demonstrates the role of background rules of private law on
the economics of squatter settlements. By limiting our
conceptions of the latter to simply the limitations of law
enforcement, a separate social system of laws, the capitalist
exploitation of labor, and other constructions of the sort, it
renders invisible the current system of distribution of rights
and privileges within property law producing the current
state of affairs. Furthermore, maintaining imprecise ideas
about the informal and its instrumental use as a vehicle for
reform confounds the possibility for alternatives within the
law. Retaining the myth of informality's exceptional and
transitory nature simply leads to an unclear approach. At
the same time, the fixation on titled property as investment,
accumulation, and development makes it that much harder
to perceive its negatives in responding to the need for lowincome housing.

A.

Non-Formalized Alternative Legal Interests

In the context of Panama City, specifically, the untitled residents of Felipillo, Loma Cobd, and Boca La Caja
could simply be described as mere trespassers. And, the
94

Maldonado Copello, Maria Mercedes & Martim Smolka, Using

Value Capture to Benefit the Poor: The Usme Project in Colombia,
LAND LINES, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY July 2003.
95 See Alvaro Uribe, Ciudady Sostenibilidad,Remarks at Encuentro

Interamericano de Desarrollo Sostenible, Fundaci6n Conama, Nov. 1921, 2007, http://www.conama.org/eima/documentos/8.pdf (last visited
Oct. 15, 2008).
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construction of houses on that land can be seen as illegal
possession. There is no separate category under the Civil
Code of Panama for "informal tenure. ' 96 At the same time,
forms of land tenancy short of full titled rights are legally
recognized, such as simple possession and adverse possession.97 Squatters may possibly qualify for one of these
designations under the law. Notably however, in the conland, adverse possession does not run against
text of public
98
the state.
And yet, the residents in these areas enjoy relative
tenure security from government eviction. Indeed, the government itself can be seen as promoting this mode of housing. 99 First, by not prioritizing sufficient affordable and
social housing it implicitly acts to maintain the status quo.
Second, by over-relying on the market and over-estimating
job growth, it knowingly accepts the predictable lowincome housing shortages that will be thereby produced.
Additionally, the government leads the way by example by
allowing the externalization of social costs at the highfinance end, such as when it authorizes exceptions for private construction and public works projects through national parks and areas that were previously zoned more
stringently. 100 Finally, commentators have noted that a post
hoc titling program further encourages the invasion of private and public land as a route to property holding.
Other commentators confirm Panama's de facto
policies on squatters. For example, rural settlers may obtain
title to a "patrimonio familiar," a form of tenure that is
limited to land of a certain size and value and includes
immunity from judgment creditors, rights to inheritance by
96 C6digo Civil de la Repfiblica de Panam, Aug. 22, 1916, Art. 324-

627.
97
Id., Art. 1696 (requiring uninterrupted possession for 15 years).
98 Id., Art. 1670 (amended by Cabinet Decree 75, Art. 1, Mar. 21,
1969).
99 See Prez-Perdomo & Nikken, supra note 38 at, 224-25.
100 Arica, supra note 60.
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heirs, an absolute prohibition on mortgages, and restrictions
on alienation except in cases of absolute necessity. 1 1 As
another indication of recognition, squatter neighborhood
organizations are eligible to obtain legal personage. This
has been noted to be particularly commonplace in Panama
City, especially in certain cases where the government has
organized the delivery of electricity and water to squatter
settlements and charging users a fee. 1° 2 These associations
have also been active as a form of local government, especially beginning in 1967 when the national housing authority promoted self-help housing
projects in Panama City and
03
invested resources in them.'
Furthermore, Panama's Metropolitan Area Plan of
1997 estimated an increase in informal housing over the
1997-2005 decade, expecting a decline thereafter and ultimately a 5.6% rate of informality by the year 2020.04
These estimates by the consulting firm hired to produce the
report are based exclusively on the income earning potential based on very optimistic assumptions of job growth in
Panama City. Their conclusion is that on the basis of more
101 Ley Niumero 22 de 20 de marzo 1941 sobre Patrimonio Familiar,
Asamblea Nacional de Panamd, Repfiblica de Panamd (Gaceta Oficial
No. 8476), Ley Nfimero 108 de 29 de diciembre de 1960, Dictanse
disposiciones relativas al Regimen Provincial, Asamblea Nacional de
Panamd (Gaceta Oficial No. 14,300). CompareLutz, supra note 27, at
8-12, with Antonio Azuela & Emilio Duhau, Tenure Regularization,
Private Propertyand Public Order in Mexico, in ILLEGAL CITIES: LAW
AND URBAN CHANGE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 164-65 (Ed~sio
Fernandes & Ann Varley, eds., 1998) (arguing that the Mexican experience with "patrimonio familiar" simply led to illegal transactions as a
way of circumventing restrictions on alienation).
102 Lutz, supra note 27, at 9-23. ("The results of some recent
survey
research studies, including my own, suggest that in Panama City the
level of participation in barriada improvement organizations is higher
than in Santiago, Chile, Lima, Peru, and Guayaquil, Ecuador").
103 Lutz, supra note 36, at 306.
104 "Plan de Desarrollo Urbano de las Areas Metropolitanas del Pacifico
y del Atfintico", Informe Finaldel Plan Metropolitano,Vol. 1, Parr.
9.2, Dec. 22, 1997, Ministerio de Vivienda, Repdiblica de Panama.
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and better jobs a decade hence, the City's reliance solely on
the private sector to respond to low-income groups housing
needs is justified--despite the continuing and optimistically-low, 2002 estimate of private sector housing insufficiency.1 0 5 Thus,0untitled
housing settlements can be seen as
6
de facto policy.'
B.

Problems with uncontrolled and unplanned settlements

The characteristic conditions of squatter settlements
resulting in overcrowding, poor sanitation, and substandard
constructions are universally deplored. There is more disagreement, however, at the level of policy solutions. A
recent report warns:
Any attempt to tackle the problem of existing settlements must take into account the deep-rooted
causes of this phenomenon in order to design
measures that will prevent it from continuing at
the present speed and scope. Thus, while addressing the lack of basic infrastructure, accessibility,
and public services, as well as unclear tenure
rights, governments must look at policies to either
stop or decrease the speed at which urban informality grows in its various dimensions. If nothing
is done to reverse the current trend, the slum population may reach 1.5 to 2 billion people in 2020.07

105 Id., at Vol. 2, Part 2, Parr. 13, Dec. 22, 1997.

See generally Larsen, supra note 44, at 167 ("the current trend
toward great wealth inequality and limited government responsibility
for
the basic social provision is enduring and fundamental").
107
Claudio Acioly Jr., The Challenge of Slum Formationin the Developing World, LAND LINES, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY, 3
(Apr. 2007).
106
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One commentator identifies three strategies of "regularization" most recently employed by developing states as (1)
short periods of adverse possession leading to full ownership for private land; (2) executive branch direct action to
title squatters on public land and expropriate private land
with compensation for benefit of squatters: (3) government
purchase or designation of public land so that it develops
and sells as low-income housing.' ° 8 Analysts have also
begun to highlight the ill effects of many titling programs.
They note the perverse incentives that programmed regu0 9
larization has on encouraging more illegal settlements.
And, it is argued that the costs of regularization programs
are higher than providing publicly financed serviced land
1 10
for low-income housing.'
i.

Tenure Security

Not all untitled neighborhoods enjoy uninterrupted
stability. They typically go through a process of consolidation. Newer areas of "invasion" are more likely to be recuperated by state forces. Observers have noted that
occupations of public land are met with much less resistance than those on private property where the titled owner
seeks to evict. In some cases, however, private owners are
overpowered and must either agree to sell, settle on a low
price, or simply stand by. The Panamanian Ministry of
Housing has been active in negotiating sales agreement
with private owners of squatter settlements. Compromises
include the sale of part of the land to squatters and a relocation of some others elsewhere. 1 1' However, in longer standing settlements there is little likelihood of mass evictions.
108 King,
109

supra note 81.
Martim Smolka, Informality, Urban Poverty and Land Market

Prices,LAND LINES, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY Jan. 2003.
110Id.

111
"Noticias: Avanza medici6n de lotes en el Progreso", Ministerio de
Vivienda, Repfiblica de Panamai, Direcci6n de Relaciones Pfiblicas,
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A change in government direction at some point
could potentially overcome the implicit policy, political
resistance, and practical inertia against massive squatter
evictions. More likely, certain communities in areas of
economic interest will simply be pressured to re-locate.
This eventuality is not so different for those holding title to
land. If the "persuasive" powers of the market do not work,
powers of eminent domain are constitutionally available to
be applied in such cases.1 12 By way of precedent, the public
use limitation may potentially be extended to include eco113
nomic development cases, as we have seen in the U.S.
However, legally mandated compensation in the case of
title holders may be calculated in a different and maybe
more beneficial way. The political costs of uprooting a
whole community would likely produce pressure as well.
Those residents would likely be offered some amelioration
or alternative housing by the state. Thus, in many cases, the
difference between titled and untitled land holding in terms
of permanence is not so great as it would seem at first
blush.
Additionally, as noted above, untitled tenancy clearly does not fit within the categories of land tenure under the
civil code. To the contrary, there is always in theory the
potential of being charged with trespass. In practice however, the de facto government policies have created this
alternative land structure. Certain areas of public land are
routinely ceded and electoral politics are soon integrated
within these neighborhoods. Moreover, residents generally
conduct their affairs through regular legal forms, exchanging contractual documents to purchase and sell their holdFeb. 27, 2008,
http://www.mivi.gob.pa/noticias/Febrero%2008/febrero08_22.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2008).
2 See generally Hale, supra note 74, at 93-110.
113See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE
OVER CONSTI-

TUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 64-68 (2006).
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ings. Private contracts may be used and chains of "title"
maintained by keeping records of past conveyances. Notably however, questions of zoning and services are dictated
by practical exigencies rather than by the strict application
of city codes.
ii.

Regulatory Compliance

The argument against untitled housing is often
based on the low levels of regulatory compliance with
building and health codes in squatter settlements. In the
Loma Cobd neighborhood, for example, the residents themselves cleared and set plot lines for their own homes. "Pirate" middle-men are not believed to have played any role
nor are believed to operate in Panama in any significant
way. Over the past fifteen years, much of the empty land
has been reforested and rendered habitable. Indeed, it has
been described as meeting better standards and a more
appropriate equilibrium between urbanism and the environment than many formal development projects by private
capital.1 14 The plots are more spaciously parsed out and
road flows are better designed than in some of the middleclass tract homes, which are constructed for maximum
space utilization and highest sales prices. In fact, Panama
City architect Alvaro Uribe has noted that:
The [informal] neighborhoods that have been produced do not correspond to the "phantom neighborhoods" of yesteryear but rather resemble true
neighborhoods with an environmental quality not
found in the scarce public housing projects or in
the "popular" neighborhoods of the private sector,
which are generally high priced and/or low quality. By contrast, all the spontaneous low-income
neighborhoods have open and enclosed spaces
114

Uribe, supra note 95.
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dedicated to communal activities and are more generous in the size of streets and individual lots,
with areas 4 or 5 times greater than the lots offered
by private developers or the Ministry of Housing
in equivalent locations. These efforts at informal
housing developments have reached levels of spatial quality, habitability and savings that do not exist in the rationalized and miniaturized designs
of
115
neighborhoods.
conventional low-income
Lots traced by settlers at Loma Cobd are rather large in
size. Part of the explanation, in this particular case, may
result from the benefits of building in a relatively spacious
area outside the city center. It may also result from lot requirements for septic tank functioning on each plot of land,
under Ministry of Housing regulations. 116 Responding to
government regulation-albeit not in full compliancethese settlements place less strain on governmental services, and design corresponds to constraints other than
profit maximization. Clearly, it would be better if these
residents had more ample resources and could construct
even better homes up to code. However, as one possible
policy alternative, untitled housing development on public
land may not always be simply irresponsible or unplanned.
C.

Positive potential of alternative forms of
property

There are no doubt numerous dangers associated
with unplanned and unregulated human settlements, as
noted above. Water, electricity, sanitation, safety, environmental and other regulatory concerns are surely more imperiled and are at a higher risk of experiencing
' Id. at 12-13.
116 Ministerio de Vivienda, Resoluci6n No. 160-2002, July 22, 2002,

Gaceta Oficial No. 24645. Repfiblica de Panamd.
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noncompliance. Nonetheless, state resources could be more
broadly deployed in these areas, and this mode of land
holding could potentially be made to work. In most cases,
Latin American governments provide public services to
shantytowns after the fact, once a residents association has
become organized. However, this need not be the case.
Government agencies can be, and in some places are, more
proactive in ensuring some levels of services and regulation. Some of the adverse effects of non-complianceparticularly in relation to health and the environmentcould be lessened by government action. These need not be
conditioned exclusively on the three modes of regularization noted above. It could work with alternative forms of
property holding as well.
As such, untitled holdings on state land need not
signify, either imaginatively or in fact, free for alls. They
may simply constitute areas of different modes of regulation. The existence of differential regulation and different
modes of enforcement has already been discussed.' 17 Additionally, this regime may produce some positive goods in
their own right. This mode of land holding opposite to the
neo-liberal prescription reduces the liquidity of this undeniable asset. This may not be a bad thing. Indeed, many
communities across the globe have struggled with the
proper modalities for ensuring affordable housing. Different legal formulas have been produced whereby affordable
housing is transferred by the state and then its alienation is
limited to other eligible purchasers at below market prices.
Untitled tenure can be conceptualized as a vehicle for lower
cost housing. It maintains this sector of the property market
at different values than the titled market-which generate
different negatives. As a result, residents may be more
hesitant to transfer their property, or not be in a position to
dispose of it so easily to creditors. It may also ensure that
transfers are also directed to other purchasers desiring pri117

See Larsen, supra note 44, at 18.
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marily to live in the house as a primary residence. In this
way, untitled holdings create a different housing market
with some of the same intended consequences that societies
with no significant untitled sector in place must construct
by contract or other restrictive covenants.
Finally, as already alluded to above, untitled holding lessens the financially speculative dimension of housing. By de-linking housing and investment, residents are
insulated against a number of financial risks. Especially in
the context of the real estate debacle seen in the United
States in the past year, this risk is very real. Banks and
financial organizations typically do not make mortgage
loans against untitled property. Again, this is the direct
opposite to the neo-liberal intention of making all housing a
source of investment funds. However, this form of microlending with recourse to borrowers' homes places them at
risk of outright destitution. This is already a vulnerable
segment of the population with no access or diminished
access to resources. A government policy that transfers to
them "rights" to their existing interests may only put them
at risk of having those assets more easily stripped away.
Indeed, this government policy is precisely premised on the
expectation that property holders will indeed draw on the
equity of their newly titled assets. At the end of the day,
what it provides is simpler asset-guarantees for the financial sector and a new credit market.
VI.

Classical property regime

The benefits of titling are generally characterized as
providing for greater security in tenure, incentives for improvements, collateral for mortgage loans, and a secondary
sales market. Less discussed are some of the drawbacks
that titling, under the current constellation of ownership
rights, may in practice entail. In the specific context of
Panama City, the expansive rights of title and permissiveness of zoning has led to a miscalibrated housing supply.
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Specifically, legal rights are often exploited to their utmost
degree thereby imposing many negative externalities on
society at large. A number of built-in and unseen subsidies
are made available to developers by government-provided
infrastructure. Better planning and control by government
officials are compromised by the seemingly pre-determined
logic of property rights. Working class displacement, environmental degradation, and historical preservation are all
made worse as a result.
From a different angle, the legal system can also fall
prey to certain powerful interests to the detriment of the
expectations of others. More prosaically, though, even the
run-of-the-mill expected permanence of unchanging property rights, tenure security, and guaranteed expectationsunder the aegis of property law-is misplaced. Textual
interpretation, application of legal standards, and discretion
in rule enforcement are intrinsically dynamic aspects of the
legal system. Therefore some of the assumed benefits of
titling are premised on the expectation of political consensus rather than some inherent feature of rule formalization.
The examples below demonstrate a number of negative
effects in the Panamanian context.
A. Over-construction of high income housing
The clearest illustration of over-construction is the
number and size of luxury condos in the city Center. Structures are erected to the ultimate possible allowances under
the zoning codes and then some. These vary across the city
in terms of permissible density, setbacks, and use. In reality, however, they are quite permissive, especially in the
Center. The tangible result has been tall skyscrapers and
condominiums in previously low-rising residential districts.
Minimal or no setback requirements at the lower floors has
builders building to the widest extent of their land. Zoning
laws limit density by floor. Its purpose presumably is to
limit urban density and traffic by limiting the number of
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residents per lot. The effect has been twofold. It encourages
more luxury units-to which the full density limit is assigned-to in effect reap the highest profit margin as a
function of density. But, it also drives the buildings higher
up in order to add more units. It thus increases the inventory of high-priced housing and encourages overbuilding
both horizontally and vertically. A March 2008 Miami
Herald article reports 250 new skyscrapers under construction and applications for another 400 already filed.' 1 8 It is
reported that the Municipality of Panama received
$1,023,000 in new construction permitting revenues for
January and February 2008 combined, a 72.3 % increase
over the 2007 figures. 19 Alvaro Uribe notes that:
The formula of continuing to make use of the advantages of conglomeration in the Center, where
the flexibility of norms allows for anything goes,
continues to be more persuasive than the uncertainty that still weighs over the reverted lands [in
the Canal Zone]. 2 °
This leads him to the observation of a zone of "laissezfaire" that is enacted through the law of registered titles and
zoning codes. 12 1 Two things are interesting to note. First,
state regulatory law is very flexible.122 A recent Panama
City op-ed notes:

118 See Panama'seconomic boom breeds pride, concern, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 30, 2008; see also Mufioz, supra note 32.
119 Panama City buildingpermits up, THE PANAMA NEWS, Mar. 23-

Ar. 5, 2008.
Uribe, supra note 26.
122 Law 6 of February 1, 2006, Repdblica
de Panama. See also Eric
Jackson, Panama'sEmerging Urban PlanningRegime, THE PANAMA
NEWS, July 8-21, 2007.
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The extraordinary boom of runaway construction
of large towers everywhere, although it has some
situational benefits, rapidly begins to destroy the
potential of the city. It occurs with the sudden
changes in zoning laws without the consultation of
neighbors, without streets and other infra-structure
to rationally accommodate the increases in density, with no attention paid to public easements,
sidewalks, green areas, open spaces, historically
and architecturally valued buildings, public recreational spaces for the young and the elderly... The
excessive traffic, without proper avenues or
streets, the noise, the environmental pollution, the
lack of parking, you can keep listing.... 123
Second, it prioritizes construction and private property over
other public policy concerns, such as the environment,
quality of life, and health.1 24 As such, the legal system
subsidizes agglomerations of title at the expense of the
public rather than incorporating a greater portion of social
costs within the background rules applying to housing en123

Nicolds Ardito Barletta, Panamd:La ciudad (I), LA PRENSA, May 8,

2007.
124 See, e.g., AlcantarilladoSanitario:Obsoleto, insuficiente y contaminante, EL PANAMA AMERICA, June 30, 2002 ("So that the million
inhabitants of the capital have an idea of the problem and possible
solution [of pollution in the bay, and river and streams that empty
there], they should know that when they flush the toilet in their homes
and businesses, the fecal matter that runs through the pipes arrives
100% raw at the bay, along the rivers and large pipes that dump directly onto the coast. The same occurs with sewage coming from sinks,
bathrooms and wash tubs."); Elizabeth A. Garrido & Wilfredo S. Jordan, Al rescate de la bahia, MARTES FINANCIERO, Mar. 16, 2004,
Marianela Palacios Ramsbott, Podremos baharnosen la bahia en 2010,
LA PRENSA, Mar. 27, 2007 (announcing sewage treatment project in
progress financed by $50 million loan from Inter-American Development Bank and a second $167 million loan from the Japanese Government).
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trepreneurs. 125 Additionally, legal rules sanction this result
and, by adopting this essentially laissez-faire baseline,
render it more difficult to exercise needed re-allocation of
resources to the low-income housing sector.
B. Misdirected public subsidies
The attribute of title also entitles owners and builders to demand the subsidized basic services of the city. In
some setting this may be justified and part of government
incentives. In the context of Panama, though, city services
are stretched to their limit. The city is already home to
numerous residents living in precarious conditions and not
connected to basic services. The city's infrastructure is
decaying in parts because of disorganized spurts of
growth. 12 6 The particular shape the housing boom has taken

places great demands on the city's capacity for more and
larger water and sewer connections. All of this is occurring
simultaneously with a number of high-rise projects. Thus,
in the case of complying building plans, city officials are
required to scramble to provide services such as water and
sewer to huge buildings. Indeed, city officials understand
that they are compelled to provide the municipal services
so long as all the listed requisites have been met. They are
effectively powerless to impose further limits, greater sequencing, or additional fees. Certainly, public officials can
propose legislation or other measures having this effect.
Yet, the perception of encroachment on baseline property
rights makes this difficult to achieve. Notably, no ameliorative measures have been put in place, undoubtedly because

See Jerry L. Anderson, Britain'sRight to Roam: Redefining the
Landowner's Bundle of Sticks, 19 GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REV. 375
(2007). See generally, Hohfeld, supra note 76.
126 Irma Elena Mordok, Exigen desarrolloplanificado,PANAMA
AMitRICA, June 4, 2007.
125
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any such proposal would be met by substantial resistance
from builders and other property owners.
Finally, many of the condominium units in these
skyscrapers actually remain vacant. Indeed, city officials
estimate that 30 % are unoccupied (developers typically
proceed when they have deposits on 70%), but in all likelihood this is a very conservative estimate if one considers
all the purchases based upon speculation.1 27 Many of the
rest are also not occupied on a full-time basis. Moreover,
considering the prices and maintenance costs of these units,
it is not surprising that they are beyond the reach of most
Panamanians. Thus, even the permissive building codes
encouraging construction to the full extent of lot lines is
doing little by way of resolving the demand for housing of
local Panamanians since most of these units are being
bought by high net worth individuals.
C.

Hiding assets and laundering money

Purchasing real estate in Panama may also provide a
route to hide assets from the reach of other jurisdictions and
to launder money in the form of legal real property. For
instance, real estate developers are permitted to accept cash
payments from buyers. 128 Additionally, private investors
may own real estate anonymously by holding title through
non-registered bearer share corporations.129 Share transfers
30
are not recorded and thus not available for inspection.'
Rather, simple possession of the stock certificate controls
127

See Jim Landers, Condo boom hits Panama-As towers rise, sellers

seek to woo Americans, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 24, 2007 (estimating that 70 to 90 % of units are bought on speculation).
128 Panama, supra note
129

118.

See Ronald Edwards, PanamaAnonymous BearerShare Corpora-

tions, (November 13, 2006) available at
www.goinglegal.com/article_98649_86.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2008).
130 id.
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disposition of the asset.1 3' Thus, this freely and anonymously transferable asset (i.e. housing units), which from a
public-policy perspective serves many purposes, can easily
serve to evade legitimate creditors and to launder money.
The pressure this influx of illicit money places on
the housing industry has a number of deleterious effects.
The demand for stashing large amounts of cash distorts the
housing market, putting pressure on more high-end units as
well as building disproportionately in size and volume.
Furthermore, the subsidies generally available to these
users in the form of installation of services and increased
capacity upgrades are misdirected away from more pressing housing needs. Indeed, they may be redirected to the
luxury end of the housing sector or to illicit activities.
D.

Housing instability

Another feature not typically highlighted of titling
is the opposite of its purported claim to tenure security. A
good example is Boca La Caja, near the high rise developments of Punta Pacifica, Paitilla, and San Francisco. Approximately 40% to 75 % of the families there live in
houses without title.1 32 Because of their proximity to the
city Center, their waterfront location, and high-end neighbors, residents are under significant financial incentives to
sell their homes and re-orient their livelihoods. Land titling
appears to be a good solution to protect them. Indeed the
legal guarantees of title would appear to permit those preferring to stay with greater security than their current status
of "informal" dwellers.13 3 This security however is somewhat illusory since it is the possibility of titling these lands
by their current occupants that makes them attractive to

131Id.

132 Mufioz, supra note 32.
133Mojica,

supra, note 31.
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developers. Reflecting on government titling in the Panamanian interior, Radil Leis observes that for micro-farmers:
The state undertakes the massive titling of lands,
granting or titling individual lots, but without significantly augmenting raw materials, marketing,
technology, by which the small landowner (indigenous or peasant) ends up selling his farm at
low prices in the land market and migrating to the
agricultural fringes or cities. Under these conditions the countryside is, more so all the time, a
1 34
reservoir of extended poverty and growing.
Indeed, in a different context, the practice of titling
very small plots to Sicilian farmers has been shown to be
counter-productive. 135 Its effects have been principally an
ensuing concentration of land. Titling made it easier to
36
consolidate the land by providing easier transferability.
And, restricting transferability defeats the professed objectives of development-oriented advocates of titling programs. 37 In the context of titling programs, the Minister of
Housing and other officials are limited to simply exhorting
residents not to sell their properties once formalized, ex38
plaining that they constitute subsidies from the state.'
134

Raf1 Leis R., Panamd: Centralismoy Metropolizaci6n,in,

COMI-

SION UNIVERSITARIA DEL CENTENARIO DE LA REPUBLICA, PANAMA:

CIEN ANOS DE REPOBLICA
135Harold

247 (2004).

Lemel, Land Titling: Conceptual,Empiricaland Policy

Issues, LAND USE POL'Y, 283, 283-85 (July 1988).
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Tim Hanstad, DevelopingLand RegistrationSystems for Developing

Countries, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 647, 666 (1998).
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See DE

SOTO,

supra note 41, at 42-43, King, supra note 81, at 447

("these conditional grants of title, if intended to diminish the redistribu-

tive aspects of titling programs, have often failed to alleviate the housing shortage to which they are addressed, as they have merely provided
incentives to settlers to subdivide, sell, or rent their plots illegally").
138"Noticias: 7,000 familias reciben asignaciones de lotes en Arraijdn,"
Ministerio de Vivienda Repfiblica de Panamd, Direcci6nde Relaciones
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Potential title holders have been warned that if they sell
their lots prior to the finalization of title they would become
ineligible and the property would be awarded to someone
else. 139 Selling newly acquired titles will likely lead to
squatting on land elsewhere.
In Panama City, condominium developers are already offering significant sums of money for this untitled
land, offering residents the funds to get them titled and then
sell them for development. 140 Indeed, these financial incentives are spurring more precarious informal construction by
new residents. More makeshift houses are being built in
this area, in low lying zones, and on land part of the tidal
basin, reputedly in an effort to stake out claims to valuable
land, for which title will be obtained-with the help of
condominium developers-and then sold to them. New
squatters have been advised by the Panamanian authorities
of the illegality and dangers of building on land reclaimed
from the sea since they are prone to flooding. The area
residents, however, point out that high rise developers are
similarly reclaiming land from141the sea to build their luxury
buildings in contiguous areas.
E.

Deepening sub-prime credit markets

Titling is meant to provide access to collateral. Indeed, one of the main arguments for titling squatters is that
PNtblicas, Apr. 4, 2008,
http://www.mivi.gob.pa/noticias/abril09/001arraijan.html1 (last visited
Apr. 11, 2008).
139"Noticias: Culmina agrimensura y ordenamiento de lotes
en Villa
Vivian", Ministerio de Vivienda, Direcci6nde RelacionesPtiblicas,
Repfiblica de Panamd, Apr. 1, 2008,
http://www.mivi.gob.pa/noticias/marzoO8/marzoO8_14.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
140 Muiioz, supra note 32.
141 L. Ivis & C. Franco, Peligro ronda Boca La Caja, EL PANAMA
AMtRICA, Oct. 1, 2006.
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they will then be able to use the equity in their assets. Since
squatter dwellings are principal places of residence, these
individuals will presumably continue to live in them. Thus,
the primary means of accessing such equity will not be
through selling. Rather, access to capital will depend on
borrowing against the value of their home equity. In this
way, the untitled will then be able to, through loans, access
cash and presumably put it to good use.
The difficulties with this plan are evident. This area
of home financing is practically by definition a sub-prime
market. Accordingly, interest rates will likely be high.
There is a strong danger of predatory lending. Moreover, a
default because of a missed paycheck, unrealized profit
from a new business, or an economic downturn will produce a major economic crisis, foreclosures, and a newly
homeless people. Thus, plugging these lower-income sectors of society into the financial markets places both them
and the economy at great risk. Indeed, it may be that housing priorities for the less advantaged in Latin America
should be given precedence over financial sector policy.
Increasing liquidity in the economy at the expense of putting shantytowns dwellers in jeopardy of losing their homes
may not be the smartest course.
Not so dissimilar is the working-class tract housing
on Panama City's outskirts. As noted above, lower income
developments dot the east and north routes into the city. In
an effort to create more of them, the Ministry of Housing
has initiated a small program to stimulate this type of private development. It plans to sell three large tracts of public
land to private developers for low-cost titled housing. In
turn, at the level of home purchases, qualified buyers meeting certain restrictions are granted access to preferential
mortgage terms for these homes. This situation again produces the same difficulties of risky and high-cost credit as
with recently-titled squatter settlements-regardless of title
to real property collateral. In the place of private credit
markets, then, subsidized government loans are required to
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ensure individuals access to homes. It is not clear that this
form of government transfer is preferable to outright investment in public utilities and infrastructure for residents
on urban public land.
VII.

Intrinsic uncertainties of legal rules

An inescapable dimension of titled property regimes, somewhat counter-intuitively, is the relative indeterminacy of legal rules. Conventionally, formalization in
the form of titled rights appears to offer clarity of legal
rights and certainty of tenure. Moreover, as described
above, an expansive definition of private property allows
titleholders to capture a disproportionate share of public
goods and to externalize social costs. However, this beneficial distribution of economic power to titleholders is subject to all the regular "informality" of liberal legal systems,
including legislated ambiguities, regulatory discretion,
indeterminate legal rules, and conflicting judicial interpretation. These aspects of the legal system are less frequently
addressed as areas of informality. As a result, the latter is
mostly depicted as existing outside of law.
An example of the phenomenon addressed here is
the experience of residents at Ciudad Jardin Albrook. The
homes there were sold by auction by the Panamanian government between approximately 1998 and 2000. Many
individuals including former and retired Panamanian Canal
Zone employees as well as U.S. retirees obtained homes in
this way. Ownership is held through formal registered title.
This formal guarantee to home and neighborhood, however, has not come without its drawbacks. A large part of
the appeal of the garden city is the low height and density
restrictions, reduced traffic, and the aesthetics thereby produced. 142 The neighborhood reflects the mandates of larger
142

See Rafael Spalding, Noticias objetivas o propagandaen Albrook,
June 20, 2002.

LA PRENSA,
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setbacks, harmonious styles, and single family home character maintained by the U.S. military. The designation of a
"garden city" under the 1997 Panamanian law for the Canal
Zone and subsequent August 8, 2000 Resolution No. 139 of
the Ministry
of Housing were meant to preserve this char14 3
acter.
In 2001, after most initial owners had purchased
their titles, two existing buildings in the area formerly
housing for single soldiers, were bought by a developer
with expansion Vlans for greater height, added floors, and
greater density.'
This development, called Albrook Park,
was permitted under the zoning regulations for Panama
City and not the specific legislation for the "garden cities"
within the Canal Zone.' 45 Although not a skyscraper, it
brings multiple units, more height, increased density, and
added traffic to two-lane residential streets. The unbargained-for expansion, contrary to the expectations of initial
owners, has changed the character of the neighborhood and
harmed their environment. Additionally, it has led many to
question
the legal guarantees available under Panamanian
14 6
law.
Despite contrary zoning regulations in effect at that
time, the Ministry of Housing approved the expansion
plans. Individual Albook owners, organized in a residents
association ("Aprojal"), took action and questioned the
Ministry's decision. The Ministry, however, did not reverse
Ley 21 de 1997, Plan Regional y el Plan General de Uso, Conservaci6n y Desarrollo del Area del Canal, Repfiblica de PanarrmA, Resoluci6n No 139-2000, Gaceta Oficial Sept. 1, 2000, No. 24,130, Normas
especiales para mantener el cardcter de ciudad jardin en la regi6n
interoceinica, Ministerio de Vivienda, Repfiblica de PanamrA, Aug. 8,
2000.
144
Resoluci6n N0 204-2003 de 30 de Sept. de 2003, Emitida por el
Ministro de Vivienda, Repfiblica de PanarrA.
145 See Rafael Spalding, Justicia dilatadano esjusta, LA PRENSA, Sept.
16, 2002.
146 Luis A. & Mndez F., Las burlas de la "CiudadJardin," LA PRENSA, Oct. 6, 2001.
14'
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course. Instead, government officials and even media
commentators have criticized the group as trouble-making
U.S. retirees, unknowledgeable about Panamanian law,
expecting to live in a military-style enclave, privileged,
elitist, and seeking to embarrass the Panamanian government by calling upon the U.S. embassy for support. 147 The
Aprojal president claims to have called upon U.S. officials,
simply, to warn foreign purchasers of the risks of property
ownership in Panama. In any case, in Aprojal's favor, the
Panama Municipal Council, on October 31, 2001, temporarily halted construction at Albrook Park based on Aprojal's complaint pending a final decision by the competent
authorities.148 Specifically, Aprojal sued on the basis of
Resolution 139-2000, paragraph b.12 of the Ministry of
Housing which provides for these reverted properties:
There should be maintained inasmuch as possible
the original designs of facades in terms of texture,
color, materials, number of finished floors,
49
heights, and other physical characteristics. 1
According to past Association President Rafael Spalding,
they hired a lawyer who also brought the case to the Panamanian Supreme Court in 2002. The Association succeeded
in convincing the government's lawyers, the Procuraduria
de la Administraci6n, of the illegality of the Ministry's
147Manuel Dominguez & Hermes Sucre, ARlpromete no derribarni

un drbol en Albrook, LA PRENSA, Nov. 1, 2000.
148Consejo Municipal suspende las obras de "AlbrookPark," LA

PRENSA, Oct. 31, 2001, Mario A Mufioz, Proyecto de Albrook Park
cumpli6 con las normas ambientales, LA PRENSA, Nov. 1, 2001, Victor
D. Torres, FV Constructoramenaza al Municipio de Panam6i, LA
PRENSA, Nov. 1, 2001.

149
Resoluci6n N' 139-2000, Gaceta Oficial, Sept. 1, 2000 No. 24, 130,
Normas especiales para mantener el cardcter de ciudadjardin en la
regi6n interoceinica, Ministerio de Vivienda, Republica de Panama,
Aug. 8, 2000.
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actions. The Supreme Court, however, refused a preliminary injunction and did not decide the case.
By 2003
with still no ruling handed down the Albrook Park project
was completed and occupied.
Additionally, in February 2007, the National Assembly amended Law 21 of 1997 to allow the Ministry of
Housing to modify provisions of that same law relating to
urban development in the reverted areas by simple resolution, retro-active to July 1997.151 This law was the basis, in
a recent decision by the Administrative Chamber of the
Supreme Court, for lifting a prior injunction against construction on land zoned as a "green urban area" under the
1997 law. By resolution dated 2000, the Ministry of Housing changed the "green" zoning to residential medium density. The Supreme Court in a prior decision issued January
31, 2006 had granted a preliminary injunction based on a
clear likelihood of success on the merits, considering the
clear inconsistency of the Ministry's resolution with the
law.' 52 However, based on the February 12, 2007 legislative amendment of the law authorizing the Housing Ministry to unilaterally re-zone and ratifying its unilateral re150Demanda Contencioso Administrativa de Nulidad interpuesta por la

firma forense Rosas & Rosas, en representaci6n de Asociaci6n de
Propietarios de Viviendas de Ciudad Jardin Albrook (APROJAL), para
que se declare nula, por ilegal, la Resoluci6n N0 204-2003 de 30 de
Sept. de 2003, emitida por el Ministro de Vivienda, Ponente: Adin
Arnulfo Arjona L, Panamd, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la RepTblica
de Pananmad, Expediente No. 58-06. Mar. 20, 2006.
151 Ley 12 de 12 de Feb. de 2007, publicada en la Gaceta Oficial No.
25731 de 13 de Feb. de 2007, que modifica el Articulo 13 de la Ley 21
de junio de 1997, sobre el Plan general de uso de suelos de la regi6n
interocernica.
152 Demanda Contencioso Administrativa de Nulidad, Interpuesta por el
Licenciado Carlos E. Varela Cardenal, en representaci6n de la Alianza
para la conservaci6n y el desarrollo, para que se declare nulo, por
ilegal, el articulo No. 8 de la Resoluci6n 09-2000 del 31 de mayo de
2000, emitida por la Direcci6n General de Desarrollo Urbano del
Ministerio de Vicienda, Ponente: Victor Benavides, PanarmA, Jan. 31,
2006.
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zoning retro-active to 1997 the Supreme Court terminated
the preliminary injunction. Petitioners are now challenging
the constitutionality of the legislative amendment. Previously, an opposition congressman had already challenged
the constitutionality of this amendment before the Supreme
Court in March 2007.153 No decision has yet been rendered
on this issue. Additionally, as of this writing, the legality of
the first Ministry approval of Albrook Park, challenged by
Aprojal, is still pending in the Panamanian Supreme Court
-six years later. Aprojal's action will no doubt be dismissed if the constitutionality of the Ministry's newly
granted and retroactive powers were to be upheld. 15 4 Comparing the situation of both squatters and Albrook residents,
Alvaro Uribe has noted the unexpected similarities:
These actions [by Albrook residents], respecting
the differences of social group distance involved,
are equivalent to the efforts of the inhabitants of
the self-built popular barrios: they are struggles
for permanence in the barrio and for permanence
of the barrio, faced with the threat of expulsion by
55
new projects. 1
Certainly, this example can be seen as a simple matter of a
violation of existing laws and a potentially improper manipulation of the legislative process. However, it may be
adjudged within the legislature's powers as part of the
flexibility inherent in legal and constitutional interpretation.
Thus, if the Court grants the legislature the authority to
make this retro-active change, the latter becomes part of the
corpus of property law. This example demonstrates that,
153Juan

Manual Diaz, Demanda contra ley de uso de suelos, EL PANA-

MA AMERICA, Mar. 20, 2007.
154 Rafael Spalding, Una corte de injusticia suprema, LA PRENSA,

Feb.

26, 2008.
1 Uribe, supra note 26,
at 13.
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even in the context of title and zoning, expectations may be
frustrated. Indeed, any one of the various sticks in the
bundle of these rights can be re-arranged, and alternative
types of legal relations may be sanctioned. Thus, the questions involve not merely the distinction between formal or
informal legal relations but also the advantages and disadvantages of different property-holding regimes.
VIII.

Conclusion

This essay is an attempt to move beyond the trope
of "informality" as merely an argumentative device. That
is, the notion that there is informality or an informal law
has often been used in the past primarily as an argument for
other ends. It has been instrumentalized to argue for a more
pragmatic conception of law. Conversely, it has also been
used to argue for a reinforcement of private property rights.
In either case, the observation that a certain segment of the
population is living on land not titled in their name has
supported a strategy to re-calibrate the scope of legal regulation.
Quite differently, this Essay leads to several concluding points. Untitled housing on public land is not usefully understood as simply "self-help deregulation," opting
out of the high costs of legality. Rather, this arrangement is
an alternative for low-income housing that has been de
facto sanctioned by the state. Also, it need not be uniformly
negative. Not unlike the titled regime, it has its positives
and negatives. Because the state has superior ownership
rights does not mean it need remain otherwise unregulated
or unplanned. Simply awarding titles, however, may lead to
more housing insecurity, foreclosures and financial crisis,
than to sustainable capital infusions in the economy coming
from the equity in squatter property. Finally, the options
currently available are a reflection of existing laws. The
rules leading to the current situation are political and economic positions regarding the distribution of entitlements,
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principally those governed by private law rules. As such, a
more frank assessment of those rights and privileges may
lead to the consideration of different forms of property
holding and alternative modes of collective regulation.
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ESSAY

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN POSTCOLONIAL SOCIETIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE PROPOSED
EXPANSION OF THE PANAMA CANAL
Carmen G. Gonzalez*

Vamos a hacer de estas instalaciones recuperadas (Canal de Panamdt) y de esos kil6metros cuadrados (dreas de la Antigua Zona del
Canal), el uso mds colectivo possible. Y
cuando digo el uso mIs colectivo, les estoy
manifestando aquel uso en el que la mayor
parte del pueblo panamefio
pueda disfrutar
1
del esfuerzo de su lucha.
Panama's destiny has been shaped by its geographic
location at the crossroads of international trade.2 Lacking
*Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. I would like
to thank Daniel Suman, Frank Valdes and Colin Crawford for organizing an enlightening one week seminar in Panama during which the
Canal expansion and many other topics were explored. I am especially
grateful to the many Panamanian scholars, government officials and
non-governmental organization representatives who took the time to
meet with us and to share their thoughts and insights.
1President Omar Torrijos, Speech before the Panamanian National
Assembly, August 19, 1977, (quoted in Marco A. Ganddsegui, Los
Retos Que Enfrentan el Paisy el Canalde Panamcd, 113 TAREAS 39
(2003), availableat
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/tarl 13/marco.rtf.) ("We
are going to make the most collective use possible of these recovered
installations (the Panama Canal) and of these square kilometers (the
former Canal Zone). And when I say the most collective use possible, I
mean the use which permits the majority of Panamanians to reap the
rewards of their struggle.").
2 See WALTER LAFEBER, THE PANAMA CANAL: THE CRISIS IN HIS-

TORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (1989).
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mineral wealth or extensive arable lands, the country has
prospered or declined based on the use made by others of
the country's major resource-the Panama Canal.3 The
Panama Canal is a potent symbol of Panamanian identity, a
reminder of Panama's lengthy colonial history, and an
important
generator of income for the modem Panamanian
4
nation.
On December 31, 1999, the United States officially
transferred the Panama Canal to the Panamanian govemment. 5 This transfer was the culmination of a lengthy
struggle for Panamanian
sovereignty and
selfdetermination. 6 With the departure of the United States,
Panamanians would finally have the opportunity to shape
their economic and political destiny subject to the constraints imposed by the global economic order.
The transfer, however, was not a panacea. Even
after the colonial power departed, the institutional and
ideological vestiges of colonialism were not easily eradicated.7 Commentators wondered whether the Panamanian
government would operate the Canal in the interests of the
Panamanian people-as President Omar Torrijos had
hoped-or whether the Canal would be managed just as the
United States had managed it. 8 This question took on particular urgency when the Panamanian government proposed
to expand the Panama Canal in order to increase the Ca9
nal's competitiveness and efficiency.
3See id.
4 See id. at 222-23.
5 See JOHN LINDSAY-POLAND,

EMPERORS IN THE JUNGLE: THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF THE U.S. IN PANAMA 172 (2003).
6 See generally LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 63-102, 222-23.
7 See MAHMUD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY
AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 286 (1996) (observ-

ing that the post-colonial state often reproduces key elements of the
colonial state).
8 See LINDSAY-POLAND, supra note 5, at 190.
9See Panama Canal Authority, Proposal for the Expansion of the Panama Canal: Third Set of Locks, Apr. 24, 2006,
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On April 24, 2006, six years after the transfer, Panamanian authorities announced a $5.25 billion plan to
expand the Canal by constructing a third set of locks.' 0 In
accordance with Panamanian law, the expansion proposal
was submitted to a popular referendum on October 22,
2006 and was overwhelmingly approved." However, the
referendum was plagued with procedural irregularities that
raised questions about the legitimacy of the pro-expansion
outcome-including the absence of a comprehensive assessment of the environmental and socioeconomic impacts
of the controversial project.12
This article will examine the expansion of the Panama Canal as a case study on two distinct but interrelated
challenges faced by post-colonial societies. The first is
how to develop natural resources in Foreword-looking
ways consistent with long-term national self-interest despite the tendency of colonial practices and institutions to
persist long after the colonial power has departed. The
second is how to use environmental impact assessment law
as a tool to enhance public and governmental decisionmaking in the development planning process.
The article is divided into three parts. Part I introduces the Canal expansion case study and describes the
controversial referendum. Part II discusses the role of
environmental impact assessment in development planning,
explains the Panamanian laws and regulations applicable to
http://www.pancanal.com/eng/plan/documentos/propuesta/acpexpansion-proposal.pdf.
'0 See id.
1
'See Marc Lacey, PanamaniansVote Overwhelmingly to Expand
Canal,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2006, at A3.
12 See NotiCen: Central American & Caribbean Affairs, Panama
Canal
Expansion Approved in Heavily CriticizedReferendum, Oct. 26, 2006;
Eric Jackson, EnvironmentalDefense of Torrijos-Alemin Zubieta Plan
Collapses,The Panama News, Sep. 17 - Oct. 7, 2006, Vol. 12, Num.
18 at
http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v 12/issue_18/news_01.html.
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environmental impact assessment, and analyzes and critiques the application of this legal framework to the proposed expansion of the Panama Canal. Part III examines
the ways in which the colonial legacy distorts the development planning process and discusses strategies that might
be deployed to resist the re-imposition of colonial practices
and institutions. Drawing upon the Canal expansion case
study, Part III recommends specific amendments to Panama's environmental impact assessment laws and regulations designed to enhance governmental decision-making
and to promote public participation in the development
planning process.
I. The Panama Canal Expansion Project: Introduction
to the Case Study
In order to examine the multi-layered controversy
over the expansion of the Panama Canal, it is essential to
place the dispute in historical context. This Part presents a
brief history of the Panama Canal, summarizes the arguments for and against the expansion project, and discusses
the highly contentious referendum.
A. Brief History of the Panama Canal
From the earliest days of Spanish colonial rule until
the present, Panama has played a pivotal role in international trade.' 3 During the Spanish empire, Spanish ships
arrived in the Caribbean port of Portobelo, where their
goods were unloaded and hauled by mule across the isthmus to Panama City for distribution to the Spanish colonies
on the Pacific Coast-from San Francisco in the north to
Santiago in the south. 14 Likewise, Peruvian silver was
13

14

See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 3.

See INSTITUTO DEL TERCER MUNDo, GUIA DEL MUNDO: EL MUNDO

DESDE EL SUR 453 (2001) [hereinafter Instituto].
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transported across the isthmus from Panama City to the
Caribbean coast for shipment to Seville.1 5
In 1821, Panama declared its independence from
Spain and joined the Republic of Gran Colombia (a union
of Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador). 16 When this entity
was dissolved in 1830, Panama became part of Colombia. 17
As the U.S. economy expanded in the 1820s, U.S.
businessmen began to eye Panama as a possible location
for a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. i1 U.S.
interest in Panama intensified with the discovery of gold in
California in the 1840s. 19 Because the U.S. transcontinental railroad would not be completed until 1869, U.S. financiers constructed a railroad between Panama City (on the
Pacific Ocean) and the city of Col6n (on the Atlantic
Ocean) between 1851 and 1855 to facilitate the movement
of people and goods to and from California. 20 In its fourteen years of operation, the railroad carried 600,000 passengers and $750 million in gold bullion between the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts.21
The first attempt to construct a canal across Panama
22
was undertaken by the French between 1880 and 1889.
Ferdinand de Lesseps, the famed architect of the Suez Canal, attempted to construct a sea-level canal based on the
Suez model. 23 De Lesseps abandoned the effort in 1889

15 See JOHN MAJOR, PRIZE POSSESSION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE
PANAMA CANAL 1903-1979, 9 (1993).
16 See U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(CIA), THE WORLD

PANAMA, availableat
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/pm.html.
17 See id.
FACTBOOK:

18See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 7-8.
19 See id. at 10.
20 See id.
21 See id.
22
See LINDSAY-POLAND, supra note 5, at 77.
23 See id.
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when disease, financial mismanagement, and construction
setbacks doomed his project to failure. 24
The project was taken up by the United States,
which convinced the Colombian ambassador in Washington, DC to sign a treaty giving the U.S. a 99-year lease on a
six-mile wide canal zone in exchange for a $10 million fee
and annual payments of $250,000.25 Hoping for a better
deal, the Colombian senate unanimously rejected the treaty.
The United States supported Panama's November 1903
Declaration of Independence from Colombia and dispatched the marines to prevent 26Colombian troops from
repressing the Panamanian revolt.
Contrary to popular mythology, Panama's bid for
independence was the product of a lengthy struggle against
Colombia. It was not simply engineered by the United
States at the last minute in order to construct the Canal.
Panamanians had rebelled against Colombia in 1830 and
1831, and perhaps fifty times between 1840 and 1903.28
These rebellions were nurtured by a nationalist ideology
driven by the "geographical myth" that Panama was predestined to control one of the world's greatest trade
routes. 29 This ideology also had a powerful anti-imperialist
element, which was directed initially against Colombia and
30
would later be directed against the United States.
U.S. support for Panamanian independence came at
a great price. In exchange for a $10 million fee and a
$250,000 annual annuity, the Panamanian government was
forced to sign the egregiously one-sided Hay-Bunau Varilla
Treaty (negotiated on Panama's behalf by the French entrepreneur Philippe Bunau Varilla), which gave the United
24

See id.; LAFEBER, supra note

2, at 11.

25 See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at
26 See Instituto, supra note
14.
21 See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at
28 See id. at 20.
29

18.
19-20.

See id.

30 See id. at 20-21.
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States perpetual authority over a ten-mile wide canal zone
and the right to intervene in Panama to maintain public

31

order "in case the Republic of Panama should not be, in the
judgment of the United States, able to maintain such order." 32 Panama surrendered sovereign control of the Canal
Zone, and granted the United States the authority to operate
the Canal Zone "as if it were the sovereign of the territory."
33 The treaty also gave the United States the perpetual right
to use Panama's rivers, lakes and streams for Canal-related
purposes and to use, occupy and control any lands outside
the Canal Zone needed for the construction, operation or
protection of the Canal. 34 Finally, the treaty required Panama to permit free immigration to the Canal Zone by
workers (and their families) of every nationality and pro35
hibited Panama from subjecting them to military service.
The influence of the United States in Panama extended far beyond the Canal Zone. In order to ensure that
the Canal construction would not be disrupted by social
unrest, the United States supported an elite white oligarchy,
crippled the opposition political party, disbanded the army,
and assumed responsibility for protecting the oligarchy
against both internal and external enemies. 36 Using defense
of the Panama Canal as a pretext, the United States intervened militarily in Panama in 1912, 1915, 1918, and 1925
to repress riots and demonstrations. 37 The U.S. condoned
widespread election fraud in the name of political stabil31 See

The Convention Between the United States and Panama for the

Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect the Waters of the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans (1903) at arts. II, XXIV, availableat

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1903panama.html [hereinafter,
Hay-Bunau Varilla Convention]; LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 28-33
(describing the events that led to the treaty).
32 Hay-Bunau Varilla Convention, supra note 31, at art. VII.

" Id. at art. III.
34 See id. at art. I, IV.
31 See id. at art. XXII.
36

See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 40.

" See id. at 56-58.
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38
ity-thereby thwarting Panama's political development.
Finally, the United States dictated Panama's foreign policy
and dominated Panama economically. 39 In effect, Panama

became a U.S. colony.40

The Panama Canal was officially opened on August
15, 1914, and generated huge savings for the U.S. shipping
industry.4 ' In addition to reducing by the trip between New
York and San Francisco nearly 8000 miles, the Canal
charged very modest tolls. 42 Indeed, the United States did
not increase tolls between 1914 and431973 in order to subsidize American shipping companies.
The United States maintained a powerful military
presence in Panama, with fourteen military bases and an
average of 7400 troops between the two world wars.44 By
1943, 63,000 troops were stationed in Panama.45 During
the Cold War, Panama was the site of the U.S. Southern
Command, the command center for U.S. military activities
in Central America and South America. 46 In 1946, the
School of the Americas was established in the Canal
Zone. 47 Between 1950 and 1986, the School of the Americas would train over 57,000 Latin American army and
48
police officers in counter-insurgency operations.
After a period of prosperity during the Second
World War, the Panamanian economy suffered a severe
decline, and was in a state of crisis by 1960. 49 The country
depended on two major sources of revenue. The first was
38 See id. at 54-55.

3 See id. at 58-61.

40

See id. at 52-54.

41 See Instituto, supra note 14,
42 See LAFEBER, supra note 2,

at 453.
at 48.

41 See id.

44 See LINDSAY-POLAND, supra note 5, at 190.
41 See id. at 45.
46 See id. at 106.
47 See id.
48 See id.
49 See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 102.
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banana production, which was controlled by United Fruit;
the second was the North American military-industrial
complex in the Canal Zone, which employed Panamanian
workers and purchased goods from Panamanian merchants. 50 The presence of the Canal Zone created two distinct worlds within a small geographic area:
the
prosperous, air-conditioned First World dominated by the
United States, and the steamy, slum-ridden, povertystricken Third World ruled by an entrenched and corrupt
oligarchy (with U.S. support). 51 As discussed in Part III of
this article, this image of the two Panamas would have a
subtle but powerful impact on the management of the Panama Canal after the transition to Panamanian control.
The 1930s, 1940s and 1950s were characterized by
rising nationalism in Panama as the middle class rebelled
against the oligarchy and demanded better terms in the
relationship between Panama and the United States. 52 In
1958, Panamanian university students entered the Canal
Zone to plant Panamanian flags at strategic locations, but
the flags were promptly removed by Canal police.5 3 Later
that month several students were shot as they participated
in demonstrations demanding Panamanian sovereignty over
the Canal.54 The following year, Panamanian university
students again marched into the Canal Zone to plant Panamanian flags. 55 When one student was arrested and others
were repelled by Canal police and by U.S. troops with fixed
bayonets, rioting broke out in Panama City.56 The riots did
not stop until the Panamanian National Guard was called in
to restore order. 57 In response to the political turmoil, Pres0 See id.

51 See id. at 83-84, 101-05, 118-19.
52

See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 63-98.

51 See id. at 98-99.
14

See id. at 99.

51 See id. at 100.
56
17

See id.
See id.
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ident Eisenhower sent his brother Milton on a fact-finding
mission to Panama, where one Panamanian official explained the situation as follows:
You in the United States inherited vast mineral wealth .... Africa was given gold and
diamonds. The Middle East is rich in oil.
God gave Panama nothing but a waterway.
We must make a living from our own resources as others have from theirs.58
The deadliest riots took place in 1964 after several
hundred Panamanian university students marched peacefully into the Canal Zone to demand that the Panamanian
flag be exhibited alongside the U.S. flag at Balboa High
School.59 When four to five hundred waiting North Americans confronted the students, violence broke out, and the
Panamanian flag was torn. 60 As rumors of the confrontation swept Panama City, as many as 30,000 Panamanians
marched into the streets, congregating in the area near the
Canal Zone. 6 1 U.S. troops took up battle positions and
exchanged gunfire with snipers. 62 Mobs of irate Panamanians responded by ransacking and setting fire to U.S. businesses in Panama City, overturning and burning
automobiles with Canal Zone license plates, and besieging
the U.S. Embassy. 63 The violence quickly spread into CoDuring four days of
16n and the interior of the country.
rioting, twenty-four Panamanians and four U.S. soldiers

58 Id. at 99 (omission in original).
59 See id. at 108.
60 See id; Luis MURILLO, THE NORIEGA MESS: THE DRUGS, THE
CANAL AND WHY AMERICA INVADED 214
61See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 108.

(1995).

See id.
See id. at 109; MURILLO, supra note 60, at 215.
64 See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 109.
62

63
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lost their lives. 65 Over two hundred Panamanians and
eighty-five North Americans were wounded.66
Panamanians increasingly demanded complete sovereignty over the Canal. 67 When General Omar Torrijos
assumed control of the Panamanian government in 1968,
the struggle to wrest control of the Canal from the United
States was elevated to the international stage. 68 Torrijos

sought and obtained support for his cause from other Latin
American countries and the Non-Aligned Movement. 69 He
shrewdly persuaded the United Nations Security Council to
hold its March 1973 meeting in Panama instead of New
York City, and used the meeting to focus world attention
on the canal issue. 70 Delegates were given the opportunity
to see for themselves the stark contrast between the manicured lawns and air-conditioned bungalows of
the Canal
71
Zone, and the wretched slums across the street.
When Jimmy Carter was elected President of the
United States, he made the Canal question one of his top
diplomatic priorities. 72 After difficult negotiations and an
arduous battle to obtain U.S. Senate approval, the Panama
Canal Treaty of 1977 (the "Panama Canal Treaty") and the
See id.
See id.
67 See Instituto, supra note 14, at 454.
65

66

68

See id.

See id.
See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 142.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 150. Carter was determined to negotiate a successful Canal
69

70

treaty for several reasons. First, he wanted to demonstrate that the
United States could work constructively with developing countries and

thereby outmaneuver the Soviet Union. Second, he believed that the
Canal's strategic significance had declined while its potential to ignite
conflict with Panama had increased. Third, he regarded Torrijos as an
ideal negotiating partner ("reasonable and able to control his own

people"), and did not want to jeopardize Torrijos' position in Panama.
Finally, he viewed the negotiation and ratification of a Canal treaty as
the litmus test of his ability to manage foreign affairs. See id. at 158.
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Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation

of the Canal (the "Neutrality Treaty") were ratified by the
U.S. Senate on April 18, 1978. 73 Torrijos had obtained a
Canal treaty, but on terms far less favorable than he had
hoped.74 The Canal would not be handed over to Panama
until the year 2000. 75 Moreover, the U.S. Senate had added
a condition during the ratification process that permitted the
United States to intervene militarily in Panama to reopen
the Canal if the Canal were closed for any reason even after
the year 2000.76

On December 31, 1999, Panamanian president
Mireya Moscoso accepted the formal transfer of the Canal
to the Panamanian nation at a ceremony on the steps of the
Canal administration building. 77 At the time of the transfer,
nearly forty percent of Panamanians lived below the poverty line,78 and Panama had the second most unequal distri-

bution of income in Latin America (after Brazil).79 One
commentator rightfully queried whether the future of the
Canal would be determined by the needs of international
maritime interests or by the needs of the majority of PanaIn order to formulate a preliminary answer to
manians.
this question, it is useful to consider the Canal's physical

71 See id. at 113-15, 145, 148, 159, 178-79, 182. The transfer of the
Canal to Panama was so controversial in the United States that the vote
in the Senate was 68-32 in favor of ratification-barely satisfying the
requisite two-thirds majority. Id. at 182. See also Panama Canal Treaty,
U.S. - C.Z., Sept. 7, 1977, 33 U.S.T. 47; Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, U.S.-C.Z.,
Sept. 7, 1977, 33 U.S.T. 11 [hereinafter Neutrality Treaty].
74 See LAFEBER, supra note 2 at 186.

75 See Panama Canal Treaty, supra note 73, arts. 11(2), XIII(1).
76 See LAFEBER, supra note 2, at 178-81.
77 See LINDSAY-POLAND, supra note 5, at 172.
78 See THE WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 16 (estimating the popula-

tion below the poverty rate in 1999 at 37 percent).
79 See LINDSAY-POLAND, supra note 5, at 176.
8 See id. at 184.
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characteristics and the contentious debate on whether or not
to expand the Canal.
B. The Canal Expansion Proposal and Its Critics
The Panama Canal stretches fifty miles, connecting
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through numerous artificial
channels, three lakes, and a series of locks. 81 Every year
14,000 vessels pass through the Canal, accounting for approximately five percent of the world's trade. 82 Panamanian authorities predict that the Panama Canal will reach its
maximum capacity between 2009 and 2012, and will be
incapable of handling increased ship traffic without a decline in the quality of service. 83 Ships attempting to traverse the Canal are already experiencing significant delays,
and these delays are predicted to worsen as trade volumes
continue to expand.
Additionally, the Panama Canal can only handle socalled Panamex ships-vessels specifically designed to fit
through the Canal's existing locks and capable of carrying
up to 5000 containers. 85 However, with the expansion of
81 See

Global Market Brief: The Panama CanalExpansion, Oct. 26,

2006, http://www.stratfor.con/global_ marketbrief panama canal expansion.

See Larry Luxner, As Panama Plans CanalExpansion, Neighboring
Countries Eye Alternatives, WASHINGTON DIPLOMAT, Mar. 2007,
availableat http://www.washdiplomat.com/March%202007/
a7 03 07.html
83 See Proposalfor the Expansion of the PanamaCanal,supra note 9,
at 34.
84 See id. at 36.
85 See Global Market Brief supra note 81; Lome Matalon, Panama
CanalExpansion Spurs EnvironmentalDebate,NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, June 27, 2007,
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/06/ 070627-panamacanal.html; PanamaApproves CanalExpansion, BBC NEWS, July 15,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/5182472.stm.
82
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trade between Asia and the Americas, an increasing percentage of the world's cargo is being transported on postPanamex vessels capable of carrying up to 12,000 containers. 86 Unable to traverse the Panama Canal, these postPanamex vessels currently unload goods from Asia at ports
on the U.S. West Coast for road or rail transport to the
eastern United States, or travel through the Suez Canal.87
While only approximately one hundred vessels (or ten
percent of all shipping fleets) currently exceed the capacity
of the Panama Canal, it is anticipated that
the number of
88
post-Panamex ships will continue to grow.
In light of anticipated increases in trade volume and
ship size, Panamanian authorities proposed to expand the
Panama Canal in order to strengthen the Canal's competitive position vis-A-vis alternative routes and in order to
increase the efficiency of the Canal's operations. 89 The
expansion project, estimated to cost $5.25 million, consists
of adding a third lane to the Panama Canal, constructing
new lock facilities on both the Atlantic and Pacific sides,
and widening and deepening existing navigation channels. 90 Panamanian authorities contend that the project will
pay for itself through toll increases, will generate ten million dollars in additional toll revenues through 2025, will
employ 6500 to 7000 additional workers during the peak
construction years, and will produce an economic boom in
Panama that will generate an additional 250,000 jobs by
2025.91
86 See Global Market Brief supra note 81; Matalon, supra note 85;

BBC
NEWS, supra note 85.
87
See Gary Corbin, Panama CanalExpansion and the Global Economy, GLOBAL ENVISION, Nov. 20, 2006,
http://globalenvision.org/library/3/1339.
88 See id.; Global Market Brief supra note 81.
89 See Proposalforthe Expansion of the
Panama Canal,supra note 9,
at 31, 39-40.
90 See id. at 3-5, 10.
"' See id. at 57, 61, 66-68.
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Critics of the project paint a far gloomier picture.
First, they disagree with the government's claim that the
Canal will shortly reach full capacity and question the need
for the project. 92 Second, they contend that the government
has underestimated the cost of the project and has overestimated the project's future revenues. 93 Third, they predict
that the project will result in a net economic loss and that
the Panamanian elite will siphon off the project's benefits
while imposing an enormous financial burden on the
Panamanian nation. 94 Fourth, they contend that the project
will squander resources needed for health, education, transportation, and other national priorities. 95 Finally, the project's opponents predict an ecological disaster that could
result in deforestation, loss of biological diversity, and
salinization of the water supply of the Panama City metropolitan area. 96 These arguments are explored in greater
detail in Part II, Section D of this article. They are mentioned here to underscore the controversy surrounding the
expansion proposal and lay the groundwork for the discussion of the referendum.
C. The Panama Canal Authority and the Canal
Expansion Referendum
The referendum on the proposed expansion of the
Panama Canal must be understood in the context of the
unique constitutional status of the governmental entity
responsible for the Canal's operation and management. In
See Roberto N. Mndez, Por Qu6 Panamd Debe Decir "No" a la
Propuestadel Tercer Juego de Esclusas, 124 TAREAS (Sept.-Dec.
2006), available at http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/
ar/libros/panama/cela/ tareas/tar 124/06mendez.pdf.
92

9' See id.
94 See id.
" See id.
96 See Panama Canal Expansion Approved in Heavily CriticizedReferendum, supra note 12.
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recognition of the important economic role of the Panama

Canal and of the Canal's significance as a symbol of Panamanian nationhood, the Panamanian Constitution declares
the Panama Canal the "inalienable patrimony of the Panamanian nation," 97 and creates an autonomous institution,
the Panama Canal Authority (Autoridad del Canal de Panamd, or ACP), to "operate the Canal in a manner that is
safe continuous, efficient and profitable." 98 The ACP is
autonomous in at least three distinct ways. First, the ACP's
administrators are insulated from partisan politics by the
constitutional requirement that the first board members be
appointed to staggered terms. 99 Second, while the ACP
makes annual payments to the Panamanian national treasury based on Canal revenues, the ACP's budget is separate
from the national budget.' 00 Third, the ACP's employees
are subject to a merit-based employment regime similar to
the regime in place prior to the transfer of the Canal from
the United States to Panama.'
The administrative structure and specific responsibilities of the ACP are detailed in
the Organic Law of the Panama Canal Authority, National
02
Assembly Law No. 19 (the Organic Law).1
The Panamanian Constitution makes the ACP acountable to the Panamanian electorate by requiring a referendum before certain major changes to Canal operations
are undertaken. 1° 3 Under article 325 of the Panamanian
97 See

Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblica de Panamd art. 315 (2004),
http://www.epasa.com/constitucion/ constitucion.pdf.
98
See id. at art. 3 16.

99 See id. at art. 318; see also PANAMA CANAL AUTHORITY, ACP
Over-

view, http://www.pancanal. com/eng/general/acp-overview.htm.
100 See Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblica de Panam, arts. 320-21
(2004).

101 See id. at art. 322
Organic Law of the Panama Canal Authority, Panama National
Assembly Law No. 19, (June 11, 1997),
http://www.pancanal.com/eng/legal/law/law.pdf.
103 See Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblica de Panamd, supra
note 97,
102See

at art. 325.
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Constitution, any proposal for the construction of a third set
of locks or a sea-level canal on the existing route must be
approved by the executive branch and then submitted to the
National Assembly for approval or rejection. 1 4
If
approved, the proposal must be submitted to a popular
referendum no earlier than three months 0 5after the proposal's approval by the National Assembly.'
On April 24, 2006, the ACP's Board of Directors
presented its proposal to Panamanian President Martin
Torrijos for the construction of a third set of locks.' 0 6 A
few months later, President Torrijos and the Cabinet Council of Panama approved the proposal and submitted it to the
National Assembly.1" 7 In July 2006, the National Assembly unanimously endorsed the expansion proposal and,
pursuant to the Panamanian Constitution, passed a law
mandating that a referendum be conducted at least ninety
days after the National Assembly's approval of the proposal. 108

The referendum took place on October 22, 2006,
and nearly eighty percent of the voters supported the proposed Canal expansion. 10 9 On November 1, 2006, Panama's Electoral Tribunal published a resolution
104

See id.

105 See id.
106
107

Proposal for Expansion of the Panama Canal, supra note 9, at 1.
PresidentMartin TorrijosApproves Panama Canal Expansion

Proposaland Submits it to the NationalAssembly, PANAMA CANAL
AUTHORITY, June 27, 2006. http://www.pancanal.com/eng/plan/
documentos/propuesta/acp-expansion-natl-assembly.pdf.
108 See Panama CanalExpansion Takes Major Step Forward:National
Assembly UnanimouslyApproves Expansion Proposal,Passes Law
MandatingReferendum, PANAMA CANAL AUTHORITY, July 17, 2006,
availableat
http://www.pancanal.com/eng/plan/documentos/propuesta/acpexpansion-referendum.pdf; National Assembly Law No. 28, arts. 1, 78 (July 17, 2006), http://www.pancanal.com/
eng/plan/documentos/referencia/acp-plan-ref-ley-28.pdf.
109 See Lacey, supra note 11.
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announcing the "Si" victory in the referendum and authorizing the ACP to execute the proposal for the construction
of a third set of locks in the Panama Canal. 110 Curiously,
turnouts ever."11
this was one of Panama's lowest voter
Since only about forty percent of eligible voters showed up
of the electorate actually
at the polls, only thirty percent
1 12
expansion.
approved the Canal
The ostensible purpose of a referendum on the construction of the third set of locks is to ensure that the Panamanian people have a say in the management of a resource
that is an important symbol of the Panamanian sovereignty
and an essential source of national revenue. The low voter
turnout raises questions about the ACP's popular mandate
to expand the Canal. Even more disturbing are the allegations of impropriety with respect to how the referendum
was carried out. These concerns are two-fold. First, the
public was not provided with the necessary information to
make an informed decision about the environmental and
socioeconomic impacts of the proposed Canal expansion.
Second, the referendum process was fraught with procedural irregularities designed to favor the proponents of the
Canal expansion and to silence the opposition. These irregularities are discussed in Part II below in the context of
the applicable legal requirements regarding environmental
impact assessment.
II. Environmental Impact Assessment and the Referendum Process
Environmental Impact Assessment (hereinafter
"EIA") is an evaluation of the environmental consequences
of proposed projects, activities and programs in order to
11o See Boletin del Tribunal Electoral, Resoluci6n 387 (Nov. 1, 2006)
(on file with the author).
111See Lacey supra note 11.
112See id.
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integrate environmental protection into development planning. 113 Because a project or activity might also have significant social and economic consequences, social impact
analysis (SIA) is often part of the EIA process.' 14 The
following sections discuss the basic principles of EIA,
examine Panama's EIA legislation, and utilize this information to analyze and critique the procedural irregularities that
marred the referendum process.
A. Environmental Impact Assessment: Origins
and Basic Principles
EIA emerged as a regulatory tool in the early 1970s
with the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) in the United States, 1 5 and was subsequently
adopted by both high and low-income countries and by
international aid and financial institutions.16 Currently,
over 150 countries have domestic EIA legislation. 117 EIA
requirements are so pervasive that some would argue that
the duty to assess environmental impacts
has become a
118
law.
international
of
principle
fundamental
The primary objectives of the EIA process are twofold. First, the EIA process is designed to ensure that the
possible impacts of a proposed project are fully identified

113See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND
POLICY 531 (2007).
114 See UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE (UNECE), POLICIES AND SYSTEMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT

21-22 (1991).

115See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 4321-46 (2001). The NEPA regulations are set forth at 40 C.F.R. §§
1500.1-1517.7
(1985).
116
See ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES: PRINCIPLES METHODS, AND PRACTICE

3 (Normian

Lee & Clive George, eds. 2000).
117 See HUNTERET AL., supra note 113, at 533.
118

See id.
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and analyzed before a decision is made. 1 9 Second, the EIA
process is a tool to inform the public about the proposed
project and to solicit meaningful1 public input on the proj ect's potential costs and benefits. 20
One key aspect of the EIA process is the identification of alternatives to the proposed project. 12 1 In the absence of alternatives,

the

EIA becomes

a post-hoc

122
justification for a decision that has already been made.
Instead of evaluating only one course of action, the EIA
should consider alternative ways of achieving a particular
goal so that the decision-maker may select the alternative
that minimizes environmental, social and economic
costs. 123 As explained in the following sections, Panama's
EIA legislation incorporates some but not all of these established EIA principles.

B. Environmental Impact Assessment:
Panama's Legal Framework
Under the Panamanian Constitution and under the
ACP's Organic Law, the ACP is responsible for the conservation of the Canal's water resources. 124 The ACP must
protect the water resources of the Canal in order to operate
the Canal and to supply drinking water to the communities
" 9 See id. at 531.
120 See id. at 531-34.
121 See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 957-63

(1994); WILLIAM A. TILLEMAN, Public Participationin the Environmental Impact Assessment Process:A ComparativeStudy of Impact
Assessment in Canada, the UnitedStates and the EuropeanCommu-

nity, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 384-393 (1995); UNECE,
supra note 114, at 15;WORLD BANK, THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT: A REVIEW OF WORLD BANK EXPERIENCE, World Bank

Technical Paper No. 363 at 30-34 (1997).
122 See UNECE, supra note 114, at 15.
123See id.

124 See CONSTITUCION POLOTICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE PANAMA, supra

note 97, art. 316; ORGANIC LAW, supra note 102 , at arts. 120-21.
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surrounding the Canal. 125 These communities comprise
approximately sixty percent of Panama's population and
include the nation's capital, Panama City. 12' The ACP, in

consultation with other government authorities, must protect the environment in the Canal watershed, and must
assess the environmental impact of projects and 1activities
27
that may significantly impact the Canal watershed.
According to the regulations promulgated by the
ACP pursuant to the Organic Law, the ACP is responsible
for reviewing and approving EIAs for its own projects as
well as for projects conducted by third parties in the Canal
watershed; these EIAs must be performed in accordance
with the ACP manual developed for this purpose. 128 However, the ACP's regulations subject projects referenced in
article 325 of the Panamanian Constitution (such as the
construction of a third set of locks) to the EIA requirements
of the National Environmental Authority (Autoridad Nasupra note 102, art. 120.
Presentation by Roy Phillipps, ACP attorney, during meeting with

125See ORGANIC LAW,
126

ACP staff in the ACP office in the former Canal Zone, Dec. 13, 2007
(notes on file with the author); See also, Juan Luis Batista, Panamdy
Col6n: g Una Sola Ciudad?,LA PRENSA, Feb. 7, 2000 (explaining that
approximately half of Panama's population resides in the area surrounding the Panama Canal).
127

See ORGANIC LAW, supra note 102, arts. 121 (1), (5).
No. 116, arts. 5, 7, 14, and 37-42 (July 27, 2006),

128See ACUERDO

http://www.pancanal.com/esp/legal reglamentos/acuerdo 116.pdf. At
the conclusion of a meeting at the ACP's offices in the former Canal
Zone on December 13, 2007, the ACP staff provided the author with a
copy of the Manual Thcnico de Evaluaci6n Ambiental (2006) prepared
by the ACP and with ANAM's Manual Operativo de Evaluaci6n de
Impacto Ambiental (Resoluci6n No. AG-0292-01) (Dec. 9, 2001). The
ACP staff also provided the author with the Environmental Evaluation
Manual (January 1999) prepared for the Panama Canal Commission
(the ACP's predecessor) by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mobile
District. These EIA manuals do not appear to be available on the ACP
website despite the availability of voluminous background materials on
the Canal as well as the statutes and regulations applicable to the ACP.
See http://www.pancanal.com (last visited on March 3, 2008).
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cional del Ambiente, or ANAM) and to the approval of
both ANAM and the ACP. 129 Because the ACP's own
regulations subject the Panama Canal expansion project to
ANAM's procedural and substantive EIA requirements, it
is useful to examine the source and scope of ANAM's
regulatory authority.
ANAM was created by Law No. 41, the general environmental law for the Republic of Panama, which was
enacted by the National Assembly on July 1, 1998.130 Law
No. 41 grants ANAM the authority to enforce Panama's
environmental laws, regulations, and national environmental policy.' 31 Among ANAM's obligations are the
evaluation of EIAs and the promotion of public participation in the enforcement of environmental legislation and in
the development and implementation
of environmental
132
policies, strategies, and programs.
Law No. 41 requires the preparation of an EIA prior
to the commencement of any activity, work, or project in
Panama that may generate environmental risks, including
projects to be conducted in the Canal watershed, and designates ANAM as the regulatory entity responsible for EIA
review and approval. 133 The EIA evaluation process consists of three steps: the submission of the EIA to ANAM;
the evaluation of the EIA and its approval or rejection by
ANAM; and, if the project is approved, the supervision and
evaluation of the project's execution by the designated
environmental authority. 134 ANAM is responsible for public consultation on the EIA, and must provide a public

129

See id., art. 40.

130See

Ley General de Ambiente de la Repfiblica de PanamAi, No. 41,

art. 5 (July 1, 1998), availableathttp://www/
asamblea.gob.pa/NORMAS/1980/1983_018_0598.PDF.
131See id.
132 See id., at art. 7 (10), (11).
133 See id., at art. 23.
134
See id. at art. 24.
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comment period. 13 5 If the project proponent fails to submit
an EIA or submits an inadequate EIA, ANAM may enjoin
36
the implementation of the project or impose sanctions.'
Pursuant to Law No. 41, ANAM has promulgated regulations detailing
the EIA requirements and has produced an
137
manual.
EIA
The ACP's Organic Law, which was promulgated
one year after Law No. 41, is silent on the relationship
between the authority of ANAM and the ACP with respect
to the approval of Canal-related EIAs. 138 However, the
Organic Law does require the ACP to protect the Canal
'1 39
watershed "in coordination with competent authorities,"
and authorizes the ACP to promulgate EIA regulations
"taking into account the general provisions in force in Panama., 140 Far from displacing ANAM's authority over
Canal-related EIAs, the language of the Organic Law appears to defer to pre-existing environmental legislation.
Notwithstanding the Organic Law's apparent deference to ANAM's regulatory authority under Law No. 41,
the ACP promulgated regulations on July 27, 2006 (five
weeks before the referendum) that make the ACP the sole
arbiter of all EIAs for Canal-related projects except major
construction projects contemplated by article 325 of the
Panamanian Constitution (such as the construction of the
third set of locks). 14 1 Because the ACP did carve out a
See id. at art. 27.
See id. at art. 30.
137
ANAM's EIA regulations are set forth in EXECUTIVE DECREE No.
115

136

209 (Sept. 5, 2006) (on file with the author). ANAM's EIA manual,
which was supplied to the author by the ACP staff, is contained in
RESOLUCI6N No. AG-0292-01 (Dec. 9, 2001) (on file with the author)
availableat

www.asamblea.gob.pa/legispan/PDFNORMAS/2000/2001/2001_303
3913.PDF.
138 See generally, Organic Law, supra note 102.
139 See id., at art. 12 1(1).
140 See id., at art. 121(5).
141 See Acuerdo 116, supra note 128, at arts. 5,7, 40.
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narrow exception for Article 325 projects, there is no ques-

tion that the proposed expansion of the Panama Canal is
and approvals of both the
subject to the EIA14 requirements
2
ANAM.
ACP and
ANAM's EIA manual unequivocally recognizes
that environmental impact assessment is a tool for enhancing and informing decision-making by government agencies and by the public-rather than a post-hoc
143 Simirationalization for previously approved projects.
larly, while the ACP's EIA manual emphasizes the technical rather than policy aspects of environmental impact
assessment, the EIA manual prepared by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers for the Panama Canal Commission (the
ACP's predecessor), which is used as a reference by the
ACP, explains that the fundamental purpose of the EIA
process is to enhance decision-making by government
agencies and by the public by providing information about
the environmental impact of proposed actions.1 44 The
ANAM EIA manual points out that EIAs should be conducted at the earliest possible stage of the contemplated
project or action.' 45 The Panama Canal Commission EIA
manual emphasizes that the methodology utilized should
"bring together the results of all environmental studies
conducted to allow preparation of a single consolidated

document describing the considered action's total im142
143

See id., art. 40; Constituci6n Politica, supra note 97, at art. 325.
See ANAM, Manual Operativo de Evaluaci6n de Impacto Ambien-

tal (RESOLUCION No. AG-0292-01) (Dec. 9, 2001) § 1.1.2, at 10 (on
file with the author).
144
See U.S. ARMY CORPS

TAL ENVIRONMENTAL

OF ENGINEERS (USACE), ENVIRONMENEVALUATION MANUAL at 28 (Jan. 1999) (on file

with the author). ACP attorney Roy Phillipps informed the author that
the USCACE manual has been superseded by the ACP's EIA manual
and is currently used only as a reference. See March 28, 2008 e-mail
correspondence between Roy Phillipps and the author (on file with the

author).

See ANAM, Manual Operativo de Evaluaci6n de Impacto Ambiental, supra note 143, at 4, 10.
145
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pacts." 146 Both the ANAM and Panama Canal Commission
EIA manuals discuss the importance of evaluating alternatives to the proposed action and of analyzing environmental
147
and socioeconomic impacts in an integrated manner.
C. Subversion of the Referendum Process
through Environmental Non-Compliance
In light of the foregoing language in the ANAM
EIA manual and in light of Law No. 41 's prohibition on the
commencement of projects or activities in the absence of an
EIA, one would expect that a comprehensive EIA on a
project as significant as the Panama Canal expansion would
be completed and submitted for public comment and for
ANAM and ACP approval prior to a national referendum.
In the absence of a completed EIA, it would be difficult for
Panamanian voters to fully assess the costs and benefits of
the proposed Canal expansion.
Regrettably, the referendum took place before an
EIA for the Canal expansion was produced and in the face
of conflicting claims about the authority of ANAM to review and approve EIAs for Canal-related projects. The
comprehensive Environmental Impact Study for the construction of the third set of locks was not completed until
July of 2007 (nine months after the referendum), 148 and was
not approved by ANAM until November of that same
year. 149 While the ACP prepared several environmental
146

28.
147

See USACE, Environmental Evaluation Manual, supra note 144, at
See id. at 3-4, 190-97; ANAM, Manual Operativo de Evaluaci6n de

Impacto Ambiental, supra note 143, at 4.
148 See Panama Canal Authority, Environmental Impact Study (EIS) for
the Panama Canal Project-Third Set of Locks (2007),
http://www.pancanal.com/eng/expansion/eisa/index.html.
149
See Panama Canal Authority,
http://www.pancanal.com/esp/ampliacion/eisa/ (last visited March 2,
2008) (listing the EIAs prepared by ACP and the dates of ANAM
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and socioeconomic impact evaluations prior to the referenfora,'5 °
dum and presented these to the public in various
these piecemeal assessments fell short of the comprehensive study recommended by the Panama Canal Commission
EIA manual, and were not reviewed and approved by
ANAM. 151
In the weeks preceding the referendum, Panamanian citizens and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
began to criticize the "Si" campaign (the government's
campaign in favor of the Canal expansion) for proposing to
expand the Panama Canal without first having performed
an EIA and for side-stepping ANAM's regulatory authorIn response, ANAM director Ligia Castro de Doens
ity.1
announced that a review of an EIA by ANAM would only
be necessary if the ballot proposal was approved. 53 Furthermore, the ACP declared that, pursuant to the ACP's
rule making power under the 1999 Organic Law, "to deapproval and explaining that ANAM approved the Environmental
Impact Study for the Third Set of Locks on November 9, 2007 pursuant
to Resoluci6n DIEORA 632-2007). It appears that the constructionrelated ElAs produced by the ACP after the referendum were all apVroved
by ANAM.
0 Presentation by Hortensia Broce, ACP official, during meeting with
ACP staff in the ACP office in the former Canal Zone, Dec. 13 ,2007
(notes on file with the author).
151See Panama Canal Authority, Estudios Complementarios,
http://www.pancanal.com/esp/ampliacion/
esia/complementarios/index.html (providing links to these earlier
studies); Manuel Zdrate, El Canal,El Ambiente y el Proyecto de Ampliaci6n, 124 TAREAS (Sept.-Dec. 2006), availableat
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/panama/cela/tareas/tarl 24
/04zarate.pdf (discussing the inadequacy of the fragmented environmental studies).
152 See Eric Jackson, supra note 12; Asociaci6n EcologistaPanamefay
Asociaci6n de DerechoAmbiental, En peligro la vida y el ambiente de
los panamefios, 124 TAREAS (Sept-Dec. 2006), availableat
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/panama/cela/tareas/tarl24
/1Oguevara.pdf.
153See Jackson, supra note 12.
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velop projects in the area that can affect the environment
[and] to approve environmental impact studies that are
required for authority projects . . . are functions of the

[ACP] administrator."' 154 In other words, the ACP took the
position that ANAM's review of EIAs, as required by Law
No. 41, did not apply to the ACP, and that if the referendum passed, the ACP would be authorized to approve its
own EIA. 155
The positions taken by ANAM and by the ACP in
connection with the EIA for the Canal expansion generated
controversy in Panama. Former ANAM director Gonzalo
Mendndez argued that the Organic Law did not give the
ACP the power to usurp Panama's environmental legislation. 156 Mr. Mendndez alleged that the ACP "attempt[s]
with unnatural and absurd legalisms to make us believe that
there is no conflict of interest if the ACP does an environ57
mental impact study and the same ACP approves it." 1
In short, the referendum process was abused. The
Panamanian electorate was asked to approve an extremely
expensive and controversial project in the absence of comprehensive information about the potential environmental
and socioeconomic impacts and on the basis of piecemeal
ACP studies that were not reviewed and approved in advance by ANAM.
D. Manipulation of the Referendum Process to
Suppress the "No" Vote
In addition to the absence of a comprehensive EIA
for the proposed Canal expansion project, the referendum
was marred by procedural irregularities designed to favor
the "Si" campaign and silence the opposition.

156

See id.
See id.
See id.

157

See id.

154
155
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First, the government's handling of the proposed
Canal expansion lacked transparency. According to former
Canal administrator Fernando Manfredo, the Panamanian
public was kept in the dark during the nearly ten years that
the ACP developed its studies and proposals regarding the
future of the Canal.158 By contrast, other interested parties,
including shipping companies, the international community, the Panamanian construction industry, and the Panamanian association of15 9engineers and architects, were
consulted and informed.
When the Canal expansion proposal finally saw the
light of day, the public was given only a few months to
read, digest and analyze 55,000 pages of studies and supporting documents far too technical for the average lay
person to understand. 160 To add insult to injury, the ACP's
studies were initially available only in English. 16 1 As Professor Miguel Antonio Bernal from the University of Panama pointed out, English is not the official language of
Panama. 162 Professor Bernal condemned the ACP for placing the burden on Panamanian citizens to translate the
ACP's studies into Spanish.'63
Second, the government was accused of using public funds to promote the "Si" campaign by taking over the
airwaves and saturating radio and television broadcasts
with pro-expansion propaganda. 164 Much of this propa158

See Fernando Manfredo, Canal de Panamd: El Proyecto del Tercer

Juego de Esclusas, 124 TAREAS (Sept.-Dec. 2006), availableat
htttp://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/panama/cela/tareas/tarl2
4/02 manfredo.pdf.
159 See id.

160 See id.; NotiCen, supra note
12.
161Miguel Antonio Bemal, The Right

to Information, The Panama
News, May 7-20, 2006, Vol. 12, Num. 9 at
http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v 12/issue 09/opinion 02.html.
162See id.
163See id.
164 See NotiCen, supra note 12.
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ganda was intended to manipulate nationalist sentiment.1 65
For example, on April 25, 2006, in an event marked by
patriotic pomp and circumstance, President Torrijos endorsed the ACP's proposal and proclaimed that the Canal
expansion would elevate Panama to the status of a First
World nation.' 66 The ceremony concluded with all of the
participants standing and proudly singing the national anthem. 16 7 As if to discourage the public from reading the
55,000 pages of Canal-related documents, the ACP deputized sixty functionaries to explain in simple terms all of
the Canal expansion's benefits.1 68 The ACP reportedly
hired a global public relations firm to disparage antiexpansion research projects and marginalize the grassroots
"No" campaign. 169 According to the Frente Nacional por la
Defensa de los Derechos Econ6micos y Sociales
(FRENADESO), an umbrella organization of groups opposed to the Canal expansion,17the
cost of the "Si" campaign
0
was a staggering $1.8 billion.
Third, the government allegedly used public funds
to purchase votes from vulnerable segments of the population. President Torrijos purportedly gave indigent families
a bi-monthly payment of $35 and informed them that this
assistance could only be sustained in the future if the "Si"
vote were to prevail. 17 1 Similarly, President Torrijos raised
eyebrows when he gave every representative of the country's corregimientos (the smallest level of local govern165
166
167
168

See Manfredo, supra note 158.

See id.
See id.
See id.

169

See Danielle Ryan, PR PushingThrough the PanamaCanal Expansion, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Oct. 20, 2006,
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0610/S00338.html.
170 See NotiCen, supra note 12.
171 See Eric

Jackson, On the Campaign Trailfor the Canal Expansion

Referendum, The Panama News, June 4-17, 2006, Vol. 12, Num. 11,
http://www.thepanamanews.co/pn/v_ 12/issue_ 11/ business_02.html.
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ment) $80,000 for social projects in the midst of the proexpansion campaign.172
Fourth, the media collaborated with the "Si" campaign by suppressing reports unfavorable to the expansion
project during the referendum. For example, newspaper
columnist Maribel Cuervo de Paredes alleged that she was
fired from La Prensa (a major Panamanian newspaper)
after 15 years of service for writing against the Canal expansion. 173 According to Cuervo de Paredes,
[t]he media have suppressed all the points
and arguments of the proponents of the
"No" [campaign]. And the reason is very
simple. The owners of the media in Panama
are owners of important businesses or form
part of the law firms that litigate or provide
services to the shipping companies or who
[sic] represent firms or companies that proto the ACP.
vide services or sell 1products
74
It's a matter of money.
When the Catholic Church demanded a fair debate
over the proposed expansion project, La Prensa gave twice
as much coverage to expansion proponents than to the
Catholic bishops and no coverage to the views of the expansion opponents.1 75 In some instances, newspaper reporters were, themselves, compromised by association with
172

See NotiCen, supra note 12.

173

See id. Cuervo de Paredes claims that she was informed by her

publisher that her column would be cancelled because her views were
supposedly not "objective." See Ashley Dalman, Expanding the Panama Canal: A Wider Canalor More GovernmentalPayola? Council
on Hemispheric Affairs, Aug. 8, 2006,
http://www.coha.org/2006/08/08/expanding-the-panama-canal-a-widercanal-or-more-government-payola/.
174

175

See NotiCen, supra note 12.
See Dalman, supra note 173.
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the "Si" campaign. For example, the president of the Colegio de Periodistas (the journalists' trade association) was
that
the owner of the firm hired by the civic associations
76
1
referendum.
the
in
campaign
supported the "Si"
Sixth, opponents of the Canal expansion were allegedly arrested, beaten, or otherwise intimidated in order to
suppress the "No" vote. For example, anti-expansion campaigners were reportedly arrested in Chiriqui and in Panama City; subjected to detention and physical abuse in
Cocl&, Santiago de Veraguas, and Arraijdn; and maimed in
Chitr6 for passing out "No" campaign literature. 177 There
is also evidence that employees of Constructora Urbana
S.A. (CUSA), a construction company owned by ACP
administrator Alberto Alemdn Zubieta, were paid to become members of the pro-expansion "Obreros de la Construcci6n por el Si, "an ad hoc organization created to give
the impression that workers supported the Canal expansion.
Finally, the voting process itself was full of irregularities. On the day of the referendum, former Panamanian
President Guillermo Endara, who dressed in red from head
to toe to show his opposition to the expansion, complained
that polling place workers wore "Si" clothing and handed
out cards with directions on where and how to vote-with
the "Si" campaign printed on the
propaganda supporting
79
side.'
opposite
E. Why the Canal Expansion Was Controversial
The subversion of the referendum process is unfortunate because the Canal expansion proposal was contro176

See NotiCen, supra note 12.

177 id.
178
179

See id.
PanaGal, Expansion ofPanama Canal isApproved, Sept. 4, 2007,

http://www.panamaexpertos.com/expansion-of-panama-canal-isapproved.
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versial and merited thoughtful public debate and analysis.
While this article will not attempt to resolve the substantive
controversy over the Canal expansion project, this section
discusses the concerns expressed by the expansion project's
critics in order to highlight the numerous environmental
and socioeconomic impacts that should have been analyzed
in painstaking detail in a comprehensive EIA prior to the
referendum.
1. Environmental Concerns
The major environmental concerns voiced by the
opponents of the Panama Canal expansion include salinization of the drinking water supply, the potential migration of
species between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and deforestation.
At first glance, the proposed expansion project appears to be environmentally benign. All of the construction
will take place in areas that were previously dredged, filled,
and deforested during the initial Canal construction and
during the aborted effort in the 1930s to begin work on a
third set of locks.' 80 The project will recycle sixty percent
of the water it uses, which means that the new locks will
181
use seven percent less water than the old locks.
However, on closer inspection, studies performed
by the ACP's own environmental consultants raise serious
questions about the possible salinization of the drinking
water upon which the Panama City metropolitan area relies. i8 2 Miraflores, Gatin, and Alajuela are the three
freshwater lakes used to fill the Canal's locks and to supply
180See Panama

Canal Authority, Proposalforthe Expansion of the

Panama Canal,supra note 9, at 14, 24.
"' See id. at 46-47; Matalon, supra note 85.
182 See Ariel Rodriguez Vargas, Impacto
de la Ampliaci6n en Los
Lagos Gatzin y Miraflores, 124 TAREAS (Sept.-Dec. 2006), availableat
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/panama/cela/tareas/
tarl24/09vargas.pdf.
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drinking water to the neighboring population.1 83 The environmental studies commissioned by the ACP suggest that
the salinization of these lakes is already taking place and
that the water recycling operations of the new locks will
184
likely accelerate the intrusion of saltwater into the lakes.
In addition, underwater blasting and dredging associated
with the construction project may contaminate the water
supply. 185 According to the project's critics, the public
documents prepared by the ACP prior to the referendum
are misleading because they reassure the public that water
quality will not be impaired by the construction of a third
set of locks and
do not address the considerable evidence to
86
the contrary.
A second concern articulated by environmentalists
is that the new locks will facilitate the passage of species
from one ocean to the other, potentially damaging Caribbean coral reefs and other ecosystems. 87 As Greenpeace
observes, "[t]he creation of artificial corridors that allow
migration of species from previously separate habitats is of
great concern because it is highly likely to have unpredictable and potentially catastrophic consequences on the finely balanced web of life in each habitat."'1 88 Scientists have
identified a number of exotic species transported into the
See id.
See id.; Jackson, supra note 12.
185See Matthew Parker, Changing Course, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 28,
183
184

2007).
186 See Rodriguez Vargas, supra note 182; Jackson, supra note 12. For
example, the ACP's Proposalforthe Expansion of the Panama Canal
states that "[e]ven when operating at maximum capacity, the third set
of locks, equipped with water reutilization basins, will not affect the
water quality of Gatfin and Alajuela lakes or that of their tributaries.
These lakes will keep their tropical fresh water quality with stable
ecosystems, and the water will be kept to well within appropriate quality levels and standards in order that they can be made potable and used
by the population." Panama Canal Authority, supra note 9, at 51.
187 See NotiCen, supra note 12.

188 See Parker, supra note 185.
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waters of the Canal during the Canal's initial construction

and subsequent operation, but there is a dearth of research
1 89
on the effects of these species upon native ecosystems.
Finally, the construction of a third set of locks will
result in the fragmentation and destruction of approximately 490 hectares of forests. 190 The deforestation is
anticipated to produce ecosystem disruptions and loss of
biological diversity. 191 Among the forests potentially affected are the mangrove forests currently providing important ecosystem services in the form of flood control by
absorbing billions of liters of water in their complex root
systems. 192 The destruction of these forests may increase
the risk of urban flooding 93during the rainy season, particularly in the city of Col6n.1
2. Socioeconomic Concerns
The socioeconomic concerns articulated by the
project's critics are complex and voluminous and are discussed only briefly below.
First, critics of the Canal expansion dispute the
ACP's claim that the expansion is needed in order to maintain the Canal's competitiveness, question the economic
feasibility of the project, and assert that project costs will
exceed project revenues. 194 Numerous commentators have
observed that the ACP's $5.25 billion cost estimate is
grossly understated and that the real cost of the Canal ex-

See Andrea Gawrylewski, OpeningPandora'sLocks, 21 THE SCIENTIST 47, 52-53, Oct. 1, 2007.
190
See Fernando Manfredo, Canal de Panamiy Medio Ambiente, 126
TAREAS 103, 103-06 (May-Aug. 2007).
189

191

See id.

192 See Gawrylewski, supra note 189, at 47-48.
193See id.
194
See M6ndez, supra note 92.
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pansion is likely to exceed $10 billion. 195 Project critics
dispute the ACP's assertion that these costs can be recovered through toll increases without undermining the competitiveness of the Panama Canal vis-d-vis alternative
routes. 196 These critics point out that the ACP's ability to
increase tolls is constrained by competition from the Suez
Canal and from the U.S. overland route. 197 Furthermore, if
global warming opens up an Arctic route (the coveted
Northwest passage)-a much shorter path than the Panama
Canal for trade between Europe and Asia and between the
U.S. East Coast and Asia-then the Panama Canal may
198
have to reduce tolls in order to remain competitive.
195 See id.; Luxner, supra note 82; Tomdis Drohan Ruiz, El Verdadero
Costo de la Ampliaci6n del Canalde Panamd, 124 TAREAS (Sept.-Dec.
2006), availableat http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/ panama/cela/ tareas/tar124/05ruiz.pdf.
196 See Roberto N. M~ndez, ViabilidadFinancierade un Tercer Juego
de Esclusas, 126 TAREAS 89, 95-96 (May-Aug. 2007); Fernando Manfredo, Los Estudios Sobre la Ampliaci6n del Canal de Panamd, 123
TAREAS (May-Aug. 2006), availableat
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/panama/cela/ tareas/tarl23/04 manfredo.pdf.
197 See Manfredo, supra note 158.
198 See id.; Corbin, supra note 87; Scott Borgerson, The Scramblefor
the Arctic, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 63, 68-71 (2008). As a consequence

of global warming, the Arctic ice cap has been melting at a far more
rapid rate than had been projected by almost all of the computergenerated simulations. See Andrew C. Revkin, The Arctic 's Alarming
Sea Change: DwindlingIce Cap Concerns Scientists But Heartens
Traders, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 3, 2007, at 5. The thinning of

the Arctic ice cap increases the feasibility of the Northwest Passage as
a shorter route than the Panama Canal between the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans - both during the summer months (for normal ships) and yearround (for ships equipped with ice breakers). See Robert Wade, A
Warmer Arctic Needs Shipping Rules, FINANCIAL TIMES (Asia Edition),

Jan. 16, 2008, at 11; Saran Somanthan, Peter C. Flynn & Jozef K.
Szymanski, Feasibilityof a Sea Route Through the CanadianArctic, 9
MARITIME ECONOMICS AND LOGISTICS 324 (2007). Some experts
believe that a tipping point has already been reached and that increasingly faster melting will make the Northwest Passage a viable altema-
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These critics also question the ACP's assertion that the
Canal will shortly reach maximum capacity, and cite numerous studies predicting a far lower annual increase in
trade volumes than projected by the ACP. 199 In short, the
project opponents argue that the Canal expansion is of
dubious economic value and that the government's limited
should be invested in more worthwhile undertakresources
200
ings.
Second, project critics caution that the Canal expansion may impose serious financial burdens on Panama.20 1
If the expansion project's costs cannot be recovered
through toll increases and through increased trade volumes,
20 2
Panamanian taxpayers may wind up footing the bill.
Although the ACP claims that the expansion project is selffinancing, the ACP acknowledges that it will have to obtain
an additional $500 million per year in the financial markets
in order to cover expansion project requirements. 20 3 The
ACP asserts that the Panamanian government will not have
to endorse or guarantee these loans because the Panamanian Constitution makes the ACP financially independent
from the rest of the government. 204 Project critics point out
that it is unclear whether lenders will provide loans to the
ACP without an explicit guarantee from the Panamanian
government. 205 If a government guarantee is required, then
the Canal expansion could double the national debt and
reduce the government's ability to promote economic development and provide for the basic needs of the popula-

tive route for much of the year as early as 2015 -even for ships that are
not equipped with icebreakers. See Wade, supra note 198, at 11.
199
See M~ndez, supra note 92.
200 See M~ndez, supra note 196, at 100.
201 See Manfredo, supra note 158, at 15.
202 See id.
203 See Panama Canal Authority, supra note 9, at 61-62.
204 See id. at 63-64.
205 See Manfredo, supra note 158.
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tion.206 Moreover, the ACP's investment of Canal revenues
in the expansion project represents a diversion of funds that
could have7 been earmarked for more socially productive
20
purposes.
Third, project opponents dispute the ACP's claims
that the expansion project will generate jobs and other
economic benefits for Panama.2 °8 They point out that the
estimated 7,000 new jobs generated during the peak construction period are temporary jobs of a relatively short
duration 20 9 and few Panamanians are qualified for these
highly skilled positions. 2 10 While the ACP claims that
public and private entities will institute training programs
to ensure that the labor force is primarily Panamanian, the
project's critics question how such training programs will
be financed. 211 The project opponents reject as completely
unsubstantiated the ACP's claim that the Canal expansion
will produce an economic boom in Panama that will generate over 200,000 additional jobs in the long run.2 12 These
critics maintain that only a small fraction of the funds invested in the Canal expansion will remain in Panama, and
that most of the money will be used to hire foreign contractors and consultants and to import equipment, technology
and materials.213
See id.; Manfredo, supra note 196.
See Manfredo, supra note 158.
208 See id.
209 See id.
210 See Corbin, supra note
87.
211 See Panama Canal Authority, Proposal for the Expansion of the
206
207

Panama Canal, supra note 9, at 67-68 (discussing the training programs); Manfredo, Canal de Panamd: El Proyecto, supra note 158
(questioning how the training programs will be financed).
2 See Manfredo, supra note 158.
213 See Jorge E. Illueca et al., Algunos Mitos En Torno a la Amplicacidn
del Canal, 124 TAREAS, Sept.-Dec. 2006, availableat
htttp://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/panama/cela/tareas/tarl 2
4/ 08illueca.pdf; Manfredo, Los Estudios Sobre la Ampliacirn, supra
note 196.
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Fourth, the project critics highlight the potentially
negative impact of the Canal expansion on the Panama City
metropolitan area. They assert that the Canal expansion
project will enlarge the population of the metropolitan
region, as rural migrants and foreign workers converge on
the area in search of Canal-related employment. 2 14 Because the vast majority of migrants will not find jobs, this
migration will increase urban poverty and unemployment,
swell the ranks of those working in the informal sector,
strain public services (including the police and the judiciary), place additional demands on the urban housing stock,
and generate additional shanty towns.215
Fifth, project critics contend that the real beneficiaries of the Canal expansion will be the friends and relatives
of government officials who will profit handsomely from
Canal-related contracts.2 16 These critics point out that ACP

directors and administrators have blatant conflicts of interests because they own shares or have other commercial ties
with the construction companies, banks, and law firms that
stand to gain from this project. 217 These concerns were
reinforced when the first company awarded a construction
contract proved to be closely associated with the current
ACP administrator. 218 On July 6, 2007, the ACP announced that Constructora Urbana S.A. (CUSA), which is
owned by the family of ACP administrator Alberto Alemdn
Zubieta, had been awarded the contract for the excavation
2 19
of the Pacific entrance for the new set of locks.
Sixth, the project opponents maintain that the billions of dollars allocated for the Canal expansion should
See Manfredo, supra note 158.
id.
216 See Mrndez, Por Qu6 PanamdDebe Decir "No, " supra
note 92;
Doubts Over Transparencyof Canal Tender, Caribbean and Central
American Report, July 19, 2007.
217 See Mrndez, Por Qu6Panamd Debe Decir "No, "supra note 92.
218 See Caribbean and Central American Report, supra note 216.
219 See id.
214

215 See
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instead be directed toward health, education, transportation
and other national priorities. 220 These critics point out that
Panama currently has one of the most unequal distributions
of wealth in Latin America. 2 2 According to the World
Bank, nearly forty percent of Panama's population lives in
poverty. 222 While the wealthiest 20 percent of the population receives 60.3 percent of the country's
22 3 wealth, the
percent.23
2.5
only
receives
percent
20
poorest
Finally, several critics of the Canal expansion project have emphasized the need to integrate the Panama
Canal into the country's development strategy, rather than
dealing with it as a separable entity. 2 24 These critics point
out that it is necessary to develop a national development
plan that will utilize the Canal to stimulate other sectors of
the economy, 225 and that will include a strong social justice
component designed to strengthen the provision of essential
services, such as health, education, transportation, housing,
and environmental protection.'
E. The Post-Referendum Environmental Impact
Assessment
Nine months after the referendum, the ACP prepared a comprehensive EIA for the Canal expansion project
that encompassed both environmental and socioeconomic
impacts.227 Critics of the project lambasted the EIA for
220

See Mendez, supra note 92.
See Zfirate, supranote 151.
22 See World Bank, Interim Strategy Note For The Republic Of Panama FY2006-2007, Report No. 32887-PA (Aug. 30, 2005) at 7.
I-,
See World Bank, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2006,
Table
2.8 (2006), availableat
http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Table2 8.htm2-1 See Gandisegui, supra note 1; supra note 92; Zdrate, supra note
151.
"' See Gandisegui, supra note 1.
6See M~ndez, supra note 92.
221

27 See Panama Canal Authority, supra note 148.
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failing to fully address one of the most devastating potential consequences of the project: the salinization of the
2 28
water supply of the Panama City metropolitan area.
Nevertheless, the EIA was approved by ANAM on November 9, 2007.229 While a substantive analysis of the
environmental and socioeconomic concerns addressed in
the EIA is beyond the scope of this paper, one significant
procedural defect must be noted.
Contrary to the EIA principles discussed in Part II
(A), the EIA did not analyze alternatives to the proposed
Canal expansion, 230 presumably because the outcome of the
referendum rendered such an analysis moot. It has long
been recognized that the analysis of alternatives is at the
very heart of the EIA process.231 This analysis compares
several means of achieving the project objective (including
the option of not proceeding at all-the no action alternative) so as to enable the decision-maker to select the most

228

See Ariel R. Rodriguez Vargas, Intrusi6n Salina en el Canal de

Panamd,BURICA PRESS, Sept. 24, 2007, availableat burica.wordpress.com/2007/09/24/intrusion-salina-en-el-canal-de-panama/
(translating the conclusions of the leading scientific studies regarding
salinization and making policy recommendations); Ariel R. Rodriguez
Vargas, CuestionanEIA y ForoP~blico de la ACP Sobre Ampliaci6n,
BURICA PRESS, Sept. 8, 2007, availableat burica.wordpress.com/2007/09/08/cuestionan-eia-y-foro-publico-de-la-acpsobre-ampliacion/; Ariel R. Rodriguez Vargas, Estudio de Impacto
Ambiental de la Ampliaci6n del Canalde Panamd vs CalidadyCantidad de Agua Dulce de Los Lagos, BURICA PRESS, Aug. 28, 2007,
availableat burica.wordpress.com/2007/08/28/ampliacion-del-canal_
de-panama-vs-calidad-y-cantidad-de-agua-dulce/.
229 See Panama Canal Authority,
http://www.pancanal.com/esp/ampliacion/eisa/ (last visited Mar. 2,
2008) (explaining that ANAM approved the Environmental Impact
Study for the Third Locks on Nov. 2, 2007, pursuant to Resoluci6n
DIERO 632-2007).
230 See Panama Canal Authority, supra note
148.
231 See Tilleman, supra note 121, at 384-93;RODGERS, supra note 121,
at 957-63, UNECE, supra note 114, at 15.
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promising alternative. 232 Under ordinary circumstances,
one would expect the EIA for the Canal expansion project
to compare the costs and benefits of the proposed action
with several alternatives, including the no action alternative-the option of not proceeding at all.2 33
Regrettably, the subversion of the EIA process and
the subversion of the referendum process proved to be
mutually reinforcing. In other words, the ACP's failure to
prepare a comprehensive EIA prior to the referendum impoverished the public debate over the proposed Canal expansion and arguably facilitated the victory of the "Si"
campaign. The victory of the "Si" campaign, in turn, impoverished the EIA process by excluding alternatives to the
contemplated action from ANAM and ACP's consideration. As a result, the EIA process was reduced to an empty
ritual, a technical justification for a decision made at the
highest levels of government and subsequently "approved"
in a "democratic" referendum rather than a tool to inform
and enhance public and governmental decision-making
over Panama's single most important resource.

See UNECE, supra note 114, at 15.
See Tilleman, supra note 121, at 384-93; Rodgers, supra note 121,
at 957-63, UNECE, supra note 114, at 15. Under U.S. law, for example, the regulations promulgated pursuant to NEPA specify how the
analysis of alternatives is to be conducted and provide criteria for the
analysis of the no-action alternative. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1978)
(outlining the requirements for the analysis of alternatives, including
the no-action alternative); 40 C.F.R. § 6.203 (2007) (providing additional guidance on the preparation and evaluation of the no- action
alternative). Consistent with U.S. and international EIA practice, the
EIA manual prepared for the Panama Canal Commission (the ACP's
predecessor) explicitly required the analysis of the no-action scenario
and the development and analysis of alternatives to the proposed action.
See USACE, supra note 144, at 2-4.
232
233
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Il. Reflections on the Colonial Legacy
While the Canal expansion project is currently in the
construction phase, the case study nevertheless holds valuable lessons for Panama and for other post-colonial societies blessed (or cursed) with valuable natural resources.
Wittingly or unwittingly, colonial institutions and practices
persist long after the departure of the colonial power and
distort economic development and governmental decisionmaking. This section identifies specific aspects of the colonial legacy that continue to affect the operation of the
Canal and concludes with several suggestions designed to
mitigate the colonial legacy by enhancing public participation in the development planning process.
A. The Economic Enclave Problem
The Panama Canal historically functioned as an
economic enclave analogous in some respects to the oil,
mining, and agricultural enclaves operated by transnational
corporations throughout the Americas. 234 Enclaves, by
definition, extract wealth from a particular sector of the
economy without developing significant linkages to other
sectors and without incorporating large segments of the
domestic labor force. 235 Just as countries dependent on
234 See

Zrate, supra note 151; Castro, supra note 5, at 208; Julio Yao,

Es el CanalPatrimonioInalienablede la Naci6n o Propiedadde la
ACP? 124 TAREAS (Sept.-Dec. 2006), available at
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/panama/cela/tareas/tarl 24
/03yao.pdf. The Canal Zone differed from traditional economic enclaves in two important respects. First, the Canal Zone was operated
directly by the U.S. government rather than by private capital. Second,
instead of exploiting the local labor force, the Canal Zone applied U.S.
labor standards and paid salaries much higher than prevailing local
wages. See Castro at 208.
235 See Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs & Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Introduction: What is the Problem with NaturalResource Wealth?
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natural resource extraction derive a substantial portion of
national revenues from extractive industries, Panama, after
the transfer of the Canal, would also derive a significant
share of its national income from the operation of the Canal.236 The Panama Canal is currently Panama's single
largest generator of foreign capital but does not represent a
major source of employment for Panama's largely unskilled workforce 2 37 and does not represent
an integral part
238
of a multi-sector development strategy.
As the literature on enclave economies points out,
countries that specialize in natural resource exploitation
often perform worse economically than countries with
fewer resources.2 39 One of the reasons for this poor economic performance is failure to invest in other economic
sectors or in the human capital necessary to develop other
areas of the economy. 240 Education, for example, is frequently neglected because the production of current income
does not
require a highly diversified and skilled work24 1
force.
One lesson for Panama from the experience of
more traditional enclave economies is the importance of
integrating the Canal into the government's long-term development planning. As several Panamanian observers
have noted, the ACP currently operates as a "parallel republic" whose primary mission is the efficient administraESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 4 (Macartan Humphreys et al., eds.
2007).
236 The Canal currently accounts for approximately 20 percent of
Panama's gross domestic product and a significant share of the country's national budget. See Andrew Beatty, PanamaCanalAuthority
Sees Revenue Growth in 2008, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2008), availableat
http://www.reuters.com/ (search "Andrew Beatty revenue growth
2008.")
237 See Corbin, supra note 87.
238 See Zirate, supra note 151;
Yao, supra note 234.
239 See Humphreys, supra note 235, at 1.
24 0
See id. at 10, 12.
241

See id. at 10.
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tion of the Canal.24 2 In order to relieve poverty, generate
employment, and develop other sectors of the economy, it
is essential to integrate the operation of the Canal into a
multi-faceted development strategy designed to diversify
Panama's economic base and to provide jobs, housing,
education, and basic social services.
B. Corruption and Lack of Government Accountability
A second feature of natural resource enclaves is corruption and lack of government accountability. Enclave
economies are frequently characterized by high levels of
corruption because those who control the country's wealth243
producing assets can use this wealth to remain in office.
Enclave economies also tend to have weak, unaccountable
governments because they rely on external income sources
to fill the national coffers and are relatively less dependent
on the good will of taxpayers. 244 Indeed, citizens often
become politically passive and do not monitor government
expenditures or actively participate in government decision-making.245
As explained in Part I (C), the Panamanian Constitution attempts to address the problem of corruption by
insulating the ACP from partisan political pressure. The
Constitution makes the ACP an autonomous legal entity
whose budget is separate from the national budget, whose
directors are appointed to staggered terms, and whose employees are civil servants selected on the basis of meritbased criteria.
242 See Mndez, supra note 92; Yao, supra note 234.
243 See Mndez, supra note 92; Yao, supra note 234.
244
245

See id. at 11-12.
See Terry Lynn Karl, Ensuring Fairness:The Casefor
a Transpar-

ent FiscalSocial Contract,ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE, at 264-

65.
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Despite these laudable efforts to minimize corruption, the absence of legislation prohibiting ACP employees
from awarding Canal-related contracts to businesses in
which they or their families hold a financial stake 2 46 creates
the impression of self-dealing. It may also enable government officials and their families to benefit economically
from the Canal expansion project while imposing the costs
on the Panamanian public. Adoption of conflict of interest
legislation (or, alternatively, ACP conflict of interest regulations) should be a priority as the Canal expansion project
proceeds.
Furthermore, government accountability requires
transparency and public participation in the decisionmaking process. In theory, Article 325 of the Panamanian
Constitution promotes government accountability by requiring a referendum on any proposal for the construction
of a third set of locks or a sea-level canal on the existing
route. However, this provision covers only major changes
to the Canal's operations and is insufficient even for this
narrow range of activities in the absence of additional provisions protecting the integrity of the decision-making
process.
In order to secure meaningful public input on major
changes to the Canal's operations, it is essential to promulgate legislation mandating a pre-referendumn comprehensive EIA. As Part II of this article makes clear, one of the
fundamental problems with the Canal expansion project
referendum was the absence of a comprehensive assessment of the project's environmental and socioeconomic
impacts before the national plebiscite despite the seriousness of the concerns raised by the project's opponents.
Regrettably, the preparation of a comprehensive EIA prior

246 See CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN REPORT,

supra note 216

(explaining that -in Panama there are no restrictions for companies
owned by relatives of top officials gaining public contracts, including
canal extension contracts Nvith ACP.")
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to the referendum was not expressly mandated by the Constitution, by the legislation calling for the referendum, by
the ACP's Organic Law, or by the ACP's regulations.
While the failure to prepare a comprehensive EIA prior to
the referendum was inconsistent with the spirit if not the
letter of Law No. 41 and of ANAM's EIA manual,247
ANAM's director took the position that an EIA would not
be required unless the "Si" campaign prevailed.248 One of
the lessons of this debacle is that any legislation calling for
a popular referendum on a project of national significance
must expressly require the preparation of a comprehensive
EIA well in advance of the referendum.
Moreover, in order to enhance the quality of government decision-making on all Canal-related projects, it is
essential that the ACP's environmental determinations be
overseen by ANAM. The ACP's EIA regulations for nonArticle 325 projects erode government accountability by
making the ACP the final arbiter of all Canal-related EIAs
including projects undertaken by the ACP.24 9 This arrangement is problematic because it places the ACP in the
position of both promoter and regulator of ACP projects
that may have significant impacts on the Canal watershed.
In order to avoid actual or apparent conflicts of interest and
in order to benefit from the environmental expertise of
ANAM, the ACP should modify its regulations to require
ANAM approval of EIAs for all Canal-related projects
undertaken by the ACP and its consultants or contractors,
whether or not these projects rise to the level of Article 325
projects.
Finally, the referendum and the post-hoc EIA for
the Canal expansion project exposed deeper problems with
the EIA process in Panama that diminish transparency and
accountability. Because these problems are inextricably
247 See
248

249

supra notes 137, 143-45, and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
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intertwined with the issue of public participation and democratic decision-making, they are discussed in the final
section of this article.
C. The Civilizing Mission and Authoritarian Political Culture
The Canal divided Panama into two distinct nations:
the prosperous, efficiently managed U.S.-dominated Canal
Zone and the poverty-stricken, "underdeveloped" Panamanian state ruled by the Panamanian oligarchy. 250 U.S. officials and the U.S. media justified the U.S. colonial presence
in Panama by depicting the Canal Zone as an oasis of civilization amidst the "torrid, uncontrolled life of the tropics"
and by constructing Panamanians, Colombians, West Indians and indigenous peoples as "natives" incapable of democratic self-government. 251 Sadly, this colonial construct
would be internalized by Panamanians and would reinforce
both the racism and the authoritarianism of the Panamanian
oligarchy, 25
which
perceived the Canal Zone as a model of
2
efficiency.

This emphasis on efficiency at the expense of other
values (such as democracy) is a vestige of the colonial
experience that is evident in some of the ACP's publications. For example, the ACP's EIA manual (the Manual
T6cnico de Evaluaci6n Ambiental) is concise and narrowly
technocratic (as its name implies), with no discussion of the
underlying policies, principles, and objectives of environmental impact assessment.25 3 The ACP's 2003 Social and
Environmental Report is replete with references to the
250

See Castro, supra note 234, at 208-09; Zirate, supra note 151;

LAFEBER,

supra note 2, at 84, 101-05, 118-119; OVIDlO DIAz EsPINo,

How WALL

STREET CREATED A NATION: J.P. MORGAN, TEDDY ROOSEVELT AND THE PANAMA CANAL 197 (2001).
251 See LINDSAY-POLAND, supra note 5, at 3-6.
252 See Castro, supra note 234, at 209-10.
253 See ACP, supra note 128.

202

4:2 TENNESSEE

ACP's

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

350

"efficiency" and "productivity" and emphasizes

technocratic environmental objectives (such as energy,
efficiency, best practices in reuse and recycling, and best
standards to handle hazardous substances) in lieu of process-oriented objectives such as public participation in the
environmental decision-making process.254
As environmental impact assessment has become
widely utilized by planners and decision-makers throughout
the world, two distinct variations of EIA have emerged:
technocratic and democratic.255 The technocratic version of
EIA is designed to provide information to government
officials and project promoters on the environmental impacts of projects and activities in order to comply with preestablished regulatory standards. 6 It tends to focus on the
physical environment and
may not always identify alterna7
tive courses of action.

The democratic version of EIA is designed to integrate environmental and socioeconomic considerations into
economic planning and to serve as a vehicle for public
involvement in the decision-making process. 2 5 8 It tends to
be process-oriented, externally focused, and open-ended. 9
Early identification of alternatives is a hallmark of this
approach.26 °
While the EIA approach adopted by the ACP in its
EIA manual incorporates socioeconomic considerations
into the EIA process, the ACP's approach is nevertheless
254 See ACP, Informe Social y Ambiental (Social and Environmental

Report) (2003), at 17, 39, availableat
http://www.pancanal.com/common/general/reports/acp-social_
environmental-report-2003.pdf.
255

See DAVID B. SMITH & MIEKE VAN DER WANSEM, STRENGTHENING

EIA
256 CAPACITY IN ASIA 1-2 (World Resources Institute 1995).
See id. at 1.
257 See id.
258 See id. at 1-2.
259 See id. at 2.
260

See id.
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more akin to the technocratic rather than the democratic
EJA model. 26 1 Even though the ACP has developed proce-

dures for public involvement, 262 the ACP's EIA manual
omits several important elements that are essential to the
promotion of robust public debate about the environmental
and socioeconomic impacts of proposed projects.
First, the ACP's EIA manual neglects to emphasize
the importance of EIA as a planning tool and fails to provide guidance on precisely when an EIA should be developed. In the absence of explicit guidance about the timing
of environmental review, there is a danger that the EIA will
not be prepared until after a decision has been made (as
occurred with the Canal expansion project) and will become a post-hoc rationalization rather than a deliberative
document designed to facilitate the evaluation of the proposed project by the public and by government officials.
Second, the EIA manual should require public input
on the scope of the EIA and the issues to be analyzed at the
earliest possible stage in the EIA process.263 For example,
the public should have been invited to comment on the
design of the EIA for the proposed Canal expansion project
well in advance of the referendum. By involving the public
at a preliminary stage in the EIA process, the ACP would
have received early notice of the public's key concerns and
would have had the opportunity to produce an EIA (prior to
the referendum) designed to foster meaningful public de-

261

See ACP, supra note 128.

262

The ACP provided the author with its public involvement guide-

lines at the conclusion of a meeting with the ACP staff on December
13, 2007. See ACP, Procedimiento Para la Realizaci6n del Foro Pfiblico
(on file with the author); ACP, ProcedimientoParala Preparaci6nde
un Plan de Divulgaci6ny Consulta PNiblica (on file with the author).
263 For example, under the U.S. regulations implementing NEPA,

federal agencies are required to invite citizens to participate in the EIA
scoping process in order to identify major issues well in advance of the
preparation of the EJA. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1978).
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bate about the costs and benefits of the proposed Canal
expansion and its alternatives.
Third, the ACP's EIA manual should require the
identification and analysis of alternatives to the proposed
action (including the no action alternative) and should provide guidance on how to evaluate these alternatives. As
explained in Part II of this article, the alternatives discussion drives the EIA analysis because it enables the public
and the government to compare the environmental and
socioeconomic costs and benefits of alternative ways of
achieving a particular objective. If the EIA is prepared
after alternatives have been foreclosed (as occurred with
the Canal expansion), the public participation process becomes a meaningless ritual that frustrates and disempowers
the communities affected by the proposed project.
Fourth, the ACP's EIA manual should promote
meaningful dialogue about the project and its alternatives
by requiring the ACP to articulate and provide a detailed
response to the concerns voiced by the proposed project's
opponents. In so doing, the EIA manual would force the
ACP to analyze new information supplied by the public and
would reassure the public that its contributions will be
valued and taken seriously.
Finally, the ACP should make its EIA manual and
public involvement guidelines available on its website so
that members of the public can understand and monitor the
EIA process.
Because the ACP's EIA manual is consistent with
the EIA regulations promulgated by ANAM in Executive
Decree 209, 264 the recommendations set forth herein apply
with equal force to ANAM's EIA regulations. Indeed,
given ANAM's statutory obligation to protect the environment and to promote public participation, it is essential that
ANAM take a leadership role in promoting a democratic
rather than technocratic conception of EIA. Although
264 See

Executive Decree 209, supra note 137.
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ANAM's EIA manual is vastly superior in this respect to
the ACP's EIA manual, ANAM's EIA regulations generally provide little to no guidance on the key EIA reforms
proposed herein.
As Panama struggles to rid itself of its authoritarian
legacy, the adoption of a democratic conception of EIA and
the promotion of public participation in government decision-making will fulfill several important objectives. The
first objective is to generate additional information. The
EIA process invites the public to present additional information and perspectives to decision-makers in order to help
overcome bureaucratic inertia or tunnel vision.265 The
second objective is to enhance government accountability.
Public participation mechanisms facilitate public oversight
of government decision-making by requiring decision266
makers to publicly justify and explain their decisions.
The third objective is to create formal mechanisms for
public input in order to prevent government "capture" by
powerful economic interests.267 In the absence of such
mechanisms, the public would lack the resources, the "insider" relationships, and the organization to influence the
decision-making process.268 Finally, public participation
mechanisms promote democratization and civic engagement by fostering informed and reasoned debate about
whether a particular project or decision will promote the
common good. 26 9 The democratic conception of the EIA
process is particularly compelling in the case of the Panama
Canal in light of the Canal's economic and symbolic significance to the Panamanian nation and in light of the danger that this valuable resource will be "captured" by the
economic elite.
265 See Stephanie Tai, Three Asymmetries of Informed Environmental

Decisionmaking,78 TEMPLE L. REv. 659, 677 (2005).
266

See id. at 677-78.

267

See id.

268
269

See id.
See id. at 678-79.
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While the recommended reforms are an important
first step in ensuring that the Canal expansion debacle will
not be replicated in the evaluation of other projects, public
participation in the development planning process will not
become a reality in the absence of the political will to depart from the country's authoritarian past and to embrace a
more democratic conception of the common good.
Conclusion
The Panama Canal case study illustrates the ways in
which the colonial legacy frustrates the development planning process in post-colonial societies and highlights the
importance of public participation as a counterweight to the
persistence of colonial institutions and practices. In addition to the domestic, legal, and political constraints discussed in this article, Panama's options with respect to the
Canal are profoundly constrained by the interests of the
Canal's users: the international shipping industry and the
countries whose merchandise traverses the Canal (particularly the United States, China, Korea, Japan and the European Union).27 ° While an analysis of these international
constraints is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to remember that Panama's destiny (at least in the
foreseeable future) will continue to be shaped by its strategic location at the crossroads of international trade.
Whether the Canal will be managed in the interests of the
Panamanian people will depend on the country's ability to
overcome the domestic legacy of colonialism and to skillfully manage the challenges posed by the international
economic order.

270

See Ruiz, supra note 195.
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ESSAY

PANAMA CITY REFLECTIONS: GROWING THE CITY IN
THE TIME OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Ileana M. Porras1
Introduction
The image that frames our arrival in Panama City is
unexpected, yet pervasive. From the moment we land we
are aware of the skyscrapers. Improbably enough, in this
mostly flat, hot, humid, congested third world urban landscape, fronting on the Pacific, luxury residential skyscrapers are rising everywhere. On our first morning in the city,
we take a couple of taxis to the Parque Metropolitano,2 a
small, relatively untouched green area within the city limits. This area is a legacy of the U.S. controlled Canal Zone,
protected for now, because of its status as an essential
component of the canal watershed! We hike up the hill
through an exuberant tropical forest and, within twenty
minutes, we have reached one of the best vista points over
the city. From our bird's eye view, the city opens up before
us, old and new. As we make our way from the first mirador up the steep stairs to the second platform the initial
1Visiting Professor, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona
State University. I would like to thank all those involved in the planning of our week-long Study Space Workshop in Panama City. In
particular, I would like to thank Colin Crawford and Daniel Suman
who made it all come together. I would also like to join in thanking all
our hosts in Panama City who generously gave of their time and shared
their passion and expertise to help us understand their city.
2 The ParqueNaturalMetropolitano (232 hectares) is within the Corregimiento (administrative sub-district) of Ancon, in Panama City, in
what was until recently the U.S. controlled Canal Zone, and offers one
of the highest viewpoints over the city and its surrounding area. See
http://www.parquemetropolitano.org (last visited June 6, 2008).
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view of a quiet "sea of green" of the Canal Zone, spotted
with its distinctive white-painted, red-roofed, barrack villages gives way to the dense, bustling, concrete urban space
of the city, engaged, it would seem, in a frenzy of construction. When we get to thirty, we give up trying to count the
cranes that sit atop the high rises under construction.
From this vantage point, we can also observe the
diminutive peninsula where the traumatized residents rebuilt their city within fortified walls after the original and
unprotected town was sacked (and burnt) by the infamous
pirate/privateer Captain Morgan in 1671 . 3 Known as the
Casco Antiguo,4 this peninsula, the once decaying heart of
the old city of Panama, was designated a UNESCO World
Heritage Site in 1997. Today it is in the throes of redevelopment, gentrification and commodification as a tourist destination. This change has resulted in the displacement

3 See Peter Earle, THE SACK OF PANAMA: CAPTAIN MORGAN
AND THE
BATTLE FOR THE CARIBBEAN (2007) [hereinafter SACK OF PANAMA]
4 The term Casco Antiguo or Casco Viejo ("Ancient"

or "Old" Quarter)
is often used to refer to the historical and monumental center of San
Felipe (once Panama City intra-muros) and it is this section of the old
town, along with a small portion of Santa Ana, which has been designated by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site. See Eduardo Tejeira
Davis, Historia Concisa del Casco Antiguo de Panami, in EL CASCO
ANTIGUO DE LA CIUDAD DE PANAMA 56 (2001) (hereinfater HISTORIA
CASCO ANTIGUO); See also World HeritageList: Panamd (Panamd),
ICOMOS, No. 790
(19 9 7),http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory bodyevaluation/790bis
.pdf. Technically, however, the historical city of Panama includes the
three administrative districts of San Felipe, Santa Ana and Chorrillos.
Furthermore, the Casco Antiguo benefits from the special conservation
and investment incentives law, which provides for a public-private
partnership for redevelopment of the area. See Ley No. 4 de 15 de
Enero de 2002. "Que modifica el Decreto Ley 9 de 1997, sobre un
regimen especial de incentivos para el Casco Antiguo de la Ciudad de
Panamd, y dicta otras disposiciones," Gaceta Oficial No. 24,472 (Jueves 17 de Enero de 2002).
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of the poor and mostly black community that had progressively taken up residence in the historical center when it
was abandoned
by the gentry and middle classes in the mid
h century. b
201
From our perch, however, it becomes obvious that
the Casco Antiguo's designation as a UNESCO World
Heritage site, has at least saved it from the upward push to
which the rest of the city appears to be dedicated. Absent
this designation, it seems likely that the Casco Antiguo
would have been bulldozed and transformed into its mirror

image at Punta Paitilla. 5 There, a little to the south, separated from the Casco Antiguo by the length of the Avenida
Balboa, 6 which runs parallel to the Bahia de Panama, we
could observe a crowd of skyscrapers densely congregated
on a confined waterfront perch, already precariously pushing their way out into the water on the new landfill of Punta
Pacifica.c Across the city, wherever we turned, we observed the tell-tale sign of skyscrapers under construction,
most recent development at Punta Paitilla took off as a result of
the concession granted to a Mexican company (ICA S.A.) in 1995 for
the construction of the Corredor Sur, the 19.5 kilometer toll highway
that links the downtown financial district to the eastern parts of the city
and to the international airport at Tocumen. See Felix Wing Solis &
Claudia Saladin, Panama's CorredorSur: Turning the Bay ofPanama
into a "FecalSwamp" (2000) at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/IFCCSPanama.pdf. An integral component of the compensation structure for the project was a grant of
property rights for development of about 30 hectacres on the mainland
(the old Paitilla airport) and 35 hectares of landfill in an adjoining area.
See id. Today's Cinta Costera is in effect a continuation of the Corredor
Sur - its "second phase."
6The portion of the Bay adjacent to the Avenida Balboa is the site of
the controversial project for a Cinta Costera,which had "broken
ground" just days before our arrival in the city. For the official version
see the project's website at http://www.cintacostera.com.pa/index.html.
For a more critical review of the project see
http://burica.wordpress.com/2008/04/1 1/cinta-costera-oxigeno-ocemento/, for a series of articles criticizing the Cinta Costera project
[hereinafter "Burica Press on Cinta Costera"].
5 The
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some incongruously rising out of quiet old residential

neighborhoods, playing havoc with all sense of urban
scale.7
Looking out to the west, to the Bay and sea beyond,
it was obvious what all these towers sought to provide: the
promise of unobstructed ocean views 8 at a fraction of the
cost of a similar ocean view apartment in Miami Beach.
Just beyond the causeway and the three small islands of
Naos, Perico and Flamenco that today form a kind of sea
wall at the mouth of the canal, 9 we could make out an endless line of container ships waiting their turn to enter the
canal on their nine hour, fifty-one mile-long, West-East
shortcut from the Pacific to the Atlantic. 10
These ships
served as a reminder of the city's enduring vocation as a
port of passage, standing sentinel at one end of the most
important inter-oceanic trade route in the Western world.
In 1519, the Spaniards founded Panama City, the first permanent European settlement on the Pacific coast, locating it
7A

good example of this is in the neighborhoods of Bella Vista and
San Francisco. Presentation of Arq. Manuel Trute to Study Space
Group December 14 th, 2007. [Notes from presentation on file with
author].
8In reality the "promise" of unobstructed views is often little more than
a "fantasy," for the density of these towers, and the lack of meaningful
urban planning limits, means that today's view will be blocked by
tomorrow's high rise, if it is not so already.
9The three islands and the causeway that links them (built with rock
excavated from the Canal) are part of the reverted areas. Since the
Panamanian government obtained control over the area it has promoted
a high end tourist development with marinas, resorts, convention centers, restaurants and upscale shopping facilities. This area is also the
projected site for a new harbor and for the Frank Gehry designed biodiversity museum. See The Building in Context,
http://www.biomuseopanama.org/en/index.html
10Apparently it is not uncommon for up to 100 vessels to be queued up
on either end of the canal at any given time. See Andrew Gumbel,
Panama Canal: work begins on a $5bn project to widen the canal that
revolutionised the transportof goods, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 3, 2007
[hereinafter "PanamaCanal: work begins"].

213

4:2 TENNESSEE

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

361

at the lowest and narrowest point of the landmass that separated the Atlantic from the Pacific. From its inception the
city's fate had been intimately linked to its function in
facilitating international trade. It had served as a launching
pad for the Iberian conquest of the Incan Empire. Then for
almost three centuries it had served as the critical transit
point for the two-way traffic with Spain. Silver and gold
from the Andean mines was ported from Panama City, west
to east, across the isthmus to the waiting Spanish galleons
anchored at the Atlantic port of Nombre de Dios (later
Portobello). 11 In return, from east to west, came European
goods and African slaves on their way to the Andes' settlements. When European shipping became adept at navigating through Cape Horn the City's fortunes began a long
period of decline. The City rose to prominence again only
when in 1855 the first transoceanic railway was built across
the isthmus to service the demand for fast transportation of
people and cargo from the East Coast of the United States
to California during the "gold rush" of 1849.12 Boom times
in Panama City accompanied the de Lesseps' French sea
level canal project begun in 1880 and abandoned in 1893
amidst financial scandal and horrific loss of life) and rebounded again in 1904 when the United States began work

11See WALTER LAFEBER,

THE PANAMA CANAL: THE CRISIS IN HIS-

TORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3-5 (1989).
12 The Panama Railroad Company

was a U.S company, which obtained

from the government of New Granada (Colombia and Panama) a 49
year concession. The railway, granted extensive rights of way, including large properties adjacent to its terminal on the outskirts of what was
then Panama City, proved extremely successful until the 1880s when it
began to face competition from the new railway lines in the United
States. It was subsequently purchased by a French consortium and put
to the service of building the French canal in the mid 1880s. When the
French Compagnie Nouvelle du Canal de Panamafailed, its shares and
assets, including the railway were purchased by the U.S. government.
See Ibid. at 10.
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on the Panama Canal. 1 3 Consciousness of their country's
historic vocation and of Panama's economic dependence on
maintaining her status as a privileged trans-isthmic trade
route, led the people of Panama in 2006, only six years
after Panama finally established sovereignty over the canal
and its zone, to approve by referendum a plan to enlarge the
canal by building a third set of locks at an estimated cost of
$5.25 billion.' 4 This massive project, touted as the vehicle
that will pull Panama out of the third world into the first,
had begun just three months before our arrival in Panama
City.
13

15

As is well known, the Colombian government's rejection of the U.S.

application for the concession to build a canal across the Panamanian
isthmus prompted the U.S. government to assist secessionist forces in
what was then a province of Greater Colombia. The Republic of Panama declared independence in November of 1903 and two weeks later
the U.S. and the new republic entered into the Hay-Bunau-Varilla
Treaty of 1903 by which Panama granted the U.S. the right to build and
manage the canal as well as exclusive control over the Canal Zone in
perpetuity. Work on the canal was completed in 1914, just in time for
the Great War. See Ibid. at 11-45.
14 Despite the headlines, endorsement of the expansion project was in
fact lukewarm. While just under 80% of those voting in the referendum
voted "yes," voter turn out was uncharacteristically low, with an abstention rate estimated at about 60%. See Voters overwhelmingly
approve Panama Canal expansionplan in referendum, IHT, October
22, 2006. The project to enlarge the canal was driven by the concern
that the long-term viability of the canal would be compromised by its
inability to provide passage to the ever larger cargo boats, and because
the slowness of the lock process and the increased traffic resulted in
long waits for passage. See generallyPanama Canal: Work Begins,
supra at note 10. For official information and updates on the $5.25
billion projected expansion project which began in September 2007,
see the Panama Canal Authority's website at
http://www.pancanal.com/eng/plan/index.html.
15 In his speech to the nation introducing the canal expansion project,
President Martin Torrijos made a reference to the canal as Panama's
"oil," and suggested that just as new oil deposits must be explored and
exploited, the canal's viability must be extended. See Discurso en
Inicio de Periodode Divulgaci6ndel Proyecto de Ampliaci6n del
Canalde Panamd, Apr. 26, 2006, at
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As our week in Panama City progressed, however,
it was the image of the skyscrapers that stayed with us.
Skyscrapers closing off our line of vision; skyscrapers
etched on billboards and on the fences enclosing construction sites-promising that not even the sky is the limit;
skyscrapers proudly displayed in the city's publicity materials; skyscrapers, each more fantastical than the other,
emerging out of the ubiquitous glossy magazines offering
real estate opportunities to all and sundry. 16 Each day as
we struggled with the urban congestion, the city's noise and
air pollution, we kept coming back to the question: "Why
skyscrapers?"
I.

Sustainable Development and the City

According to the statisticians and demographers
compiling population data for the United Nations, we have
arrived at a milestone in human history. 17 It was recently
http://www.presidencia.gob.pa/discurso.php?cod=866- See also Panama Canal: Work Begins, supra at note 10. He further stated that Panama's geographic position and the new international reality
(globalization and the growth in the volume of international seaborne
trade) created a significant opportunity for Panama to rise above the
barrier of underdevelopment and enter the first world. See Discurso en
Inicio de Periodo de Divulgacidn del Provect6 de Arnpliaci6n del
Canal de Panamd, Apr. 26, 2006, at
http://www.presidencia.gob.pa/discurso.php?cod=866. See also Panania Canal: Work Begins, supra at note 10.
16 Accurate figures on buildings and construction in Panama City are
hard to come by. Arquitecto Ren& Paniza from the Alcadia de Panama
(Panama City Municipality) informed us that 107 new high-rises had
been approved. According to SkyscraperPage.com, a website dedicated
to skyscraper enthusiasts, Panama City already boasts 128 skyscrapers,
with 122 under construction and at least 22 more proposed. See
http://skyscraperpage.com/cities/?cityID=864.
17 Department of Economic & Social Affairs, Population Division,
World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Highlights, at 1,
U.N. Doc. ESAJP/WP/205 (Feb., 2008), availableat
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predicted that half of the world's population would be living in urban areas by the end of 2008.18 Moreover, this
proportion is expected to grow to 70% during the next half
century as developing countries, especially those in Asia
and Africa, become increasingly urbanized. 19 By midcentury, as the world's population climbs from 6.7 billion
in 2007 to 9.2 billion in 2050, it is projected that the number of human beings inhabiting urban spaces will reach 6.4
billion. 20 While the reliability of these numbers and projections can certainly be questioned, 2 ' there is no denying the
fact that the world is increasingly becoming urbanized.22
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2007/2007WUP Hi
ghlights-web.pdf. The database may also be consulted at
http://esa.un.org/unup/.
'8 See id at 1-2.
19See id. at 1-2.
20

See id. at 3.

21

See e.g. Montgomery, M. R., et al.,

CITIES TRANSFORMED: DEMO-

GRAPHIC CHANGE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

128-154 (2003) [hereinafter "CITIES TRANSFORMED"]; see also David
Satterthwaite, The Scale of Urban Change Worldwide 1950-2000 and
its Underpinnings,Human Settlements Discussion paper, IIED (2005)
available at http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/9531 lED.pdf.
22 From the perspective of managing the world's limited
natural resources, increased urbanization may not be a bad thing. Moreover, the
figures are somewhat deceptive. In fact, overall, the annual rate of
population growth in urban areas is slowing down. (The average annual
rate of growth between 1950-2007 was 2.6 per cent, whereas it is
expected to be 1.8 per cent from 2007-2050). It should be noted that
more than half of the population of the developed world was already
urbanized by 1950, and today that proportion has reached between 72%
in Europe to over 80% in North America. Moreover, Latin America
already exhibits high degrees of urbanization (78%). The regions that
will experience the highest rate of urban growth between now and 2050
are those presently least urbanized: Asia and Africa, with India and
China projected to account together for a third of the increase in the
urban population in the next few decades. See id. at 1-12. The real
issue from the perspective of sustainable development is not increased
urbanization per se, but net population growth. While the popular
IPAT formula (Impact=Population x Affluence [or Consumption] x
Technology), most commonly associated with the work of Paul R.
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Across the globe, a disproportionate amount of production
takes place in urban areas, while the ecological footprint of
consumption and waste in the city is deep and spills out far
beyond any city limits. Cities may be hubs of government,
culture, education, entertainment and social services, but
they also provide the setting for the most extreme disparities of wealth. Cities have become the privileged sites of
human habitation, production and consumption. The question is: can they
become the privileged sites of sustainable
23
development?
In its 1987 report, "Our Common Future," the
Brundtland Commission adopted the concept of "sustainable development" to challenge the dominant paradigm of

Erlich, is a useful reminder that environmental impact is determined not
only by population size, but also by patterns of consumption and the
availability of more sustainable technologies, it is undeniable that each
additional human being (or consumer) adds to the pressure on the
earth's "carrying capacity." Furthermore, recent research suggests that
if present patterns persist much of the projected urban growth will swell
the already large proportion of urban dwellers who live in inadequate
conditions in the world's squatter settlements or slums. See THE
CHALLENGE OF SLUMS - GLOBAL REPORT ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS

2003 (UN-Habitat) availableat
http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/getPage.asp?page=bookView&book156.
23 The literature on sustainable cities has grown by leaps and bounds
in
the last decade. Many city governments have explicitly committed
themselves to sustainability, especially in the developed world. The
problem, as David Satterthwaite and others have pointed out, is that
"[s]uch a diverse range of environmental, economic, social, political,
demographic, institutional and cultural goals have been said to be part
of 'sustainable development' that most governments or international
agencies can characterize some of what they do as contributing towards
sustainable development." David Satterthwaite, Sustainable Cities or
Cities that Contribute to SustainableDevelopment?, 34 URB. STUD.
1667, 1668 (1997) [hereinafter Satterthwaite, Sustainable Cities].
Satterthwaite's insight is consistent with my own conclusions about
Panama City's commitment to "sustainable development."
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development as equivalent to economic growth.24 The
report's oft cited formulation states, "[S]ustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs. 25 The key concern of the Brundtland Report was to establish the proposition that there
might be certain limits or constraints on economic growth.
In the familiar Brundtland definition of sustainable development, however, the limits were not specifically attributed
to excessive ecological burdens or the problems of unnecessary waste and negligent environmental destruction.
Instead, the limits to growth were deemed to be imposed by
the oddly hypothetical, yet compelling, "future generations," whose ability to meet their hypothetical future needs
by their own means must be taken into account when making development choices today; choices assumed to be

24

See WORLD

COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT:

(1987), available at http://habitat.igc.org/opengates/wced-ocf.htm [hereinafter, THE BRUNDTLAND REPORT].
OUR COMMON FUTURE

Id. at ch.2. To be fair, the Commission's definition does not stop
there, but continues in its first paragraph: "Sustainable development is
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains
within it two key concepts:
" the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the
world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and
" the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and
social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs."
This first paragraph is followed by fourteen further paragraphs, which
elaborate on the concept. Id. Many are concerned with issues of poverty
and "equity," both inter and intra-generational and with the problems
posed by environmental degradation. See id. Ch.2, subsec.2. Anthropocentric as it is, the full report is a conceptually ambitious and insightful document, which has nonetheless suffered the fate of so many group
efforts produced for UN consumption. The bulk of the text has receded
into oblivion while the first sentence of its "definition" has come to
stand for the whole.
25
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driven equally by the pressing needs of the present generation.
The Brundtland Commission's formulation and the
concept of sustainable development that it spawned have
been much written about, elaborated on and critiqued, since
26
the concept was endorsed at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.
Since then, the term has given rise to a bewildering array of
homologous concepts such as sustainable economy, sustainable business, sustainable agriculture, sustainable energy, sustainable communities, sustainable tourism,
sustainable design, etc. It is not my purpose here to join
that debate, or to attempt to disentangle the confusion that
has arisen from the sudden popularity of the adjective "sustainable." I note merely that since 1992 the term "sustainable development" has been catapulted onto the
international stage, widely espoused in official texts and
pronouncements by all levels of government, civil society
and even the private sector.27 Arguably, the objective of
26

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,

UNCED (1992), availableat
www.ciesin.org/datasets/unced/unced.html. For a discussion of the
1992 Rio Declaration and how it attempts to shape the concept of
"sustainable development," see Ileana Porras, The Rio Declaration:A

New Basisfor InternationalCooperation,in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW (Philippe Sands ed., 1994).

The objective of sustainable development was endorsed in Panama's
first comprehensive environmental legislation, which created the National Environmental Authority (ANAM) See Ley No. 41 de 1 de Julio
de 1998, por la cual se dicta la Ley general de Ambiente de la Republica de Panama y se crea la Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente, G.O.
23,578 de 3 de Julio de 1998. Sustainable development is defined as:
"Proceso o capacidad de una sociedad humana de satisfacer las necesidades y aspiraciones sociales, culturales, politicas, ambientales y econ6micas actuales, de sus miembros, sin comprometer la capacidad de
las futuras generaciones para satisfacer las propias." See Ley General
de Ambiente, La Asamblea LegislativaDecreta, Capitulo II, Art.2
availableat
http://www.anam.gob.pa/normasambientales/Ley%20Gral%22Ambient
al.html (process or capacity of a human society to meet the needs and
27
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sustainable development is on its way to becoming, like
"peace,' ''democracy" or "free trade," one of the standard
desiderataof the liberal international agenda package.
It is indisputable, of course, that some of the term's
popularity and the ease with which it has emerged as an
international norm is due to its "brilliant" ambiguity, flexibility and open-endedness. To some the term, properly
understood, requires a radical reorientation of the economic, environmental and social status quo, not just at the
national but also at the international level; for others, however, it merely connotes the need for a little tinkering. For
all that, it is possible to argue, that a commitment to "sustainable development" can and should be taken to denote
(at a minimum) a recognition that economic growth cannot
be pursued without due regard to its environmental impact
or to considerations of inter-and intra-generational equity.2 8 Sustainable development calls for a holistic costthe social, cultural, political, environmental, and economic aspirations
of its members without compromising the capacity of future generations to meet their needs and aspirations (author's translation)), Sustainable development continues to drive ANAM's agenda. See, e.g.,
EstrategiaNacionaldel Ambiente: Gesti6n Ambientalparael Desarrollo Sostenible 2008-2012, ANAM (2007).
28 This perhaps explains the popularity of the quasi-scientific
instrument known as the Environmental Impact Assessment which is used
whenever a "major" project is proposed. The production of an EIA, in
accordance with the relevant legislation, gives the decision maker
confidence that he has adequately "balanced" the economic imperative
(growth) against the environmental constraints. In some cases it may
even allow him to believe that he has "balanced" the equity concerns.
As with all such policy tools, of course, the determination of the point
at which a prospective environmental harm will trump the projected
economic benefit, is, in the end, a political decision under the guise of a
routine administrative procedure. This is not to suggest that ElAs are
of no use at all; they may often serve as a means to reduce potential
harm by forcing project designers to consider alternatives or by requiring the project developer to mitigate the harm. The "sustainable development" imprimaturthat EIAs procure project proposers and decision
makers, however, is almost always unwarranted.
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benefit approach to decision making: the recognition that
policy areas are interconnected and that the decision to
build a new highway in Panama, for instance, or the designation of an area as a protected wilderness, will have potential economic, environmental and societal impacts both
short term and long term, and that it would be irrational not
to take these into account. In this respect, sustainable development corresponds perfectly to our era's spirit of globalization and to our general preoccupation with the new
reality of inter-dependence. In the end, "sustainable development" is a political not a scientific term, because the
"right outcome" can only be determined in relation to an
antecedent political choice setting priorities and policy
goals. Indeed, whether or not sustainable development is
viewed as a radical critique or as a refinement on the status
quo depends on how we assess the status quo. While it is
unlikely that an objective test can be developed to answer
the question of whether or not a given project or a particular policy meets the criteria of sustainable development, it
should nevertheless be possible to ascertain how the proposed project or policy purportedly furthers the goal of
sustainable development and how the competing interests
have been balanced. To the extent sustainable development
is a political process, it will be helpful to begin to identify
how the competing economic, environmental and social
interests have been prioritized and to what extent the
"needs" of the most vulnerable segment of the present
generation are to be met. Sustainable development may
require the balancing of costs and benefits across policy
sectors and across the population. Almost by definition,
balancing requires that some interests be sacrificed to the
promotion of others. If, in practice, however, the interests
of the poor in the present generation are routinely discounted in favor of the interests of growing the economy,
protecting the environment or preserving the capacity of
future generations to meet their own needs, then this pattern
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of sacrifice must be made visible so that the political process can be reformed.
Of course, many expressions of commitment to the
goal of sustainable development can be dismissed as lipservice by politicians, bureaucrats, and other entrepreneurs
in pursuit of public approval or the significant funding that
has been ear-marked for sustainable development projects.
Yet, sustainable development is also being endorsed and
promoted with urgency and in good faith by countless civil
society entities: international, national, and local organizations, communities, groups and individuals. Are all these
efforts leading to better, more sustainable development
choices?
Given the population trends already alluded to, it is
evident that for the concept of sustainable development to
have any purchase, it must be possible to implement it in
the cities-where over half of the world's population currently resides. What does a commitment to sustainable
development mean for the city and its residents? How are
we to read the city, especially the city in the developing
world-where so many of the world's poor are concentrated-through the optic of sustainable development? Has
the theoretical shift from the traditional development paradigm to the holistic approach of sustainable development
made any inroads in the city? Has it served the urban poor
in any way?
The most prominent environmental and social
problems shared by the fast growing urban areas in the
developing world are simply exacerbated forms of the urban problems that plague many of the cities of the developed world. At the top of the list are: traffic congestion; air
pollution; noise; inadequate low cost housing options; inadequate provision of services such as electricity, water,
sanitation, and municipal waste collection; lack of access to
education and affordable health care; inadequate public
transportation and deficient security. Other critical problems include spatial segregation of city residents based on
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wealth; the non-separation of incompatible land uses (such
as the location of industrial and manufacturing facilities in
the midst of densely populated areas); high levels of insecurity; and underperforming local government institutions.
Anyone who has ever lived in a city will recognize some of
this litany of ills. Even with the material and technical
resources available in the wealthy industrialized countries,
it is hard to manage a city. In the developing world, lack of
economic resources, poor basic infrastructure, the vertiginous growth of the urban population in the post-colonial
period and the desperate poverty of a large segment of the
population have combined to make these urban problems
seem intractable. What does it mean in these places to
adopt a model of development that "meets the needs of the
present without compromising the
ability of future genera29
tions to meet their own needs?,
II. Placing the City: The Case of Ciudad de Panamd
The concept of sustainable development may be one
of general application, yet it also requires attention to the
particularity or specificity of place. Indeed, the focus on
"place" seems to offer great promise, in that, while taking
into account the multi-scalar character of sustainable development, it also recognizes that sustainable development
is ultimately implemented at the local level, in furtherance
of local objectives and pursuant to local initiatives. 30 What
29

30

See supra at note 24.
See Martin Purvis, Geography and SustainableDevelopment in

EXPLORING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 33-49 (Martin Purvis & Alan Grainger eds., 2004) [hereinafter

Geography]. In a sense sustainable development has inherited the
mantle of the environmental movement with its injunction to "Think

globally, act locally!" The "localism" of sustainable development
differs from that of the environmental movement in that it is concerned
not just with local action regarding environmental protection but with
local action regarding development "needs."
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may pass for sustainable development in one place may
simply not pass muster in another. In order to explore the
relationship between sustainable development and the city,
it is thus indispensable to delve into "place." Each place is
formed by a unique convergence of geography and history.
All cities are made up of people, communities, corporations, buildings, neighborhoods, sacred spaces, public
spaces, infrastructure, culture, government and law. Yet in
each particular space, these exist, and are determined, not
just by the history of the place but also by the ecological
systems on which the city has physically superimposed
itself. In addition, each city is in an ongoing relationship
with a "hinterland" from which it draws people and resources and in a complex exchange relationship with the
world beyond its borders; for the city is by no means selfsufficient. In order to understand a city, it is necessary to
perceive it as part of a web of connections, past and present
to the nation, the region, other cities and spaces around the
world.
Panama City is no exception, and in order to understand the city's present trajectory in relationship to the
pursuit of sustainable development, it is necessary to uncover its history. Panama City is a city on the move, but it
is no mega-city. 31 The metropolitan region has reached the
not insubstantial population of one million inhabitants. This
represents a tripling of the population since 1960.32 Ap31Usually defined as cities with over 10 million inhabitants.
More

attention has been paid to mega cities yet in many ways the smaller
large cities are just as critical. Indeed as Satterthwaite reminds us
urbanization is not all taking place in the largest urban centers. See
David Satterthwaite, Outside the Large Cities: The Demographic
Importance of Small Urban Centres and Large Villages in Africa, Asia
and Latin America 2006. Human Settlements Discussion Paper-Urban
Change 3 (2006) available at,
http://www.iied.org/pubs/display.php?o=l 043711ED.
" According to the 2000 census, the Metropolitan City of Panama
composed of the districts of Panama and San Miguelito, contained a
total of 979,635 residents. Alvaro Uribe, La Integraci6n del Area del
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proximately one third of the country's population lives in
this urban area alone. 33 As might be expected, the major
urban challenges in Panama City include the characteristic
problems of any city in the developing world whose rapid
growth has outstripped its infrastructure and its resources.
Poverty, affecting a large segment of the population, is at
the top of the list. 34 Other problems include traffic congestion, air pollution, noise, sanitation issues, water pollution
and inadequate shelter. These problems are exacerbated by
the income based spatial segregation that characterizes the
city; the ongoing displacement of lower income communities to peripheral zones distant from employment opportunities; and the concentration of private and public

Canaly la Expansi6n de la Ciudadde Panamcn, LINCOLN INSTITUTE
RESEARCH REPORT, 1, 8, tbl. 1 (2000), [hereinafter Integraci6n]It is
possible that the area has now hit the million residents mark. It should
be noted, that as in much of the rest of the world, the urban growth rate
has slowed down in the past two decades.
33 If we consider the urban area that is formed by the interconnected
communities that are strung along parallel to the canal, from the Pacific
to the Atlantic coast-the so called "trans-isthmic" or "transoceanic"
city-the number rises to half of the country's population. See Panamcd
y Col6n g Una Sola Ciudad? La Prensa Web, (February 7th, 2000) at
http://mensual.prensa.com/mensual/contenido/2000/02/07/lunes/trasfo
ndo.html.Like the rest of Latin America, Panama is already highly
urbanized. According to UN figures, in 2005, almost 71% of Panamanians lived in urban areas; a number which is expected to grow to 80%

by 2020. See supra WORLD URBANIZATION

PROSPECTS

at note 16.

34 Panama's overall HDI Rank (Human Development Index) is 62 out

of 177 countries for which the UNDP collects data. However, in terms
of income inequality (Gini Index), Panama ranks amongst the worst 15
countries. In a state where the GDP is $7,605 per capita, according to
the latest data available: 37.3% of the population lives under the national poverty line. Of these 18% live on under $2 per day; 7.4% under

$1 per day. See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007-8 (UNDP)
availableat
http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/datasheets/ctydsPAN.html
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investment in the central areas of the city. 35 Urban pres-

sures on the natural habitat include invasion of rural and
forested areas for use as squatter settlements, the ongoing
in-filling of sensitive coastal zones and dredging of wetlands by private economic actors for real estate development purposes, and the destruction of riverine habitats
through uncontrolled urban and industrial pollution.
At the heart of many of the major problems of Panama City is the disorderly and haphazard growth resulting
from a radical failure of urban planning. 36 Ironically, it was
not always so. Indeed, Panama City was the beneficiary of
an early form of urban land use planning. As with all settlements established by the Iberians in the New World, the
City of Panama was imagined from its foundation as an
ordered Christian enclave in a world otherwise dedicated to
Satan.37 The famous Ordenanzas de las Indias of 1573
(Ordinances for the Discovery, the Population and the Pacification of the Indies) issued by Phillip II, were the culmination of a series of instructions issued by the Crown
seeking to order the space of these new urban settlements
along Renaissance lines with an eye on the City of God.38
The Ordenanzas provided ordered sacred, public and private space along a grid centered on a plaza mayor. The
city was to serve as a physical representation of the natural
order, reinforcing the social and hierarchical distinctions of
3' Based on general observations of the city during our visit and the

lectures we heard. On the difference in investment see Integracidn
supra note 29, at 9.
36 See, e.g. Alvaro Gonzdlez Clare, Realidad Urbana:La bruta densidad en la ciudad de Panam6, Oct. 17, 2007 availableat
http://burica.wordpress.com/2007/10/17/la-bruta-densidad-en-laciudad-de-panama/.
37
See Jorge Cafiizares-Esguerra, PURITAN CONQUISTADORS: IBERIANIZING THE ATLANTIC, 1550-1700 (2006).
38 See The Laws of the Indies and Jean-Frangois Lejeune, Dreams of
Order: Utopia, Cruelty and Modernity in CRUELTY AND UTOPIA:
CITIES AND LANDSCAPES OF LATIN AMERICA, Jean-Frangois Lejeune,
ed. (2003) 18-29, 30-49. See Augustine, CITY OF GOD.

227

4:2

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

375

early modem Spain as it tamed and extended its dominion
over the wilderness of America. Yet, curiously the Ordenanzas were also, informed by an almost monastical conception of self-sufficiency, an early model for sustainable
living - since the instructions ordered each new settlement
to address the problems of food provision, water supply,
sewage disposal, security, defense, health and sanitation
from the moment of its founding. The Ordenanzas de las
Indias were, in effect, a conscious response to the discovery period's initial images of the New World as one of preedenic harmony and simplicity (where nature provided
man's few needs), a world that must now give way to civilization and be re-oriented towards the "New Jerusalem,"
imagined as a built and ordered environment.
The original City of Panama was founded in 1519,
before these texts were fully developed, but when the city
was rebuilt in 1673, 39 the new Panama did seek to conform,
as far as possible to these instructions. As a coastal town
that had already once been attacked and destroyed, the
"new" City of Panama was, contrary to the Ordenanzas'
ideal city, built on a small, defensible peninsula, with its
back to the sea, and enclosed within a city wall. The constraint of the fortified wall and its peninsular location, made
the City of Panama unusual among Iberian New World
cities, for the Ordenanzas provided for open cities built on
the premise of growth. Instead, Panama City soon occupied
all of the space available intra-muros,leaving the residents
with no formal room for expansion. Ironically, in the midst
of an abundance of open space, the city grew dense and
crowded within its formal boundaries. Further, the constraint on formal city space reinforced another pattern instituted by the Ordenanzas-the spatial segregation between
the races. Settlers of Spanish or European origin or descent
were in the seventeenth century very much a minority in
Panama City. The greatest part of the urban population
39

See HISTORIA

CASCO ANTIGUO

28 supra at 4.

228

4:2 TENNESSEE

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

376

was made up of African slaves and free blacks, with mestizos 40 and others of mixed races making up the remainder. 41 The non European population of Panama City was
almost immediately relegated to the unofficial urban space
extra-muros, in the areas immediately adjacent to the
walled city; a pattern which can be observed still today, as
the quarters of the city closest to the old town are poor and
predominantly black.
The constricting effect of the fortified walls on the
city's expansion was only the first of a series of strategic
choices that spatially shaped and distorted the city as it
grew. The fortunes of the City of Panama, linked intimately to its geographical location and to its monopoly
over the transisthmic portion of the Iberian transatlantic
trade, declined rapidly in the mid 1 8th Century when the
great markets at Portobello were finally suspended and new
commercial routes were established. In 1821, Panama
along with the rest of northern South America, declared
independence from Spain and joined with the Bolivarian
federation of Gran Colombia. When the federation dissolved following Bolivar's death in 1830, Panama, by then
little more than an economic backwater, remained with
Colombia as Nueva Granada. Its geographic destiny as
major inter-oceanic point of passage was rediscovered with
the advent of the California gold rush in 1849, which led to
an economic rebirth.
So opened a period of major works in Panama: first,
the construction of the transisthmic railway; second, the
French attempt to build a sea-level canal, a task which,
though left incomplete, was a major enterprise; and finally
the construction of the U.S. Canal.42 Panama City's econ40 Mestizos was the term used for the offspring of Spanish settlers with

indigenous women and their descendants. See
supra at note 3.
41 See id.
42 See supra at note 11.

SACK OF PANAMA

122

229

4:2 TENNESSEE

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

377

omy grew, in this period, along with its population, as
waves of immigrants arrived to take advantage of the new
economic opportunities. Thus, Afro-Caribbean and Chinese
laborers were brought in to work in the brutal construction
projects. Many of these migrants stayed on and contributed
to the City's already complicated ethno-racial composition.
From a spatial urban perspective, however, the most
dramatic effect of these major works was that significant
areas of land adjacent to the City were ceded to the foreign
companies in charge of the projects. The cession had two
effects. First, it required the creation of a new land market
where none had existed, which in turn began the transformation of the class of erstwhile rural hacendados into rich
urban land barons. Second, the ceded lands, including significant areas of desirable property adjacent to the city,
became off-limits to the City's expansion precisely at a
moment of intense growth a3

Cut off to the West by the US Canal Zone, which
inherited the railway's right of way and terminal, the City's
center migrated to the East and South, leaving the old city
behind on the periphery. As roads were built to the North,
towards the Atlantic port of Colon, population followed.
Unplanned and unmonitored, human settlements further
damaged important ecological habitats already compromised by the introduction of roads. In any case, the roads
failed to deliver prosperity as economic activity and employment opportunities continued to be concentrated in the
city center. The shape of the City that grew up alongside
the distorting mass of the U.S. Canal Zone has been aptly
described as a "Y" with a short stem.an In contrast to the
dense and constricted City of Panama, the U.S. Canal Zone
was lightly populated and composed of small discrete garden cities set in their natural environment.

43

See HiSTORIA

47 supra at note 4.
44See Integraci6n,supra note 29, at 3.
CASCO ANTIGUO
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Coinciding with completion of the Canal in 1914,
the well-to-do residents of Panama City began to emulate
their North American counterparts by building spacious
residences in the open and exclusive suburban spaces to the
East of the walled city. The desertion of the Casco Antiguo
by the wealthy had begun. Two distinct property regimes
evolved side by side in the Panama City area. In the city,
property ownership was the exception rather than the rule.
Most low-income residents were subject to the rental system known as inquilinato. Entire families resided in oneroom rental units with shared bathroom facilities at the end
of the corridor in buildings designed to maximize occupancy. The properties were milked for profit and the buildings and the infra-structure that supported them were
allowed to decay. The handful of private property owners
were thus effectively in charge of "land use planning" in
the city. By contrast, in the Canal Zone all property was
owned exclusively by the United States' government. Together with the military the U.S. government made all land
use decisions, managed all construction works and allocated housing and other premises to zone residents. Given
the importance of the canal's watersheds for the proper
functioning of the canal, much attention was lavished on
45
protecting the remaining ecological integrity of the Zone.
The Zone had become a green enclave of order and prosperity in the midst of urban decay (save for the few "suburbs" of the wealthy, which rapidly became Panama City's
real center). In an intriguing re-casting of the original Iberian morality play of a civilized Christian city embedded in
and ordering the Pagan wilderness, North Americans imag-

45 Of course construction of the canal was itself a major ecological

disturbance, including the damming and flooding of large areas to
create the artificial lakes that would together act as reservoirs for the
canal's locks and produce electricity. It should also be remembered
that US military bases in the Canal Zone did much damage.
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ined the Zone as a preserve of civilization in the middle of
the jungle.
By the time of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties of 1977,
which began the process of reversion of the canal and its
zone to Panama, the population of the metropolitan city had
grown to just over half a million, as a result of an unprecedented growth spurt led by rural migration to the city. The
prospect of the imminent reversion of the Canal Zone fired
imaginations and gave life to new projects. After years of
disorderly, unplanned growth in the city and the constraints
imposed by the overbearing presence of the U.S. in the
Canal Zone (the intimate stranger in their midst) the people
of Panama seemed ready to take on the challenge of creating an urban space, which would integrate the ex-Canal
Zone into the city proper. Despite the setback of the U.S.
invasion in 1989, which left some of the poorest neighborhoods of the city in cinders, hope was in the air. At last,
not only Panama but the City of Panama would be one. It
would be a "new city."
In 1997 the government of Panama commissioned a
general urban land use plan that encompassed not only
Panama City and the reverted Canal Zone, but also the City
of Colon and its urban periphery on the Atlantic side of the
isthmus. 46 It was an audacious idea. Panama City and Co16n together would grow into the world's first (and only)
transisthmic city. The 1997 plan made projections through
the year 2025. Among its major recommendations was the
creation of a nodal urban arrangement in which employment, housing, and services would be decentralized across
the transisthmic city's space so as to reduce pressure on the

46

See Plan de Desarrollo Urbano de las Areas Metropolitanas del

Pacifico y del Atlintico (Dec. 22, 1997),
http://www.mivi.gob.pa/urbanismo/4URBANISMO/urbanismo/volume

n2b/indicella.html.
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the quality of life for
existing city centers and improve
47
city.
whole
the
residents across

Unfortunately, it was not to be. The plan was not
given legal effect. Instead, it remained little more than a
road map whose main recommendations were soon ignored
by decision makers at every level of government. Lack of
serious political commitment to managed urban growth led
to a failure to adopt the necessary regulatory framework of
land use planning, zoning regulations, and environmental
assessment requirements that underpin rational urban planning. Moreover, the government did not invest in the basic
infrastructure necessary to address the pressing needs of
low-income residents or to facilitate a transition to the new
decentralized city envisaged by the plan. Further, the government failed to put in place any meaningful fiscal incentives to encourage the private sector to invest in the
development of new nodal urban centers at the heart of the
strategy to reduce pressure on the existing city centers.
Instead, the government left in place the existing weak
regulatory structure and antiquated zoning regulations,
while providing generous tax holiday incentives for private
investments in high value real estate. Further, as part of a
concession agreement with a Mexican multinational (ICA,
S.A.) for the construction of a 19.5 km toll-highway (the
Corredor Sur) linking the downtown financial district to
the eastern parts of the city and the international airport at
Tocumen, the government made a fateful decision. The
decision was to grant the company property rights for development of about 30 hectares on the mainland adjacent to
the bay (the old Paitilla airport) and the additional right to
fill-in up to 35 hectares of the adjoining bay.d As might
have been expected, the result was not the rational growth
envisaged in the 1997 Plan, but a chaotic building boom,
concentrated almost exclusively in the center of town and

47 id.
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along the Bay, with its most intense focus in Punta Paitilla
and the new landfill at Punta Pacifica. 48
While the 1997 Plan remains the official reference
point, it was bypassed within five years-its projections
meaningless in the wake of the building frenzy that overtook the city. 49 The past ten years of unregulated urban
growth have produced a city ever more centralized and
congested, and local government authorities who claim to
be powerless to intervene.5 ° In this context, land use decision-making has been effectively delegated to private economic actors whose concern is not with the city as a whole,
or with the quality of life of its residents, but with maximizing their investment. Moreover, the reverted Canal Zone,
which seemed to offer so many prospects for facilitating
decentralized, rational growth across the isthmus, has so far
failed to fulfill expectations. The Zone's more highly regulated environment has failed to attract significant private
investment for either residential or commercial development, because developers have found it more congenial to
build in the virtually unregulated city center which doubles
as the commercial heart of the region. Instead, the trend
within the Zone has been to conserve the traditional garden
48

See Felix Wing Solis and Claudia Saladin, Panama's CorredorSur:

Turning the Bay of Panama into a "FecalSwamp," 2000,

http://www.ciel.org/Publications/IFCCSPanama.pdf. Today's Cinta
Costera is in effect a continuation of the Corredor Sur; its "second
phase."
49
Notes from Arquitecto Ren6 Paniza's presentation to the Study Space
group
at the Panama City Municipality, December 10, 2007.
50
Id.Paniza explained that the Mayor's office (Panama City) was
indeed concerned with the rate at which high rises were continuing to
be proposed by developers, and in particular worried about the additional stress such buildings were placing on already strained city services. Yet when asked to explain why the local government continued
to approve building permit applications for high rises, Paniza responded: "our hands are tied, we have no basis to deny them."
Whether or not this statement is strictly accurate, it clearly reflects a
defensible bureaucratic position.
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city character of its urban areas, thereby preserving an oasis
for those who can afford to live away from the city's congested center. In addition, the transfer of the local city
airport from Punta Paitilla in the Bay, to the airfield at
Albrook in the Zone, led to the imposition of strict building
height restrictions in one of the Zone's most promising
urban areas. Today, the Zone and the City are far from
integrated and instead of becoming a nodal city, Panama
City appears set on becoming an unworkable imitation of
Manhattan on the Pacific.
III.

Development as Mimesis: Skylines, Skyscrapers and Retirement Havens

Gazing down on the city from our vantage point in
the Parque Metropolitano, and later looking at the Punta
Paitilla and Punta Pacifica developments from across the
Bay during our visit of the Casco Antiguo, the term that
came to mind was "Manhattan." It was an image that was
invoked often during our visit to Panama City. When the
likeness was voiced by locals, there was an unmistakable
note of pride, accompanied, more often than not, by a shaking of the head; a counterpoint of disbelief. The disbelief,
however, was not critical. It did not denote disappointment
or frustration about the city's development choices. It was
closer to an expression of amazement that Panamanians
were bringing into being a "modem" city so soon after
shaking off the U.S. Empire.5
The Manhattan skyline, it turns out, continues to
capture the global imagination. Though high-rises are
ubiquitous around the world today, and despite the fact that
51For Panamanians, the U.S. Canal Zone came to be experienced as
trauma. Outside of Panama, the narrative of Panama's birth was always told as merely an accident of the U.S. desire for a transithmic
canal. Panama was, until the year 2000, not only dominated by U.S.
commercial and military interests, but literally cut in half by the U.S.
presence on the ground.
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many cities boast at least as great a concentration of skyscrapers as New York, all skylines seem still to refer back
to Manhattan. To build skyscrapers is a statement about
identity. To (re)produce a Manhattan skyline at home is to
present to the world the ultimate face of modernity and to
make a claim about an already achieved development.
Even the wounding of Manhattan on 9/11 has failed to dent
this dreamscape of modernity and progress.
There is something somewhat paradoxical of course
in Panamanians' mimetic impulse to recreate Manhattan on
the Pacific at the very moment when independence from
the U.S. was finally achieved. It may be as simple as a
visual, steel and concrete manifestation of a rejection of the
self-image of Panama as an economically backward jungle
hinterland; an image that Panamanians found reflected back
at them from the U.S. Canal Zone. In Panama, the U.S.
performed the role of quasi-colonial administrator, with the
Zone functioning as an expatriate civilized white enclave distinct and separate-a permanent reminder of U.S. cultural and technological superiority over the "locals," who
were dismissed as naturally backward. The Canal may
have been built through Panama, but it was not of Panama.
Read this way, the decision to build the city skywards (as
much as the later decision to widen the Canal) is no more
than a continuation of the declaration of independence, an
act of self-enfranchising separation: "We are as good as
they are. We too inhabit the concrete urban city, not the
jungle. We too are full of energy and creativity. We too
are civilized, not barbaric and backward. Let us show you
how we too can manage big works." Thus, the mimetic
gesture here is implicitly not a rejection of U.S. values, but
rather a validation of these values accompanied by an assertion of equality. Mimesis is a form of appropriation, and
can involve a re-inscription or even a reversal, but it also is
inescapably a form of tribute. In the Panamanian case there
is unfortunately little evidence that the production of skyscrapers has in any way subverted their signification. Fur-
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thermore, as a development strategy, the production of
luxury residential skyscrapers is hard to reconcile with even
5 2 Unless,
the most open-ended concept of sustainability.
that is, the term sustainable development is used merely as
a synonym for economic growth, in which case, the creation of employment opportunities in construction work and
the attraction of foreign investment to feed the boom could
arguably be taken as sufficient ends in themselves.
For a state ridding itself of the dominant foreign
power within and eager to leave behind its image of dependency and sense of inferiority, a certain contradiction
arises from the fact that only a small proportion of the skyscrapers have been devoted to commercial use and that
only a tiny fraction of the luxury residential apartments will
likely be lived in by local Panamanians. Instead, most of
the skyscrapers being built are destined for use as secondary residences or investment properties for wealthy foreigners or are being marketed to middle class retirees from
the "first world. ' ,e Although the government is seeking to
promote more traditional and conference-based tourism and
to encourage the creation of additional hotel capacity in
Panama City, the most active economic sector appears to be
the real estate market targeted at foreigners. Practically and
symbolically, this use destination of skyscrapers is at odds
with the conception of high rises as the locus and representation of economic power and self-determination.
rises impose heavy burdens on a city's infrastructure. In a city
where there is little or no sewage treatment capacity, where water and
power provision are already seasonally stressed, and where traffic
congestion and air pollution are significant problems, the superimposition of skyscrapers without a corresponding requirement to improve
public services simply makes a bad situation worse. Furthermore, not
only do skyscrapers contribute to some increase in population density
and their demand on services, but physically they contribute to the
problems. Their reflective surfaces in particular increase heat and glare
and act as a heat trap, while rising city temperatures lead to the increased use of energy for air conditioning.
52 High
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Indeed, the City of Panama, following the lead of
the national government, appears to have embraced first
world retirement as a major axis of its development strategy. Despite much competition from cities and states
around the world, it has succeeded in becoming a favorite
destination. INTERNATIONAL LIVING MAGAZINE, 53 for instance, aimed at (mostly) US retirees, and claiming a readership of over 400,000, is currently promoting Panama,
"the whirring hub of the Americas," as one of its top destinations. 54 In addition to its success with retirees, it appears
that Panama has also become a popular location for the
secondary home market. 55 It is still too early to know how
the global housing financial crisis or the fear of recession in
the US will affect retirees' choices or the investment decisions of the well-to-do in the US and Europe. However, 56
it
is probable that sales of luxury apartments will decline.
Be that as it may, there is no question that the construction
boom in Panama City has created at least temporary employment opportunities for skilled and low skilled workers.
The downside, however, is that development pressure in the
city center and rising property values have become a significant factor contributing to the displacement of low and
middle income residents from their traditional neighborhoods to less desirable areas of the city. This displacement
53 International Living, InternationalLiving,

http://www.internationalliving.com (last visited October 5, 2008).
54 See International Living, InternationalLiving in Panama,
http://www.intemationalliving.com/countries/panama (last visited
October 5, 2008).
55 See e.g. Amy Gunderson, House Hunting as Vacation, N.Y.TIMES

Dec. 12, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/12/travel/escapes/12your.html?_r-1
&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print.
56 There is some evidence that much of the building boom in Panama
City has been driven by speculation and that there is now an overproduction of units, resulting in low occupancy rates. See Jim Landers,
Condo boom hits Panama-As towers rise, sellers seek to woo Americans, CHI. TRI. Aug. 24, 2007.
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has exacerbated the problem of spatial segregation by income across the metropolitan area. Furthermore, the building boom has been accompanied by a disproportionate cost
to the local environment, in the form of additional air and
water pollution, noise, traffic congestion, energy use and
waste production, not to mention the heat trapping characteristic of high rises and the obstruction on air flows and
vistas. The lower cost of acquiring a luxury apartment in
Panama City, compared to a similar unit in Miami Beach is
due in large part to lower property values and labor costs,
and to the Panamanian government's generous tax incentives. There is no question, however, that lower or nonexistent environmental regulations contribute to comparatively lower prices. When foreigners acquire real estate in
under-regulated markets, they are in effect externalizing
their environmental and social costs on the local population. Given that the end use of residential high rises is
essentially non productive, that owners of residential luxury
real estate in Panama have been granted a tax holiday, and
that their construction and operation imposes a significant
environmental and social burden on the local economy, it is
unclear how they can contribute to a long term sustainable
development strategy.
IV.

Conclusion: Traditional Development, Sustainable Development and Binge Development

How then are we to think of Panama City's present
trajectory in relationship to the concept of sustainable development? In this essay I have focused almost exclusively
on the city's present love affair with skyscrapers. Of
course, I would not want to suggest that Panama City is
unique in its sudden devotion to developing a real estate
market in luxury residential apartments. Miami, Florida, for
instance is in the midst of an upward growth spurt, while
Punta del Este in Uruguay, has become not only a hot tour-
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ist destination, but also a hub of real estate speculation.
Furthermore, the building boom I have described is, by no
means, all that is going on in the City of Panama. Nonetheless, my sense is that the city's primary development orientation is being driven by the construction industry and real
estate developers, while all other development activity
dovetails to some extent with the building boom.
A good example is that of the controversial Cinta
Costera, a major bay landfill project that is being undertaken by the Ministry of Public Works (Ministerio de Obras
Publicas) and which is projected to be completed in April
2009, a month before the next Presidential elections. The
proposed Cinta Costera (or coastal strip) will encompass
25 hectares of new landfill, and provide the city with a
wide strip of new "land" running along the stretch of
Avenida Balboa that runs between the Casco Antiguo and
Punta Paitilla. Despite the heavy traffic congestion that
transforms it into a noisy and polluted parking lot during
most of the day, Avenida Balboa is still one of the City's
most scenic areas. This is because, apart from the egregious case of the 168 In., 55-story tall Intercontinental
Hotel Miramar and Miramar Towers , the Bay side of this
stretch of Avenida Balboa has thus far been preserved from
development. Accordingly, it is one of the few remaining
areas of the city where pedestrians can still enjoy unobstructed views of the Bay.
Estimated at a cost of $189.1 million, the Cinta
Costera is being promoted as a solution to the problem of
vehicular congestion and air pollution in the city.57 Indeed,
most of the landfill's 25 hectares of "new land" will be
dedicated to a four lane highway that connects to the Cor-

57

The EIA prepared for the Cinta Costera can be found at the MOP

(Ministerio de Obras Publicas) website at

http://www.mop.gob.pa/VideoCintacostera.htm along with the promotional video for the project.
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redor Sur, the 19.5 km stretch of toll-highway that presently runs from Punta Paitilla to Tocumen airport. After
the project design had already been approved, last minute
input by urban community group Alianza Pro Ciudad58 led
the City to modify its project to include highway overpasses, green areas, pedestrian walkways and bicycle
paths-areas dedicated to recreation and security posts.
With these embellishments, it has become easier for the
city to justify the Cinta Costera as a coherent urban planning project designed to improve and beautify the city by
providing much needed green spaces for the populace. As
critics have pointed out, however, the proposal to create
green spaces and provide useful recreational areas is likely
to prove unfeasible. First, is the problem that the new
green spaces will be physically cut off from the city by the
massive concrete and asphalt structure of the four lane
highway, which will, in addition, have to be protected by
an effective barricade to keep pedestrians from attempting
to cut across. The sense of the highway as an impenetrable
barrier between the city on one side and the new green
areas and the Bay on the other, will be exacerbated by the
noise and air pollution that the fast moving traffic will
inevitably produce. Further, there are doubts concerning
the long term viability of green areas on a salt water land58 See Alianza Pro Ciudad, Alianza Pro Ciudad,
http://www.alianzaprociudad.org/(last visited October 5, 2008)
Alianza Pro Ciudad is one of the community groups that has emerged
in response to the City's failure to take responsibility for rational urban
planning. Its membership is drawn largely from urban professionals
and a middle class affronted by the dramatic urban changes taking
place in their neighborhoods over which they have been given no voice.
Pro Ciudad's most notable success so far was the City's agreement to
amend the already approved design for the Cinta Costera in light of the
group's proposals. Other Pro Ciudad projects call for a moratorium on
demolition permits and approval of new high rises in historic middle
class residential neighborhoods such as Bella Vista and Exposici6n
where these buildings would be out of scale and impose excessive
burdens on local infrastructure.
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fill, given that many trees and plants cannot thrive in soil
characterized by high salinity.59
In any event, given the underlying cost of the Cinta
Costera project, it is evident that its purpose is simply to
provide the land necessary for constructing a new highway
to facilitate vehicular transit across the city. It is, in practice, a "second phase" extension of the CorredorSur and,
has, not surprisingly, given rise to a new wave of real estate
speculation. Already high property values on the stretch of
Avenida Balboa running between the Casco Antiguo and
Punta Paitilla have risen astronomically as investors seek to
capitalize on the new urban vision. 6 1 A quick review of
ongoing and proposed building projects in Panama City
confirms the impression that within the next five years a
"wall" of skyscrapers (many over seventy stories high) will
rise along the avenue, effectively blocking in the city. Behind this wall, the city will be cut off not only from its most
aesthetic feature, a view of the Bay, but from the air flows
that at present help cleanse the city's already compromised
air quality. Meanwhile, increased residential and commercial density on Avenida Balboa will almost certainly increase local traffic on the Avenue's six lanes and produce a
new source of congestion, which will soon negate the already dubious environmental and quality-of-life improvements that the new highway was supposed to deliver to the
city's residents.
In reflecting on the overall scenario of politically
backed economic activity underway in Panama City, it is
See Eduardo A. Esquivel, Las aventuras de la cinta costera,
prensa.com, Apr. 15, 2008,
http://mensual.prensa.com/mensual/contenido/2008/0 4/15/hoy/opinion/
1322309.html.
60 See Burica Press on Cinta Costera supra at note 6.
61 See Ebrahim Asvat, La cinta costera y corrupci6n, Apr. 21, 2008,
59

http://burica.wordpress.com/2008/04/21/la-cinta-costera-ycorrupcion/,stating that property values on Avenida Balboa have risen
to as much as $5,000 per m3 .
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easy to wonder how this scenario fits in with an official
commitment to sustainable development. Without question, the City is the midst of a frenzy of economic activity
fed in large part by foreign investment. In addition to the
building boom, supported by tax incentives and a lax regulatory environment, a significant number of major urban
projects are underway in the City. These include: construction of the Cinta Costera; the urban renewal project in the
Casco Antiguo; the Panama City and Bay sanitation project; the development of the City of Knowledge in the Canal Zone; 62 and development of the Amador causeway's
high-end touristic potential. In addition, both the Canal
expansion project and the completion of the Panama-Colon
highway are likely to have a major impact on the city's
residents.
With the significant exception of the City and Bay
sanitation project, however, there is little evidence that any
of these projects are directly intended to benefit the poor
residents who constitute the majority of the city's popula-

tion. For the most part, these projects seem designed instead to enhance the City's appeal to foreigners by making
the city more physically appealing as a modem (high-rises),
convenient (easy airport access), fun (Amador) yet quaint
62

The City of Knowledge is located in the ex US military base of Fort

Clayton in the Canal Zone. The City of Knowledge, managed by a
Foundation and governed by a generous regulatory incentive package
to attract foreign investment is designed to bring together technological
business enterprises, academic centers and international organizations.
See City of Knowledge,
http://www.cdspanama.org/index.php?set language=en&cccpage=indx
Since its inception in 1999 the Foundation appears to have been
relatively successful in attracting businesses, university centers and
international organizations, yet it is too early to say whether the much
vaunted "synergies" will contribute in any measurable way to local
employment or to local capacity building. The generous package of tax
incentives and privileges granted to foreign employees are likely to
produce a foreign knowledge enclave with little spill over effects into
the local economy.
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(Casco Antiguo) destination for retirees, second home vacationers, business and recreational tourists, while rendering
it more attractive as an investment haven for foreign capital. In effect these projects can be understood as part of a
concerted strategy by the government of a small nation
(and a large city) to secure for itself a meaningful place in
the globalized economy. As always, the benefit to the
majority is assumed to arise indirectly from some indeterminate form of trickle down effect in the future.
It is of course an open question whether or not an
economy based on tourism, retirement and construction of
residential real estate is viable in the long term. Tourism is
fickle, retirees, whose overall economic value to the receiving state is in any case dubious, are liable to being courted
by the next cheaper, even more fiscally advantageous destination, while real estate busts tend to follow booms. Even
the nation's canal expansion project may prove financially
risky as construction costs are likely to be much higher than
anticipated, while the projected volume of transoceanic
trade from China to the East Coast of the United States and
Europe is likely to have been overestimated. While the
long term economic benefits are doubtful, it is nonetheless
clear that the economic activity in Panama City is producing short term economic benefits for some small segment
of the local population. It is equally clear that quality of
life for the vast majority of the residents of the city is being
compromised by this frenzy of activity, as air and water
pollution levels increase, congestion intensifies, commuting
distances and times increase, low and middle income residents are pressured out of their neighborhoods, and spatial
segregation by income levels is accentuated. From an ecological perspective some of the evident present harms are
the damage to the coastal zone ecosystems from additional
in-filling and increased waste discharges, the destruction of
forest and mangrove eco-systems, and the increased energy
and water consumption associated with the construction
frenzy, the first world consumption habits of tourists and

244

4:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 392

retirees, and due to the heat trap effect of so much new
concrete and glass in the city. The needs of the majority of
the present generation are not being met, and it seems
likely that today's development choices have compromised
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.
If we approach Panama City as a case study for
sustainable development in the city, it is hard not to conclude either that local policy makers have badly misunderstood the concept or that the government's apparent
commitment to the goal of sustainable development is simply window dressing. One response to the evidence on the
ground in Panama City, might be to suggest that, despite
the rhetoric, there has been no development paradigm shift
at all, and that today's development policies are simply a
continuation of development policies adopted during the
heyday of the traditional conception of development as
economic growth-the more the better. However, there is
a sense in which we have collectively lost our innocence.
In the days before "sustainable development" it was possible to believe that the sky was the limit. The economic
growth spurt in the developing world's economies-China
and India of course, but also Panama-would have been
interpreted as unmitigated goods. The general consensus
was that growing the economy was the way out of poverty
and the solution to all of poverty's attendant ills.
Today the concept of sustainable development
marks our new understanding of the interrelationship between economic activity, environmental impact and issues
of intra- and inter-generational equity. Today, we are
aware that quality of life on earth depends on the integrity
of the natural systems that we once took for granted. While
they are difficult to quantify and value we know that we
rely on a series of eco-system services for everything from
drinking water to energy to food production. And we have
come to learn that while nature is abundantly resilient;
there comes a point of collapse. Given time we may be
able to resurrect a seemingly dead river, but this comes at a
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great cost, and we cannot make it teem again with salmon.
Even if we could, there would be no way to compensate for
the lost revenue. Further, we are no longer so sanguine
about the earth's non-renewable resources. The possibility
of future scarcity can no longer be denied. Depletion of
ground water reserves may prove even more critical than
depletion of oil reserves. Our wasteful, energy inefficient,
natural resource intensive patterns of production and consumption have come under review. Meanwhile, we have
become much more knowledgeable about the impacts on
human health and life expectancy of pollutants in our air,
water and food supply. The human species is inventive,
creative, and innovative. At times it seems that there is
nothing we cannot do if we put our minds to it. For all that
technology promises, however, we know that we can no
longer behave as if there were no repercussions. Our development choices impose a cost today and may compromise the choices of the future.
What sustainable
development calls on us to do is not to limit economic
growth in any particular instance, but to be as conscious as
possible of the short term and long term costs and benefits
of our development choices, and of how these costs and
benefits are allocated within the present generation.
What we can observe in Panama City today, as in
countless other places, is that development choices are
being made with an eye to economic growth, with little
effort to engage in any meaningful attempt at the kind of
cost benefit analysis required by sustainable development.
For all that, what we have today is not simply a continuation of traditional development. Instead, I would argue,
what we are observing is something that we could term
"binge" development. 63 Development can be termed
63 1

am borrowing (and reframing) the image of the "binge" developed

by Richard Wilk in the context of what he terms "binge consumerism."
See Richard Wilk, Consumer Culture and Extractive Industry on the

Margins of the World System, CONSUMING

CULTURES, GLOBAL PER-
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"binge" development when it is exclusively presentoriented, clearly excessive, unconstrained by any sense of
limits and blissfully unconcerned with future repercussions.
While on the ground it may look indistinguishable from
traditional development, it is binge development because
the context today is informed by the prudential concept of
sustainable development. We know there are consequences; we know it is not sustainable; yet we continue to
consume in a manner that is out of control and irresponsible: as though there were no tomorrow. Has the fear of
future scarcity, the concern that our future choices may
indeed be limited, actually exacerbated the problem and
contributed to irrational development patterns?
V.

Modest Proposals for Actions in Pursuit of
More Sustainable Development in Panama
City

Without question, one of the most serious urban
problems affecting the quality of life of all sectors of society in the City of Panama is the combined burden of air
pollution and traffic congestion. Poor air quality and traffic
congestion are due as much to the failure of urban planning, as to the number of motorized vehicles on the roads.
The rise in air pollution can be directly attributed to an
increase in the absolute number of motorized vehicles,
including a significant proportion of older vehicles with
poor or nonexistent emissions controls, but also to the massive amount of uncontrolled dust produced by the countless
construction projects. The increase in car ownership and
daily use can be attributed to two factors: first, an inadeSPECTIVES: HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES, TRANSNATIONAL EXCHANGES

(John Brewer & Frank Trentmann, eds., 2006), 123-44. Binge consumerism is a form of present oriented consumption that stands in stark
opposition to that of the rational (protestant) idea of frugality and
prudential saving for the future.
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quate public transportation system that relies on privately
owned and operated antiquated buses with a poor safety
record and an enormous fleet of privately owned taxis; and
second, on the increasing commuting distance from employment opportunities for the vast majority of low and
middle income workers. The city's number one priority
must be to adopt a comprehensive transportation policy,
including the introduction of a safe, effective and affordable public transportation system. Such a system, however,
will fail to produce meaningful results unless transportation
policy is approached as an integral component of an urban
land use management plan for the whole city. This will
likely require a political commitment at all levels of gov64
ernment to the nodal model promoted by the 1997 Plan.
Furthermore, until such a plan is put into effect, it may be
necessary to place a moratorium on incentivized private
investment in the center of the city.
This is a tall order, yet Panama City cannot hope to
become sustainable if it does not commit itself to transportation reform and land use planning. Of greatest urgency is
the need to revisit the logic of the project for the Cinta
Costera. Ideally the project should be abandoned. However, at a minimum, if indeed the purpose of the project is
to relieve air pollution and traffic congestion, then the government must ensure that the highway running through the
Cinta Costera is not a toll road but open to all drivers regardless of means. Otherwise, like the CorredorSur it will
turn into a convenient and underutilized thoroughfare for
the privileged while it is externalizing its environmental
costs on the city's residents. Further, the Cinta Costera
project must be redesigned to include a dedicated corridor
for collective public transportation.
Moreover, the speculative bonanza for developers
on Avenida Balboa must be reined in. It would be inconsistent with the goal of reducing air pollution and traffic
64

See supra note 44.
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congestion to allow more luxury high rises to be built on

this already overburdened strip of urban space. In addition
to the urban blight that such structures represent for city
residents trapped behind these structures, high rises will
add to traffic congestion as residential and commercial
density increases, have negative impacts on airflows, and
contribute to a rise in city temperatures. Today promoters
of the Cinta Costera are counting on the ground level development of high rises as shop fronts on Avenida Balboa
to make the experience of the city street less alienating.
There are two problems with this. First, the existing regulatory regime does not require it, so it will be a matter for
the private developers to determine whether it is in their
interest. Thus, the result is likely to be a patchwork at best.
Second, if the Avenida Balboa is transformed into an avenue for upscale shoppers, this will simply add to the traffic
congestion problem. In addition, in the absence of rational
and safe public transportation options more shopping will
require more parking which is already at a premium in the
area. Indeed, it is my prediction that if the Cinta Costera is
built without a serious re-evaluation of its justification and
design, it will ultimately turn into one big parking lot. The
result will be more congestion and more air pollution.
Appendix
aParqueMetropolitano.

The park, designated an ecologi-

cal, scientific and cultural reserve, see Ley N' 8 de 1985;
Gatica Oficial 20,352 (19 de Julio de 1985), is located
within what until recently was the US controlled Canal
Zone, an area which quite literally bisected the Republic of
Panama, extending, as it did, about five miles out along the
whole length of the canal on either side. This land, granted
to the US "in perpetuity" by the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty
of 1903, finally reverted back to Panama by operation of
the Torrijos-Carter treaties of 1977, which entered into
force in 1979. While the ParqueMetropolitano bills itself
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as the "lungs of Panama City," its protected status is due
less to the undoubted eco-services it renders the city, nor
even to its ecological importance as one of the few remaining dry tropical forests in the region, but rather to its function as a key component of the so called "canal watershed".
The Panama Canal is dependent on large quantities of
freshwater for its proper functioning as, each time the locks
empty, 52 million gallons of freshwater are drained into the
sea. See web site of the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) at
http://www.pancanal.com/eng/noticiero/canalfaqs/index.ht
ml. Thus, since its inception, the Canal Zone's watersheds,
rivers and lakes have been dedicated to this purpose. Even
so, the park is today under increasing pressure. Despite its
protected status, in 1995 the Panamanian government approved the construction of a new highway, the Corredor
Norte, through the eastern sector of the park, a decision,
justified by the need to ease the city's severe traffic congestion, which was a source of air and noise pollution. In its
response to a petition filed before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights challenging the project, the
government averred that in approving the construction of
the new highway it had complied with the EIA requirements and was, in any case, acting pursuant to its "duty to
promote development to prevent environmental pollution."
See Parque Natural Metropolitano v. Panama, Caso
11.533,
Informe No. 88/03, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEA/Ser./L/V/II.118 Doc. 70 rev. 2 en 524 (2003), §25
(author's translation). Today the park's "empty" lands are
under great pressure from the crowded city's poorer residents who view the area as an attractive new frontier for
informal settlement.
b

Gentrification of the Casco Antiguo. Panama City's

black residents today are mostly Afro-Caribbean descendants of the West Indian workers who were brought to
Panama to work on the US Canal in the early 2 0 h Century.
See WORLD DIRECTORY OF MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS
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Minority Rights Group International at
http://www.minorityrights.org/?lid=4210. Excluded from
the strictly segregated US Canal Zone, the AfroPanamanian community was forced to take up residence in
the doubly peripheral neighborhoods of Chorrillos and Rio
Abajo, squeezed in between the walled city of San Felipe
and the US Canal Zone. As the historical center was abandoned by its traditional residents, drawn to the more spacious and "modem" garden city suburbs to the north of the
city, the empty buildings were subdivided into single-room
dwellings and rented out to mostly Afro-Panamanians.
Lack of investment by property owners and neglect by
local government led to the inevitable deterioration of the
housing stock. The neighborhood, overcrowded, decaying
and characterized by the poverty of its residents gained
notoriety as a hub of criminal activity. See HISTORIA CASCO
ANTIGUO at note 4, 47 et seq.
The project to save Panama's cultural heritage in
the Casco Antiguo has resulted in the condemnation of
numerous dangerous residential structures, the displacement of old time residents from buildings slated for renovation and a radical change in the character of the local
community. While the law regulating the redevelopment of
the Casco Antiguo provides for some degree of compensation for ousted long term tenants and the responsible Governmental entity, the Oficina del Casco Antiguo (OCA), has
made some determined efforts to follow the law's prescription to provide low income housing within the district to
retain the mixed income character of the historic center,
such efforts cannot begin to address the housing needs of
the vast majority of the community. See Ley 4 de 2002,
Ibid at note 4, Art. 5 & 8. See also Ariel Espino, Casco
Antiguo: Su Gente in PATRIMONIO HUMANO: ESPACIO
GROUPS,

ARTE, OFICINA DEL CASCO ANTIGUO, CIUDAD DE PANAMA,

2007, 17 et seq., and Demolerdn siete casa condenadas en
El Chorrilloy San Felipe, June 8, 2007 news article posted
on the web site of the Ministry of Housing

251

4:2 TENNESSEE

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

399

http://www.mivi.gob.pa/6NOTICIAS/porfechas/j unio_07/j
un_14.html. Displaced residents from the Casco Antiguo
will likely find themselves swelling the already densely
populated low income neighborhoods of the city, such as
Curundfi, or be pushed further out to the outskirts of the
city, to the informal squatter settlements which lie distant
from the city's employment opportunities.
C

Punta Paitilla and the Bay Cleanup. Real estate web-

sites advertising residential properties in Punta Paitilla (and
Pacifica) refer to it as an exclusive neighborhood and emphasize the high quality shopping available at its U.S. style
shopping malls. See Punta Pacifica - Panama Realtor,
available at www.panamarealtor.com/locations/53/puntapacifica. They do not mention that at the point where the
Avenida Balboa meets the main entrance to Punta Paitilla,
just across from the undoubtedly modem and fancy Multicentro Mall, the Matasnillo River, today one of the
crowded city's open sewers, dumps its untreated and foul
smelling domestic and industrial waste waters directly into
the Bay. Up in their air-conditioned towers the fortunate
residents may enjoy their views of the Pacific, those seeking to enjoy the views from down below along the walkway
of the Avenida Balboa, which skirts the Bay, must hold
their nose and push on past. Swimming in these waters is,
of course, out of the question, and fishing and shellfish
collection have been severely compromised in the Bay.
"The local population and the city's industrial and commercial establishments generate a daily volume of approximately 280,000 m 3 of wastewater. Virtually all of it
flows untreated into the rivers running through the city, or
directly into Panama Bay." See PanamaCity and Bay Sanitation Project (1) Loan Proposal IDB PR-3021 (7 February
2006) at 1, available at http://www.iadb.org/projects. With
financial assistance from the IDB, EIB and the Japan Bank
for International Co-operation, plans are underway to build
wastewater collectors, a wastewater interceptor and a
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wastewater treatment plant for Panama City. When fully
implemented, this expensive (estimated at $360 million)
and ambitious project will collect and treat about 50% of
the city's wastewater and will thus contribute significantly
to improvement of the city's and the Bay's sanitation.
Remaining concerns include the need for better standards
and controls over industrial and manufacturing waste water
discharges at source, the potential significant ecological
impact of siting the proposed plant in one of the few remaining mangrove areas bordering the city in Juan Diaz,
and the structure of service charges that is to be established
to recover project and waste water treatment costs.
d In

hindsight it is interesting to speculate whether the Mexican company's project to construct the Corredor Sur was
not designed primarily to take advantage of the lucrative
opportunity for real estate development rather than driven
by the much less viable highway construction. When it
was proposed, the Corredor Sur was justified by the urgent
need to relieve traffic congestion in the city, to reduce
travel time and decrease air pollution. As any visitor to
Panama can attest, the Corredor Sur makes travel from and
to the airport a relatively painless experience, as the road is
direct, in excellent condition and unobstructed by other
vehicles. Indeed, it would appear that high tolls charged for
use of the highway keep most Panamanians off the Corredor Sur. Given how little of the city's daily vehicular traffic
that must make its way into and out of the city along this
axis makes use of the highway, it is certain that neither the
goal of easing traffic congestion nor decreasing air pollution were achieved. Rather, the opposite was the result.
The high value and dense real estate and commercial developments of Punta Paitilla and Pacifica added to the congestion. Meanwhile, air quality suffered further
deterioration not only from increased vehicular traffic and
the new bottlenecks but from the significant quantities of
dust produced by the construction process.
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' An amusing story hit world headlines just as our Study
Space group was making its way to Panama. On December
5th, 2007, The Mirror, a British tabloid, published a photograph of a happy looking retiree couple posing with their
real estate agent in Panama City. See picture at
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/topstories/2007/12/05/deadcanoeist-arrested-for-fraud-pictured-with-wife-in-200689520-20205194/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). The smiling
husband in the picture was identified as none other than
John Darwin: the "dead" canoeist. Presumed dead since
2002, Mr. Darwin, had come to the attention of the press a
few days before publication of the Mirror photograph by
walking into a police station in London, claiming to have
no memory of the five years elapsed since his mysterious
disappearance during a solo canoeing trip in the North of
England. See Canoeist Resurfaces Five Years On, BBC
NEWS,
Dec.
2,
2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/england/7124119.stm
(last visited Apr. 8, 2008). From her new home in Panama
City, his widow, Anne, had expressed surprise and delight
at his sudden re-appearance. Unfortunately for the scheming couple, presumably involved in a life insurance scam,
The Mirror's snapshot, drawn from the "satisfied customers" section of the website of MOVE TO PANAMA showed
the happy couple shopping together for their ideal Panama
City apartment a year before his unexpected re-appearance.
See Welcome to Panama,http://www.movetopanama.com/
- "If you are looking for the best place in the world to live That place is in Panama!" claims the website.
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ESSAY

TAMALES & BOLLOS-PATRIMONIO DE LA HUMANIDAD /
WORLD HERITAGE: CHALLENGES FACED BY RESTORATION EFFORTS IN PANAMA CITY'S SAN FELIPE HISTORIC

DISTRICT

Daniel Suman*

Introduction
On a street comer in Panama City's historic San Felipe neighborhood (and World Heritage Site) in December
2007, a vendor was selling tamales and bollos (traditional
corn meal wraps). Few foods could be more typically
Panamanian than these that were being sold in Panama
City's oldest neighborhood. The vendor cries "bollospatrimonio de la humanidad" or "bollos--"patrimony of
humanity." This vendor represents the dichotomy evident
in San Felipe today. For the past 50 years, San Felipe has
been a "popular" neighborhood with a majority low income
residents, active street life, and cultural and social diversity.
Moreover, the Presidential Palace, the Ministry of Government and Justice, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
also made San Felipe one important node of political activity of the Nation. A two-decade-long movement to protect
the architectural heritage of the neighborhood culminated
in 1997 with designation of San Felipe as a United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Site, as specified by the 1972 World

* Professor of Marine Policy, Rosenstiel School of Marine and Atmospheric Science, University of Miami. J.D., University of California,
Berkeley; Ph.D., University of California, San Diego; M.Ed., M.A.,
Columbia University; A.B., Middlebury College.
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Heritage Convention.1 Historic preservation legislation, the

UNESCO declaration, and new legislation promoting restoration through economical and fiscal incentives has jumpstarted a dramatic process of restoration.

The result has

been increasing restoration activity with much more on the
horizon. At the same time, the majority of the former residents (both renters and squatters) have been displaced by
wealthier new owners. 2 Today, the price per square meter
of restored residences in the historic district is among the
highest in Panama City.3 The danger is that the historic
neighborhood of San Felipe in the near future may contain
many newly restored buildings occupied by high income
(and foreign) residents. Many of these new residents will
only spend a fraction of the year in Panama. Chic boutique
restaurants will continue to multiply, and the deli will replace the Chinese-owned comer grocery. As a result, the
typical Panamanian street life and culture may become
increasingly absent, and social diversity may become a
distant memory.
This manuscript describes the San Felipe neighborhood and its historic significance to Panama City and its
urban space, details the legislation adopted to protect the
architectural values of the neighborhood, and discusses
some of the challenges that this effort faces.

' See generally UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 11 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1358, availableat
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 10,

2008).

2 Angela de Picardi, Pasadoy Presentese Funden en un Solo
Valor:
Lo Humano, PATRIMONIO HUMANO: ESPACIO ARTE, OFICINA DEL
CASCO ANTIGUO CIUDAD DE PANAMA, 2007, at 10.
3 EDUARDO TEJEIRA DAVIS, Aspectos Sociales y Econ6micos (Social
and Economic Aspects), in CIUDAD: EL CASCO ANTIGUO DE LA CIUDAD DE PANAMA (CITY: PANAMA CITY'S OLD QUARTER) 58, 76 (Ofi-

cina del Casco Antiguo, 2001).
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I. A History of Spatial and Social Changes in
Panama City and the Casco Antiguo
Panamd Viejo (Old Panama) was the first Spanish
settlement located on the Pacific coast.4 It was founded in
1519 by the Spanish conquistador Pedrarias Ddvila and
served as an important trade and communications link between Spain and its colony in Peru. 5 The trans-isthmian
route passed from Panama on the Pacific to Nombre de
Dios and later Portobelo on the Caribbean. 6 Major natural
disasters struck the town: earthquakes in 1541 and 1641
and fires in 1539, 1563, and 1644. 7 Abandonment occurred
in 1671 after pirate Henry Morgan sacked and burned the
city. 8 The low-lying, swampy site provided
no natural
9
defenses from attack and no natural port.
Consequently, the Spanish moved their city to a site
about 7.5 km to the southwest on a more easily defended
peninsula on January 21, 1673.10 They constructed fortress
walls to protect their new city from possible attack from the
4 World HeritageList:

Panamd (Panamd), ICOMOS, No. 790 at 91
(1997),
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory bodyevaluation/790bis.pdf.
5 EDUARDO TEJEIRA DAVIS,

Historia Concisa del Casco Antiguo de

Panamd:A Concise History of Panama City's Old Quarter,in CIUDAD:
EL CAsco ANTIGUO DE LA CIUDAD DE PANAMA (CITY: PANAMA CITY'S OLD QUARTER) 24, 26, 30-31 (Oficina del Casco Antiguo, 2001).
6

Id. at24, 31.

7 Rebeca H. Sandoya, El Crecimiento EspacialyDemogrdfico de la
Ciudadde Panamd, in GEOGRAFiA DE PANAMA (Omar Ja~n Suirez ed.,

1985) at 404-20, 411.
8 SHOSHANNA LEVY

& EFRAiN G6MEZ, EL CASCO ANTIGUO: THE OLD

QUARTER 12 (1999); World HeritageList: Panama (Panama),supra
note 4, at 91.
9 TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 28.
10 Patricia Pizzurno, Un Nuevo Recorrido por el Centro Hist6rico, 434
La Prensa - Talingo, 7, 8 (Feb. 17, 2002), 8; Levy & G6mez, supra
note 8, at 12; Sandoya, supra note 7, at 411; Tejeira Davis, supra note
5, at 24, 28.
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sea, as well as a wall across the peninsula to protect from
land attack.'1 The walls enclosed a 16 ha area.12 The walls
had an additional function; they separated the social and
economic elite who lived inside the walled city from the
13
servants and lower classes who resided outside the walls.
to administer Spanish
At this time, the city continued
14
commerce in the New World.
However, before the collapse of the Spanish Empire
in 1820, Panama had already lost its importance, as shipments of Peruvian gold began to pass to Spain via the
southern route of the Rio de la Plata instead of the northern
route through Panama.' 5 Additionally, disastrous fires
destroyed major parts of the settlement in 1737, 1756, and
1781.16 The plight of San Felipe changed following the
collapse of the Spanish Empire and independence from
Spain (as a department of Colombia) in 1821.17
Panama City's growth continued sporadically in the
19t h Century due to external factors, such as the 1848 discovery of gold in California.' 8 Many prospective miners
preferred to travel from the East Coast of the United States
to California by sea via Panama instead of traveling by
train across the continental United States. 19 To meet this
demand, a consortium built the trans-isthmian railroad from
11TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 28-29. See generally Eduardo
Tejeira Davis, La Traza y las Murallas a lo Largo del Tiempo/The
Layout and the Walls: Over Time, in CIUDAD: EL CASCO ANTIGUO DE
LA CIUDAD DE PANAMA (CITY: PANAMA CITY'S OLD QUARTER) 80, 87
(Oficina del Casco Antiguo, 2001).
2 Sandoya, supra note 7, at 411.
3 Pizzumo, supra note 10, at 9; Sandoya, supra note 7, at 412.
14Pizzurno, supra note 10, at 8; TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 31.

World HeritageList: Panamd (Panamd),supra note 4, at 91.
supra note 5, at 24, 33.
17 Pizzuno, supra note 10, at
8; TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 31.
'8 ERNESTO CASTILLERO, HISTORIA DE PANAMA 95 (1962); EDUARDO
15

16 TEJEIRA DAVIS,

TEJEIRA DAVIS, PANAMA: GuiA DE ARQUITECTURA Y PAISAJE: AN
ARCHITECTURAL AND LANDSCAPE GUIDE 118 (Panamd - Sevilla 2007).
19TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 18, at 118.
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1850 to 1855.20 The Pacific terminus21of the railroad was
located about one km from San Felipe.
Some of San Felipe's most defining moments involved attempts to construct the Panama Canal. In 1878, a
French company, under the direction of Ferdinand de
Lesseps, obtained a concession from the Colombian government for the purpose of building a trans-oceanic canal.22
The headquarters of the French canal company were located on the main square in San Felipe near the Cathedral.23
Faced with numerous financial, technical, and public health
problems, the French abandoned their canal dreams in
1889. 24 However, French 25
influence on San Felipe architectoday.
remains
tural styles
A possible trans-isthmian canal remained Panama's
principal potential. 26 In 1903, Colombia rejected a proposed treaty with the United States regarding an inter27
oceanic
canal.nationalists
As a result,
the United
States supported
Panamanian
who declared
independence
from
20

PANAMA HOY: RETRATO DE LA NACI6N 93 (KENNETH JONES ED.,

Focus PUBLICATION 2002); Pizzurno, supra note 10, at 8; TEJEIRA

DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 36.
supra note 18, at 167; TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at

21 CASTILLERO,

24, 42, 47.

22 PANAMA HOY, supra note 20, at 92-93; WALTER LAFEBER, THE
PANAMA CANAL: THE CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 13 (New

York, 1978).

23 Reinier Rodriguez Ferguson, CascoAntiguo: Su Arquitectura, PATRIMONIO HUMANO: ESPACIO ARTE, OFICINA DEL CASCO ANTIGUO,
CIUDAD DE PANAMA, 2007, at 22, 25; TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 18,

222.

24 LAFEBER,
25 Rodriguez

at

supra note 22, at 14.
Ferguson, supra note 23, at 25-27; Eduardo Tejeira Davis,

Evoluci6n de la Arquitectura del Casco AntiguolEvolution ofArchitecture in the Old Quarter,in CIUDAD: EL CASCO ANTIGUO DE LA CIUDAD
DE PANAMA (CITY: PANAMA CITY'S OLD QUARTER) 106, 138 (Oficina
del Casco Antiguo, 2001). Eduardo Tejeira Davis,
26 PANAMA HOY, supra note 20, at 92-93; BONIFACIO PEREIRA JIMENEZ, HISTORIA DE PANAMA 289 (1969).
27 LAFEBER, supra note 22, at 22.
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Colombia in 1903.28 Soon afterwards, the new leaders
signed a canal treaty with the United States-opening a
new era in Panamanian history that, among other political,
social, and economic impacts, greatly affected the face of
Panama City.29 During the canal construction period and in
later years, the United States played a dramatic role in
Panama City's urban development. 30 Balboa became the
center of the U.S.-controlled Canal Zone, canal operations,
and Panama's principal Pacific port. In Panama City
proper, the canal authorities constructed a drainage system
and aqueduct in San Felipe, paved streets, and exterminated
mosquitoes. 3 1 These infrastructure developments improved
the public health of Panama City residents. 32 The new
Republican government also built new monumental buildings in San Felipe, including the National Theater in
1908. 33 Also built in 1908 was the Club Uni6n, a social
center for the elite. 34 Modernity had arrived.
During this century, Panama City's population (essentially San Felipe and surrounding areas) grew from
about 5,000 in 1821 (Independence from Spain) to 13,000
during the California gold rush period, to 24,000 at the end
of the French Canal period, and finally to 60,000 in 1914
when the U.S.-constructed canal opened.35
The construction of the canal also created a need for
workers. Many West Indians arrived in Panama during the
28

Id. at 23-24; PANAMA HOY, supra note 20, at 93.

See TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 18, at 125-35; ANDREW ZIMBALIST
&
JOHN WEEKS, PANAMA AT THE CROSSROADS: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 22-39
29

(1991).
TEJEIRA DAVIS,

supra note 5, at 24, 50.
d. at 24, 46.
32Id. at 24, 50.
33 Pizzumo, supra note 10, at 9.
34
TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 3, at 58,
68.
35 World HeritageList: Panamd (Panami),supra note
4, at 91-92;
TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 39, 47.
30

31
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first two decades of the 2 0 th Century to fill this need. 36 The
influx of construction workers created a need for housing
and stimulated the construction of rental tenements in El
Chorrillo, Santa Ana, Marafi6n, and Calidonia, areas adjacent to San Felipe. 37 At this time, San Felipe was surrounded by low-income workers' rental housing. These
rental neighborhoods were located in close proximity to the
railroad station located on the Plaza 539
de Mayo from which
sites.
work
their
to
laborers commuted
In 1915, to celebrate the opening of the Canal, the
first administration of President Belisario Porras (19121916) organized an international exposition in Panama.4 °
To promote this celebration, the government filled swampy
lands along Panama Bay and constructed Avenida Balboa
and the new neighborhoods of La Exposici6n and Bella
Vista.4 ' Many of the wealthy families living in San Felipe
moved to these new neighborhoods. 42 As the elite aban36 PANAMA HOY,supra note

20, at 93.

37 Pizzurno, supra note 10, at 9; Sandoya, supra note 7, at 413; TEJEIRA

DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 52.
38 TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 3, at 58, 63.
39 The railway station was built on the Plaza 5 de Mayo. Pizzumo,
supra note 10, at 7; TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 25, 51.
40 "'LaExplosi6n: Struggling to Survive in the Midst of Luxury and
Urban Blight," 13 PANAMA-THE VISITOR/EL VISITANTE 4, Feb. 9-22,
2007, availableat
http://www.focuspublicationsint.com/NewSite/Visitorl 34/tours visitor.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008); CASTILLERO, supra
note 18, at 167; Jorge Luis Mitchell, Las Dos Caras de Bella Vista, LA
PRENSA (Panama), June 12, 2006, availableat
http://mensual.prensa.com/mensual/contenido/2006/06/12/hoy/panoram
a/63 1831 .html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008).
41 Rodriguez Ferguson, supra note 23, at 28-29.
42 Pizzurno, supra note 10, at 18, 28; Rodriguez Ferguson, supra note
23, at 28; Ariel Espino, Casco Antiguo: Su Gente, PATRIMONIO HUMANO: ESPACIO ARTE, OFICINA DEL CASCO ANTIGUO, CIUDAD DE

PANAMA, 2007, at 16, 18; PANAMA HOY, supra note 20, at 111; Sandoya, supra note 7, at 413; TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 52, 55;
Olmedo J. Varela, Modeling the Changing Urban Landscape of a Latin
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doned San Felipe, their properties were subdivided into
rental units and the neighborhood became a melting pot
that represented multi-cultural Panama: Blacks, Mestizos,
and whites; new migrants from the interior provinces; as
immigrants. 43
Hindu
and
Chinese,
Jewish,
Arab,
well as
During much of the 20th Century, Panama's population
became more ethnically and culturally diverse; however,
the quality of the housing stock in San Felipe gradually
deteriorated.44
Additional factors also contributed to the deterioration of the housing stock in Panama City. For example, in
response to a new tax on real property in 1925, owners'
increased rents between 25% and 50%. 45 This stimulated
the Renters' Movement of 1925, which resulted in the
freezing of rents in Panama City.46 The rent freeze created
an incentive for owners not to maintain their properties and
also led to an increase in condemned properties which
continued to be occupied.47 Subsequent rent controls in
1945 and 1959 returned rents in both cases to their 1941
government of Omar Torrilevels. 48 The populist military
49
1973.
in
rents
froze
jos again
During much of the 2 0 th Century (1920-1970), San
Felipe was abandoned to its fate as the elite moved out and
buildings continued to deteriorate.5 0 During this half cenAmerican City: Lessons from the Past and Considerations for the
Future of Metropolitan Panama City (Sept. 24-26, 1998). (Unpublished
manuscript on file with American Studies Associations Conference).
43 Ferguson, supra note 23, at 28-29.
44 TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 53; See also Espino, supra note
42 at 18, Ferguson supra note 23 at 28.
45 TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 3, at 58, 65.
46 Id. at 58, 65-66.
47 Pizzurno, supra note 10, at 9.
48 TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 3, at 58, 68.
49
1d. at 58, 70. "Dictanse Medidas Sobre los Arrendamientos," Ley
No. 93, at art. 36, de 4 de Octubre de 1973; Gaceta Oficial No. 17.456
(lunes 22 octubre de 1973).
50 TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 52-56.
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tury, government policy gave no importance to historic
preservation.4; The deterioration also occurred in the adjacent rental neighborhoods of El Chorrillo, Santa Ana, and
Calidonia. 52

In the 1950s the government constructed

three-story cement housing units, and in the 1960s, 12 story
housing blocks. 5
Much of El Chorrillo neighborhood
burned in the 1989 U.S. invasion-adding to the urban
blight. However, despite the decline of the Casco Antiguo,
it remained the seat of the Panamanian Government with
government offices such as the Presidential Palace, the
Ministry of Government and Justice. and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs housed in the newly renovated
Sal6n
4
1826.
in
Congress
Bolivarian
the
of
Bolivar, site
Architects and urban planners soon became alarmed
at the deterioration of the architectural and historic monuments of San Felipe.f' Owners of buildings preferred to
allow their abandoned properties to deteriorate beyond
repair and failed to save ornamental and decorative elements. 56 Saving San Felipe from deterioration required
more than an isolated investment in restoration of a single
building or a plaza; rather. a master plan for the entire area
was essential. Part of this effort required that the govern-

51

EDUARDO TEJEIR.Ak DANvis.

Restauracidny Consernaci6nen Panama:

Una Retrospectha. in ENSAYOS

SOBRE CONSERVACION

Y RESTAUA-

c0N. 95. 96-102 (Nunzia Guardiani & Eduardo Tejeira Da-is eds..
2004).
;2 Eduardo Tejeira Da-is. Address at the Conference on "Centros
Hist6ricos y Desarrollo Incluyente," Canal Musuem. San Felipe, Panama (December 6, 2007).
" Id.
Id., P.-kNA\L HOY, supra note 20, at 111-14: TEJEIRA DAN-IS. supra
note 18. at 202-03. 211-13.
i Sebastiin Sucre. San Felipe: Su Arquitectura.su Futuro, in ARQUI-

TECTL RA. URBANISMO. ARTE 46-49 (Sebastiin Sucre, ed., 199-). This
essay was pre-iously published in "Elias.'"the supplement to the Diario
La Prensa, November 13. 1996.
56 Id. at 49.
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ment invest in and restore its own properties. 57 The other
components of the solution included encouraging private
owners
and investors to restore and preserve historic struc58
tures.
In the 1970s, as the Torrijos government began to
demonstrate a new interest in the values of San Felipe, the
tide began to change. 59 This administration created the
National Directorate of Historical Patrimony and facilitated
San Felipe's first master plan. 60 Although the political and
economic crisis of the 1980s slowed the restoration process, the resurgence of civilian governments in the 1990s
expanded interest in preservation of San Felipe. 61
II.

Values of the Casco Antiguo
a.

Spatial Arrangement

The Casco Antiguo historic district occupies approximately 30 ha of land on a peninsula projecting south
into the Pacific Ocean.62 The district maintains its original
orthogonal grid street layout with many streets paved in
brick from the early 20 t h Century. 63 The heart of the district is the Plaza de la Independencia bordered by the Cathedral, the Municipal Palace, the Hotel Central, and the
former headquarters of the French Canal Company (the
Canal Museum today). Two smaller plazas also exist in
blocks that were destroyed by the 1 8 th Century fires. 64 The
57

id.
58 id.

59 TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 51, at 95, 102-08.
60 Pizzurno, supra note 10, at 9; TEJEIRA DAVIS,

supra note 5, at 24,

55.

61 TEJEIRA DAVIS,

supra note 51, at 95, 108-12.
World HeritageList: Panamci (Panamd),supra note 4, at 92.
id.
64 Oficina del Casco Antiguo, El Casco Antiguo y sus Plazas/The Old
62
63

Quarterand its Squares, in CIUDAD: EL CASCO ANTIGUO DE LA
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colonial sea fortifications survive on the southern tip of the
peninsula, but only a few ruins exist today of the Spanish
colonial wall across the peninsula. The southern tip of the
peninsula is the site of an additional plaza (Plaza de Francia) between curves in the sea fortifications in front of the
French Embassy and old the Supreme Court building which
today houses the National Institute of Culture (INAC).
b.

Buildings

San Felipe's architecture is a mixture of Spanish colonial architecture and its early American variations, as
well as French styles from the late 19th Century. 65 According to the UNESCO World Heritage Evaluation Committee, this combination of architectural styles creates a unique
quality among Latin American colonial cities. Panamanian
authorities have identified some 17 buildings in San Felipe
as being important for 17th to 19th Century architectural
heritage, and the UNESCO World
Heritage Committee has
66
evaluations.
agreed with these
These important structures include numerous religious sites, including the Cathedral (1791), La
Merced Church built with stones transferred from Old Panama (1688), San Felipe de Neri Church (1688), San Jos6
Church (1677), and San Francisco Church and convent
where Bolivar celebrated the Bolivarian Congress in 1826
th
67
(originally built in the 18" Century).
Public buildings
recognized for their architectural heritage include the Municipal Palace, the French Canal headquarters (originally,
CIUDAD DE PANAMA (CITY: PANAMA CITY'S OLD QUARTER) 152, 153

(Oficina del Casco Antiguo, 2001).
65 World Heritage List: Panamd (Panamd),supra note 4, at 92; LEVY
& GOMEZ, supra note 8, at 17.
66 World Heritage List: Panamd (Panamd),supra note 4, at 92.
67 LEVY & GOMEZ, supra note 8, at 21, 24, 29, 72; TEJEIRA DAVIS,
supra note 18, at 211, 215; World HeritageList. Panamd (Panamd),
supra note 4, at 92.
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the Grand Hotel; subsequently, the Post Office; and today,
the Canal Museum), the National Theater, and the Presidential Palace (1673 with reconstruction in 1921), among
others. 68 The Municipality restored the Casa G6ngora
(1760), a former privately-owned residence that today
serves as an art gallery and cultural center. 69 Additionally,
the World Heritage designation recognized the importance
of numerous multi-family tenement houses constructed
since the mid- 1 9 th Century. 70 These structures marked a
change from the more traditional single-family upper class
homes that were one to three stories in height, to multifamily units. 71 This change symbolizes the social shift
toward an increasingly complex social stratification. 72
Architects note the human scale of construction in
San Felipe.73 No building is taller than five stories and all
points are easily accessible by foot. Four major public
plazas are located in the historic district, and residents and
visitors can view the ocean and other parts of Panama City
from numerous viewing spots.
Buildings in San Felipe represent many different architectural styles. The 17t and 181h Century churches and
convents represent Spanish colonial styles (Santo Domingo
Church and convent (1675), La Compafiia Jesuit Church
and convent, La Merced Church, San Jos6 Church, the
68 PANAMA Hoy,

supra note 20, at 111-14; LEVY & G6MEZ, supra note
8, at 18, 21, 24, 29, 62.
69 The Casa G6ngora is a rare example of a structure in San Felipe that
was expropriated by the Direcci6n Nacional de Patrimonio Hist6rico
(DNPH). This occurred in 1995, and the property was transferred to
the Municipality that same year for restoration. LEVY & GOMEZ, supra
note 8, at 79-80. The former owner had removed the roof to accelerate
deterioration of the structure. Interview with Ariel Espino, Director of
the Oficina del Casco Antiguo, San Felipe, Panama (December 12,
2007).
70 World HeritageList: Panamd (Panamd),
supra note 4, at 92.
71id.
72Id.

73 SUCRE, supra note 55, at 46-49.
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Cathedral). 74 Buildings constructed in the late 19 th Century
and early 201h Century display numerous architectural
styles, including Gothic and Romanic (San Francisco
Church), Neo-classical (Municipal Palace, National Theater), 5and Art Nouveau and Art Deco (buildings on Avenue
7
A).
Only about 10% of the space in the Casco Antiguo
Historic District is occupied by public buildings. 76 Municipally-administered parks, plazas, and public infrastructure account for some 35% of the area.77 The Archdiocese
owns about 5% of the space while the remaining
50% of
78
the area is privately-owned structures and lots.
When Panama nominated the Casco Antiguo for inscription as a World Heritage Site in 1995, the majority of
buildings displayed significant deterioration. 79 Panama's
nomination dossier noted that only 5% of the structures
were reasonably conserved while 70% displayed significant
physical or functional deterioration. The principal causes
of the deterioration included a lack of regular maintenance
and high population densities in the sector which produced
more wear-and-tear81 of buildings and also altered their
structural integrity.
c.

People and Social Diversity

San Felipe corregimiento (burrough) is a dense urban neighborhood that occupies only approximately 30 ha
of land. 82 National Census data indicate that the population
& GOMEZ, supra note 8, at 32.
1Id. at 47.
76 World Heritage List: Panamd (Panam6),supra note
74 LEVY

75

4, at 92.

77 Id.
78 Id.

79
1Id. at
80 Id.

93.

81 Id.

82

d. at 92.
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of San Felipe increased from 11,447 people in 1950, to
14,145 people in 1970.83 However, since 1970, population
has declined-i 1,696 people in 1980, to 10,282 people in
1990, to 6,928 people in 2000.84 The dramatic decrease of
residents during the 1990s was a result of both evictions
Addibecause of restoration and real estate speculation.
led
also
have
may
stock
housing
tionally, the deteriorating
8
6
some people to abandon the neighborhood.
The National
Census of 2010 will provide the next official indicator of
San Felipe demographics. Some urban planners estimate
87
that the 2010 population will be less than 4,000 people.
Social indicators point to the socio-economic diversity of San Felipe's residents. According to the 2000 National Census, the median income of residents in Panama
City (Panama District) was $362 per month. 88 However,
the median income in San Felipe was merely $305 per
month and those of neighboring corregimientos were similar: El Chorrillo at $280 per month and Santa Ana $324
per month. 89 Median incomes in the middle class corregimientos in the central city were approximately twice as
high: Betania at $684 per month, Bella Vista at $912 per
month, and San Francisco at $646 per month. 90 Income
levels in San Felipe are similar to those in corregimientos
on the urban periphery, such as Tocumen at $300 per
month and Chilibre at $284 per month. 9 1 Recent surveys of
over 200 residents in San Felipe shed light on the housing
83 TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note

3, at 73.

84 id.

85id.
86

See TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 53.

87

Ariel Espino, Address at the Conference on "Centros Hist6ricos y

Desarrollo Incluyente," Canal Museum, San Felipe, Panama (December 6, 2007).
88 TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 3, at 58, 74-75.
89
1 d. at 75.
90 I.
91Id.
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situation there: about 42% of respondents lived in rental
housing while a similar percentage occupied condemned or
abandoned structures. 92 In addition, only 6% of respon93
dents resided in a unit or house that they owned.
Displacement and eviction of many of San Felipe's
low income residents, and the subsequent occupation of
restored buildings by wealthy residents will certainly
change these data in the 2010 National Census. The population is expected to decrease significantly. At the same
time, however, San Felipe's median income should increase dramatically due to the influx of wealthy residents.
d.

UNESCO World Heritage Designation

UNESCO has granted World Heritage designation to areas
in over 26 Latin American cities, including Panama's San
Felipe neighborhood. 94 On September 29, 1995, the Government of Panama nominated the San Felipe historic district for inclusion in the World Heritage List.95 Four
criteria were cited as justification for San Felipe's nomination.96 First, Panama advocated nomination based on the
buildings, their fortifications, and their layout which "reflect the importance, interchange, adaptation, and persistence of human values that for centuries have been oriented
towards further inter-oceanic communications at this strategic site on the Central American isthmus." 97 Second,
Maria Adames, Address at the Conference on "Centros Hist6ricos y
Desarrollo Incluyente," Canal Museum, San Felipe, Panama
(December 6, 2007).
92

93 i.

9'SEBASTIAN SUCRE, PUERTAS Y VENTANAS DEL BARRIO DE SAN

FELIPE: TESTIMONIO DE UN VALIOso LEGADO

8 (February, 2003);

EDUARDO ROJAS, INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK, OLD CITIES, NEW
ASSETS: PRESERVING LATIN AMERICA'S URBAN HERITAGE 7 (1999).

95

World HeritageList: Panamd (Panamd),supra note 4, at 91-92.

96 Id.

97

Id. at 91.
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Panama emphasized San Felipe's 16 h to 1 8 th Century
styled houses as exceptional because of their unique narrow
lots and internal layout. 98 In fact, such houses can only
found in this region of the Americas.99 Additionally, Pa-

nama explained that the multiple family homes from the
end of the 1 9 th Century and early 2 0 th Century illustrate
"how society has reacted to new requirements, changes,
and influences brought about by modern world-wide communications. '' 0 In other words, these houses are a monument to tenement buildings built to house construction
workers of the Canal, and illustrate San Felipe's increasingly diverse social structure when compared to the original
elite families of San Felipe. °1
Also highlighted was the threat to conservation of
San Felipe's cultural property by the deterioration of living
conditions and increasing levels of poverty. 10 2 The Panamanian Government was more polite in its characterization;
it explained that "immovable cultural property is affected
by a society seeking to resolve its manifold contradictions."' 0 3 Finally, Panama's nomination noted the historical
significance of Panama to Spanish expansion and commerce in South America, as well as the historic significance
of the Sal6n Bolivar, the site of Sim6n Bolivar's Congress
in 1826 which attempted to forge Latin American unity. 10 4
After Panama's nomination, an expert mission representing the International Council on Monuments and
Sites (ICOMOS)" ° evaluated the nomination and sent a

98 Id.
99 Id.

1oo Id.
101Id.

102 I .
103 Id.

104 id.

'0' ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites) is an
advisory body mandated by the World Heritage Convention that evalu-
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team to Panama in February 1996.106 The group recognized the significance of Casco Antiguo's mixture of Spanish colonial, Early American, and French architecturewhich was a product of Panama's position as an international crossroads. 10 7 The ICOMOS mission, however,
requested a complete and final plan for revitalization of the
historic district before it would grant final approval. 10 8 The
mission also asked for clarification of the role of the Panamanian Tourist Institute (IPAT) in the Casco Antiguo revi09
talization plan. 1
In 1996, the Bureau of the World Heritage Committee adopted the recommendations of ICOMOS that withheld final approval until Panama clearly delineated the
110
spatial area of the historic district and its buffer zone.
The World Heritage Committee also requested additional
support for restoration efforts-including the detailed master plan and legislation that controlled activities in these
areas.111 Panama supplied the requested information
in
12
January 1997, to the approval of ICOMOS experts.'
The World Heritage Committee finally approved
the inscription of the San Felipe Historic District on the
World Heritage List in September 1997.' 13 The justification was based on three criteria (ii, iv, and vi) which recog-14
nized the significance of street layout and buildings.

ates nominated sites. World Heritage Convention, Glossary, available
at http://whc.unesco.org/en/glossary/ (last visited on April 17, 2008).
106 World HeritageList: Panamd (Panamd),supra note 4, at 93.
107 id.
108 Id.

109 Id.
0
"1
1d.
111Id.
112 Id. At that time, plans existed for the creation of a "buffer zone."

However, this concept was eventually dropped from Decree Law No. 9

of 1997. TEJEIR.A DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 56.

113 World HeritageList: Panamd (Panamd),supra note 4, at 93-94.
114 Id. at 93.
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Criterion v, which noted the growing threats to the patrimony of the area was rejected. 1 5 The inscription read:
Panama was the first European settlement on the
Pacific coast of the Americas, in 1519, and the
Historic District preserves intact a street pattern,
together with a substantial number of early domestic buildings, which are exceptional
testimony to
1 16
the nature of this early settlement.
The World Heritage Committee also recognized the7
significant historical importance of the Sal6n Bolivar."
The twenty-first session of the World Heritage Committee
approved the inscription of the "Historic District of Panama" (Casco Antiguo Historic District) on the World
Heritage List at its meeting in Naples, Italy, in December
1997.118

III. Evolution of Preservationist Legislation for
the Casco Antiguo
Panamanian legislation to protect the cultural patrimony of San Felipe has evolved significantly in the past
decades. The first protective legislation from 1941 declared several structures in that area as National Historic
Monuments. 119 These included the Cathedral, the San
1l Id. Although there is no formal documentation of the rejection of
Criterion v, ICOMOS did not include this criterion in its justification
for its September 1997 recommendation.
"67 Id. at 93.
11
Id. at 94; LEVY & GOMEZ, supra note 8, at 72.
1 World Heritage Committee, Report of the Twenty First Session,
Naples 1997, WHC-97/CONF.208/17 (Feb. 27, 1998), availableat
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/repcom97.htm#790, at 48 (last visited
Sept. 10, 2008).
119
"Sobre Monumentos Hist6ricos Nacionales," Ley No. 68 de 11 de
Junio de 1941; Gaceta Oficial No. 8.538 (Jueves 19 de Junio de 1941).
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Felipe Church, the San Francisco Church, and the Flat Arch
(Arco Chato) located in the ruins of the Santo Domingo
convent and church. 120 This early legislation prohibited the
sale, destruction, or alteration of these monuments and also
designated the Department of Fine Arts of the Ministry of
Education the responsible institution for the conservation of
these sites.121 However, efforts focused merely on the
protection of monuments and allegedly were poorly respected.122
a. Law No. 91 (1976)
In 1976, Panama's National Assembly adopted legislation which, for the first time, focused on preservation of
the Casco Antiguo as a whole rather than protection of
individual monuments. 123 This legislation declared three
sites-the historical areas of Portobelo and the Portobelo
National Park on the Caribbean coast, the Old Panama
ruins (PanamAi
Viejo), and the Casco Antiguo"Monumental Historical Sites" (Conjuntos Monumentales
Hist6ricos) as they testify to the Nation's past. 124 Additionally, this designation covered similar intact buildings or
ruins which had125recognized architectural, historical, and
aesthetic values.
Law No. 91 designated the Panamanian Tourist Institute (IPAT) as the agency responsible for administering,6
conserving, restoring, and promoting these three sites."
An advisory body, the National Council of Monumental
20 Id. at art. 1.
arts. 2 & 3.

121Id. at

TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 51, at 95, 98.
123"Regilanse los Conjuntos Monumentales
122

Hist6ricos," Ley No. 91

de 22 de Diciembre de 1976; Gaceta Oficial No. 18.252 (Mircoles 12
de Enero de 1977). See also TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 55.
124 Ley No. 91, supra note 123, at art. 5.
125 Id. at art. 2.
126/d. at art. 4.
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Historical Sites, comprised of representatives of four governmental agencies and two groups from civil society, was
to advise IPAT on protection, administration, and restoration of the sites. 127 All construction or restoration projects
required the permission of IPAT and the approval of the
Council. 128 The Council also possessed the authority to
recommend to IPAT and the Executive that the "Monumen-29
tal Historic Sites" be declared "Historic Monuments."'
The legislation set forth guidelines for the "Historic
Monuments." 130 They could not be sold to private individuals, their use had to be compatible with their historic
condition, and if they were privately owned, they could
only be sold to the State or expropriated. 131The legislation
defined the Casco Antiguo Historic Site spatially, by including the area on the peninsula to the east of Twelfth
Street from shoreline to shoreline. 132 As a result, the Panama City Municipal Engineer's office could not grant
construction permits for any building within the Casco
Antiguo Historic Site without the prior approval of IPAT
1 33
and the National Council of Monumental Historic Sites.
The legislation also established general construction
guidelines in the historic area. These guidelines mandated
that any new construction must be in harmony with existing
34
adjacent buildings, as well as those in the historic site.'
For example, new buildings could not exceed four stories
nor vary more than two stories from adjacent buildings.
127Id.
at art.

6 & 7. The members of the Council represented the National Directorate of Historical Patrimony of the National Institute of
Culture, the Ministry of Finance, the Housing Ministry, the Ministry of
Agricultural Development, the Panamanian Academy of History, and
the Archdiocese of Panama. Id. at art. 6.
128 Id. at art. 9.
12 9
Id. at art. 12.
3
°Id. at art. 13.
131id.
132 Id. at art. 37. See also TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24-25.
133 Ley No. 91, supra note 123, at art. 38.
134 id.
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Door and window levels also had to be similar to the existing buildings, as did the external walls, fagade, and decora13
tive roof.
The 1976 legislation was significant because it recognized the importance of preservation of the entire historic
district and established general criteria for new construction
which required harmony with the existing architecture.
However, despite this significant step, this initial legislation
failed to involve private groups and owners in the process
and lacked subsidies or incentives for private restoration
efforts. 136 In fact, the legislation offered no financial support of any kind for restoration. With IPAT as the lead
agency, the ultimate goal of the law appeared to be promotion of tourism-a common goal in initial stages of historic
preservation.137
b.

Law No. 14 (1982)

In 1982, the National Assembly passed additional
legislation which changed the institution responsible for
conservation and administration of the nation's historical
patrimony. 138 The National Institute of Culture, through its
National Directorate of Historical Patrimony, was now
135

136

id.

This legislation did not include provisions for inclusion of citizens

groups in any stage of the decision-making process and also lacked an
incentive regime.
137 ROJAS, supra note 94, at 14-16. These public actions, however, do
not ensure the viability of preservation, the long-term sustainability of
restored buildings, or the engagement of the private sector in these
efforts. Id. at 19. Direct government investment has resulted in successful historic preservation in some Latin American cities, such as
Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, and Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. Id.
at 20.
138 "Por la cual se dictan medidas sobre custodia, conservaci6n y administraci6n del Patrimonio Hist6rico de la Naci6n," Ley No. 14 de 5 de
Mayo de 1982; Gaceta Oficial No. 19.566 (Viernes 14 de Mayo de

1982).
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charged with the stewardship, conservation, administration,
and investigation of Panama's historical patrimony. 139 This
agency had to approve any restoration project involving
national monuments. 140 A deliberative body -the National
Commission of Archaeology and Historical Monumentsadvised the National Directorate. 14 1 The legislation reiterated that urban areas, such as streets, plazas, neighbor42
hoods, or ruins could be considered national monuments.'
The 1982 legislation created the possibility of sanctions of
up to B/.10,000, as well as ten months imprisonment for
143
persons who destroyed these national monuments.
c.

Ministerial Resolution No. 75-90 (1990)
(MIVI)

In 1990, the Housing Ministry (Ministerio de Vivienda or MIVI) promulgated special regulations for urban
development in the Corregimiento de San Felipe 144 (San
Felipe borough) which took into account the existing legislation pertaining to the Casco Antiguo Monumental Historical Site. 145 MIVI's special norms limited the uses of
buildings in the Casco and set out structural parameters for
construction, including restrictions on population densities,
areas of occupation of a parcel, building height, construction lines, lateral and rear setbacks between buildings, and
parking. 146 The resolution also reiterated the restrictions on
139 Id. at art. 1.
141 Id. at arts. 40, 42.
141Id.

at art. 4.

143Id.

at art. 42.

142 Id. at art. 37.

" The limits of the Corregimiento de San Felipe (San Felipe Borough)
are almost identical to the limits of the Casco Antiguo as defined by the
1976 legislation.
145"Por la cual se aprueba Norma Especial para el Corregimiento
de
San Felipe," Resoluci6n Ministerial No. 75-90 de 13 de Diciembre de
1990; Gaceta Oficial No. 21.701 (Jueves 10 de Enero de 1991).
116 Id. at art. 2.
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construction and restoration of dwellings (single and double-family residences, row houses, apartments-but excluded rooming houses); cultural, religious, and educational
facilities; small businesses such as pharmacies, bookstores,
147
craft shops, corner grocery stores, and small restaurants.
According to the legislation, use should not adversely affect the residential nature of the Casco nor conflict with the
area's architectural style. 148 Additionally, the height restrictions limited new buildings to four stories (ground
floor plus three floors), and affirmed that neighboring
buildings could have no more than two stories difference. 149
Although this resolution was not a proactive plan
for the restoration of the Casco nor detailed zoning, it nevertheless remains significant as the first effort to guide new
construction in the historical zone. The posture of the State
with respect to the Casco Antiguo would change radically
several years after MIVI's resolution.
d.

Decree Law 9 (1997)150

Decree Law No. 9, passed in 1997, symbolized a
significant shift in historical preservation in Panama as it
utilized fiscal incentives to encourage preservation and
restoration of structures in the San Felipe historic district.
Essentially, the legislation recognized that historic preservation of the Casco Antiguo was beyond the capacity of the
public sector and that the private sector should also bear the
cost of preservation. This legislation expanded the area
147 id.
148

id.

149Id.

150 "Por medio del cual se establece un regimen especial de incentivos

para la restauraci6n y puesta en valor del Conjunto Monumental Hist6-

rico del Casco Antiguo de la Ciudad de Panamd," Decreto Ley No. 9 de
27 de agosto de 1997; Gaceta Oficial No. 23.366 (sdbado 30 de agosto
de 1997).
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included in the San Felipe "Monumental Historic Site"
several blocks further to the northwest-approximately
from 12th Street to 14" Street."' Additionally, the Decree
Law recognized that not all structures within the district
possessed the same historic value.1 52 The National Directorate of Historic Patrimony (DNPH) was charged with
classifying structures based on parameters that the Decree
indicated
Law described in Article 3.153 The classification
154
the degree of human intervention allowed.
Buildings classified as first-order structures represented the highest historical and cultural values and were
generally constructed prior to 1850.155 Nevertheless, more
modem structures might fall into this class if they were
determined to be one of the best examples in the country of
the architecture of that time period. First-order structures
were to be conserved and restored using scientific methodologies, although discordant elements could be eliminated. 156 Buildings classified as second-order structures
presented some important architectural elements of their
architectural period-regardless of the date-and were also
considered to have a relatively high value. Restoration was
to focus on high value elements, although discordant elements could be eliminated. 157 Buildings classified as thirdorder structures offered little architectural value but may
have created important "environmental" values.' 58 The
legislation mandated the conservation of the fagade of these
structures and the elimination of discordant elements. At
151 Id. at

art. 3. See also TEJEIRADAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 25.
Ley No. 9, supra note 150, at art. 3.

152Decreto
153Id.

154

Id.
155
Id. at
156
i.

art. 3(a).

57 Id. at art. 3(b).

158Although

Decree Law No. 9 does not define "environmental values," they might include "aesthetic" values or "city-scape" values that
create enjoyable urban spaces.
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the same time, renovation could not significantly alter the
exterior that was visible from the street. No new floors
could be added to the front of the building; the front roof
had to maintain its original angle and form; and the existing
window openings "vanos" had to be conserved without the
addition of new windows. 159 Finally, buildings classified as
fourth-order structures were defined as those built post1940 which offered little or no architectural or environmental value.' 60 In these cases, remodeling was less strict.
However, restoration had to improve the environmental
quality of the site and respect exiting norms. 161 Sites where
new construction was allowed were limited to fourth-order
structures and empty lots.' 6 2 However, in both cases new
structures had
to maintain the architectural style of nearby
63
buildings.
Decree Law No. 9 established the procedure for architects and developers wishing to restore structures in the
Historic District.164 Project proponents had to submit new
development or restoration plans to the National Directorate of Historic Patrimony (DNPH). 165 Within fifteen days,
the DNPH would then convene a meeting of the National
Commission of Archaeology and Historical Monuments to
evaluate the proposal. 166 The Commission could recommend approval, denial, or modification.'
The DNPH and
the Commission also had to grant approval for final
plans. 68 Additionally, the legislation required that the Municipality not approve construction plans or permits in the
159

Decreto Ley No. 9, supra note 150, at art. 3(c).

160

Id. at art. 3(d).

161

id.

162 id.
163 id.

164

Id. at art. 4, 5, & 6.

165 Id. at art. 4.
166 id.
167 id.

168Id. at

art. 5.
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Historic District unless the project proponent had obtained
written approval from the DNPH.' 69
An innovative aspect of Decree Law No. 9 was the
regime of economic incentives it used to support restoration
activities by numerous real property actors in San Felipe.
Incentives were offered to mortgagees who used borrowed
funds to purchase or restore historic properties, current
owners beginning restoration, investors in restoration projects, and renters of restored properties.1 70 The legislation
primarily focused on incentives for financing restoration
projects. Banks could participate in a system of "Preferential Mortgages for Restoration" which were used exclusively for purchasing a building located in the Casco
Antiguo, financing the total or partial restoration of a building located in the historic district, or constructing a new
building in the historic district on a parcel where none existed. 171 In order to take advantage of these preferential
loans, the current or future owner had to have his project
plans approved by the DNPH and also use the object prop72
erty as collateral for the loan.1
Decree Law No. 9 also specified that the construction or restoration project be financed by a preferential
mortgage which would have to begin within one year after
approval of the loan. 173 The legislation also specified how
69

' Id. at art. 7.
Id. at Chapters III & IV (arts. 8 - 32). Decree Law No. 9 marks
the
initiation in Panama of a shared public-private effort to protect the
cultural patrimony of the Casco Antiguo. The government established
a regulatory environment to attract private investment and protect the
public interest. The regulatory environment included the regime of
fiscal incentives, as well as standards, norms, and procedures for restoration. The expectation was to encourage private residential and commercial real estate investors to take advantage of opportunities in the
Casco Antiguo. See ROJAS, supra note 94, at 8.
171Decreto Ley No. 9, supra note 150, at art.
9.
172 id.
170

173 Id. at art. 21.

281

4:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 429

the preferential rate would be calculated. 1 74 Each quarter,
the Director of the National Banking Commission would
publish a local market reference interest rate based on
mortgages, with no less than a fifteen year period offered
by the participating financial institutions. 175 These preferential rates were based on the average interest rate offered
for these loans by the five largest financial institutions
during the month immediately prior to the date of publication of the new preferential rate. 176 The preferential interest
rate offered by participating banks and mortgages companies could not be more than three percentage points less
than the calculated average interest rate.' 77 The legislation
also offered participating financial institutions an incentive
to participate in this regime. During the loan period these
financial institutions would receive a fiscal credit equal to
the difference between the income they would have earned
178
with and without the preferential interest rate mortgages.
The fiscal credit could be earned during the lifetime of the
original loan and could be applied against the institution's
tax on earnings. 179 The credits could be applied against the
financial institution's tax obligations for three years after
they were generated or could even be transferred to other
taxpayers via written agreement. 180
Additionally, the legislation created fiscal incentives to encourage the sale of historic properties with the
ultimate goal of promoting restoration by the new owners.
Current property owners who sold their buildings or land in
the historic district were exempt from taxes on the profits
from the property transfer if the sale occurred within two
years from the date of approval of Decree Law No. 9 (Au174

Id. at art. 10.
175 id.
176 id.
177 Id. at art. 11.
178 Id. at art. 12.
179 Id.
180 Id.
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gust 30, 1999).181 Similarly, such property transfers were
also exempt from property transfer tax which was two
percent of the sales value. 182 Additionally, property transfers within the two year window were also exempt from
property tax obligations. 183 However, if the new owner had
failed to initiate restoration, construction, or reconstruction
within 5 years of the purchase date, he84would be subject to
back taxes with interest and penalties. 1
An additional suite of incentives targeted current
owners or developers who undertook construction or restoration activities on property in the Casco Antiguo. Owners
who restored or built properties were exempt from taxes on
profits from property sale, rental, or transfer of the property
for a period of ten years measured from the date of the
occupancy permit. 185 Owners of these new or restored
buildings who obtained occupancy permits after the passage of the Decree Law No. 9 were exempt from property
taxes for a period of 30 years.1 86 The first transfer of the
renovated property after the date of passage of the legislation was also exempt from the property transfer tax, as long
as the minimum investment in restoration of the building
was more than B/. 50,000 [US $50,000].187 Similarly, a
property owner who constructed or restored the property
within five years subsequent to passage of the legislation
was exempt from the Tax on Profits from Commercial,
Professional, or Industrial Activities that the property owner conducted on the property for a five year period measured from the date of the occupancy permit. 18 A final
181Id. at art. 22.
182 Id. at art. 23.
183 Id. at art. 24.
184Id.

...
Id. at art. 26. The C6digo Fiscal (Tax Code) establishes this 10%
national tax on profits.
116 Id. at art. 27.
117Id. at art. 28.
188Id. at

art. 29.
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provision provided an exoneration of import taxes for any
equipment or materials used in construction or restoration
activities in the Casco Antiguo, provided that the equipment or materials were not produced in Panama in the desired quantity and quality.1 89This legislation also contained
several additional incentives. Renters of renovated or newly constructed buildings in the Casco Antiguo could deduct
their monthly rents from their general incomes for personal
income tax purposes for a period of five years measured
from the time of the occupancy permit. 190 Persons who
used lots or buildings for public parking purposes were
exempt from paying taxes on the generated income for a
period of ten years from the date of the occupancy permit. 191 Furthermore, any legal or natural person could
include amounts invested in the construction, restoration,
maintenance, or improvement of parks, churches, green
spaces, or any other public site in the192Casco Antiguo as a
deduction from his or her income tax.
In addition to the sweeping set of fiscal incentives
for property owners who renovated buildings in the historic
district, Decree Law No. 9 also recognized the plight of
renters and squatters who would be displaced as a result of
restoration activities. The legislation mandated that the
Housing Ministry "take the necessary measures to facilitate
the relocation of persons who currently live in buildings in
the Casco Antiguo that were to be restored or renovated." 193 Although, the legislation failed to define "necessary measures," the legislation demanded that the Housing
Ministry's General Directorate of Rental Properties be
informed of all eviction requests related to Casco Antiguo
structures.1 94 A property owner in the historic district who
89

19

'

191
192
193

Id. at art. 30.
Id.at art. 31.

Id. at art. 32.
Id. at art. 25.
Id. at art. 33.

194 Id. at

art. 34.
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planned to renovate his building in conformity with the
established regulations and norms also had to file an eviction notice with the Agency.1 95 The Decree Law also established a non-extendable thirty-day period during which
the General Directorate of Rental Properties had to approve
or reject the eviction request via summary hearing.1 96 If the
Ministry failed to reject the eviction request
within the 30
97
1
approved.
presumed
was
eviction
days, the
The legislation also referred to renter's rights.
Faced with eviction, the renter had to abandon the premises
within 30 days but could extend the final occupancy period
by an additional month for every 12 months of occupancy
to a maximum of 6 months. 198 In addition, the property
owner had to compensate all renters who were current with
their rental payments.199 The compensation was equivalent
to one month's rent for 12 months of occupancy with a
maximum payment equivalent to 6 months' rent. 20 0 Additionally, property owners who requested eviction but failed
to begin restoration within a year, or failed to continue
restoration once begun, faced fines. 20 1 The fines were not
less than B/. 1,000 nor more than B/. 10,000.202
The Decree Law also created additional sanctions.
Owners of unoccupied buildings who "fail[ed] to take the
necessary measures to protect the structure or diminish the
deterioration of the building" could face fines ranging between B/. 100 and B/. 10,000.23 These penalties could be
levied by the DNPH of the INAC. 204 The DNPH also had
195 Id. at
196 id.
197

98

1

art. 35

id.

id. at art. 36.

199 Id.
200Id.

201Id.
202Id.

at art. 37.

B/. I is equivalent to US $1.
211 Id. at art. 38.
204Id.
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additional authority to levy fines against owners of unoccupied properties in the Casco Antiguo who, for at least two
years, failed to "take the necessary measures to conform to
205
the restoration policy of the Monumental Historic Site."
These fines ranged between B/. 1,000 and B/. 10,000.206
These fines and penalties were then to be deposited into a
special fund to restore and conserve the Casco Antiguo
Monumental Historic Site. 207 Finally, the legislation noted
that persons who took advantage of the incentives created
by Decree Law No. 9 had to complete their projects within
5 years of the date of promulgation of the Decree (August
30, 2002).2o8

e.

Law No. 4 (2002)209

Almost five years after the passage of Decree Law
No. 9, the National Assembly approved Law No. 4; many
of the provisions revised articles of the earlier legislation.
The new legislation was necessary because the applicability
of many of the fiscal incentives were limited to the fiveyear period after promulgation of the Decree Law No. 9,
which ended on August, 30 2002.210 The new legislation
extended the older provisions concerning evictions and

205

Id. at art. 39.

206 i.

208

Id. at art. 40.
Id. at art. 41.

209

"Que modifica el Decreto Ley 9 de 1997, sobre un r6gimen especial

207

de incentivos para el Casco Antiguo de la Ciudad de Panamd, y dicta
otras disposiciones," Ley No. 4 de 15 de Enero de 2002; Gaceta Oficial
No. 24.472 (jueves 17 de enero de 2002).
210 Article 41 of Decreto Ley No. 9 stipulated that the incentive regime
applied to property transfers that occurred five years after its promulgation - meaning the date of its publication in the Gaceta Oficial. Publication occurred on Aug. 30, 1997. Decreto Ley No. 9, supra note 150,
at art. 41. Therefore, applicability of the first incentive regime terminated on Aug. 30, 2002.
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income "social housing" within the historic
created low
211
district."
Article 1 of the new law extended the tax exemption
period (paid on profits gained from the transfer of real
property in the Casco Antiguo) as long as the transfer occurred before the end of 2003. 212 Furthermore, real property transfers before the end of 2003 were exempt from the
Property Transfer Tax. 2 1 Property transfers during this
time period were also exempt from property tax obligations.214 The 2002 legislation, like Decree Law No. 9,
required a new property owner to commence reconstruction
or restoration within five years, or pay back the tax exemption benefit with interest and penalties.215 However, the
new legislation forgave new owners who had begun to
evict occupants but had not been able to complete process
due to factors beyond their control.216 Article 4 of the new
legislation extended the period of exemption of the tax on
profits from commercial, professional, or industrial activities of property owners in the building for a five year pe217
riod measured from the date of the occupancy permit.
This tax exemption covered new or renovated properties for
the ten-year period from promulgation of Decree Law No.
9 (August 30, 1997 to August 30, 2007).218
The new legislation also modified provisions for
eviction of current occupants of buildings to be renovated.219 While the 1997 Decree Law stipulated that the
owner would pay of one month's rent for each 12 months of
occupancy to a maximum of six months, the amended arti-

212

Id. at arts. 7, 8, 9, 10.
Id.at art. 1.

213

Id. at art. 2.

211

214 Id. at art. 3.
215

Id.

216id.

217 Id. at art. 4.
218/d.

219

Id.at art. 5.

287

4:2

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

435

cle changed this payment into a flat fee depending on the
number of years of occupancy. 22 For example, a person
occupying a rented unit for more than 40 years would have
the right to receive B/. 5,000, while a person renting the
unit for less than 10 years would could receive B/. 2,000.221
Again, the property owner could claim these payments as
tax credits.222 Further, the new legislation extended the
period during which property owners were eligible for
fiscal credits and incentives to August 30, 2007-or ten
years after promulgation of Decree Law No. 9223
Law No. 4 referred to low income housing in the
historic district. Article 8 demanded that the Housing Ministry along with the National Mortgage Bank renovate
properties owned in San Felipe for purpose of constructing
low-income housing ["vivienda social" or "social housing"]
according the architectural parameters of the National Directorate of Historic Patrimony. 224 These low income
housing projects soon became symbols of government
efforts to maintain the social diversity and fabric of San
Felipe as the city underwent social transformation.
f.

Executive Decree No. 51 (2004)225

In 2004, the Ministry of the Presidency promulgated
detailed rules for the restoration of the Casco Viejo historic
district. These rules incorporated the classification of

220 id.
221
222

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at art. 8.
"Por Medio del Cual se Aprueba un Manuel de Normas y Procedimientos para la Restauraci6n y Rehabilitaci6n del Casco Antiguo de la
Ciudad de Panama," Decreto Ejecutivo No. 51 de 22 de abril de 2004,
Gaceta Oficial No. 25.039 (jueves 29 de abril de 2004).
223
224
225
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spestructures defined in Decree Law No. 9 and provided
226
cific requirements for the classification of structures.
The Executive Decree also detailed allowable use of
space in Casco Antiguo. 227 For example, its provisions
required that electric cables, telephone lines, sewers, drains,
and water pipes be buried.228 Streets were to be paved with
229
clay bricks similar to those which currently existed.
Vehicles weighing more than seven tons and longer than
seven meters or wider than two meters were prohibited on
Casco Antiguo streets. 230 The rules also identified different
zoning 1categories and defined permitted uses for each cate23
gory.
Owners and developers had to follow certain procedures that the Executive Decree laid out when they pro232
posed construction, modification, or renovation.
Developers had to present a pre-proposal to the National
Directorate of Historic Patrimony (DNPH) when they
wished to construct new buildings, restore first-order or
second-order structures, intervened in more than 35% of
the total area of a building, or proposed a land use
change. 233 After inspecting the site, the DNPH convened a
meeting of the National Commission of Archaeology and
National Monuments to evaluate the proposal within fifteen
days. 234 Ultimately, the DNPH could approve, modify, or
disapprove the proposal within 15 days after the meeting of
the Commission.235 Last, after obtaining this approval, a

226

Id. at arts. 125-33.

227

Id. at arts. 134-52, 156-98.
221 Id. at arts. 27, 29, 34, 38, 40, 44.
221Id. at art. 59.
230
Id. at art. 64.
231 Id. at arts. 8-16.
232 Id. at titulo IV, arts. 199-238.
233

211
235

Id. at art. 202.
Id. at art. 219.
Id. at arts. 218-20.
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developer had to apply for a construction permit from the
municipality's construction office.2 3 6
The rules also provided for numerous sanctions. A
developer who began work without a permit from the
DNPH or who violated a permit may have had to demolish
the new structure or reconstruct the destroyed structure.2 37
Total or partial destruction or demolition of a building in
the Casco Antiguo without permission could have lead to a
maximum fine of B/. 50,000.238 If an owner evicted tenants
but failed to begin restoration, he or she could have faced
fines between B/. 1,000 and B/. 10,000. 239 An owner of an
unoccupied building who through inaction failed to avoid
the deterioration of the building may have been fined between B/. 100 and B/. 10,000.240
The Executive Decree appeared to contemplate establishing a Casco Antiguo "buffer zone" but instead created a "transition area with structures of historic or
archaeological interest.",24 1 Under this Decree, the land use
242
rules of the Casco Antiguo apply to the "transition area;"
however, the Executive Decree failed to spatially 243
define the
"transition area" or define "buildings of interest.,
Thus, almost 30 years after the designation of the
Casco Antiguo historic district, detailed rules exist to guide
developers or renovators of structures, public utilities, and
the use and construction of public infrastructure. An incentive regime is also in place to encourage private owners to
restore their properties, and sanctions exist for actions that
violate the spirit of preservation.

236!d. at art. 225.
237/d. at art. 232.
238

Id. at art. 233.

2 39

240

Id. at art. 234.
Id. at art. 235.

241

Id. at art. 6.

242 id.
243 id.
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IV. Restoration Efforts and Results
During the past several decades, many civil and
professional groups dreamed of the restoration of the Casco
Antiguo and hoped that one day it would enjoy protection
similar to Cartagena, Colombia; San Juan, Puerto Rico; or
La Habana, Cuba. Their dreams were blocked by numerous factors: occupation of structures by poor residents who
did not pay rent or protect the buildings, absentee owners
who had no interest or incentive in maintaining their properties, lack of financial resources and a plan to channel
restoration, and lack of government support for such a
project.
The Torrijos military government in the early 1970s
244
focused new energy toward the renovation of San Felipe.
Carlos Flores Marini developed a master plan between
1972 and 1975 focusing on revitalization of San Felipe's
national monuments and public spaces.24 5

During the

Torrijos Administration, actual restoration of government
buildings in the Casco Antiguo occurred with the assistance
of the Inter-American Development Bank following the
approval of Law No. 91 (with the exception of the National
Theater which was restored later).246 These initial restoration efforts from 1977 to 1985, included the fagade of the
Cathedral, the Plaza de la Independencia, the San Francisco
Church, and the Mano de Tigre Bastion.24 7 Additional
conservation efforts restored the Municipal Palace (1977),
the Casa de la Municipalidad (1979-83), the Santo Domingo monastery (1981-83), the Jesuit Church (1981-83),

244 TEJEIRA DAVIS,

supra note 5, at 24, 55; TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note

51, at 95, 102-08.

supra note 5, at 24, 55; TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note
51, at 104.
246 World HeritageList: Panamd (Panami),supra note 4, at 92-93;
TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 51, at 104.
247 World HeritageList: Panamd (Panamd),supra note 4, at 92-93.
245 TEJEIRA DAVIS,
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and three additional plazas. 248 Further evidence of the
increasing interest in cultural patrimony was Panama's
ratification of the World Heritage Convention in 1978.249
From 1990 to 1991, after a decade of political and
economic crisis in the 1980s, and the end of the authoritarian military government, the new civilian administration of
President Guillermo Endara created an ad hoc presidential
250
commission for the conservation of the historic district.
Additionally, in 1995, during her active term as mayor,
Mayin Correa initiated a Revitalization Plan which adopted
251
many of the aspects of the original 1972 master plan.
This plan, sponsored by the Inter-American Development
Bank, considered that the Municipality would take the lead
in restoration.252
Despite these initial attempts to protect public spaces and buildings, San Felipe restoration did not begin in
earnest until the administration of President Ernesto PerezBalladares, with the passage of the Decree Law No. 9 in
1997, and the UNESCO World Heritage Site designation in

248

Id.; TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 56.

249

Ley No. 9 de 27 de octubre de 1977, Gaceta Oficial No. 18.552 de 7

de abril de 1978, "Por la Cual se Aprueba la Organizaci6n de las Naciones Unidas para la Educaci6n, la Ciencia y la Cultura"; States Parties: Ratification Status, at http://whc.unesco.org/enlstatesparties/;
TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 51, at 106.
250 Vanessa Spadafora, El Casco Antiguo de la Ciudad
de Panamd:
Gesti6n, Planificaci6ny Puesta en Valor, in ENSAYOS SOBRE CONSERVACION Y RESTAURACION 117, 119 (Nunzia Guardiani & Eduardo
Tejeira Davis eds., 2004). Endara was President of PanarrA from 19891994. INSTITUTO DEL TERCER MUNDO, GUiA DEL MUNDO: EL MUNDO
VISTO DESDE EL SUR 2001/2002 454-55 (2001).
251 World HeritageList: Panamd (Panamd),supra note 4, at 93;
Spadafora, supra note 250, at 117, 119.
252 Vanessa Spadafora, El Plan Maestro: Objetivos y Metodologia (The
Master Plan: Objectives and Methodology), in CIUDAD: EL CASCO
ANTIGUO DE LA CIUDAD DE PANAMA (CITY: PANAMA CITY'S OLD

QUARTER) 172, 182 (Oficina del Casco Antiguo, 2001).
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1997.253 For the first time in Panama, preservationist legisto promote
lation attempted to create economic incentives
254
properties.
privately-owned
of
the restoration
Following approval of Decree Law No. 9 and the
designation of the World Heritage Site, the P6rezBalladares Administration created a high-level commission
charged with the elaboration of a master plan to coordinate
activities to protect the Casco Antiguo patrimony. 25 5 The
commission included representatives of the institutions
responsible for plans and activities necessary for successful
restoration of the historic district-the Vice-Minister of the
Presidency, the Vice Minister of the Housing Ministry, the
Director of the Panamanian Tourism Institute (IPAT), and
25 6
the Director of the National Institute of Culture (INAC).
The commission was charged with elaborating the master
plan for restoration of the Casco Antiguo, defining the lines
of action, and determining the different allowable uses of
the area.257 The Executive Decree stipulated that the master plan should contain themes related to traffic circulation,
uses of public areas, infrastructure and basic services, public outreach of uses of the area, training programs for people involved in restoration activities, and cultural and
artistic activities.25 8 For the first time, the Decree also
created a technical office which would answer to the Vice
Minister of the Presidency, be composed of restoration
253

P6rez-Balladares was President of Panama from 1994-99. INSTI-

TUTO DEL TERCER MUNDO, supra note 250 at 455.
254 The

legislative analysis in Section III of this manuscript clearly

illustrates Decreto Ley No. 9 provided for the first fiscal incentives for
restoration of private-owned building in the Casco Antiguo.
255 "Por el cual se crea la Comisi6n de Alto Nivel para la Restauraci6n
y Puesta en Valor del Conjunto Monumental Hist6rico del Casco Antiguo de la Ciudad de Panama," Decreto Ejecutivo No. 84 de 14 de Abril
de
1998, Gaceta Oficial No. 23,524 (viernes 17 de abril de 1998).
256
Id. at art. 1.
257 Id.at art. 2.
258 Id. at

art. 3.
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experts, and develop
and coordinate the implementation of
259
the master plan.
The subsequent administration of President Mireya
Moscoso produced another Executive Decree in 2000,
which was almost identical to the 1998 version. 26 This
version added the Mayor of Panama City to the commission, and changed the name to the Office of the Casco Antiguo (OCA). 26 A technical group also answered to the
OCA and was the body responsible for coordination of
262
restoration activities.
The OCA attempted to avoid the
centralized models that were the norm in the 1970s and
1980s. 263 Instead, it strived to coordinate the actions and
interventions of government agencies, take advantage of
aid and cooperation from foreign governments, and foster
public-private partnerships. 264 Its primary task was the
implementation and coordination of the actions set forth in
265
the master plan.
Development of the master plan for the Casco Antiguo took many variables and data sets into account to
evaluate the conditions and characteristics and architectural
remains; among these were census demographic data and
social indices, public services and transportation infrastructure, spatially-referenced (GIS) historical and current land
uses, inventories of more than 800 properties in San Felipe.2 66
Id. at art. 5.
"Por el cual se crea la Oficina para la restauraci6n y puesta en valor
del Conjunto Monumental Hist6rico del Casco Antiguo de la Ciudad de
Panamd," Decreto Ejecutivo No. 192 de 20 de Noviembre de 2000;
Gaceta Oficial No. 24.187 (viernes 24 de noviembre de 2000).
261 Id. at art. 1. Executive Decree No. 192 also included the Minister of
the Presidency and the Minister of Housing instead of the ViceMinisters.
262 Id. at. art. 5.
259

260

263
264

Spadafora, supra note 250, at 117, 119.

Id. at 117, 119, 126.
265
Id. at 119.
266ld.

at 117, 119-126; Spadafora, supra note 252, at 172, 174-79.
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The dynamic and flexible master plan attempted to
define the areas in need of intervention, revitalization and
267
The plan was organized
Antiguo.
restoration in Casco 26
8
themes.
seven
around
Economic vitalization and training of skilled work1.
ers-Training school ("Escuela Taller") in restoration skills, preparation of local guides, improved
social services for residents, strengthening of small
businesses.2 69

Housing-Outreach about fiscal incentives, "social
housing" projects, actions 27to stop abandonment and

2.

deterioration of structures.

Tourism and cultural activities-Plans for a museum in the Jesuit Church ruins, cultural center in
the ruins of the Santo Domingo Convent, promotion
development, promotion of cultural activiof hotel
71

3.

ties.

2

Infrastructure-Plans for more than 680 new parking spaces; studies to consider pedestrian zones, and
electric and
public transport alternatives; burial of 272
streets.
of
illumination
telephone cables,

4.

267

0

Spadafora, supra note 250, at 117, 119; Spadafora, supra note 252,

at 172, 173.
Spadafora, supra note 250, at 127-28; Spadafora, supra note 252, at

268

172, 211.

2 69

OFICINA DEL CASCO ANTIGUO

(OCA),

DESARROLLO E INTEGRACI6N SOCIAL

REVIVE LA COMUNIDAD:

(n.d.); Spadafora, supra note

252,
at 172, 212.
270

OFICINA DEL CASCO ANTIGUO (OCA), REVIVE LA ARQUITECTURA:

RECUPERACION DE INMUEBLES (n.d.); Spadafora, supra note 252, at
172, 218-19.
271 OFICINA DEL CASCO ANTIGUO (OCA), REVIVE EL TURISMO: NUE-

vos DESTINOS TURiSTICOS (n.d.); Spadafora, supra note 252, at 172,
222-23.
272 OFICINA DEL CASCO ANTIGUO

(OCA), REVIVE LA CALIDAD: INFRAESTRUCTURA Y SERVICIOS URBANOS (n.d.); Spadafora, supra note

252, at 172, 224-25.
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Improvement of Public Services-reformulation of
traffic routes, improvement of trash collection, improvements if security.273
Legislation, Regulations, and ManagementProvision of a legal framework for Casco Antiguo
restoration
and development, creation of a technical
74

6.

office

7.

2

Specific Projects-Restoration of numerous public
275
buildings and spaces in the Casco Antiguo.

The results of the restoration efforts speak for themselves. Property values in the Casco Antiguo historic district skyrocketed. Most buildings in the district have
recently been purchased, although not yet restored.276 In
2002, the purchase price for un-restored properties ranged
between $150 and $400 per square meter.277 At that time,
restored property values ranged between $1,000 and $1,600
per square meter. 278 In early 2008, restoration activities
were evident on almost every block in San Felipe, 279 and
renovated property values averaged around $2,000 per
square meter. These values rank among the highest in the
Panama City real estate market today. 280 The complete
restoration of the San Felipe historic district now appears to
be highly probable.
The origin of investors and developers evolved.
The incentive legislation (Decree Law No. 9 of 1997) attracted largely Panamanian purchasers, although slowly. In
Id. at 172, 226-27.
Id. at 172, 228-29.
275 Id. at 172, 232-33.
273

274
276
277

278

PANAMA

Hoy, supra note 20, at 110.

Id.

Id.; TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 3, at 58, 76.

Interview with Ariel Espino, supra note 69. According to Espino,
some 30 restoration projects were in progress in December 2007.
280 Interview with Ausberto Rosas, Legal Counsel, Sanson, Rosas y
279

Asociados, in Panama City, Panama (April 10, 2008).
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recent years, however, most developers have been foreign
and largely European (Spanish, Italian, and French). 281 The
fiscal incentive program offered only small savings to investors who were willing to spend a million dollars or more
on a restoration project. Additionally, the Spanish Government is funding a Training School (Escuela Taller) that
offers two years of training in restoration arts (woodworking, masonry, iron-working).282 Over fifty male and
female students-all Casco Antiguo residents-are currently participating in this training which develops skills
needed for restoration activities. 283 In fact, the students are
currently
renovating the Santo Domingo Church and Con284
vent.

V. Challenges to Restoration Efforts
Recently, conservation of cultural and historic patrimony in San Felipe has faced many challenges. The
cities structures lost many of their unique qualities during
the 2 0 th Century due to social pressures, lack of maintenance, growth, neglect by government officials.285 During
this period, many buildings were irrevocably lost to decay
and deterioration. Nevertheless, in recent years restoration
efforts have begun in earnest, thanks to recent legislation
creating fiscal incentives for restoration and preservation
activities. Important government buildings located in San
Felipe, the majority of which have been restored during the
past 35 years, also provide an anchor for restoration efforts.
281Id.
282 Escuela Taller en Plena Restauraci6ndel Convento de Santo
Do-

mingo, LAS

ULTIMAS DEL CASCO (OFICINA DEL CASCO ANTIGUO,

CIUDAD DE PANAMA),

Mar. 2007; Interview with Ariel Espino, supra

note 69.
283 Interview with Ariel Espino, supra note 69.
284 Id.
285

See above Sections I and II(b) of this manuscript. See also TEJEIRA

DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 52-55.
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Moreover, the historic district has gained the international
recognition which is clearly deserved. Nevertheless, numerous challenges to the successful restoration and preservation of San Felipe still remain.
a.

Competition in the Housing Stock

The most significant impetus to restoration of San
Felipe was Decree Law No. 9 which the National Assembly
approved in 1997. This legislation created numerous tax
incentives which jump-started redevelopment of the historic neighborhood. However, this process began more
slowly than expected. 286 One of the reasons for the slow
start was the oversupply of middle-class and upper-class
287
housing in metropolitan Panama City during the 1990s.
Intense development of high-end condominiums in Marbella, Paitilla, and San Francisco began. Additionally, the
Panamanian government through the Inter-Oceanic Regional Authority (ARI), began to sell residential properties
in the former-Canal Zone and U.S. military bases, in areas
such as Albrook, Balboa, Curund-d, Diablo, and Clayton.288
These properties were attractive because of their greenspace and "garden city" layouts. Middle-class Panamanians had numerous housing choices in the 1990s.

286 TEJEIRA DAVIS,

supra note 51, at 114-15. Another reason for the

slow start of active participation in the incentive regime was the economic recession of the late 1990s that had significant adverse affects on
the local real estate market. E-mail from Ausberto A. Rosas R., Legal
Counsel, Sanson, Rosas & Asociados, (March 25, 2008 13:23:01
GMT) (on file with author).
287 Pizzurno, supra note 10, at 11.
188 TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 3, at 58, 76; Olmedo Varela, supra note
42, at 7.
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b.

Failure to Adequately Protect Structures located in the San Felipe Historic District

As the San Felipe area began to deteriorate in the
1920s, numerous administrations failed to act to protect the
national cultural patrimony of the area. The National Assembly approved the first preservationist legislation in
1941, but this merely declared a hand-full of sites as "National Historic Monuments."2 89 It was not until the 1976
legislation that the entire Casco Antiguo area as a whole
was considered worthy of preservation.29 ° This legislation
also established guidelines for construction in the clearlydefined area. 29 1 Despite this theoretical evolution in historic
district preservation, government investments focused on
the publicly-owned monumental structures in the area.
Additionally, the government provided no fiscal incentives
to private investors to encourage restoration and did not
take action to restore
decaying residential buildings in the
292
Casco Antiguo.
The 1995 dossier prepared by the Panamanian Government to support World Heritage Site designation for the
Casco Antiguo noted that about 70% of the structures in the
area displayed marked deterioration. 293 Today, the majority
of unrestored occupied buildings are degraded, overcrowded and dangerous. Many empty buildings are
boarded, and numerous blocks of San Felipe resemble a
wasteland. Of the 830 structures in San Felipe, more than
100 are presently abandoned, and many of these have been
abandoned for decades. 294 Interiors of buildings are de289 TEJEIRA DAVIS,
290

supra note 51, at 95, 97-98.
See above Section III(a) of this manuscript.

291 Id.

As noted previously, legislation regarding renovation
of the Casco
Antiguo did not provide for economic or fiscal incentives until the 1997
Decreto Ley No. 9. See above Section of this manuscript III(d).
291
World HeritageList: Panam (Panamd),supra note 4, at 93.
294Espino, supra note 42, at 17.
292
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stroyed, walls and roofs are crumbling, and balconies appear likely to fall at any moment. An unfortunate incident
in February 2007, illustrates the physical decay of many
buildings. Part of the eaves and roof from an occupied 132year old three-story building on Avenida Central collapsed
killing a mother and her two children as they exited a bakery on the street level.295 The deterioration of structures
even poses a risk to passers-by on the street.
Part of the difficulty of restoration in the Casco Antiguo is the high percentage of private properties. About
90% of the buildings are privately owned.296 Many owners
ceased to maintain their properties because of populist
government policies which froze rents.29 7 The abandonment of the San Felipe by the elite in the first half of the
2 0 th Century and the occupation by lower-income renters
and squatters has also encouraged deterioration of structures. Additionally, the government failed to take the initiative in restoration activities of residences during the decline
of San Felipe or to intervene to stop deterioration. The
Housing Ministry, Municipality, or National Institute of
Culture (INAC) all failed to purchase deteriorated properties and subsequently restore them. The government could
then have rented or sold its restored residences. Direct
government intervention might have jump-started restoration of residences in the Casco Antiguo. 298 Active govern295

Manuel Vega Loo, Caidade Alerrn Deja Tres Muertos, LA PRENSA,

(2007) availableat
http://mensual.prensa.com/mensual/contenido/2007/02/26/hoy/panoram
a/902261.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008).
296 Interview with Ariel Espino, supra note 69.

supra note 3, at 58, 68-69, 70-71.
In Guayaquil, Ecuador, the Municipality expropriated decaying

297 TEJEIRA DAVIS,
298

properties in the historic district of Las Pefias for $4.5 million and
subsequently restored them for rental properties. Con la Casa Urbina,
el BarrioLas Peflas Completa su Restauraci6n (July 5, 2007), available at
http://www.eluniverso.com/2007/07/05/0001/18/597A 9 7 11194747349
AAA963CCF8B 173B.aspx.
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ment participation and leadership in the creation of "social
housing" several decades ago could have promoted the
social diversity of San Felipe's population and avoided the
gentrification occurring today in the area. Yet, the political
will was absent.
Speculation by investors or property owners also
may slow restoration efforts. For example, the current or
new owners of property in San Felipe often have decided to
hold on to empty, unrestored properties with the expectation that increasing property values will make future sales
much more profitable.2 99 Moreover, many "flippers" consider an empty property more "attractive" than an occupied
property. 30 0 Recent legislation contained provisions that
the government could use in these cases. For example,
Article 37 of Decree Law No. 9 stipulated that owners who
requested eviction but failed to begin restoration within one
year could face fines. 30 1 Article 38 of the same law noted
that owners of unoccupied buildings who failed to stop
deterioration could be fined.30 2 According to Article 41,
persons who take advantage of fiscal incentives must complete restoration by 2002. 303 All of these provisions require
active government oversight, inspection, and enforcement. 304 In a resource-limited environment, this is often
299 Espino, supra note 42, at 17.
300
Id.; E-mail from Ausberto A. Rosas R., Legal Counsel, Sanson,
Rosas & Asociados, (March 25, 2008 13:23:01 GMT) (on file with
author).
301 See above Section III(d) of this manuscript. Decreto Ley No. 9,
supra note 150, at art. 37.
302 See above Section 111(d) of this manuscript. Decreto Ley No. 9,
supra note 150, at art. 38.
303 See above Section III(d) of this manuscript. Decreto Ley No. 9,
supra note 150, at art. 41.
30 Government expropriation of condemned structures in the Casco
Antiguo does not appear to be a viable alternative. The Constitution
allows expropriation only in instances of urgent social interest, during
war time, or during serious disturbances to the public order. Decreto
Ley No. 9, supra note 150, at art. 51.
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challenging. Nevertheless, the Oficina del Casco Antiguo
has sanctioned owners of abandoned and deteriorating
buildings. 305 In fact,
in December 2007, some 60 sanctions
30 6
process."
"in
were
Additionally, even "approved" restoration projects
are sometimes questionable and appear to further destroy
cultural patrimony. For example, the Hotel Central located
on the Plaza de la Independencia was constructed in the late
191h Century (1880), and was Panama's finest hotel until
the 1920s. 30 7 However, gradual deterioration of the neighborhood and the physical structure led to the hotel's closure
in the late early 1990s. 30 8 A Spanish consortium finally
purchased the property in 2006, and is currently "restoring"
the structure which will eventually serve as a five-star luxury hotel and meeting center thanks to a $20 million investment..309 Many observers of the restoration process,
however, note with alarm the complete gutting of the building. 31 As of April 2008, only three exterior walls remained. 311 The DNPH of the INAC had classified the hotel
as a "Second Order Structure" which requires that restora-

305

Interview with Ariel Espino, supra note 69.

306 Id.

supra note 18, at 224.
Jos6 Arcia, Hotel Central, reducido a escombros, La Prensa

307TEJEIRA DAVIS,

308

(PanamA) (Mar. 16, 2008), available at
http://mensual.prensa.com/mensual/contenido/2008/03/16/hoy/panoram
a/1295513.html, also available at
http://biblioteca.prensa.com/contenido/2008/03/16/15-6anotadelhotel.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008).
309 id.

310

Id.; Untitled and unauthored article in La Prensa (PanamA) (Mar. 16,

2008), available at
http://biblioteca.prensa.com/contenido/2008/03/16/16-9b-news 1.html
(last vsited Sept., 14, 2008); Hoy por hoy, La Prensa (Panami) (Apr. 13

,2008), available at
http://biblioteca.prensa.com/contenido/2008/04/13/13-la-

hoyporhoy.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008).
311 Arcia, supra note 308.
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tion highlights the high value elements. 3 12 Included among
these high value elements were a wooden staircase imported from New York in 1884 which connected the central
patio to the upper floors, as well as the gallery railings,
pivoted windows and skylights, and masonry facade.3 1 3
However, when gutting the building, developers destroyed
the wooden staircase even though it was in good condition,
as well as all the other structures. 3 14 Even the three remaining walls may be lost due to destabilization, according to
Manuel Choy, President of ICOMOS.3 15 This project occurred even though the National Commission of Archaeology and Historical Monuments (Conamuh) had not
approved the final restoration plans. 316 Many critics question whether the government inspectors were even monitoring this important "restoration" (i.e. "demolition")
project-located on the main plaza and only two blocks
away from the INAC and OCA offices. The failure of
authorities to regulate the restoration of this important
structure suggests that in the future they will be even less
3 17
able to respond to demands of investors and developers.
Some have even suggested that the failures to protect the

Jos6 Arcia, Demolici6n arriesga patrimonio, La Prensa (Panami)
(Mar. 22, 2008), available at
http://biblioteca.prensa.com/contenido/2008/03/22/22-5 a-not3 .html,
also available at
http://mensual.prensa.com/mensual/contenido/2008/03/22/hoy/panoram
a/1301662.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008); Decreto Ley No. 9, supra
note 150, at art. 3(b).
313 Untitled and unauthored article in La Prensa,
supra note 310.
314 id.
312

315

Untitled and unauthored article, LA PRENSA (Panarni) (Mar. 22,

2008), availableat:
http://biblioteca.prensa.com/contenido/2008/03/22/22-9b-news 1.html
(last visited Sept. 14, 2008).
316 Arcia, supra note 308.
317 Untitled and unauthored article, LA PRENSA, supra note 315.
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cultural heritage of San Felipe may lead to placing this site
on the World Heritage in Danger List.318
The above example refers to a private project. Perhaps the government does a better job of preserving its own
properties? This is somewhat questionable, however, as the
following examples illustrate. On November 7, 2003, the
325-year old Arco Chato (Flat Arch) in the ruins of the
Santo Domingo Convent collapsed. 319 The arch extended
50 feet across the nave at a height of 35 feet. 320 The exact
causes of this loss of cultural heritage may never be com-

pletely clarified. Excessive rainfall, natural deterioration of
materials, vibrations from traffic, and lack of maintenance
were all suggested as possibilities. 32 1 During the past decade, this author has observed many incompatible activities
in the ruins below in the arch, including parties with highvolume electronic music. The State clearly must take some
of the responsibility for this loss due to its lack of maintenance and allowance of what most would consider activities that are "incompatible" with archaeological ruins.
The ruins of the Jesuit church provide another example. The OCA website listed the rehabilitation of these
318Arcia, supra note 312.
319

Franco Rojas, Confabulaci6ncontra el Arco Chato, LA PRENSA

(Panamd) (Nov. 22, 2003), availableat
http://biblioteca.prensa.com/contenido/2003/11/22/22-4a-not 1.html,
also availableat

http://mensual.prensa.com/mensual/contenido/2003/11/22/hoy/portada/
1369795.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008); Jos6 Quintero De Le6n,
Sucumbe el Arco Chato, LA PRENSA, (2003), availableat
http://biblioteca.prensa.com/contenido/2003/11/08/8-1a-not1.html, also
available at
http://mensual.prensa.com/mensual/contenido/2003/11/08/hoy/portada.
shtml
(last visited Sept. 14, 2008).
320
id.

321 Gentio: Qu Opina usted del desplome de la estructuradel Arco
Chato? LA PRENSA (Panama) (Nov. 9, 2003), availableat

http://biblioteca.prensa.com/contenido/2003/11/09/9-3sondeo.html (last
visited Sept. 14, 2008); Rojas, supra note 319.
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ruins in December 2004 as a priority project. 322 However,

as of April 2008, this project had yet to begin.323 Not only
is public access denied and educational signage extremely
limited; vegetation grows on the walls of these ruins.t h
17
Clearly, the State could do much more to protect this
Century cultural resource.
Many factors have contributed to the failure to adequately protect structures. High quality restoration of his-

toric structures is a costly undertaking that requires political
will, professional expertise, and funding. Not all of these
have been present in the Casco Antiguo. Additionally, the
high percentage of privately owned buildings requires vigorous government oversight and monitoring of restoration
activities, as well as the evolving condition of the structures. Panama's model of a public-private partnership to
restore the Casco Antiguo demands great commitment from
the authorities, including a clearly-defined master plan,
technical assistance, and oversight of the private sector's
restoration activities. 324 Inspectors also need to actively fine

owners who fail to restore their private property and thus
fail to satisfy their social responsibility. This government
role is also costly in terms of effort and trained personnel.
Property values speculation has led to many abandoned and
unrestored buildings, as owners wait for the "best" moment
to invest or sell. In the interim, structures continue to deteriorate. The majority of privately owned buildings were
occupied by low income renters or squatters during much
of the 201h Century; thus, owners had little incentive to
maintain their property. Regardless of the varied causes for
the deterioration of the housing stock in San Felipe, the
abandoned and decaying buildings need to be addressed

322 Jos6 Arcia, Un Edificio Antiguo a la Espera de Rehabilitaci6n,LA

PRENSA,
Apr. 13, 2008, at 6A.
323
id.
324 ROJAS, supra note 94, at 21-22.
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immediately before structures literally collapse. Restoration
in the Casco Antiguo is clearly a race against time.
c.

Incentive Regime and Government Oversight

The current incentive regime laid out in Decree Law
No. 9 (1997) and Law No. 4 (2002) has expired. 325 To
benefit from the various fiscal incentives, properties must
have been transferred prior to the end of 2003 .326 Proposals
exist to extend the incentive regime for an additional period. 327 However, it appears unlikely that the National Assembly will approve controversial new legislation for the
Casco Antiguo before an election year (2009).328 Perhaps at
this time, fiscal incentives would only be marginally beneficial as most of the housing stock has already been purchased by new investors. The sharp increase in housing
prices in recent years perhaps provides sufficient incentive
for restoration activities.
More direct government action is needed to guarantee protection of private properties. Other instruments exist
besides fiscal incentives. Subsidies could be offered to
developers to create "social housing." New taxes on developments could also fund "social housing." Stricter monitoring and inspections of the San Felipe housing stock and
325

See Section III(e) of this manuscript. As noted above, in art. 1 of

Law No. 4 (2002), the incentive regime only applies to properties that
were transferred by the end of 2003. Ley No. 4, supra note 209, at art.
1.
326 Ley No. 4, supra note 209, at art. 1.
327 In January, 2008, the Oficina del Casco Viejo (OCA) provided the
author with a draft of proposed legislation to extend a modified version
of the current incentive regime for the Casco Antiguo.
328 Panama will celebrate nationwide general elections for President,
Legislators and Representatives on May 3, 2009. See Decreto 9 (Apr. 9,
2008), availableat http://www.tribunalelectoral.gob.pa/elecciones/elecciones-2009/decretos/Decreto-9.pdf
(last visited Jul. 17, 2008).
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implementation of norms is essential. Providing technical
support in restoration activities as a service to developers
could also enhance proper renovation. Administrative sanctions for violations are rather low considering the current
property values in San Felipe and, were they ever applied,
hardly serve as a disincentive for developers to "sit" on
unrestored properties.
d.

Gentrification and changing social structure
of the Casco Antiguo

As discussed previously, from the 1920s to the end
of the century, San Felipe became an increasingly "popular" or more lower-income neighborhood, abandoned by
the elites who moved to neighborhoods further to the east
along the waterfront. 329 These new residents represented a
cross-section of Panamanian society in class, race, and
culture. 330 The restoration process is clearly changing the
social composition of San Felipe. New owners are evicting
renters and squatters before they restore the structures.3 3 1

Restored properties in the Casco Antiguo represent some of
332
the highest property values in Panama today. New residents are inevitably wealthier than those whom they displace and often are foreigners who only reside for part of
the year in Panama.333 This social change appears result in
streets that are empty and without life where there was once
color, activity, and noise. The new residents are also more
dependent on private automobiles as well, creating parking
problems. 334 Historic preservation always creates winners
329

TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 52.

also Espino, supra note 42 at 18; Rodriguez Ferguson supra
note 23 at 28.
331Espino, supra note 42, at 17.
332 TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 3, at 58, 76; Espino, supra note 42, at 17.
330 See

333 Id.

334 Ariel Espino, Director of the Oficina del Casco Antiguo, considers
that low income residents place less demands on infrastructure than
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and losers. 3 35 In this case, the winners are the local and
foreign investors in restoration projects and the new residents. The displaced low income residents are the losers.
The thorny issue of displacement of low-income
residents prior to commencement of architectural restoration presents many perspectives. On the one hand, a new
owner of a property faces the reality of a semi-abandoned
structure occupied by up to fifty families who do not pay
rent. Although theoretically the Municipality should responsible for eviction, in reality, the new property owner
must resolve this difficult issue. Even though these residents have no legal basis for remaining, the Civil Code
grants them certain rights. Thus, even though the Decree
Law No. 9 and Law No. 4 discuss compensation for evicted
families and established time limits for families to remain
in their homes, this process has often been very slow and
arduous. Real evictions are often slower than may appear in
theory.
The social inequity is also troubling. Low-income
residents, many of them long-term residents in San Felipe
are displaced and the community structure is disrupted.
While some displaced people find new housing in lowincome neighborhoods in the central city (El Chorrillo,
Santa Ana, Calidonia), others have no option but to move
to areas with accessible housing in the periphery of Panama
City some 20 km away (Tocumen or Arraijdn). Public
transportation from the periphery to the center of Panama
City often requires a commute of several hours one way.
Do only wealthy people have the right to live in the central
city with easy access to services? A group of urban artists
recently asked just this question:

new wealthier residents because they consume less and use public
transportation instead of private automobiles. Espino, supra note 87.
335 Joseph Scarpaci, Address at the Conference on "Centros Hist6ricos
y Desarrollo Incluyente," Canal Museum, San Felipe, Panama (December 6, 2007).
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We're used to assuming that only the wealthiest
people have a right to live downtown in the most
attractive areas and that the poor people have no
option but to accept "exile" in poor neighborhoods
that surround the city and grow daily. Life in the
democratic. Cultural heritage
center city should be3 36
belongs to everyone.

Noticeably absent in San Felipe are grassroots resident initiatives to restore properties via cooperative brigades and subsequently gain title to the restored
residences. 337 In the Old Port neighborhood of Montevideo, Uruguay (Ciudad Vieja), numerous buildings have
been restored by brigades of residents. Women often form
the core of these work brigades. 338 This type of restoration
action by squatters who restore the space they occupy is
absent in Panama. Perhaps the social and political organization of groups in Uruguay, or support and encouragement

336

"Estamos acostumbrados a presumir que solo los mils pudientes

tienen derecho a vivir en el centro, en las dreas mils atractivas, y que los
pobres no les queda otra que exiliarse en esos lejanos cinturones de
pobreza que crecen dia a dia. . . La vida en el centro. . . se debe
democratizar. . . . (E)l patrimonio es de todos." Espino, supra note
42, at 20 (translation by author).
337 Recent surveys of San Felipe residents indicate that 95% do not
belong to a neighborhood organization of any kind. Adames, supra
note 92.
338 Desde Marzo Otorgan PrstamosparaRehabilitar Viviendas de
Ciudad Vieja, LA REPOBLICA (Montevideo, Uruguay) (Feb. 27, 2006),
available at http://www.larepublica.com.uy/comunidad/203715 (last
visited Sept. 14, 2008); Diana Cariboni, Cooperativa de Viviendas por
Ayuda Mutua MUJEFA: Reciclando el Futuro, availableat
http://www.chasque.apc.org/vecinet/mujefa.htm (last visited Sept. 14,
2008); Rafil Vall6s, "Derecho al Centro": Proceso de Acceso y Permanencia de los Sectores Populares al krea Central de la Ciudad de
Montevideo, Presentation at the V Jornada Internacional de Vivienda
Social - El Derecho a la Ciudad y a la Vivienda: Propuestas y Desafios
en la Realidad Actual.
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from authorities explain the success of the Uruguayan example and its absence from Panama.
San Felipe only offers a few cases of direct government intervention to restore buildings to create "social
housing" or low-income housing. 339 Several notable examples exist on the periphery of the Casco Antiguo Historic
340
District-Casa Boyacd, la Casa Rosada, among others.
These are government residential properties belonging to
the Panamanian Tourism Institute (IPAT) and the Banco
Hipotecario. 34 1 With funding from the Junta de Andalucia,
the Office of the Casco Antiguo restored a two-story triangular-shaped wooden tenement (Casa BoyacA).342 Some
twenty-six families rent subsidized units in Casa Boyacd
for monthly rents that are as low as $30.00. 343 While this

example is symbolic and represents an innovative solution
to create low-income rental possibilities, it clearly only
makes a small contribution to the social diversification of
the Casco Antiguo.
Perhaps revised legislation could create additional
fiscal incentives for owners to create several low-income
However, near the Casa Boyacd. the government owns some 38 lots
(but not the structures) on the site of the demolished colonial wall.
Many of the owners of the structures have not been identified. The
Oficina del Casco Antiguo hopes to eventually use these governmentowned parcels as sites for affordable housing. Grassroots groups are
also advocating this solution. Interview with Ariel Espino, supra note
69.
340 The Casa Boyacd is a two story wooden triangular structure
that
probably dates from 1890. It resembles the prow of a ship. The building's location next to the old Spanish wall forced the building's shape.
LEVY & G6MEZ, supra note 8, at 82.
339

OFICINA DEL CASco ANTIGUO (OCA), REVIVE LA ARQUITECTURA:
RECUPERACION DE INMUEBLES, (n.d.).
342 TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 18, at 231; Interview with Ausberto
141

Rosas, Legal Counsel, Sanson, Rosas y Asociados, in Panama City,
Panama (April 11, 2008).
343 Interview with Ausberto Rosas, Legal Counsel, Sanson, Rosas y
Asociados, in Panama City, Panama (April 11, 2008); Espino, supra
note 87.
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units in their restored properties or in other units in or near
San Felipe. Alternatively, a percentage of permitting fees or
hotel and restaurant taxes could contribute to a special fund
("Social Housing Fund") which would finance affordable
housing in San Felipe, as had been the example in La Candelaria, Bogotd, Colombia. Although investors may complain that no extra resources exist to contribute to such a
fund, some observers of the Casco Antiguo situation estimate that the profit margin for investors in restoration projects is greater than 20%. 34

Alternatively, the issue of social housing is one area
that could benefit from increased and more direct government investment. Authorities should actively use eminent
domain powers to condemn deteriorating structures and
then invest
in their restoration for social (low cost) hous45

ing.

344

3

Interview with Raisa Banfield, Architect and Alianza Pro Ciudad

member, Panama City, Panama (March 28, 2008).
345 ROJAS, supra note 94, at 17.
Efforts to preserve the historic quarter
in Quito, Ecuador, also provide a good example of attempts to avoid

displacement of local residents.
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Traffic -Parking issues and traffic control

San Felipe streets were not constructed for the traffic of the 21 t Century, as streets are narrow. Only limited
parking is available in several municipal lots and around
several plazas. 346 The Casco Antiguo Office regulates the
entry of large buses and trucks into the historic district, as
mandated by the San Felipe land use norms enacted in
2004. 34 7 Other options for parking may exist. Buildings

built since 1940 are generally classified as Fourth Order
buildings and may be demolished. 348 Some owners of restored buildings have also purchased a nearby building
constructed after 1940 and demolished it to create parking
for their residents. Additional proposals include a large
public parking lot on the site of the demolished Public
Market, trolley service in the historic district, or street closure to most vehicles. However, movement on these projects has been slow.
f.

Absence of a Citizens' Advisory Committee

A public-private partnership to restore the Casco
Antiguo requires the active participation of a wide mix of
social actors with different interests, including government
and cultural elites, citizen and community organizations,
political parties, tourist operators, real estate investors, and
community residents. 349 This requires acceptance of the
important role of the private sector in transparent decisionmaking.
Restoration efforts in San Felipe have been very
"top-down" and led by the national government through
legislation and master plans. Urban planners and architects
346 Spadafora, supranote 252, at 172, 206.
347 Decreto Ejecutivo No. 51, supra note 225.
348 Decreto Ley No. 9, supra note 150, at art. 3(d).
349 ROJAS, supra note 94, at 8, 23.
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advocated for preservation of the neighborhoods patrimony, but little evidence exists of grassroots citizens' efforts to protect "their" neighborhood. In addition, notably
absent from the restoration process in San Felipe is a citizens' advisory committee. Many new and old residents of
San Felipe are extremely concerned by the direction of
restoration process, the challenges and obstacles that it
faces, and the social changes in the area. A citizens' advisory committee could offer important recommendations to
government officials concerning potential solutions "numerous quality of life" issues. Additionally, such as committee could provide important information to officials on
neighborhood problems and cases non-compliance with the
existing regulations. A citizen's committee could also be a
valuable conduit of information from government officials
to residents.
g.

Development of Panama and Outside
Threats to the Integrity of Casco Antiguo

Numerous developments in Panama City could impact the restoration activities and quality of life in San
Felipe. One of these is the "Cinta Costera" (Coastal Belt),
a major project begun in 2007 to fill in (reclaim) approximately 30 ha of Panama Bay adjacent to Avenida Balboa. 350 The reclaimed area extends for almost 3 km along
Avenida Balboa. 35 1 The Ministry of Public Works' primary
purpose for this project is construction of additional highCinta Costera - La Vitrina del Nuevo Panamai, availableat
http://www.cintacostera'com'pa/proyecto-caracteristicas'html (last
visited Sept. 10, 2008); Coastal Beltway (Cinta Costera), Panama City,
Panama, availableat
http://www.roadtraffictechnology.com/projects/cintacosta/ (last visited
Sept. 10, 2008); Urania Cecilia Molina, Cinta Costera Va (Green Light
for the CoastalBeltway Project), LA PRENSA (Panamd), Mar. 17, 2007,
at IA.
351Id.
350
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way lanes to ease the traffic congestion in central Panama

City and connect with a partially-constructed system of
expressways. 352 Great debate surrounds the amount of
"green space" that will eventually exist on the newly-filled
lands. 353 The filled area in the "Cinta Costera" project will
end only 500 m from the beginning of the Casco Antiguo
Historic District. 354 Moreover, a large number of vehicles
will pass on these new highways only a short distance from
San Felipe. The potential impacts on air quality, visual
aesthetics, or traffic impacts in the Casco Antiguo of the
"Cinta Costera" have not been considered.
An additional concern for San Felipe is the serious
deterioration of the low-income neighborhoods that surround it: El Chorrillo, Santa Ana, Calidonia, and central
artery-la Avenida Central. The housing stock and infrastructure of these neighborhoods are deteriorating as the

commercial activities have moved to several new shopping
centers in more accessible areas for automobiles. Many
structures of significant architectural value are deteriorating
352

Urania Cecilia Molina, Nuevo Diseho de la Cinta Costera (New

Designfor the CoastalBeltway), LA PRENSA (Panama), Mar. 17, 2007,
at 5A.

353 Ana Teresa Benjamin, Cinta Costera en el Ojo del Huracdn (Coast-

al Beltway in the Eye of the Hurricane),LA PRENSA (Secci6n Construcci6n) (Panamd), Mar. 27, 2007, at 4; La Cinta Costera de Panama
(The Coastal Beltway of Panamd), ALIANZA PRO-CIUDAD, availableat
http:alianzaprociudad.org/cintacostera.html (last visited Sept. 10,
2008); Eric Jackson, Bern Upset with Newspaper Coverage of his Hotel
and the Cinta Costera,THE PANAMA NEWS, Vol. 14, No. 13 (Jul 8,

2008), available at
http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v

14/issue_13/economy_07.html

(last visited Sept. 10, 2008); Green Areas Shrink in Cinta Costera's

Updated Plans,English News Panama, availableat
http://englishnewspanama.com/index.php?option=comcontent&task =
view&id=687&Itemid=176 (taken from LA PRENSA, May 2, 2008) (last
visited Sept. 13, 2008).
354 The Cinta Costera Project will end at the Mercado del Marisco
(Seafood Market) less than half a kilometer from the Casco Antiguo.
Benjamin, supra note 353.
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in these neighborhoods, and lack of security is a continuing
problem. Some type of historic district or a San Felipe
"buffer zone" must be declared for these areas that are
important in their own right and also entry points for San
Felipe.
h.

Linking the Casco to Other Historical Districts-Panama Viejo & Balboa/Canal Areas/Bella Vista & La Exposici6n

A major challenge facing the Casco Antiguo is the
need to develop connections to other historic areas of Panama City, including the ruins at Old Panama. The World
Heritage Committee designated the ruins of Old Panama as
a World Heritage Site in 2003. 3"5 Both sites (Old Panama
and the San Felipe Historic District) form the UNESCO
World Heritage Site, yet they are not managed together and
are separated by a distance of 7.5 km.356 No promotional
or education materials exist that link the two sites despite
the history that connects them.
The San Felipe historic district also needs links to
the neighborhoods that surround it, including El Chorrillo,
Santa Ana, and Calidonia. These are all low income areas
that were "extramuros" or outside the walls of the colonial
city. 357 They were also the site of rental buildings for Canal
workers. 358 The historic district of San Felipe needs a formal "buffer zone" that includes these neighborhoods. Although the "buffer zone" concept was proposed, it was not
included in the 1997 or the 2002 legislation. 359 Historical
important structures in these areas must also be preserved
Archaeological Site of Panamd Viejo and Historic District of Panama, availableat
&unique number-934.
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/790/multiple=1
356
355

id.

357 TEJEIRA
358 id.
359

DAVIS, supra note 5, at 24, 47.

See Sections Ill(d) and Ill(e) of this manuscript.
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and restored, and harmonious links should be developed
with San Felipe. Moreover, urban planners must develop
in all
synergies between preservation of cultural patrimony
360
efforts.
renewals
urban
and
these neighborhoods
The neighborhoods of Bella Vista and La Exposici6n, constructed between 1915 and 1940, drew the elite
from San Felipe. 361 They offer many examples of art deco
and neo-colonial Mediterranean-style single-family and
multi-family structures. However, their architectural heritage is rapidly disappearing today, victim of urban redevelopment, rising property values, and the real estate and
development boom that is converting these neighborhoods
into high-rise condominium zones. 362 They both lack historic designation, but clearly together with San Felipe,
represent the diversity of the architectural patrimony of the
city.

360

ROJAS, supra note 94, at 24.

361 See

Section I of this manuscript. Espino, supra note 42 at 18,

Rodriguez Ferguson supra note 23 at 28-29; TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note
5, at 24, 52.
362 As the elite left San Felipe during the first half of the 2 0 tb Century
for Bella Vista, it also abandoned Bella Vista and La Exposici6n for El
Cangrejo and Paitilla in the 1960s-1970s. Most of the original neoclassical homes have been converted to apartments or demolished in
recent years to make room for modem high-rise buildings. See Panama-The Visitor/El Visitante supra note 40. A citizens' group,
Alianza Pro Ciudad has been advocating the preservation of Bella
Vista's and La Exposici6n's architectural patrimony. The National
Institute of Culture (INAC) declared the Bella Vista corregimiento a
"Zone of Cultural Interest" in 2004 via Resoluci6n No. 246 (Nov. 16,
2004). "Por la Cual se Declara un Area del Corregimiento de Bella
Vista como Zona de Interns Cultural," Resoluci6n No. 246DG/DAJ de
16 de Noviembre de 2004; Gaceta Oficial No. 25.201 (mi~rcoles 22 de
diciembre de 2004). However, this resolution is poorly implemented
by the Municipality and the Housing Ministry and is purely precatory.
Restacemos Bella Vista y La Exposici6n, ALIANZA PRO CIUDAD, Nov.
29, 2006, at 1-2.
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San Felipe should also develop links with nearby
Balboa and the "garden city" that was the hub of the U.S.
administered Canal Zone. This area also represents a very
different model of urban planning that should also be a
protected part of Panama's cultural and architectural patrimony.
VI.

Final Thoughts

Panama's Casco Antiguo incentive law (Decree
Law No. 9 from 1997) appears to cause a very unique preservation success story in Panama City. The key has been
the creation of a public-private partnership which has positive externalities for private investment in the Casco Antiguo. Although it appeared to begin slowly, today, ten
years after its approval, most properties have now been
sold. Restoration projects have increased significantly in
recent years, and a new face is beginning to appear in the
Casco Antiguo. Today, about 20% of the total housing
inventory has been restored.363 Besides the legislation
creating fiscal incentives, the 1997 designation of the
Casco Antiguo Historic District as a UNESCO World Heritage Site has also stimulated restoration activities and provided guidance and security for the restoration process.
This designation is also a source of great pride for Panamanians. Panama's early 2 1st Century real estate boom also
appears to have spilled over to the Casco Antiguo. Foreign
and domestic investors may also consider the Casco Antiguo an alternative type of real estate investment. Real
estate values in the historic district today are among the
highest in Panama City.
Despite these successes, many challenges still remain to successful preservation of the Casco Antiguo.
These include the social issues, the management of traffic
and increasing numbers of tourists, and the changing face
363

Espino, supra note 87.

317

4:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 465

of this neighborhood that is a symbol for all Panamanians.
The dizzying growth of Panama City also presents numerous challenges for San Felipe. Some broader urban development issues in the metropolitan region also may
adversely impact San Felipe; for example, the Cinta Costera project (land reclamation project along 3 km of Panama Bay), increasing levels of traffic, and the general
urban decay of the adjacent neighborhoods of El Chorrillo,
Santa Ana, and Calidonia. Clearly, the Casco Antiguo
requires a broad "buffer zone." This isolated pocket of
cultural patrimony must be better connected to other nearby
areas in Panama City, such as La Exposici6n and Bella
Vista, which lack adequately enforced historic preservation
protection and are rapidly being altered and lost with the
explosion of high-rise structures.
Restoration changes the nature of the Casco Antiguo from a low-income residential neighborhood to a
wealthier community that is increasingly becoming a tourist attraction. Globalization is reaching San Felipe as visitors and residents arrive from all over the world. The old
Spanish wall separated the inner settlement ("intramuros")
where the elite resided from the lower classes outside the
wall ("extramuros").364 The colonial wall was demolished
in the late 191h and early 20 t h Centuries. 365 However, it is
being replaced with a new invisible wall that separates
classes based on property values. Despite this, hope remains that San Felipe will continue to be a vibrant living
urban neighborhood which will be home to people who
represent the great cultural and social diversity of Panama.
Hopefully, in 10 years it will still be possible to purchase a
home-made bollo or tamale from the street vendor in San
Felipe instead of a frozen one at the local gourmet deli.

364 TEJEIRA DAVIS, supra note 3, at 58, 59.
365 TEJEIRA Davis, supra note 11, at 80, 98.
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ESSAY

"I ENTERED DURING THE DAY, AND CAME OUT DURING
THE NIGHT": POWER, ENVIRONMENT, AND INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES IN A GLOBALIZING PANAMA

Osvaldo Jordan*
For months now, the widow has clung to her tiny
shack in this picturesque village above the Changuinola River-even when local officials and hydroelectric workers said she must leave, even
when a bulldozer roared into her yard in the summer. "I will not go," insists Isabel Becker, 59, a
diminutive Ngobe Indian who lives in a dirtfloored home. "If the company wants to send police to kill me, go ahead."'

The story of the Ngobe widow Isabel Becker, living
in the Province of Bocas del Toro in Northwestern Panama,
who entered at mid-day to an unknown business tower in
Panama City, and was not able to leave that building until
mid-night, may easily be interpreted as yet another of
countless cases of local indigenous women being abused by
the mighty power of corrupt governments and multinational
corporations. For the casual observer, the same plot could
be laid out in almost any country in the humid tropics:
Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Brazil or Guatemala. Yet,
under the surface of what Paul Farmer (2004) has called the

* Alianza para la Conservacion y el Desarrollo (ACD), Republic of
Panama (Alliance for Conservation and Development (ACD), Republic
of Panama).
Ben Shors, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 2, 2007.
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"ethnographically visible, ' 2 we can discover that the drama
of Isabel is not simply an archetype of the continuous tragedy of indigenous peoples, but instead a reflection of a
complex web of social relations, embedded in and creating
of the legal framework of a national state that is simultaneously global and parochial, liberalized and oppressive, the
booming Panama of the XXI century without the welfare
state that sought for the protection of the Ngobe regime of
defacto political autonomy in the 1970s.
Under this light, the story of Isabel is not yet another tragedy of any indigenous widow in a Third World
country. Instead, the destiny of Isabel is an open-ended
question about the place of the Ngobe womb in a globalizing economy, a question that demands a definitive answer
from all of those who participate in this continuous struggle
for power. In spite of the celebrated legal victories of indigenous peoples in Latin America, the case of Panama
reveals a number of disturbing questions about the persistence of colonial relations between indigenous peoples and
the descendants of the colonizers. The widow Isabel
Becker appears not to have any place in a globalizing Panama of skyscrapers, beach resorts, and expanded waterways.
I. Changing citizen regimes in Latin America
The end of the Cold War prefigured profound transformations in Latin American societies. With the legacy of
a code-based legal system, and what many observers would
call the burden of patriarchal, Catholic authoritarianism,
every Latin American country, with the possible exception
of Cuba, embarked upon a double transition from statecontrol into market economics, and from top-down authoritarian rule into liberal democracy in the 1990s. Inimical to
2 Paul Farmer, An Anthropology Of StructuralViolence,
CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 45 (2004), at 305.
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this "modernization" of Latin American society was the
dismantling of those corporatist structures that maintained
an ingrained intertwining of state and society. 3 The marriage between popular organizations and centralized governments, allegedly based on class distinctions, was
expected to recede in the wake of free enterprise and equal
citizenship. State companies should be disaggregated and
sold to private investors who would not only bring new
technology and capital investment, but improve efficiency
and overall customer satisfaction. In general, the structural
(and social) adjustment of the Latin American economies
was associated with lifting restrictions against private initiative and individual accomplishment.
In spite of this Washington Consensus that promised citizen equality and personal liberty, many social scientists perceived an unexpected rise of assertive "new"
indigenous movements that emerged from the foundations
of previous class-based organizations, such as peasant leagues and worker unions.4 The 1990 Ecuadorian "General
Uprising" and the Bolivian "March to La Paz" symbolized
the arrival of these new social movements of a postmodern
Latin America, the expression of suppressed identities that
had been sequestered by leftist guerrillas and Marxist intellectuals many years before. 5 Under this scenario, the legal
3 DONNA LEE VAN COTT, THE FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION OF THE PAST:
THE POLITICS OF DIVERSITY IN LATIN AMERICA 3 (2000); Willem

Assies, Indigenous Peoples and Reform of the State in Latin America,
in THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE
REFORM OF THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA 9-10 (Willem Assies, Gemma van der Haar & Andre Hoekema eds., 2000); DEBORAH YASHAR,
CONTESTING CITIZENSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA: THE RISE OF INDIGENOUS
MOVEMENTS AND THE POST LIBERAL CHALLENGE 65-66 (2005).

4 Xavier Albo, 9 El Retorno del Indio Revista Andina 299-345 (1991).
5Kay B. Warren, Indigenous Movements as a Challenge to the Unified

Social Movement Paradigmfor Guatemala, in CULTURE

OF POLITICS,

POLITICS OF CULTURE: RE-VISIONING LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 165-66 (Sonia Alvarez, Evelina D'Agnino & Arturo Escobar

eds., 1998).

322

4:2

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

470

recognition of special indigenous rights in several Latin
American constitutional reforms-Nicaragua (1987), Brazil
(1988), Colombia (1991), Ecuador (1998), Venezuela
(1999)-was regarded as a major victory against the legal
barriers that separated the
descendants of the colonists from
6
those of the colonizers.
These new multicultural citizenship regimes granted
special rights to indigenous peoples and Afro-Descendants
without compromising the liberal principle of citizen equality and the sovereignty of the State.7 Special indigenous
rights should be acknowledged based on the historical
claims of indigenous peoples (and in some cases Afrodescendants). Although not all of the Latin American
countries adopted multicultural citizenship regimes, constitutional reforms at the national level were also paralleled
by the development of an international regime of indigenous rights, beginning with the enactment of ILO 169 and
culminating with the 2007 United Nations Declaration on
Indigenous Peoples. 8 Even when national legislation did
not explicitly recognize the rights of indigenous peoples,
international human rights legislation bolstered their claims
for territory and autonomy, as was demonstrated by the
decisions adopted by the Inter-American Human Rights
Court in favor of the Mayangna of Awas Tingni in Nicaragua and the Saramaka in Surinam. Even the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB),
harshly criticized and held responsible for the plight of
indigenous peoples in the 1970s, officially recognized indigenous rights and enacted special guidelines for the pro6See generally COTT, supra note 3; Assies, supra note 3; YASHAR,

supra note 3.

7 See generally WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP:
LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995).
8INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA
6-8

A

(Donna Lee Van Cott ed., 1994); see generally ALLISON BRYSK, FROM
TRIBAL VILLAGE TO GLOBAL VILLAGE: INDIAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA (2000).
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tection of indigenous peoples in their development initiatives. 9 In legal terms, the multicultural revolution had been
launched, and the new legislation promised to build a new
framework for both citizen equality and cultural tolerance
in Latin America.
In spite of the optimism of the 1990s, other social
scientists have questioned the extent and the intent of multicultural reforms in the context of neo-liberal government
policies.' 0 According to Hale, what he called neoliberal
multiculturalism is not only an incomplete response to
racial discrimination and social exclusion, but may actually
hinder the development of more ambitious initiatives, imposing the terms of participation and suppressing the expression of what would be called "extreme" opinions."l
According to Diaz Polanco, multiculturalism is inimical to
the construction of a global empire, in which the other is
not only embraced, but refashioned by the forces of global
capitalism.1 2 As a new dawn of constitutional reforms
extends through Latin America, indigenous peoples and
their advocates are seriously questioning the capacity of
multicultural citizenship regimes to accommodate ethnicity

9 See generally JONATHAN A. Fox & L. DAVID BROWN, THE STRUGGLE
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: WORLD BANK, NGOs, AND GRASSROOTS
MOVEMENTS

(1998).

10See generally Charles Hale, Does Multiculturalism menace? Governance, CulturalRights and the Politicsof Identity in Guatemala, 34
JOURNAL OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES 485-524 (2002); Otero Gerardo
& Heidi Jugenitz, ChallengingNationalBordersfrom Within: The
Political-ClassFormationof Indigenous Peasants in Latin America, 40
CANADIAN REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

504-24

(2003); Otero Gerardo, Global Economy, Local Politics:Indigenous
Struggles, Civil Society, and Democracy, 37 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE 325-47 (2004); HECTOR DIAZ-POLANCO, EL LA-

BERINTO DE LA IDENTIDAD 23-56 (2006).

"1Hale, supranote 10, at 485-524.
12 DIAZ-POLANCO,

supra note 10, at 23-56 (2006).
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or what
beyond the confines of mere cultural difference
13
multiculturalism."
"boutique
labeled
Stanley Fish
II. Puente del Mundo y Corazon del Universo
Although Panama has never officially recognized
multicultural citizenship in the National Constitution, the
country has historically been heralded as a pioneer of indigenous political autonomy in Latin America. With no
powerful landed oligarchy submitting the native masses to
coerced labor, the staunchly Liberal Panamanian merchant
elite-the same that wore British outfits in the mid-XIX
century-advocated for equal opportunities for whoever
capitalized the advantages that were provided by the cosmopolitan inter-oceanic passageway-Jewish, Chinese,
Hindu, or Italian immigrants, they would all be welcomed
in this land of unfettered opportunities. 14 In this respect,
why should Panama be declared multicultural, like Nicaragua or Ecuador, if the country was by its very "nature"
open to people of all "races," faiths, and ideologies? In an
intrinsically multicultural Panama, indigenous peoples and
Afro-descendants, like European and Asian migrants,
would all possess a comer in this crossroads of the world.
No other time was this national myth more eloquently expressed than in the heated election for the presidency of the
National Assembly in September 1999, when the new fe13Stanley Fish, Boutique Multiculturalism,or Why Liberals are Inca-

pable of Thinking about Hate Speech, 23 CRITICAL INQUIRY 378-95
(1997).
14For a historical account of the development of Liberal cosmopolitanism as a dominant ideology in Panama, see ALFREDO FIGUEROANAVARRO, DOMINIO Y SOCIEDAD EN EL PANAMA COLOMBIANO (1821-

1903): ESCRUTINIO SOCIOLOGICO 215-22 (Editorial Universitaria
1982); PETER SZOK, LA ULTIMA GAVIOTA: LIBERALISM AND NOSTALGIA IN EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY PANAMA 13-34 (2001); AIMs
MCGUINNESS, PATH OF EMPIRE: PANAMA AND THE CALIFORNIA GOLD

RUSH 84-7 (2008).
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male President Mireya Moscoso eagerly awaited the results
of the election between Afro-descendant Haydee Milanes
de Lay from Darien and Kuna indigenous legislator Enrique Garrido from San Blas. Regardless of the final outcome favoring Garrido, Panama had accomplished its
ultimate destiny as a country of equal opportunities
for
5
people of all racial and ethnic backgrounds.'
With such a cohesive national myth, Panamanians
have avoided explaining the virulent nationalism of the
1930s; the continued conflict between cattle ranchers and
Ngobe indigenous peoples in Western Panama; and the
Kuna insurrection of 1925, among other instances of ethnic
conflict. 16 In particular, the Kuna insurrection of 1925 has
been reinvented to signify the creation of an innovative
Panamanian regime of indigenous political autonomy, and
not as the violent reaction of indigenous peoples against the

imposition of colonial rule by an assertive national state.
The armed insurrection of indigenous leader Victoriano
Lorenzo between 1899 and 1902 has also been transformed
by nationalist writers into a "peasant" struggle against Colombian political domination. In spite of all the historical
15

The whole story was revisited by the Panamanian daily El Siglo on

September 4, 2008. This newspaper reproduced the declarations of
Haydee Milanes de Lay just a few days before the primary elections of
the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD). On September 7, Balbina
Herrera, whom Milanes de Lay had accused of bribing her to become
the nominee for the presidency of the National Assembly in 1999,
received the majority of the party votes to become the PRD presidential
candidate for the upcoming general elections in May 2009.
16 See Francisco Herrera, The State-Indian Relations in Panama, 19031983 88-89 (Masters Thesis, University of Florida, 1989) (referencing
the historical conflict between cattle ranchers and Ngobe indigenous
peoples); THOMAS PEARCY, WE ANSWER ONLY TO GOD: POLITICS AND

THE MILITARY IN PANAMA, 1903-1947 88-89 (1998) (discussing the

institutionalization of discriminator practices against West Indians,
Middle Easterners, and East Asians); SZOK, supra note 14, at 110-14
(2001); JAMES HOWE, A PEOPLE WHO WOULD NOT KNEEL: PANAMA,
THE UNITED SATES, AND THE SAN BLAS KUNA (1998) (discussing the

Kuna Insurrection of 1925).
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evidence supporting the claim that ethnic relations have
been replete with different levels of political conflict in
Panama, the hegemonic discourse of innate multiculturalism has permeated all layers of society, concealing a deeply
skewed distribution of income in which indigenous peoples
comprise the majority of the poor.
This historical legacy of uneven wealth distribution,
that was associated with class, race and ethnicity, began
fracturing the Panamanian political system in the 1960s,
auguring an increased mobilization of indigenous peoples,
peasant leagues, labor unions, student federations, and
other popular organizations in the coming years. 17 In 1965,
the proclamation of an independent Ngobe republic by the
leaders of the Mama Tata revival movement reflected the
malaise that plagued the country, only a year after student
protestors had been massacred by US armed forces in the
Canal Zone. 18 Like Isabel Becker of Charco de La Pava,
the Prophet of Mama Tata, Delia Bejarano, was a Ngobe
woman who was trying to draw the map of her own destiny. According to anthropologist Guionneau-Sinclair, she
had recently left the banana plantations of Pacific Western
Panama after many Ngobe labor organizers had been fired
by the Chiriqui Land Company, a subsidiary of the United
Fruit Company. An isolationist spiritual movement that
was at the same time critical of the Ngobe traditions of
poligamy, chicha'9 drinking and ritualized fighting, 20 Ma17 GEORGE PRIESTLEY, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN PANAMA: THE TORRIJOS REGIMES,

1968-1985 21-26

(1986).
18FRANCOISE GUIONNEAU-SINCLAIR, MOVIMIENTO PROFETICO E INNOVACION POLITICA ENTRE LOS NGOBE (GUAYMI) DE PANAMA, 1962-

1984 74-125 (1988).
19 The term chicha refers to a variety of fermented drinks that are used
by indigenous peoples in Latin America.
20 The Ngobe tradition of ritualized fighting, or balseria, was
the most
important trans-kinship ceremony before the advent of the Mama Tata
movement in the 1960s. For a complete ethnography of this cultural

327

4:2 TENNESSEE

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

475

ma Tata called for the separation of the Ngobe from the
corruption of Spanish-speaking society. For this reason,
this movement sparked the political mobilization of the
Ngobe who had been claiming for the legal recognition of
their territorial rights during many years. After the unexpected death of the prophet in 1964, and the declaration of
an independent Ngobe republic by her followers a few
months later, the State response was the dispatch of a National Guard unit to the Ngobe territory under the command
of Mayor Omar Torrijos Herrera. Here the official account
of Guionneau-Sinclair presented an unexpected turn of
events. Mayor Torrijos refused to repress the Ngobe protesters and fostered a dialogue with the indigenous leaders,
who eventually decided to recognize Panamanian sovereignty. Had Torrijos not become the "supreme leader" of
Panama four years later, the overarching implications of
this episode would have probably not only been forgotten,
but grossly underestimated.
III.

The Corporatist Legacy of the Torrijos Dictatorship

After an internal quarrel within the National Guard,
Omar Torrijos Herrera emerged as the main leader of the
so-called 1968 revolutionary process. 21 Like Velasco Alvarado in Peru, Torrijos redefined the contours of the State
relations with indigenous peoples.22 The persistence of
indigenous territorial rights was formally recognized in the
practice,

see PHILIP YOUNG, NGAWBE: TRADITION AND CHANGE

AMONG THE WESTERN GUAYMI OF PANAMA 204-12 (1971).
21 STEVE RoPP, PANAMANIAN POLITICS: FROM GUARDED NATION TO
NATIONAL GUARD 38-41 (1982); PRIESTLEY, supra note 17, at 26-27;
WALTER LAFEBER, THE PANAMA CANAL: THE CRISIS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 125-27 (1989); CARLOS GUEVARA-MANN, PANAMANIAN
MILITARISM: A HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
22 Herrera, supra note 16, at 94-99.

106-09 (1996).
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1972 Constitution, and the Kuna exception was adopted as
a national model of political autonomy. Torrijos committed
himself to the creation of comarcas for the protection of the
collective lands of all indigenous groups in the country.
The personal, direct and even occasionally affectionate
relations between Torrijos and several of the main indigenous leaders have been recorded in numerous anecdotes of
real or imaginary encounters between Torrijos and these
ethnic leaders. As controversial of a figure as Torrijos was,
both a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize and at the same
time accused of human rights violations; after the 1981
plane crash in which he prematurely died, it would be impossible to decipher his real intentions for developing such
a close association with indigenous leaders.
As the head of a military dictatorship, Torrijos was
reputed for declaring that he was not with the Left nor with
the Right, but with the Panamanian people. As a result, the
Torrijos government was composed of the most disparate
characters that anybody could ever imagine, from a US
educated and later to become Vice-President of the World
Bank, Nicolas Ardito Barletta, to some of the most renowned communist intellectuals in the country. The eclecticism of the Torrijos coalition reflected both its intent, and
its inherent contradiction. The General tried to create a
powerful State that would incorporate all different sectors
of society into a common struggle for national liberation
and economic development. He came to practice what has
been referred as corporatism in Latin America, ruling in
response to organized groups both created and submissive
to the national government. Under this model, the interests
of indigenous peoples would be incorporated into state
decisions, yet indigenous peoples would never be expected
to act independently of government-defined national interests. In this regard, the indigenous, and other corporate
interests, would always be considered secondary to the
principal goal of recovering the Canal Zone from the control of the United States. In the same token, the Canal Zone
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would be visualized as a national public good for the benefit of all Panamanians without any distinctions-the golden
cup that was lost for many years and that would produce
wealth for the rest of the country.
After the approval of the Panama Canal treaties in
1977, the second phase of the Torrijos government could be
implemented, integrating the national territory into a coherent organic entity, in which all groups would contribute and
receive benefits from the inter-oceanic passageway.23 Indigenous peoples were certainly the poorest among all
Panamanians, yet their territories were loaded with valuable
natural resources that could be harvested for the welfare of
the country. Timber, water resources for oil-free energy,
and precious metals were all present in the Naso, Ngobe,
Kuna, and Embera territories. Loyal to his promise, Torrijos would not demand the indigenous peoples to relinquish
their lands using the threat of government repression. Instead, he directed his state bureaucracy towards the formal
recognition of indigenous territorial rights through the
creation of comarcas; yet he also expected that the indigenous peoples would contribute to the wealth of the nation
by offering their natural resources. Apparently, Torrijos
was not aware of the inherent contradiction of the policies
that he was promoting, that once indigenous peoples were
empowered and entitled to their lands, they would also be
free to make their own decisions about the use of their
natural resources, even against the alleged benefit of the
rest of the country.
The bargaining approach promoted by the Dictadura con Carino24 of Omar Torrijos led to the signing of
the Farallon Accords, in which the Kuna of Bayano ac23

Herrera, supra note 16, at 107; ALAKA WALI, KILOWATTS AND

CRI-

SIS: HYDROELECTRIC POWER AND SOCIAL DISLOCATION 16-17 (1989);
CHRIS GJORDING, CONDITIONS NOT OF THEIR CHOOSING: THE GUAYMI
INDIANS AND MINING MULTINATIONALS IN PANAMA 31-35 (1991).
24 "Dictatorship with Love"
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cepted that their ancestral lands be flooded for the construction of the Bayano hydroelectric project in Eastern Panama.25 In compensation for this extraordinary sacrifice,
the State would provide the Kuna with health facilities and
potable water; and would protect the existing forests for the
Kuna to maintain their traditional culture and to continue
with their subsistence economy. We would never know
what the fate would have been of the Torrijos corporatist
model of indigenous participation had his author survived
into the 1980s; yet the future tensions that would be generated by this regime of corporatist citizenship were subsumed by the spontaneous expression of a Kuna woman
during a meeting about the Bayano negotiations: "Acaso
Usted es Dios para prometer tanto" (Franciso Herrera
personal communication). No new indigenous comarcas
were created during the lifespan of Torrijos, and after his
death, all the internal contradictions of his revolutionary
movement, and all the disparate forces that had been subtly
repressed by his military corporatism emerged with sufficient pressure to confront indigenous peoples against the
government bureaucracy of the Revolutionary Democratic
Party (PRD). 26
IV.

A Struggle for Power: Indigenous Peoples
against the Revolutionary Process

After the death of Omar Torrijos, his successors
inherited many promises that were difficult to fulfill. Torrijos had committed his government with the Embera, the
25

WALI,

supra note 23, at 81-84; Stephanie Wickstrom, The Politics of

Development in Indigenous Panama,30 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 48-49 (2003); Lynn Horton, ContestingState Multiculturalisms:
Indigenous Land Struggles in Eastern Panama,38 JOURNAL OF LATIN
AMERICAN
STUDIES 838-39 (2006).
26

The Revolutionary Democratic Party, or PRD, was created by Omar
Torrijos himself in 1978 as part of the democratic opening that followed the signing of the Panama Canal treaties.
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Ngobe, the Bugle and the Naso for the creation of new
comarcas; yet he had also embarked the country into a
course of development that would demand the same land,
energy and mining resources that were contained in the
indigenous territories. 27 During the first years after the
death of Torrijos, the bureaucracy of the Revolutionary
Democratic Party (PRD) 28 engaged in simultaneous negotiations with the different indigenous groups for the creation of their comarcas and to obtain their approval for
development projects. However, government officials soon
encountered Ngobe opposition to the construction of hydroelectric projects in Tabasara and Teribe-Changuinola,
and to the exploitation of the Cerro Colorado mines, located in the heart of the Ngobe Territory. As negotiations
with the Ngobe stalled, the Government was only able to
proceed with the creation of the Embera-Wounaan Indigenous Comarca in 1982.
The Ngobe negotiations collapsed in 1983 after
unsolvable disagreements about the continuation of the
Cerro Colarado mines and the limits of the comarca in the
Veraguas region. 29 The failure of the negotiations coincided with a period of increasing turmoil in Panama, as the
country approximated to the first direct general elections
since 1968. General Manuel Antonio Noriega had defeated
his main political opponents within the military, and was
27

John Bort & Mary Helms (eds.), Panamain Transition:Local Reac-

tions to Development Policies. Museum of Anthropology, University
WALI, supra note 23, at 16-17;
GJORD1NG, supranote 23 at, 31-35.
28 Although there were high-ranking government officials involved in
these negotiations, I have chosen to use the term bureaucracy to refer to
all of them, since they were all part of a whole generation of Panamanian civilians who had developed their careers with the support of the
military, and who typically occupied different positions in government
service until the end of the "revolutionary process" with the US Invasion in 1989. During this entire period, actual political power resided
in the hands of the military.
29 Herrera, supra note 16, at 113-15.

of Missouri, Columbia 3-16 (1983);
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prepared for seizing control of the government in favor of
his candidate, former head of the World Bank for Latin

America, Nicolas Ardito Barletta. 30 In fact, the revolutionary process had continued a decisive movement to the right
that started during the last years of Torrijos. In spite of the
boisterous populism of the military regime, the Generals
were fully aware that Panama would soon have to implement the structural adjustment measures of the Washington
Consensus, in order to salvage the indebted economy that
they had inherited from the pharaohnic projects of the
1970s.
Rather than preparing the stage for a controlled
transition to civilian rule, the 1984 elections initiated a
period of profound political instability as news spread that
the elections had been rigged by the military. 31 Although
the first structural adjustment package was eventually defeated when popular mobilizations appealed to the legacy
of social conquests bequeathed by the military; the internal
quarrel within the rank and files of the PRD further debilitated the legitimacy of the government. Combined with the
burden of the debt crisis, this crisis of governance foreclosed any possibility of discussing the issue of the indigenous comarcas, and delayed even the promotion of the
ambitious national development agenda of the 1970s, that
included roads, dams and mining complex. During this
period, however, the increasing participation of a new generation of Westerly-educated indigenous leaders in the
ranks and files of the PRD, reinforced the corporatist structures that had been laid out by Torrijos and his leftist supporters - also called La Tendencia.32 As the power of the
military was eroded by brutal repression and accusations of
corruption, most indigenous leaders remained loyal to the
30 LAFEBER, supra note 21, at 194-97.
3' Id. at 196-98.

32 La Tendencia referred to a group of PRD members who identified
themselves with Marxism-Leninism and other leftist tendencies.
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revolutionary process, hoping that the protection of their
collective lands would be achieved through the creation of
comarcas. In spite of all the unresolved controversies
about the use of natural resources, these indigenous leaders
assumed that the corporatist agenda would be resumed once
the crisis with the United States was finally resolved. The
onset of the American intervention to oust Noriega in 1989,
however, did not lead to a new coalition between the government and indigenous peoples, but instead to a complete
reinvention of the Panamanian state along the lines of privatization and individualism. The odds were thrown
against the continuation of any form of defacto indigenous
political autonomy, and in favor of the private exploitation
of natural resources by international corporations.
V.

Indigenous Comarcas and Development Projects in the New Liberal Era

The phantom of structural adjustment resurfaced
after the US Marines began leaving a war-torn and devastated Panama in 1990. The claims of PRD anti-imperialists
were absolutely confirmed as they battled against the economic reform package of the first Minister of Economic
Planning of the new democratic period, Guillermo Ford;
and against George Bush himself during his infamous visit
to Panama City in 1992. 33 Apparently, the party of the
people was not willing to sanction the dismantling of the
Torrijos legacy of corporatist governance, and was opposed
to what they called the return of the oligarchic rule that had
dominated the country before the 1960s. In this context,
indigenous peoples resumed their political mobilizations,
33 See Michael Wines, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 13, 1992 (noting

that George Bush made a stop in Panama on his way to the Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro. He was greeted by large demonstrations, in
which prominent PRD figures protested in the streets against the 1989
U.S. occupation, including presidential candidate for the upcoming
2009 general elections, Balbina Herrera).
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once again demanding the legal recognition of their territorial rights. In 1993, the Governor of Panama province was
held by the Kuna of Bayano, who claimed for the fulfillment of the Farallon Accords and for the creation of their
comarca seventeen years after their lands had been flooded
by the rise of the Bayano reservoir. 34 Faced with widespread opposition at many different fronts, the postwar
government of Guillermo Endara adopted a conservative
stance-the implementation of the Washington Consensus
would only be advanced until the limits imposed by the
political and social instability that had been left in the country by the US military action.
Paradoxically, and reminiscent of similar developments in Peru, Argentina, Bolivia and Mexico in the 1980s
and 1990s; the party of the Torrijos Revolution, the PRD,
inherited the mission to implement structural adjustment
policies, and so they did with unexpected fervor. The new
President Ernesto Perez Balladares was commissioned with
the daunting task of lifting the PRD out of the ashes of the
US invasion. A former banker, minister of economy and
Noriega rival, Perez Balladares moved the pendulum away

from military corporatism and into what he called the
"modernization" of the Panamanian economy. Under the
neo-liberal reforms, the promises of Torrijos to the Bayano
Kuna were completely buried, as the Bayano Corporation
was abolished, public utilities were privatized, and the
former Directory of Community Development was eliminated. Even the Ministry of Economic Planning was transformed into the Ministry of Economy, signaling the
disappearance of the welfare state of centralized planning
and state protagonism in national development.
As a well-educated adherent to neo-liberalism,
Perez Balladares, however, understood that private investment required the creation of regulating institutions, like

34 Horton, supra note 25, at 842-43.
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the Ente Regulador de los Servicios Publicos (ERSP) 35 and
the Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (ANAM), 6 that
would ensure free competition, citizen rights and business
accountability.
These moderating reforms, however,
lagged behind the rapid elimination of government-owned
corporations. Worried about the future of their collective
lands in the midst of the private allocation of natural resources, the Ngobe and the Bayano Kuna increased their
mobilization, which ultimately led to the creation of their
respective comarcas through Law 10 of 1997 and Law 24
of 1996, respectively. How would these autonomous regimes fare in an era of private investment and deregulation?
The creation of the Ngobe-Bugle 37 and the Madungandi 38 comarcas during the Perez Balladares administration revealed the contested legacy of the Torrijos
corporatist model. The same party that had defended national sovereignty and the incorporation of the marginalized populations in the 1970s had now dismantled public
corporations and set the stage for the arrival of new private
actors. In compensation for the Torrijos promises, or perhaps as a recourse to demobilize the indigenous population,
35 The Ente Regulador de los Servicios Publicos (ERSP), or Public

Services Regulatory Entity, was created through Law 26 of 1996 and
became responsible for concessioning the provision of national public
services like electricity and telephone and for protecting customers
against
the potential abuses of private corporations.
36
The Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (ANAM), or National Environmental Authority, was created by Law 41 of 1998, and became
responsible for approving environmental impact assessments, enforcing
environmental norms, and granting concessions for the use of natural
resources, such as timber and water resources.
37 The Bugle is a very small indigenous group (<10,000) with strong
cultural affinities with the Ngobe. Therefore, they decided to conform
a single comarca with the Ngobe. A similar request was turned down
by another indigenous group, the Naso.
38 The Bayano Kuna comarca was officially denominated Comarca
Indigena Kuna de Madungandi.
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Perez Balladares had paid the historical debt to the Ngobe
and the Bayano Kuna with the creation of the comarcas.
However, his government had also ensured that article 48
of Law 10 of 1997 would limit the autonomy of the Ngobe
by denying their right to decide on the use of natural resources; and that article 21 of Law 24 of 1996 guaranteed
the user rights of the non-indigenous colonists that had
invaded the Kuna lands after the construction of the Bayano hydroelectric project. Instead of receiving an unrestricted support from the party of the Revolution,
indigenous leaders were forced to negotiate the terms of
their political autonomy; and many indigenous leaders
unrelentingly accepted these compromises as members of
the PRD government party. Such a contradiction revealed
the inherent limitations imposed by the corporatist model of
citizenship. In the 1970s, indigenous peoples were considered part of the Revolution and supporters of the anticolonial struggles intimately associated with the welfare
state of Omar Torrijos; yet in the 1990s they would be
auctioned to the best bidder during the process of privatization.
The creation of the Kuna Comarca of Wargandi in
2000 by the new presidential administration of Mireya
Moscoso (1999-2004), precisely during the congressional
presidency of the Kuna legislator Enrique Garrido, marked
the epitaph of the alliance between the government and
indigenous peoples. In spite of all the implicit references to
multiculturalism during the inauguration of Mireya Moscoso, the aspirations of indigenous peoples conflicted with the
projections of government officials for economic growth
and national development. The development of hydroelectric infrastructure throughout the country, under a new
modality of private investment, represented a direct threat
to the integrity of indigenous territories and to the worldview of indigenous peoples. The course of collusion of the
1970s had become the road to collision in the 1990s, and
the future of Isabel Becker and many other Ngobe widows
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would be pending on the unavoidable confrontation between the capitalist logic of a renewed state bureaucracy
and the resistance position of indigenous communities. In
this process of dissociation, indigenous leaders who had
initiated their political careers hands in hands with the
Torrijos corporatist model of citizenship would be captured
by their double loyalties, exposed and discredited in the
face of growing grassroots opposition to the privatization of
their indigenous territories.
VI.

The Bonyic Hydroelectric Project and the
Unfulfilled Promise of the Naso Comarca

Although the Ngobe and the Bayano Kuna comarca
negotiations dominated most of the government discussions
and media coverage about indigenous issues during the
1980s and 1990s; most Panamanian citizens ignored the
existence of another group of distinct indigenous peoples
living close to the border between Panama and Costa Rica,
the Naso (also called Teribe in Panama and Terraba in
Costa Rica). Before the Mizkitu invasions of the XVIII
century, the Naso had constituted the most numerous indigenous group living in what today is the Caribbean Province of Bocas del Toro in Northwestern Panama. Their
historical territory, and their ferocious resistance against the
Spanish colonization, had been avidly recorded by the
Franciscan missionaries that had traveled from Costa Rica
to evangelize this frontier. 39 Possibly for multiple reasons
that have never been properly investigated, the Naso population declined drastically; and their substantial demographic recovery was not possible until the mid-twentieth
39

For infomation about the colonial history of the Naso, see Fernandez-Guardia, Ricardo 1969 Resena Historicade Talamanca. Imprenta Nacional, San Jose, Costa Rico; BURTON L. GORDON, A
PANAMA FOREST AND SHORE: NATURAL HISTORY AND AMERINDIAN
CULTURE IN BOCAS DEL TORO 39-40, 152-57 (Boxwood Press, 1982);

Castillero-Calvo supra note 14, at 291-310.
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century. By that time, the Naso territory had been reduced

to encompass only the Lower Teribe and the Upper San
San river watersheds in Panama, as well as an isolated
community in the Southern Pacific of Costa Rica. 40 The
Naso had lost most of their vast historical territory, yet they
had been able to maintain their language and their distinct
form of political organization-a monarchy.
With such a reduced number of people,4 ' and hundreds of kilometers away from Panama City, the Naso
enjoyed de facto autonomy and absolute control of their
ancestral territory during most of the XX century. However, they would eventually be reached by the prolonged
arms of the Torrijos Revolution.42 During the 1970s, the
Teribe-Changuinola watershed was identified as the most
important national reserve for hydropower generation in the
whole country. As a matter of fact, the revolutionary government had planned to develop this area after the completion of the Bayano hydroelectric project. Since the Naso
were also demanding legal recognition of their territory,
once again Omar Torrijos committed himself personally
with King Simeon Santana to grant comarca status to the
Naso lands.43 As Panama fell into political and economic
chaos after the death of Torrijos, the promise of a Naso
comarca, as well as the ambitious plans to build a gigantic
hydroelectric complex in the Teribe-Changuinola, were left
dormant for over a decade. Only after the "economic modernization" of Perez Balladares had begun to appear in the
horizon, were the Naso lands brought back to the memory
of decision-makers in Panama City. As a matter of fact,
40 According to Gordon this group had been relocated by the Franciscan
missionaries in what today is the Costa Rican town of Terraba. Gordon,
supra note 39, at 39.
41Today the Naso number around 3,000 people.
42 Jason Paiement, The Tiger and the Turbine: Indigenous Rights and
Resource Management in the Naso Territory of Panama 64-66 (2007)
(Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University).
43 Personal communication with Adolfo Villagra.
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even before the privatization of the government-owned
electric company, Instituto de Recursos Hidraulicosy Electrificacion (IRHE), a group of local entrepreneurs had
asked the Government of Panama for a concession to construct the first of the dams of the Teribe-Changuinola hydroelectric complex, that would be located on the Bonyic
River, a tributary of the Teribe River.
The return of government plans to exploit the Teribe-Changuinola watershed for hydropower generation
revived the Naso struggle for the creation of a comarca.
Since the Naso had previously rejected the proposal of the
Ngobe to form a single comarca, their collective lands were
not included in Law 10 of 1997. 44 This confronted the
Naso with the difficult challenge of negotiating a comarca
of their own with the national government. The political
tensions associated with the irruption of external actors in
the Naso Territory, from Ngobe colonization to government
aid to the advent of the Bonyic Project, had ruptured the
traditional political organization, creating a rift between45
King Cesar Santana and his nephew Luis Tito Santana.
After many months of internal disputes, Cesar recognized
Tito as the legitimate King. Tito arrived with the promise
that he would achieve the ultimate aspiration of the Naso,
the recognition of their collective lands as a comarca. For
this purpose, Tito recurred to the remnants of the corporatist governing structures that had been left by Torrijos,
perhaps unaware than in this new period of neo-liberal
multiculturalism, the interests of indigenous peoples would
be completely secondary to private investment and national
economic growth.
In 2001, the World Bank approved a loan contract
with the Government of Panama for a countrywide landti-

"Personal communication with Jose Cruz Monico.
45

Paiement, supra note 42, at 133-35.
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tling program. 46 The Land Administration Program (PRONAT) involved the delimitation and demarcation of indigenous lands and protected areas, as a corrective measure to
avoid the privatization of these collective areas by the voracious land market. The World Bank contractors and
associated government bureaucrats expected that the protection of the Naso lands would proceed uneventfully,
without any major hurdles. In fact, in 2003 the limits of the
Naso lands had already been identified and mostly agreed
upon by the Bank consultants, government officials, and
Naso authorities. A few months later, draft legislation
would be proposed to the National Assembly for the declaration of the Naso Tjer-Di Indigenous Comarca. Had unexpected events never occurred, the Naso lands would have
probably been declared a comarca during the presidential
administration of Mireya Moscoso, like had previously
happened with the Wargandi Kuna Comarca in 2000.
However, the unanticipated purchase of the Bonyic concession by the Empresas Publicas de Medellin (EEPPM), a
Colombian utilities company, once again destabilized the
Naso traditional governance structures, and in this case, led
to a crisis of representation that would be much more pronounced, prolonged, and vicious than any previous conflicts in the Teribe River.
In November 2003, several members of the Naso
Council 47 declared that they were opposed to the construction of the Bonyic Project without the creation of the Comarca, and accused King Tito Santana of having been

46

Project Information Document No. PID8082. Panama-Land Ad-

ministration Project (PAPE 0595) (www.worldbank.org).
47 Besides the King, the traditional Naso governance structure is formed
by the Naso Council and the Naso Assembly. The Council is a special
deliberative and advisory body composed of representatives of the
eleven official Naso communities. The Assembly is considered the
highest decision-making body, and is formed by all the Naso people
who are considered adults according to Naso traditional norms.
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bribed by the hydroelectric company. 48 Initially, the Naso
tried to solve this controversy internally, and in February
2004, the different factions had agreed to form an ad hoc
commission to examine the questions of the Comarca and
of the hydroelectric project. Unfortunately, King Tito decided to ignore this agreement, and a few weeks later, he
removed the President of the Naso Council, Adolfo Villagra, and several other prominent Naso leaders from the ad
hoc commission. In response, on May 30, the dissenting
group called for a Naso General Assembly, and announced
the overthrow of King Tito Santana, proclaiming his uncle
Valentin Santana as the new King of the Naso. These
events occurred only a few weeks after Martin Torrijos, the
son of former General Omar Torrijos Herrera, had been
elected as the new President of Panama. Even before the
official transfer of power, however, in June 2004, the National Assembly voted against the law project that created
the Naso Comarca. This congressional decision signaled a
reversal of the previous government policy of protecting
indigenous comarca lands, and suggested that the historical
alliance between the government and indigenous peoples
was finally over.
In spite of the negative signs given by the National
Assembly during the last days of the Moscoso administration, the election of another Torrijos as President raised
incredible expectations among the Naso and many other
indigenous peoples around the country. Before the transfer
of power, the Naso held talks with indigenous leaders associated with the PRD and even agreed on the designation of
the new Director of Indigenous Affairs of the Ministry of
Government and Justice. 49 In addition, a few weeks before
the swearing of the new national government on September
1st, the supporters of both Tito and Valentin Santana
agreed on holding elections within the Naso community to
48

Paiement, supranote 42, at 135-43.

49 Personal communication with Felix Sanchez.
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solve the existing crisis of legitimacy. They expected that
the new PRD authorities would certify the winner of these
elections, a mechanism that had proven successful during
the previous controversy between Cesar and Tito Santana.
During the first months of the Torrijos administration, the followers of Valentin Santana invited the national
authorities to mediate in the Naso governing crisis. 50 As
opposed to the very personal style of the late Omar Torrijos, these communications were never responded by the
PRD bureaucracy. The supporters of Valentin Santana did
not actually realize that the new administration had thrown
its lots in favor of Tito Santana and the Colombian company until the month of December. Then, the Deputy Minister of Commerce, and the Deputy Minister of
Government and Justice, both participated in a public
ceremony in the town of Changuinola to sign the compensation agreement between Tito Santana and EEPPM for the
construction of the Bonyic Project. Confronted with such a
betrayal by the same PRD party that they had trusted for
several decades, the Naso leaders reclaimed their de facto
autonomy regime, and forcefully expelled Tito Santana
from the Naso Territory on January 5, 2005.
During the next months, government officials from
the Ministry of Government and Justice finally began organizing elections within the Naso Territory.51 However,
these conversations stalled over the specific provisions of
the electoral statute. Whereas supporters of Valentin Santana demanded the use of the same rules that had governed
the election of Tito Santana, government bureaucrats insisted on the implementation of a new statute that would
prevent several supporters of Valentin from participating in
the elections, particularly young people under eighteen
years. When no agreement was reached after several weeks
of negotiations, the supporters of Valentin Santana decided
50 Id.; Paiement,

supra note 42, at 151-52.

51Paiement, supra note 42, at 156-59.
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to boycott the elections since they considered that these
elections were in violation of Naso customary law (usos y
costumbres). As a result, on April 3rd, Tito Santana was
reelected as King of the Naso running as a sole candidate,
although with less than half of the voting population that
was included in the electoral list that had provoked the
controversy.
Since the elections did not solve, but aggravated the
Naso conflict, the contours of the neo-liberal multicultural
State that had replaced the Torrijos corporatist model finally became entirely visible. When the followers of Tito
Santana tried to occupy the Naso government headquarters
in the community of Siey Llik, around twenty heavily
armed police units were dispatched into the Teribe River by
the national government to uphold this operation. 52 Reminiscent of Omar Torrijos Herrera forty years before, the
police officer that was responsible for the armed contingent
decided to dialogue with the Naso leaders and refused to
forcibly evict the supporters of Valentin from the Naso
government seat. As a result, the official inauguration of
Tito Santana occurred in the backyard of a house located
along the Teribe River, after which the "King," his Council
and the accompanying government delegation all traveled
back to his place of exile outside the Naso Territory. Although the Police had refused to exercise the state monopoly over the legitimate use of force, the neo-liberal
multicultural State of the 2000s had demonstrated that in
this struggle for power, the government was not willing to
tolerate those indigenous leaders who challenged the sovereignty of the State, and instead would support leaders like
Tito Santana who were subservient to the demands of international capital and government-defined national interests.
Although the supporters of Valentin Santana had
appealed to those regulatory institutions that had been es52

Paiement, supra note 42, at 160-62.
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tablished by the Perez Balladares administration as formal
mechanisms to defend citizen rights within a neo-liberal
state model; neither the Ombudsman Office nor the Public
Services Regulatory Entity (ERSP) nor the National Environmental Authority (ANAM) were capable of representing
the interests of the Naso as if they were equal citizens within a neo-liberal State, let alone protecting any special minority rights within a multicultural framework.
The
Ombudsman Office visited the Naso Territory and provided
assistance for the peaceful resolution of the conflict during
early 2004; yet when the controversy escalated, this Office
did not have any effective means to protect citizen rights
and/or special minority rights. The ERSP, that was created
with the purpose of regulating public utilities, did not have
any mandate to mediate in conflicts between private companies and people affected by development projects. And
finally, the National Environmental Authority (ANAM)
that could have rejected the Environmental Impact Assessment of the Bonyic Project, that was planned to be constructed within the Palo Seco protected area, 53 preferred to
ignore the demands of the hundreds of Naso who traveled
to the town of Changuinola to participate in the public
hearing of the Project in June 2005. As the State no longer
provided the corporatist means of participation that characterized the former Torrijos period; and yet did not implement neither equal citizen rights (neo-liberal) nor special
indigenous rights (multicultural); the Naso leaders threatened to renounce en masse to the party that they had supported for so many years, the Revolutionary Democratic
53 The Naso Territory overlaps with two nationally protected areas, the
Palo Seco Forest Preserve and the La Amistad International Park (PILA). Both of these areas are part of the internationally-recognized La

Amistad Biosphere Reserve. The Bonyic hydroelectric project was
planned to be constructed within the boundaries of Palo Seco, and
according to environmentalists, this Project would also affect the ecosystems of the La Amistad International Park, which is also a UNESCO
World Heritage Site.

345

4:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 493

Party (PRD) of General Omar Torrijos and of his son, current President Martin Torrijos.
In 2005, the Naso expressed their opposition to the
imposition of a King and of a hydroelectric project by the
same neo-liberal multicultural State that had rejected the
creation of their comarca a year before. This tense situation could have escalated into more direct and serious confrontations had the international regime of multicultural
citizenship rights not intervened to stifle the conflict. In
July, and after several months of discussions, the Private
Sector of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
decided to stop considering for financing the Bonyic Hydroelectric Project. 54 The withdrawal of the Bank represented an unforeseen victory for the followers of Valentin
Santana, and an unanticipated defeat for Tito, the national
government and the Colombian company. 55 Facing an
unresponsive neo-liberal multicultural State, the Naso had
sought for accountability and the recognition of their special rights as indigenous peoples at the international level.56
As the Ngobe widow Isabel Becker inadvertently continued
tendering her cacao groves, the dark cloud that was looming over the heads of the last surviving Naso migrated
northeast to the Ngobe Territory in the neighboring Changuinola River. As the thrust of capitalist development
forbade the explicit recognition of the Naso defacto regime
of political autonomy; the Ngobe, who had successfully
Letter fromRobert Montgomery of the Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB) to Osvaldo Jordan (Alianza para la Conservacion y el
Desarrollo), Aaron Goldzimer (Environmental Defense), and Jose
Yunis (Natural Resources Defense Council).
55 Paiement, supra note 42, at 163-67.
56 For a general discussion about transnational advocacy networks, see
54

MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); for a

discussion of the special policies of international banks towards indigenous peoples and environmental conservation, see also Fox & BROWN,
supra note 8, BRYSK, supra note 8 (for current discussions about the
internationalization of indigenous struggles).
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mobilized against the Teribe-Changuinola hydroelectric
complex in the early 1980s and had been granted their
comarca status in 1997, were expected to pay back for this
favor to the successors of Omar Torrijos.
VII.

Teribe-Changuinola ten years after the Comarca: Redefining the Ngobe Struggle for
Territorial Rights

"We are against the neocolonialism of the transnational
corporations that try to destabilize politically and create
complications in the economic life of the country, when
they are confronted with the legitimate demands
of the
57
Sovereign in defense of its natural resources,"
According to an unofficial story told repeatedly by
Ngobe grassroots leaders, the Ngobe of Valle de Risco in
the District of Changuinola rejected the proposal to belong
to the Ngobe-Bugle Indigenous Comarca when Law 10 of
1997 was finally drafted by the Perez Balladares administration. The position of the Ngobe of Valle de Risco angered many of the other Ngobe leaders that were struggling
for their territorial rights, yet Valle de Risco and several
other communities in the Changuinola and Bocas del Toro
districts in the Province of Bocas del Toro were granted a
special status as annex areas of the Comarca.58 In spite of
the decision allegedly made by the inhabitants of Valle de
Risco and of the other annex areas to part away from the
rest of the Ngobe people, several Changuinola leaders have
occupied very prominent positions in the now institutional-

57Omar Torrijos Herrera, Respuestas a Garcia Marquez, Ediciones,

Reforma Educativa, Panama (1975) (cited in Jose de Jesus Martinez,
Ideario Omar Torrijos, 113 (Osvaldo Jordan trans., Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana. 1982)).
58 Law 10 of 1997, Article 4; Law 69 of 1998, Article 8; Executive
Decree 194 of 1999, Articles 12-14.
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ized Ngobe-Bugle governing structure. 59 Loyal to the legacy of Omar Torrijos, most of them were members of the
PRD; and like the Naso of the neighboring Teribe watershed, they also expected that the government of Martin
Torrijos would favor the interests of indigenous peoples, as
was vociferously proclaimed by his father and by other
important PRD figures in the Province of Bocas del Toro.
As a matter of fact, shortly after the transfer of power,
several Ngobe leaders of Changuinola were assigned to key
positions in the regional government bureaucracy, including the regional administrator of ANAM, Ngobe leader
Valentin Pineda from Valle de Risco.
When a small company, Hydroteribe, S. A., organized the public hearings for the environmental impact assessments (EJAs) of three hydroelectric projects proposed
in the main stem of the Changuinola River in the vicinity of
Valle de Risco (Chan 75, Chan 140 and Chan 220); the
Ngobe leadership was confronted with the same conflict of
interests that had haunted a whole generation of indigenous
leaders after the approval of Law 10 of 1997. Most of the
people directly affected by the projects, including the
Ngobe widow Isabel Becker, never attended the public
hearings, and were completely unaware of the implications
of these projects that were presented by chui who spoke the
language of the Conquest. Another group of more politically active Ngobe leaders had already organized gatherings to oppose the projects since October 2004. Yet, there
was also a critical sector of the Ngobe leadership that remained committed to what was sold as a "state" project,
and who envisioned the benefits that would be provided for
'9 Law 10 of 1997 provided for the creation of several official positions
at the Comarca level, such as the Governor, caciques, congress presidents and council coordinators. Besides, international cooperation also
produced important salaried positions that were usually occupied by
Ngobe with strong political connections.
60 The word chui refers to non-indigenous people, especially mixedblood mestizos.
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"the poor" by such an outpour of financial investment.
Regardless of these internal divisions, the three hydroelectric projects appeared to be a fantasy until ANAM approved the EIAs in October 2005. A few months later, a
major North American corporation, Allied Energy Services
(AES) from Arlington, Virginia, would claim ownership of
the three hydroelectric projects, and would walk hand in
hand with government officials, including Ngobe leaders,
to promise benefits that would surpass any of the early
utopias of General Omar Torrijos.
From the beginning, the Changuinola projects suffered from a pathology that would only be imaginable in
the context of the persistent memory of Omar Torrijos
among the indigenous population: They were sold simultaneously as government-sponsored state projects in the same
corporatist tradition of the 1970s, but also as private initiatives originating from neo-liberal economic modernization.
As the former category, the projects should be supported
wholeheartedly by the government bureaucracy, including
the Ngobe leaders, and by the local communities, in the
same way that the Kuna and the Embera had relinquished

their ancestral lands for the welfare of the nation during the
construction of Bayano Project in the 1970s. However, as
purely private initiatives, the State was not responsible for
any compensations or liability negotiations, and government institutions would only be limited to a minimal regulation of private corporations according to the Perez
Balladares institutional reforms of the mid-1990s. As AES
moved decisively into the Changuinola River, and visited
the Ngobe communities with gifts and monetary offerings
of all sorts, many of the indigenous leaders that were previously opposed to the hydroelectric projects began working
for the Company; or receiving contracts for their lands,
their houses, and other kinds of services. The internal division of the Ngobe population reached its zenith in the Valle
de Risco gathering of May 2006, in which those who supported the hydroelectric projects were denied the opportu-
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nity to participate in the meeting
by those who opposed
61
hydroelectric development.
The Valle Risco gathering also marked the irruption
of the neo-liberal multicultural State into the Changuinola
conflict. In this meeting, the people opposed to the projects
announced a series of demonstrations in the dam sites (including Bonyic) on June 5, World Environment Day. A
few days before this date, however, the Government deployed police forces all around the Changuinola District,
searching for specific Naso and Ngobe leaders; and cordoned off the entrances to the communities of Valle de
Risco and Nance de Risco to control access to the dam
sites. 62 Although these government abuses were denounced
to the Ombudsman Office, there has never been any official
pronouncement about these irregular activities. During the
coming months, AES began negotiating individually the
relocations for an estimated 100 families that would be
"directly" affected by the Chan 75 reservoir, without the
63
official participation of any government institution.
However, local government officials, including several
Ngobe leaders, participated in the public events organized
by the Company, signaling that the projects had the blessing of the government as if they were state business.
According to Isabel Becker, on January 3, 2007, she
and several of her family members were transported by
AES representatives to Panama City for a tour of the capi61 Officially,

the Valle Risco meeting was also expected to be attended
by Naso and Bribri leaders, and was therefore called Naso-NgobeBribri Congress. The Bribri is a different ethnic group that also lives in
the Changuinola District between the Naso Territory and the Costa
Rican border.
62 Personal communication with Felix Sanchez and Pedro Abrego.
63 The ANAM resolutions approving the environmental impact assessments for the three projects established that Chan 75 should be constructed before Chan 140 and Chan 220. The number of people
affected by the Chan 75 project has never been officially determined,
and AES only takes into consideration the communities of Changuinola
Arriba, Guayabal, Valle Rey, and Charco de La Pava.
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tal. After some shopping in the morning, however, they
were all taken to the headquarters of AES, where the widow Isabel, who does not speak Spanish and does not know
how to read and write in any language, was asked to sign
an agreement conceding her lands to the hydroelectric
company. As Isabel struggled against her inevitable destiny, many hours passed before she finally accepted to print
her thumb into a document that she could not understand.
Many days later, Isabel would refuse to abide to this
agreement, when AES employees insisted that she needed
to leave her place for safety reasons. During this prolonged
stalemate, no government institution assumed any responsibility for the plight of Isabel, as well as of hundreds of
other Ngobe who were being pressured to renounce to their
land rights; not even the regional head of ANAM, Valentin
Pineda, who supervised the nationally protected area in
which Isabel lived and where the hydroelectric project was
planned to be constructed.64 Ironically, according to several community leaders, the Palo Seco Forest Preserve was
the main reason that most Ngobe of the Changuinola River
Watershed had been denied the opportunity to register their
land rights years before. They had been told that they were
living within a protected area.
The drama of Isabel grew increasingly tense, as the
company maintained that she had to leave her property.
Changuinola Mayor, Virginia Abrego, also an Ngobe, intervened in the controversy, at some point even holding
Isabel against her will in her "new house" in the town of
64 The Chan 75, Chan 140 and Chan 220 hydroelectric projects are also

located in the Palo Seco Forest Preserve. Like in Bonyic, environmental organizations argue that these projects will not only affect this
reserve, but the La Amistad International Park (PILA), a World Heritage Site that protects the headwaters of the Changuinola River. In
spite of this argument, in May 2007, ANAM signed a contract with
AES granting an administrative concession of 6,215 Hectares of the
Palo Seco Forest for the construction of the Chan 75 hydroelectric
project.
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Changuinola. 65 Between July and October, many other
government officials visited the widow, claiming that they
represented the government and that Chan 75 needed to be
constructed for her own welfare and for that of the rest of
the country. In contrast with the Kuna and the Embera
during the Torrijos years, no community meetings were
ever held to discuss the relocation plans, and no public
negotiations ever occurred between the government and the
affected communities. 66 The Ombudsman Office did visit
the area in several occasions, but never took any commitment to act on behalf of Isabel or of any other of the Ngobe
residents of the Changuinola River. The Ombudsman officials withheld the claims of the Company that this was an
entirely private transaction between an illiterate Ngobe
widow, who did not speak Spanish, and a multinational
corporation based in the vicinity of Washington, D. C.
After many months of continued harassment and of unrelenting suffering, on October 19, Isabel finally accepted to
print her thumb into a new agreement that like the previous
document, she did not understand. Less than a week later,
she would be escorted away from her farm by the National
Police, while AES executives and government officials
gloriously celebrated the inauguration of the construction
of the Chan 75 project in a nearby location. On October
19, the National Public Services Authority (ASEP), the
65

That same day, July 21, 2007, a bulldozer had stormed into Isabel's

property. From the impression, she had fainted, and municipal authorities had taken her to the town of Changuinola supposedly for medical
attention. After she left the physician, she was carried to a house in the
outskirts of Changuinola that had been acquired by AES for her temporary relocation. After crying for the whole night, she was finally taken
back to her house in the Changuinola River on the following day.
66 The ANAM meetings held in August and November 2007 limited
themselves to presenting the relocation plans that had been proposed by
AES and allegedly revised by ANAM. The Company always maintained that compensation agreements should be negotiated individually,
and not collectively. See Cultural Survival Quarterly, Winter 2007
(detailing a complete report about the November meeting).
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successor of the Public Services Regulatory Entity (ERSP),

had issued resolution AN 1228-Elec, declaring
the Chan67
guinola projects of public and social interest.
In contrast with the Naso relentless opposition to
the same governing party that had allied itself with indigenous peoples in the 1970s, the Ngobe leadership had succumbed to a combination of government offerings, private
enticements, and direct coercion. The same government
that had promised to protect the indigenous lands as comarcas under the Torrijos model of corporatist citizenship
had now demanded the continued loyalty of indigenous
peoples, even when government officials negotiated their
collective lands with private corporations. The Chan 75
hydroelectric project, and the tragedy of Isabel Becker,
revealed the monstrosity of the neo-liberal multicultural
citizenship regime that had been adopted by the Panamanian State in the 1990s. Special indigenous rights and
universal human rights would only be respected in the
boutique fashion described by Stanley Fish (1997). Indigenous peoples would indeed make excellent characters for
postcards and multicultural displays. Yet, confronted with
the contradictory national/private interest of business and
government, the institutional mechanisms established by
Perez Balladares to regulate private investment and protect
citizen rights would be rendered completely ineffective,
and the collective land rights of indigenous peoples would
have to be relinquished peacefully to the lures of money, or
forcibly to the batons of the National Police.

67 Law

10 of 2006 had restructured the Public Services Regulatory
Entity (ERSP) into the National Public Services Authority (ASEP).
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VIII. Rolling back the State: Neo-liberal Multicultural Citizenship and the Disempowerment of
Indigenous Peoples in Globalizing Panama
The cases of the Naso and of the Ngobe of Western
Panama illustrate the profound transformations that have
been happening in the relations between indigenous peoples and national governments after the process of neoliberal state reform and structural adjustment. For many
authors, these dislocations provided an impetus for the
increasing mobilization of indigenous peoples in the 1990s,
and for constitutional reforms that incorporated notions of
multicultural citizenship. 68 In spite of the significance of a
"politics of recognition," however, the adoption of models
of neo-liberal multicultural citizenship ultimately concealed
the power inequalities that existed between indigenous
peoples and other political actors, like multinational corporations. 69 Such a deceiving attempt at recognizing without
empowering can be complicated by two aggravating situations that proved tragic in the two cases described above.
First, the symbolic persistence of notions of corporatist
citizenship even during those situations in which the legal
framework and the political praxis denounced the existence
of a completely different playing field, the transition from
the welfare state of the 1970s to the neo-liberal regimes of
the 1990s. Initially, the Naso tried to recur to the corporatist structures of the 1970s, but when they felt betrayed by
the PRD government, they reclaimed the defacto regime of
political autonomy that had allowed them to survive
through centuries of ethnic wars, Catholic evangelization,
and the encroachment of international capitalism. In con68 COTT,
YASHAR,
69 See

supra note 3, at 1-35 (2000); Assies, supra note 3, at 9-16;

supra note 3, at 54-82 (2005).

generally Hale, supra note 10, at 485-524 (2002); Gerardo

Otero, Global Economy, Local Politics:Indigenous Struggles, Civil
Society, and Democracy, CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

37 (2): 325-347 (2004);

DIAZ-POLANCO,

supra note 10, at32-56.
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trast, the Ngobe leaders of the District of Changuinola
preferred to ally with the governing party, even when that
implied abandoning a grandmother like Isabel Becker,
leaving her alone to fight against forces that she could not
even comprehend.
In addition to the persistence of corporatist loyalties, the collapse of those institutions that had been created
by the neo-liberal state to equilibrate the power of business
and citizens left indigenous peoples vulnerable to the temptations of capitalism and to the violence of a State that was
simultaneously absent and omnipresent. The dispatch of
police forces to the Naso Territory was only the prelude to
the outright occupation of the neighboring Ngobe Territory
a year later. Whereas state officials did not acknowledge
any responsibility in the process of relocation of Chan 75,
they actively participated in the siege of Isabel Becker,
arguing that the project was important for her own benefit
and for that of the "nation." The Office of the Ombudsman
proved completely ineffective in both cases. The National
Environmental Authority (ANAM) essentially delivered the
management of the Palo Seco Forest Preserve to AES, and
ignored the claims of the hundreds of Naso who traveled to
the town of Changuinola to express their opposition against
the construction of the Bonyic hydroelectric project in
2005. The Public Services Regulatory Entity (ERSP) never
intervened on behalf of the people affected by the hydroelectric projects, and instead issued a resolution upholding
the continuation of the Chan 75 project even after the case
of Isabel Becker had become known in the media nationally and internationally.
In Panama, the prospects for indigenous peoples
under a neo-liberal multicultural citizenship regime are
completely dismal. Not only are the corporatist mechanisms of popular participation of the former Torrijos years
no longer available, but in these times of a new and younger Torrijos, indigenous peoples have also been denied the
possibility of equal citizenship rights or of special multicul-
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tural provisions beyond the mere recognition of cultural
difference and boutique expressions of uniqueness. Under
these circumstances, indigenous peoples were only left with
the collective titles that they had obtained during the period
of corporatist citizenship, with the uncertain possibility of
reaching to the international regime of multicultural citizenship, or with the alternative of recurring to their preexisting regimes of defacto political autonomy. Yet, even
these persistent spaces of autonomy are also increasingly
under siege as the tentacles of private business and government bureaucracies extend into the comarca lands themselves. 70 The Naso decided to reclaim their de facto
political autonomy in January 2005, following the examples of the Lacandon Mayas in 1994, the Ngobe in 1964,
and the Kunas in 1925. Yet, the question still remains of
how long would the neo-liberal multicultural State tolerate
these challenges to its purported national sovereignty, and
when would they respond using what Weber avidly defined
as the monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Isabel
Becker did not wait for this dreadful moment, and walking
over the footprints of millions of indigenous women in
countless places and endless times in history, she chose a
dignifying exit of her beloved homeland, as opposed to the
stoic voicing of her complains, or the humiliating loyalty of
the Ngobe bureaucrats of the governing party. Since there
is no place for her in the Panama of skyscrapers, beach
resorts and expanded waterways, she would rather abandon
her lands than betraying her ancestors for the rewards of
private payoffs or government positions.

In 2006, a group of North American speculators obtained a concession over the whole Caribbean Coast of the Ngobe-Bugle Indigenous
Comarca. As the Damani Beach Project created divisions even among
those Ngobe leaders loyal to the PRD, this dreadful precedent sent
warning signs that indigenous collective lands were not safe even
within the limits of the comarcas.
70
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Epilogue
In November 2007, seven Naso protestors were
detained in the Teribe River as they blockaded the advance
of the machinery of the Empresas Publicas de Medellin
(EEPPM). The Company had obtained financing for the
continuation of the Bonyic hydroelectric project, yet the
Naso continued defending their de facto regime of political
autonomy. In February 2008, seven other people were
taken to jail for the same reason, and between April and
September, there were several violent confrontations between the followers of Tito Santana and Valentin Santana
over the continuation of the Bonyic Project.
In December 2007, hundreds of Ngobe protestors
occupied the property that had belonged to the Ngobe widow Isabel Becker to stall the continuation of the Chan 75
hydroelectric project. On January 3, they were violently
repressed by the National Police that persecuted protest
organizers into the neighboring communities and in the
mountains of the La Amistad Biosphere Reserve. After
that date, the Chan 75 area has been permanently occupied
by the Police, controlling access to the communities and
escorting AES machinery to work on any Ngobe family
property, even against the will of the rightful owners of that
land. On March 7, 2008, Alianza para la Conservacion y el
Desarrollo (ACD) and Cultural Survival presented a petition to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission
(IAHRC) for the protection of the human rights of the
Ngobe population of the Changuinola River. As this paper
was finished, AES continued building the hydroelectric
project a few meters away and against the opposition of the
Ngobe residents of Charco de La Pava. When an AES
employee asked Ana Castillo, the only daughter of Isabel
Becker to have remained in the community, to leave her
house, she said that "she did not want money, but to live in
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her land, that her grandparents had lived in these lands, that
she will7 never go and that she will always protect her
house." 1

71

Declarations of Ana Castillo taken by human rights lawyer Karine

Rinaldi between September 27-28, 2008.
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STUDENT ESSAY

OUT WITH THE OLD IN WITH THE NEW: HOUSING ISSUES
FOR THE MIDDLE-CLASS IN PANAMA CITY, PANAMA

Eric J. D. Rogers*
Introduction
Panama City is currently experiencing unprecedented growth in all sectors of its economy.' An abundance
of foreign investment, coupled with a stable socio-political
environment, and several large infrastructure investments
by the Panamanian government, created a boom of economic expansion in Panama's capital city. 2 This recent
surge in enterprise has led to several societal benefits, including growth in the middle-class and an influx in employment. 3 However, as with most economic upheavals,
this recent surge is not without negative repercussions. In
the twentieth century, housing shortages plagued Panama.
Exacerbated by the current economic trend, these housing
shortages are likely to continue into the twenty-first century.

* Study Space Fellow, Center for the Comparative Study of Metropolitan Growth at Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to
thank the Center for its fellowship, which enabled me to attend the
Panama Study Space.
1 CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, PANAMA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/pm.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
2 Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, Panama'sExploding Economy Attracts
Investors (NPR radio broadcast, July 21, 2007) availableat
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storylD=1 2043743.
3See infra text accompanying note 23.
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Despite the fact that many prosperous societies have
large and stable middle-classes, 4 the middle-class is often a
forgotten segment in an economic analysis.
Despite this growth, one of the biggest problems,
facing even middle-class Panamanians, is the inability to
maintain adequate housing. This inability to maintain adequate housing leads to increased costs of living, not only
from the higher costs of attaining needed resources, but
also due to the necessity of renting. These extra costs prevent the middle-class from obtaining valuable assets, both
material and financial. 5 The inability to procure assets
thwarts the middle-classes ability to obtaining capital,
which6 is the key to upward mobility in a capitalist economy.

Housing shortages are not merely a lower-class
problem in Panama. 7 With the influx of hundreds of construction projects, as well as foreign residents from the
United States, Canada, Europe and elsewhere, there simply
is not enough affordable housing for working middle-class

Panamanians. The average income in Panama in 2006 was
$4,890. 8 As a result, middle-class Panamanians are forced
outside of Panama City into growing developments of
charmless, simple houses doting the outskirts of the city.
As Panama's expansion continues, even these housing
options dwindle. The only alternatives left are to join the

4 Andres Solimano, Asset Accumulation by the Middle-class and the
Poor in Latin America: PoliticalEconomy and Governance Dimensions 8 (Macroeconomia del Desarrollo Series No. 55, 2007).
5
1d. at 13.
6 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 49, 51 (2000).

7Tiffany Williams, The Ties that Bind: Capitalizingon the Existing
Social Fabricin Public Housing to Revitalize Neighborhoodsand
Avoid Displacement in PanamaCity, Panama.
8 Panama Data Profile,
http://devdata.wordbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CC
ODE=PAN (select "Panama" from dropdown list).
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informal housing sector by constructing
a home even fur9
ther outside the city or to rent.
To some, housing is merely a shelter, but to others,
housing is more than that.'0 Housing affects a society in
many different ways: from the economy, to the social
fabric of society, to the political stability of a country,11
housing has a wide net of impact. This impact comes from
housings influence on everything, from social cohesion
and
12
wealth.
and
employment,
valuation,
asset
to
stability,
The lack of adequate title to property, for example,
is a problem for those who choose to build their own
homes. 13 Without a stake in the property, a homeowner's
ability to use his or her house as an asset is hindered, causing this investment to become nothing more than a temporary shelter. Renters face similar problems. Because the
percentage of their income spent on housing increases,
renters see little to no return on their investment. These
effects of Panama's housing shortage prevent the middleclass from translating wages into investments. During times
of prosperity renters remain stagnant, and during times of
economic hardship they decline as they have no economic
foothold other than wages. 14 Property is a form of physical
capital which can play multiple roles.' 5 Property can be
9 Presentation by Manuel Trute, Urban planner, Panama City (Dec. 14,
2007) (notes on file with the author).
' 0Kenro Dowers & Pietro Masci, REFORMING LATIN AMERICAN HoUSING MARKETS: A GUIDE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 1 (Inter-American
Development Bank, 2003) available at
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=419948.

"Id. atv.
Id. at 1.

12

13

Shlomo Angel, The Housing Policy Assessment and Its Application

to Panama, 10 J. HOUSING ECON. 176, 186 (2001).
14 DE SOTO, supra note 6 at 49.
15 Orazio Attanasio & Miguel Sz6kely, An Asset-Based Approach to the

Analysis of Poverty in Latin America 8 (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working

Paper No. R-376, 1999), available at
http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubr-37

6

.pdf.
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used "to buffer temporary shocks, [produce] income, and
such as fican be accumulated for long-term objectives
16
nancing consumption after retirement."
Another consequence of the location of these houses is that more money is required to get to and from work
and obtain basic goods and services. For example, in 2000,
the average commute in Panama City was sixty minutes.
This figure will likely increase as more and more people
continue to move to the city. 17 Additionally, living inside
the city leaves the middle-class with less money to spend
on education, quality of life purchases, and housing improvements. The increased cost of living associated with
housing, along with the inability of many middle-class
citizens to turn wages into investments, stifles upward
mobility and exacerbates the wealth disparity in Panama.
Not only does increased wealth disparity hurt the
middle-class, but it can also lead to an unstable political
system. 18 The lack of socio-political mechanisms to provide for asset accumulation and upward mobility is destabilizing. 19 A population which sees possibility in a capitalist
economy is less prone to support destabilizing policies such
as populist or authoritarian regimes. On the other hand,
proper mechanisms which ensure a more equal distribution
21
of asset ownership lead to a safer, more stable country.
This paper will address the current housing issues
facing the middle-class living in Panama City and the socio-political implications. Although Panama City currently
faces serious housing issues, especially with respect to
working and lower income classes,22 this paper will focus
16

1d.
Angel, supra note 13, at 194.
Solimano, supra note 4.

'7

19Id.
20

1d. at 13.
id.

21

22Williams, supra note 7.
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on those in the middle-class who usually receive less direct
assistance from the government.
Part I analyzes Panama's current economic expansion and the factors driving it. Part II addresses the laws
and programs enacted by the Panamanian government
which encourage and regulate economic development.
Zoning laws, tax incentives, and current government programs aiding the middle-class in obtaining housing will
also be explored. Part III focuses on the social and political
implications that these laws and economic development
have on the middle-class. Part IV explores alternatives and
amendments to the current legal framework which could
balance Panama's economic development with its need to
provide adequate housing to the middle-class.
I.

Current Economic

In 2006, Panama's economy grew 8.1%, and is estimated to have grown 7.8% in 2007." This recent economic growth sparked a real estate boom in Panama City,
causing the skyline to give birth to dozens of new skyscrapers. 24 The amount of construction taking place in
Panama City is astronomical given the city's population is
a mere .5 million. This construction benefits Panama because it creates jobs and brings in foreign money which
stimulates the economy. 25 In fact, in 2007, Panama boasted
a 7.2% unemployment rate. This rate is a far lower than the
13% unemployment rate which existed for much of the
1990's and early 2000's.26 The newer unemployment rate
indicates a promising economic stimulus which could help
23
24

CIA FACTBOOK, supra note 1.
Richard Lapper & Adam Thompson, Gates Unlocked to Surprise

Prosperity,FIN. TIMES, July 24, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0 1/40406796-391 f-lldc-ab48-000779fd2ac,
dwp-uuid=8ad4e3ee-3920-11dc.
25

id.

26

CIA FACTBOOK, supra note 1.

364

4:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 512

move Panama towards greater wealth equality. A necessary
ingredient to expedite this equilibrium
will be the place27
ment of the proper mechanisms.
There are several factors driving the new wave of
construction, the influx of capital, and the economic growth
in the city formally quiet Latin American capital. The Panama Canal ("Canal") is one of the main catalysts for this
explosion. 28 In 1999, the United States ceded total control
of both the Canal and the entirety of the land making up the
Canal Zone. 29 Further, Panama now receives all of the fees,
tolls, and other revenue generated from the thousands of
ships that float through the Canal annually. 30 In fact, this
revenue makes up 14% of Panama's GDP. 3 1 With this increased revenue, Panama was able to invest more in its
infrastructure and modernization programs. 32 Additionally,
the land acquired in the former Canal Zone gave Panama an
opportunity to develop other businesses related to shipping,
ranging from shipyards to suppliers of provisions and bun33

ker fuels.

In addition to Canal ownership, the increasing size
of the waterway itself is helping to spur economic growth.
In 2006, the Panamanian people voted to increase the size
of the locks. 34 When the construction is complete, the Canal will be equipped to handle not only twice as much traffic within the thoroughfare, but an increased capacity for
larger ships. The Canal, for the first time, will accept PostDowers & Masci, supra note 10, at 2.
2' Adam Thompson, PanamaExudes Pride as
Widening of Canal
Begins, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2007, at 1.
29Brad Reagan, The PanamaCanal's Ultimate
Upgrade, POPULAR
MECHANICS, Feb. 2007, available at
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/transportation/4212183.
html?page=l.
30
27

d.

31 Id.
32

Lapper & Thompson, supra note 24.

33 Id.

34

Thompson, supra note 28.
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Panamax ships, which represent about 37% of the world's
container ships. 35 The expansion is designed to assure investors that the economy will continue to grow in the coming years and that the Canal will remain a relevant trade
route in the 21st century. 36 By investing in such large infrastructure projects, the Panamanians are encouraging foreign
companies to risk millions of dollars in developing the
country.37 These investment firms include United Kingdom-based London & Regional. Recently awarded a contract that could be worth up to $10 billion dollars, the firm
plans to create an urban city center on what used to be the
38
Howard US Air Force base.
The second major catalyst driving Panama's economic growth is the rapid growth of real estate construction, the majority of which is in high-rise condominiums.
Much of this housing development is aimed at "baby boomer" retirees and second home buyers from the US, Canada, and Europe. 3 9 Almost thirty thousand condos went on
the market between July 2006 and July 2007, totaling about
$5.7 billion in sales. 40 As of July 2007, there were 175
projects under construction and 120 more that have been
approved by the government, but have yet to begin construction.41 Of these current projects 11,000 more condos
were expected to go online in the second half of 2007. 42
35 Reagan, supra note 29.
36 id.

37 Richard Lapper & Adam Thompson, PanamaBuilds on Economic
Boom, FIN. TIMES, July 11, 2007, availableat
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/7834d0e4-2fd6-1 ldo-a68f-000077fd2ac,dap-

uid=.
38 id.
39 Lapper & Thompson, supra note 24.
40 Eliza Barclay, Latin America's Real EstatePanamania,FORTUNE,
July 5, 2007, availableat
09
/1
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortnme/fortunearchive/2007/07/
00122336.
41 id.
42 Id.
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The political and social stability of Panama is also
one of the driving factors for the large immigration of people and finance. According to the World Bank report on
government stability, Panama has remained very constant
in all six areas that are computed to determine a country's43
constancy over the past ten years. Those areas are voice
and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of
law, and control of corruption.4 4 In fact, based on this stability, a large number of the upper and middle-class from
Venezuela and Columbia have migrated into Panama City.
Searching for less restrictive government policies, increased investment opportunities, and an escape from the
possibility of threat of violence and social unrest, oftentimes these expatriates are finding the answer
on the shores
45
of Panama rather than their native countries.
The preceding factors constitute the main catalysts
for the sudden growth of Panama's economy. Foreign investors see a great deal of potential in Panama City as both
a hub of shipping and industry, as well as a retirement mecca for North Americans and Europeans.46 The Panamanian
government enacted focused legislation to regulate the
current growth and to alleviate the burden being placed on
the middle-class. 47 The current mechanisms that are in
effect in Panama will be discussed in the following section. 48

43

CountryData Reportfor Panama,1996-2006, World Bank Institute,

2006, availableat
http://info.worldbankorg/governance/wgi200 7/pdf/c 171.pdf (voice has
to do with the freedom of press).
44 Id.
45

Id.

46

Garcia-Navarro, supra note 2.

41 See infra Part II.
48 id.
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The Legal Framework
a. La Hipotecaria

One program that the Panamanian government
enacted to deal with the housing issue is called La Hipotecaria.49 La Hipotecaria is a non-bank institution in Panama
that is designed to provide middle income people with
loans for residences. The Government gives a tax credit at
the end of the year to compensate home buyers for the
difference between the preferential rates and the actual
market rates. In doing so, the La Hipotecaria allows a portion of the population to afford housing that would otherwise not. One problem with this initiative is that it only
addresses the demand side of the market. The middle-class
are able to afford the housing, but it is either non-existent
or is way outside of the city center. 50 The average income
of those that borrow money from La Hipotecaria have a
monthly income between $400-$800. The average loan size
that is given is around $23,000, and roughly 500 are given5 1
every month. This equates to 6,000 loans every year.
Further, the program is only open to those that are salaried
employees, 52 excluding non-salaried employees, small
business owners, and those working in the informal sector. 53 Furthermore, these preferential loans are only available for new housing, and not for the resale of old
housing. 54 This distorts the resale value of middle-class

49

La Hipotecaria is Spanish for "The MortgageStore." See La Hipotecaria,
www.lahipotecaria.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
50

id.

51 La Hipotecaria, Company Profile,

http://www.lahipotecaria.com/english/generales-empresa.htm (last
visited Mar. 26, 2008).
52 Angel, supra note 13, at 197.
53 id.
54 id.
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housing,
as it limits the number of people who can afford to
55
it.
buy
The La Hipotecaria program is innovative and has
opened up credit to a segment of the population that would
otherwise be unable to afford a house. It is not, however,
completely flawless. 56 Certainly, the program must exclude
some who cannot prove their creditworthiness, otherwise it
would go bankrupt. The problem is with the manner in
which they determine credit. Many people who could make
the payments are excluded because of the manner in which
they make their money. 7 There need to be other methods
of proving credit than just showing proof that an individual
has a salaried job.58 Creating a mechanism that will allow
non-salaried persons to obtain preferential loans will help
ensure that certain segments of the population are not arbitrarily excluded. The goal of housing mechanisms should
be to include as many people as possible without jeopardizing the program. Including those that can prove their credit,
even if they do not have a traditional salary, will be a step
in that direction. One such option that will open up the
program is to allow for a rental trial period to establish
credit.59
b. Zoning Laws
Panama City's main tool for controlling development is density restrictions. The law stipulates that only a
certain amount of "dwellings" are to be built on a specific
tract of land.60 The density zoning restrictions were enacted
55 d.
56

id.
57 id.
58

Id. at 201.

See infra note 150.
"Por la cual se crea la corporacion Azucarera La Victotoria," Ley
No. 9. de 25 de enero de 1973; Gaceta Oficial No. 17.276 (viernes 2 de
febrerio de 1973).
59

60
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in 1973, and they have not been updated to reflect the
changing development in the city. 6 1 There are no current
height restrictions in Panama City, except for the historical
colonial center, Casco Antigua. 62 This has created high rise
buildings that are fifty stories tall, but only have two dwellings per floor.63 As a result, Panama's population density in
2000 was only 5,835 people per square kilometer. 64 This is
about 500 less than the ordinary lower-middle-income
country and about 800 less than the ordinary upper-middleincome country. 65 When comparing Panama City to other
cities around the world, Panama City is not maximizing the
potential of its urban land.6 6 Therefore, Panama needs to
update a zoning plan that is over thirty years old to effectively concentrate the growing population in the city.
The drawback to light density zoning is that it
makes building middle-class housing in the city economically disadvantageous. If a developer is limited in the
amount of units he or she can put on a tract of land, then
the logical response to ensuring a larger profit is to build
more expensive units. This is not to say that there should
not be certain restrictions on density, but to blanket the
entire city with a very low density restriction is to artificially deflate the housing market. This then causes urban
sprawl. Other cities have dealt with this issue in various
ways. 67 Mechanisms exist that can maintain sustainable
61 id.
62

Indira Lakshmanan, In Panama City's Old Quarter,a Rebirth Takes

Place, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 22, 2007, availableat
http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2007/01 /22/in_panama_cit
ys _oldquarter a rebirthtakesplace.
63 Kevin Brass, Developers Press Ahead in PanamaCity, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 31, 2008, availableat
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/01/30/properties/repan.php.
64 Angel, supra note 13, at 194.
65 id.
66 Id.
67 See

infra Section IV.
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growth in a city center, while at the same time ensuring that

ample housing exists for middle income dwellers. 6s Some
of these options include inclusionary zoning and infill
with effective investment in the city infrahousing coupled
69
structure.
c. Tax Incentives
Another mechanism used by the government to
stimulate and control growth is tax incentives. One such
law gave complete property tax relief to any housing valued at $30,000 or less and completed by August of 2005.70
The law also dictates that if the property is worth more than
$30,000, then taxes must only be paid on the amount greater than $30,000.71
The legislature decided to make this incentive permanent and expanded it to include all property. The current
property tax structure in Panama exempts the first $30,000
of value in the property from any property tax.72 The rate of
tax on the property then increases as the value of the property increases. This property tax structure does not directly
encourage the new construction of middle-class housing. If
the exemption were given only to property under $30,000,
then there would be an incentive to keep the property at a
lower cost.
The programs and incentives created by the Panamanian government are far from what is necessary to maintain a stable balance in the real estate market. The main
68 id.
69 id.

Property Tax Exonerations/Incentives for New Construction,
http://www.panamarealtor.com/real-estate-law-incentives/taxexonerations (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
70

71 id.
72 Panama

Tax Code, art. 764, availableat
http://www.panamarealtor.com/real-estate-law-incentives/panama-real_
estate-taxes.
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focus of the actions taken are to help the middle-class obtain financing or to ease the burden of taxes once they purchase the property. There are, however, no substantial
programs that stimulate the construction of middle-class
housing, especially in areas close to job centers and transit
routes. The lack of housing on the market has created many
difficulties for the middle-class, and it will continue to
exacerbate the wealth disparity that already exists in Panama. 73 The following section will address the implications
shortage has on the average middle income
that the housing
74
Panamanian.
III.

Socio-Economic Implications

The impact of the current housing shortage is much
more than a momentary setback for the middle-class. The
implications of a continued disenfranchisement of the middle-class to the outskirts of the city and a continued inability to find adequate housing could lead to much greater
social and political problems for Panama.75 In a capitalist
society, a house represents more than a dwelling or a shelter for a family. A house is an asset that can allow a person
to build capital and develop credit in order to procure other
assets.76
Asset building is an integral part of upward mobility
in an economy. 77 One of the key factors to building a
stronger middle-class is providing better access to housing,
78
which is one of the main assets a population accumulates.
73 Solimano, supra note 4, at 13.
74 See infra Section V.
75 Solimano, supra note 4, at 5 (explaining that when middle and lower

income classes of people are unable to obtain assets they have no
upward mobility, and without upward mobility, democracy is much
harder
to maintain).
76
DE SOTO,

supra note 6, at 51.

77 Solimano, supra note 4, at 15.
78

id.
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Hindering an individual's ability to obtain housing thwarts
the main avenue to upward mobility. When that happens,
the gap between the wealthy and the poor will increase, and
a greater squeeze will be put on the middle-class. Economic
inequality already plagues Panama, and according to the
Gini index, an indicator of income inequality, Panama is
the fourteenth worst country for wealth disparity in its
citizenry. 79 If this problem is exacerbated because of unsatisfactory housing policies, then political turmoil could
follow. When populations have no possibility of a better
future, they are more likely to favor more radical regimes,
80
and when that happens, foreign investment ceases to flow.
The housing problems for the middle-class hinder
the ability to acquire assets in two ways. First and foremost,
the shortage of affordable housing in the city for the middle-class eliminates the possibility of a segment of the
middle-class to acquire the most common asset.81 A survey
taken in 1995 of middle-class housing showed that 35% of
82
the middle-class in Panama City were not homeowners.
This segment of the population will remain economically
stagnant during economic booms because they are unable
to translate wages into an investment. During economic
downturns this group will decline in the social ladder because of the inability to acquire any lasting asset.
The income this group earns is spent on rent, which
supplies a present need but offers no long-term benefit. As
long as economic times are stable in Panama, this segment
will not suffer. The problems arise when wages and jobs
are cut due to an economic downturn. In the event of recession, renters will be one of the most vulnerable groups of
people because they have no savings or assets to rely on in
79 CIA FACTBOOK, supra note 1.
80 Solimano, supra note 4, at 16.

1Id. at 15.

82 HAROLD KATSURA & CLARE ROMANICK, HOUSING DEMAND AMONG
PANAMA'S MIDDLE- AND LOW-INCOME POPULATION 3-4 (1996).
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this situation. 83 If the middle-class had adequate access to
housing, the wealth disparity would shrink, and the middle84
class would be more stable during economic downturns.
The second problem is that the housing that exists
or is being built for the middle-class does not allow for
further asset accumulation or savings accumulation. This
85
situation will exacerbate the wealth disparity in Panama.
The current trend in housing development for the middleclass is to build rows of identical houses on the outskirts of
the city. These houses are usually sold for around $20,000
but lack access to any of the essentials necessary for sustainable living, such as schools, health care, grocery stores,
or jobs.8 6 They are placed there for one reason only: to
provide shelter to the middle-class. Most everything the
middle class needs is in the center of the city. 87 Even
though this group can afford the houses, the added costs to
basic necessities make it more difficult for income to be
saved or invested in other assets. An example of the added
costs a person living in these dwellings incurs is the comthe only public transportation that
mute to work. Buses are
88
exists in Panama City.
Aside from the fare for each destination, a rider
must consider the cost of the time commuting, which can
exceed two hours each way. 89 The only alternative to commuting via bus is to own a car or take a taxi. 90 When taking
a car from these neighborhoods, the commute is usually an
hour each way in gridlocked traffic. 91 Thus, a person living
83

Solimano, supra note 4, at 8.

84 id.
85

Solimano, supra note 4, at 5.

86 Trute,

supra note 9.

87

Id.

88

id.
Jason Margolis, PartII. DevelopingPanama City, THE WORLD, May

89

22, 2007, availableat http://www.theworld.org/?q=node/1025 2 .
90 Id.
91Id.
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in the outskirts may own a house, but getting to the city for
basic necessities or work requires a car, gas, maintenance,
and other expenses that go along with long commutes to
work. These added expenses eliminate a person's ability to
save money and to acquire assets, such as better housing or
improvements on the housing they already own. The added
costs of living outside of the city center restrict the mobility, both physically and economically, of the citizenry.
IV.

Alternative Regulatory Mechanisms

There are many regulatory or legal options that the
Panamanian government can choose to employ in an effort
to deal with the current housing situation in the capital
city.92 This section will address some of the overarching
policies and laws that need to change, in order to effectuate
a better balance between the current economic growth and
the need for adequate housing for the middle-class.
In regards to housing, a major problem that arises in
many urban areas is the scarcity of land. Panama City is no

different. The government has not aided in this problem by
its policies either. Currently, zoning regulations are artificially depreciating the amount of possible dwellings in the
city. 93 Because Panama City places restrictions on the
amount of dwellings that may be placed on a certain hectare, the total possible amount of dwellings is minimized.
This not only limits the amount of people who can move to
the city, but it also raises the price of the existing dwellings. 94 Panama must first alter its density zoning laws to
afford the possibility of more middle-class housing in the
city. As mentioned, the middle-class has a dire need to be
Dowers & Masci, supra note 10, at 12.
93 Supra note 59.
94 John J. Delaney, How We Got into a Workforce Housing Crisis:And
Why Getting out of It Will Not Be Easy, LAND USE INST. (ALI-ABA
COURSE STUDY MATERIALS) 5 (2006).
92
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closer to necessary resources and work. 9 5 One of the reasons why there are density restrictions in place is because
there is a limited ability of the current infrastructure to
handle more people. Infrastructure development is an important part of developing housing for a wide array of the
population. The following zoning changes will not be possible if the proper infrastructure is not in place. Solutions
for improving the infrastructure
in the city will be dis96
section.
this
in
later
cussed
A zoning tool that has been implemented in various
urban areas to directly deal with the problem of middleclass housing shortages in the United States is inclusionary
zoning. 97 The main function of inclusionary zoning is to lift
certain density restrictions on a development, but in return,
the developer must make a certain number of the units
affordably priced for the middle-class. This ensures that
98
only those in the middle-class are purchasing these units.
This type of zoning is in place in states as different from
one another as, for example, California and Maryland. 99
This housing is usually set aside for those households that
make between 80% and 120% of the average income. 100 In
order to offset the added cost to developers, the government
can give density bonuses or tax incentives. The goal is to
mix the levels of income in a specific area and allow the
middle-class
easy access to job markets and transportation
10 1
hubs.
Another development technique that is being utilized in markets with housing crises is infill housing. Infill
housing is a technique of ensuring that land in an urban

95

Id. at 7.
See infra notes 113-33.
97 Delaney, supra note 94, at 8.
98
1d. at9.
96

99 Id.

100 Id.
101 Id.
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10 2
setting is being fully utilized to its maximum potential.
The purpose of infill housing is to create denser housing in
areas that are not being properly utilized. It can involve the
creation or modification of condos, apartments, townhouses, or single family homes. The purpose of the development is to place more dwellings in areas that can sustain
them. 10 3 Usually such housing redevelopment is done near
existing or planned transit routes, job centers, or within
walking distance of amenities and services. 10 4 The placement of these dense centers of housing is important because
if they are near these public amenities, they allow middle
and low income households to reap the benefits of their
location. 10 5 It will also require specific funding for the
improvement of the infrastructure
in that area to deal with
106
population.
increased
the
Infill housing does not come without its own problems and obstacles. Because it entails developing denser
housing in already established areas of a city, city officials
will often face a backlash from those already living in the
area. 10 7 This problem is to be expected, as bringing denser
housing can cause many more difficulties for the preexisting communities, such as higher congestion and greater pressure on the existing infrastructure a °8 Depending on
the political structure for zoning decisions, legislative
amendments to the city's general plan and zoning regulations may be required in order for an infill development to
be built.10 9

102 Jonathan C. Curtis & Mary C. Klima, DepartmentPracticeTips:

The Challenges ofInfill Housing,27 Los ANGELES LAW 12 (2005).
103Id.
14

Id. at 2.

105 Id.

106See

infra notes 113-33.

107 Curtis, supra note 102, at 3.
0

18I .
109Id.
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Since there can be a wide array of problems to acquiring infill housing approval and development, the initial
time and capital investment into these types of projects is
essential. A team of professionals that are not only knowledgeable about infill developments but are also familiar
with the city, its infrastructure, and government is essential
to getting an infill project started and ensuring that it is in
the proper area of a city." 1° Infill housing should be left to
the private sector to build, but there are several legal mechanisms the government can use to encourage this type of
efficient development. Examples of policies that have been
used are lower impact fees if a developer upgrades infrastructure, a smoother and faster process of permit acquisition, lessening of zoning restrictions, or tax break
incentives.1 1 Flexible land use policies and building restrictions can improve the private provision of serviced
land and houses, which makes them available to households across the wealth spectrum.1 12 Infill housing is an
individualized process of urban development, so each project may require different incentives and may encounter
various problems. Knowledgeable professionals and a thorough understanding of the city are essential to effective
infill projects."13
In order to facilitate these types of specific zoning
development, the city also needs to invest in the infrastructure of these areas.1 14 The term infrastructure refers to a
wide variety of things •such as water supply,• sewage
•
115 sysIt is
tems, traffic lights, green space and road conditions.
if
date
up
to
be
infrastructure
area's
necessary that a given

110

Id.
111 Id. at 2.
112 Dowers, supra note 10, at 81.
113 Curtis, supra note 102, at 4.
114 Angel, supra note 13, at 205.
115 Catherine MVichel, Brother, Can You Spare a Dime: Tax Increment
Financingin Indiana, 71 IND. L.J. 457, 458 (1996).
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more people are going to live in that area.11 6 In order to
develop infrastructure, many urban areas across the United
States utilize a funding tool known as tax increment financing (TIF).
A TIF finances redevelopment and community
improvement in a specific area of a city. In the area set
apart for the TIF, the property taxes are frozen at a particular level.1 17 Once the level of property taxes has been frozen, all of the revenue generated by the property taxes will
go into a fund for the redevelopment of that area. 118 The
projected increase in tax revenue that will occur because of
the redevelopment is then calculated. 119 From that projected amount, bonds are issued by the government and
placed in a special account that can only be used to fund
projects in that area. 120 As the tax revenue is generated
over the years, the bonds are paid back by the increases in
the tax revenue. 121 The tax revenue raised will be used to
combat the issues that normally arise in densely populated
areas. 122 TIF funds are commonly used to build and maintain roads. Traffic is a constant problem in Panama City,
which is evidenced by the long commute times of workers
in the city.123 TIF funds would need to be used to create
new roads, improve existing ones, and install traffic lights.
The Panamanian General Assembly would have to pass a
law that would allow the Ministry of Housing to issue
bonds for these particular projects.

116 Angel, supra note 13, at 205.

117
Neighborhood Capital Budget Group, How Do TIF's Work?, available at http://www.ncbg.org/tifs/tifhow.htm (last visited April 8,
2008).
118

Id.

119 Michel supra note 115, at 458.

120oId.

121Id.
122 /d.

123See supra note 91.
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The key to TIF is that the tax revenue generated
from a specific area can only be used for improvements in
that area. By allowing a city to target areas for growth, it
gives it more control over urban planning. 124 Along with
the previously mentioned zoning tools, the city could adequately control the amount and placement of middle-class
housing. Panama City could create a TIF to both redevelop
an underused part of the city, and to ensure that an adequate
amount of middle-class housing is available. In order to
accomplish this, the city could use inclusionary zoning to
make sure developers put up more than just high-end units.
Another area of city infrastructure that needs to be
addressed is public transportation. 125 Without some system
of public transportation the city cannot sustain a large migration of people into the city center. 126 The city already
has a plan in place for public transit, but the national government has stalled the project. 127 Their plan is to mimic
the system of long, accordion-style buses with dedicated
lanes that has proven effective in Curitiba, Brazil. 128 The
29
buses would essentially act as an aboveground subway.'
The bus stops would be glass tubes that more closely resemble train stops than bus stations. 130 The Curitiba system
is able to carry about the same amount of passengers as a
subway would, and it cost 100 times less.' 3 1 This system
needs to be a top priority if the city wants to continue to
grow in an efficient manner. The areas around the bus "sta124 id.

125

Ren6 Paniza, City Planner, Presentation in Panama City (Dec. 11,

1999) (notes on file with author).
126 id.

127Id.
128 id.
12 9

Id.

130 id.
131

Arthur Lubow, The Road to Curitiba,N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2007,

available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/O5/20/magazine/2OCUrifibat.html?pagewanted=l &r2&th&emcith (last visited April 8, 2008).
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tions" would be ideal areas to implement some of the zoning mechanisms discussed earlier. They would be close to
transit centers which would make the daily commute for
middle-class citizens more affordable.
None of these proposed solutions alone can solve
the housing problems in Panama City. Rather, it will take
the implementation of all of the aforementioned mechanisms to achieve a better situated and housed middle-class.
Without ensuring that the infrastructure in a newly rezoned
area is adequate to support the increased density, the problems will only be exacerbated. If the water system, for
example, cannot support the increased population then the
idea of making resources more available to the middle-class
by moving them into the city becomes a futile objective.
Also, if roads and public transportation are not improved,
then commutes to work will not decrease even though the
people live closer to their employment. If, however, the
government works to balance the current high-end housing
growth in the city center with an adequate amount of middle-class housing and proper infrastructure, there can be an
alleviation of the current housing problems.
Outside of getting more middle-class housing in the
city center, the government can also help the middle-class
by improving their current housing situation. A large percentage of middle-class households choose to incrementally
132
build their own houses, as opposed to purchasing them.
In 1996, 70% of the middle to lower-middle income home
owners built their houses. 133 One way the government
could facilitate this type of construction is through the use
of microfinancing. 134 Microfinancing for housing entails
small loans, usually between $250 to $5,000, and a rela35
tively short amortization period, between 2 to 10 years.'
132Katsura, supra note 82, at 17.
133
Id.
134
Dowers, supra note 10, at 73.
135
Id.at 77.
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These smaller loans can be used to either improve one's
house or to expand it.' 36 The obstacle to establishing a
microfinancing market in a developing country is that these
types of loans are often not profitable for banks. 137 These
small loans require high transaction and monitoring costs
and low repayment rates. 13 8 Because of these economic
hurdles, the market, on its own, will often not supply these
39
types of loans even though the demand exists for them.'
Microfinancing is an example of how innovative
governmental policies can encourage the marketplace to
perform differently than it would under normal conditions.1 40 The Panamanian government could enact a program that would guarantee these microloans for private
banks, thus taking the risk factor out of the equation for the
banks. 14 1 Another alternative would be for the government
142
itself to create a program that gave out these loans.
However, many housing economists believe that government policies work best when they enable the marketplace
as opposed to becoming a market player. 143 Encouraging
and incentivizing nongovernmental organizations to offer
microloans is also a very effective way to fill this gap in the
market. 144 An example of a microfinance bank that has
flourished is the Grameen Bank. 145 This bank gives out
small loans to impoverished individuals in Bangladesh to
allow them to start businesses and obtain housing. 141 It has
allowed individuals unable to enter the normal credit and
136 id.

137 PATRICE FRANKO, THE PUZZLE OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT,
13
8

id.
139
id.
140

407 (2007).

See Dowers, supra note 10, at 78.

141 Id.
142 Angel,
143 id.

supra note 13, at 202.

145

See Dowers, supra note 10, at 78.
Grameen Bank, http://www.grameen-info.org/bank.

146

id.

144
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loan sector to develop assets. 147 A similar microfinance
program in Panama could offer the same benefits to some
sectors of the middle-class. The Grameen Bank is a private
entity, so the Panamanian government would need to create
incentives
to encourage the development of such a pro148
gram.
In order to encourage private organizations to offer
microloans for home improvements, the government could
institute a program similar to La Hipotecaria, but for microloans. Often, the rates offered for smaller loans are
higher as a result of the added costs of this type of financing for banks. 149 If the government were to subsidize the
rates they would become more affordable to a wider base
and would lower the cost for housing improvements by
those participating in the program. 150 This program should
not be open to a group as large as La Hipotecaria. The
majority of those that incrementally build their houses are
in the lower part of the middle-class. Thus, limiting the
section of the population that may take advantage of the
program would ensure that the funds invested are reaching
those that most need the assistance, the lower strata of the
middle-class.
Finally, the government needs to expand its subsidized loans to include households made up of non-salaried
workers. 151
One option would be to develop hirepurchasing housing. Families that did not meet the criteria
for preferential housing loans could rent a house for several
years to prove their creditworthiness, and then purchase
it.152 The government would not have to manage this pro147 id.
48

1

id.

149See

Alfredo Stein and Luis Castillo, Innovative Financingfor LowIncome HousingImprovement: Lessons from Programmesin Central
America, 17 Environment and Urbanization 47, 52 (2005).
150 Id. at 56.
152 Angel, supra note 13, at 201.
52 Id.
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gram, but it could give preferential rates to developers on
their loans during the period in which they hold and rent
the asset. 153 By offering lower rates on loans to developers
during the rental period, the developers are more likely to
go along with these programs. It does not affect their profit
margin as much to keep properties for longer periods of
time because they
have to pay less in interest on their out1 54
standing loans.
V.

Conclusion

Housing in today's economies is more than just a
place to rest one's head. It is a stepping stone to greater
wealth and upward mobility. 155 A house is one of the more
common assets people acquire. 156 It can be used as collateral to allow the owner to invest in other markets, and it
can also give financial security during economic downturns. 157 If a country impedes the middle-class's ability to
obtain adequate housing it is stifles their economic
future,
158
poor.
and
rich
between
gap
the
and exacerbates
The current housing policy framework in Panama
does not adequately protect and encourage the middle-class
during this current economic boom. 159 The current financing programs, such as La Hipotecaria, extend housing credit to some of the middle-class who would otherwise be
unable to obtain a mortgage, but they also exclude a large
cross-section of the middle-class at the same time. 160 The
zoning laws of Panama City are not flexible enough to

153 Id.

at 202.

154 id.
156

Dowers, supra note 10, at 1.
Solimano, supra note 4, at 16.

157

Id. at 16.

155

158 id.

159 See supra Part I.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
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allow for efficient use of urban land. 161 As a result of the
density restrictions on development in the city, Panama
City has a lower62population density than the average city of
similar wealth. 1

These shortcomings in Panama City's framework
place a heavy financial toll on the middle-class. Because
the middle-class must put forth a much greater financial
effort to obtain adequate housing, their ability to move up
the economic ladder is diminished. 163 Stagnant economic
mobility in a country can have tumultuous political consequences. 164 As stated earlier, the political stability of Panama is one of the driving forces behind the current
economic boom.1 65 If the widening socioeconomic gap
were to create an unstable political situation, an economic
downturn would likely follow. 166 Therefore, housing policies that enable the middle-class to obtain adequate housing
would benefit the country as a whole, and help ensure that
the current wave of fortune does not subside.
In order to fix the current framework, Panama needs
to look to more progressive methods of urban planning
including inclusionary zoning and infill housing. 167 These
zoning policies will promote a more efficient use of the
land in Panama City.168 Along with more efficient use of
the land, the city needs to invest more in developing the
infrastructure of the city. 69 Without better infrastructure,
the city cannot handle greater population density. 170 As for
financing, the government needs to help develop a strong
161See supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
162 Angel, supra note 13, at 194.
163 Solimano, supra note 4, at
16 4

19.

id.

165See

supra Part I.

166 Solimano, supra note 4, at 18.
167id.
168

id.

169 id.
170

id.
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microfinance market that will enable the middle-class to
build, improve, and enlarge their housing. 17 1 The government also needs to expand the preferential housing loan
program to include the segment of the middle-class made
up of non-salaried workers. 72 A hire-purchasing program
173
would open up the system to this disenfranchised group.
The government needs to ensure that the current prosperity
in Panama does not land in the hands of the few, but rather
greater
facilitates greater equality. With greater equality,
74
stability and economic growth will follow. 1

171Id.
17 2

173

174

id.

See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
Solimano, supra note 4, at 21.
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STUDENT ESSAY

THE TIES THAT BIND: CAPITALIZING ON THE EXISTING
SOCIAL FABRIC IN PUBLIC HOUSING TO REVITALIZE
NEIGHBORHOODS AND AVOID DISPLACEMENT IN PANAMA CITY, PANAMA

Tiffany D. Williams*

Introduction
Governmentally sponsored gentrification,' by way
of the demolition of public housing projects leaves many of
the world's poor out in the cold, with absolutely no opportunity to enjoy the purported benefits of pending development. From Rio de Janeiro, Brazil to Atlanta, Georgia,
neighborhoods established by governments as public housing projects or abandoned as slums have been transformed
into new havens for the affluent, with promises of affordable housing for those displaced ringing hollow in the

* Study Space Fellow, Center for Metropolitan Growth Georgia State
University College of Law. I extend my sincere thanks to the Center for
Comparative Metropolitan Growth at Georgia State University College
of Law for so graciously funding the research for this project through
the Study Space I Fellowship Program. Additionally, I thank Professor
Colin Crawford of the Georgia State University College of Law for his
admirable commitment to encouraging the legal academy to think
critically about the world in which we live.
1The term "gentrification" traditionally refers to the rapid or gradual
influx of affluent residents into traditionally poor neighborhoods. For
the purposes of this paper, I will refer to governmentally funded gentrification, which I use to refer to state action that relocates people already
living on governmental land in purported efforts to revitalize neighborhoods. This is distinguishable from traditional gentrification because
there the government is the primary actor, not private landlords. See
Powell & Spencer, infra note 2, at 435-50.
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background.2 This means that those unfortunate enough to
dwell on government land are fighting a growing battle
against displacement. 3 Moreover, they are fighting to preserve the valuable social fabric of their communities.4
Many champions of gentrification 5 point out that it pours
important economic resources into neighborhoods in disrepair.6 With regard to public housing specifically, proponents of this kind of demolition exploit horrifying crime
statistics and living conditions as evidence of the need for
complete overhauls. Unfortunately, these narrow analyses
fail to appreciate the value of preserving community identity as a tool to facilitate community improvement.
Panama City, Panama is currently undergoing rapid
urban growth.7 New roadway construction, neighborhood
renewal, and luxury high rise residential developments are
springing up all over the city.8 Indeed, the cityscape of
Panama City is beginning to resemble that of cities such as
2 See

generally John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them
the Old "One-Two": Gentrificationand the K.0. of Impoverished
Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 How. L.J. 433 (2003).
3 See Sean Purdy & Nancy H. Kwack, New Perspectives
on Public
Housing in the Americas, JOURNAL OF URBAN HISTORY 357 (2007).
Purdy and Kwack note the long-standing problem of urban housing by
quoting urban reformer Charles Abrams in 1964, Housing progress lags
far behind industrial progress in every part of the world. The technical
genius that broke the secrets of speed, sound, space, and light still
cannot build a house cheap enough for the rank and file... A Negro
laborer's family in New York and a squatter in Caracas may both have
television sets, but neither can afford a decent house. Id. at 357.
4 Powell & Spencer, supra note 2.
5 See generally J. Peter Bryne, Two Cheersfor Gentrification,46 How.
L.J. 405 (2003).
6Id. at 406. See also Eric Rogers, Out with the Old in with
the New:
Housing Issues for the Middle Class in Panama City, Panama.
7See generally Landau, infra note
9.
8 Parte II, Plan de Desarrollo Urbano de las Areas Metropolitanas
del
Pacifico y del Atldntico,
http://www.mivi.gob.pa/urbanismo/4URBANISMO/urbanismo/volume
n2b/puntol4nodall.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
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Miami Beach, Florida. 9 However, some neighborhoods do
not seem poised to benefit from this prosperity. One such
neighborhood is Curundfi, a low-income housing project in
Panama City that seems to be entirely isolated from the
growth so rampant in other areas of the city. l ° Curundfi is a
group of multiple unit, high-rise buildings originally built

as housing projects." Over time, this community has become one of the nine high crime neighborhoods in Panama
City listed by the Overseas Security Advisory Council in its
travel advisory. 12 Extreme poverty, violent crime, and
arson characterize Curundfi in Panamanian media. 13 The
cement structures of Curundfi are so dilapidated that many

9See generally Justin Gould, Trump: PanamaPropertyInvestment

Project, THE PANAMA REPORT, June 5, 2006,
http://www.thepanamareport.com/real-estate-in-panama/trumppanama-property-investment-423.html, Matt Landau, Investing Ahead
of the Growth Curve, PANAMA NEWS, May 6-19, 2008,
http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v 13/issue 09/opinion_01 .html.
10 See generally Entreculturas, Social Crisis in Panama City (June 6,
2007),
http://www.entreculturas.org/noticias/news/socialcrisis-inPanama-ci
ty (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). Entreculturas, a non-profit organization
doing community work in Curundfi, quotes the Social Pastora of the
Maria Reina Parish, [w]hat happens in Curundi and in neighboring
areas, is no accident, it is the consequence of a social exclusion process
which stems from a development vision which places the buildings,
tourist centres, exclusive residential areas and luxury commercial
centres, before the individual. Urban development has forgotten that
development should be for all, with equity, but what we can say of one
of the most unequal countries in the world. Id.
11See generally Entreculturas, supra note 10. Note that Curundil is
named after the Curundi River in Panama and should not be confused
with Curundfi Heights, which is situated in the former Canal Zone and
formerly housed American contractors and their families. Curundfi
Heights is now a middle-class neighborhood situated near a former Air
Force base.
12 See Overseas Security and Advisory Council Global Security News
and Reports, Panama City Crime and Safety Report (2007),
http://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cftn?contentlD=62157.
13 See generally Entreculturas, supra note 10.
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residents have opted to build their own informal residences
on the grounds of the development. Despite this despair,
the people who call Curund-d home have a shared community history and identity.1 4 Should gentrification take place
in Curundfi, as seems likely given its convenient location in
the city center, residents will risk losing this history and
identity which facilitates their way of life. Additionally,
they will find themselves in a disadvantageous bargaining
position because they live on governmentally-owned land
and have few financial resources. This paper will examine
options available to governments to "revitalize" communities like Curundfi without causing extreme social and physical displacement in the face of rapid urban growth.
Part I of this paper will briefly discuss the history
and current state of the Curundfi housing project in Panama
City. Curundf provides an interesting point of reference
where gentrification is concerned because the neighborhood is centrally located in Panama City,1 5 yet neither its
structural landscape nor the characteristics of its inhabitants
appears to be substantially affected by the rapid pace of
development in other parts of the city.' 6 Given the combination of central location, poorly maintained structures,
extreme poverty, and crime, Curund-i is a prime candidate
for Panama's government to use city wide "urbanization"
as an opportunity to demolish Curundfi and build more
attractive and profitable housing for the numbers of people
relocating to the city.
Part II will discuss models of governmentally sanctioned gentrification in two communities that share some
14

/d. This is not to suggest that the people of Curundfi have one ho-

mogenous identity; rather, they are neighbors sharing a common struggle to preserve their livelihoods. Recently, for example, many have
joined organizations to tackle gang violence and arson in their communities.
'5Curundhi is situated in the Northwest end of the city near the Panama
International Airport.
16See generally Entreculturas, supra note 10.
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characteristics with Curundfi: Techwood & Clark Howell
Homes in Atlanta, Georgia and Cidade de Deus-the "City
of God" neighborhood-in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Both
communities discussed in this section are similar to Curundfi in that they are massive housing developments within cosmopolitan cities where inhabitants have few property
rights and are significantly affected by poverty and crime.
Yet, they differ from each other because the Atlanta developments began as public housing projects with the state
converting them to mixed-income neighborhoods, while
Cidade de Deus, originally a public housing project in Rio
de Janeiro, was constructed when the governing military
dictatorship forcibly removed inhabitants of the Catacumba
favela, which was located in the more fashionable parts of
the city, in 1970. I7 In both instances, crime and poverty
continue as problems in those communities after the governmental intrusion. Thus, the policy decisions made in
both Atlanta and Rio de Janeiro regarding development
may demonstrate that effective, long-term community revitalization as a tool to reduce concentrations of poverty and
crime require that the government to do more than merely
build new structures and move inhabitants around.
Finally, Part III will discuss governmental approaches to remedy the problem of public housing that do
not require the demolition of vital community ties to resources in the event that governments do demolish buildings.
An example of an attempt at this kind of
comprehensive legislation is HOPE VI in the United States,
which requires housing authorities to focus on selfsufficiency and resident improvement as a means to community revitalization. Although HOPE VI has been used as
a means to demolish neighborhoods, legislation of its kind
17 Janice

E. Perlman, Longitudinal Panel Studies in Squatter Communities: Lessons from a Re-study of Rio's Favelas: 1969-2003 2, 3 (2003),
http://www.megacitiesproject.org/Lessons-from Rio RE-study_19692003.pdf.
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has the potential to provide governments with tools to repair public housing structures while strengthening the existing social fabric through resident involvement, selfsufficiency training, and community-oriented crime prevention.
I.

Squalor Amidst Sprawl:
The Curund6i
Housing Projects in Panama City, Panama

Though the Curundfi housing projects were originally built for low-income Panamanians, the majority of
Curundfi's population is now composed of Colombian
refugees from the Choc6 region of Colombia.' 8 The cement high rises of Curundfi are fully inhabited and hundreds more live in informal housing on the property
grounds. 19 Thus, Curundd is a hybrid community, with
both formal public housing units built by the government,
like those in Techwood and Clark Howell Homes in Atlanta, and informal housing units like those in the favelas of
Brazil. 20 Common among all three community groups-in
Atlanta, Rio de Janeiro and Panama City-is the absence of
land rights for the residents. All of the inhabitants live on
governmentally owned land and therefore have significantly diminished bargaining power where issues concern-

Choc6 region of Colombia is inhabited largely by indigenous
people and African descent populations. See Jesuit Refugee Service,
JRS Dispatch No.216, Panama: Second Arson Attack in Cumndfi,
18The

(May 31, 2007),
http://www.jrs.net/news/index.php?lang=en&sid=2050.
19
In the documentary film, Curundi, filmmaker and producer Ana
Endara Mislov followed a Curundfi resident named Kenneth and exposed the isolation and poor conditions experienced by Curnd6i residents. See Ratll Leis, Curundz , THE PANAMA NEWS, Jan. 20, 2008Feb. 2, 2008,
http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v 14/issue_02/opinion 02.html;
see also Entreculturas supra note 10.
20 Leis, supra note 19, Entreculturas supra note 10.
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ing community development arise. 2 1 Additionally, afflictions such as crime, poverty, and dilapidated structures run
22
rampant among the communities.
As is the case in many poor, inner-city communities, the pressures of scarcity have produced a high crime
rate in Curundfi. 23 While gang violence224 and drug trafficking flourish, the structures in the community are under
frequent attack. 25 On January 18, 2008, Curundfi fell victim to its third major fire in six months.2 6 In March of
2007, an entire sector of the neighborhood was destroyed,
leaving 500 residents homeless.27 In May of 2007, another
fire left 355 homeless. 28 Both the March and May fires
were reportedly gang-related arsons. 29 Thus, both the peo21 Perlman,

infra note 35, at 107-36. To be clear, inhabitants in some

favelas often buy and sell their homes, so in a sense there are semiformal property rights among residents, but favela residents by definition do not have legal title to their land. Moreover, in 1970, the people
of the Catacumba favela had no legal claim to their land, which is why
the government bulldozed the neighborhood without giving any kind of
compensation to the residents. Present day favelas are not the favelas
of 1970. Indeed, Perlman's research reflects that favela inhabitants
now enjoy many of the material trappings of those in the "formal"
world, such as televisions and name brand clothing. Also, due to both
grassroots organization among favela residents and more recent governmental legislation, those living in favelas often have access to electricity, indoor plumbing, and roads. Further, living conditions in some
favelas
are superior to conditions in other so-called formal housing. Id.
22
See generally ARIAS FOUNDATION FOR PEACE AND HUMAN PROGRESS,

infra note 23.

23 ARIAS FOUNDATION FOR PEACE AND HUMAN PROGRESS,
THE FACE OF URBAN VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA,
ARMS, VIOLENCE & YOUTH SERIES (2006),

Panama,In

at 241, 252-56,

http://www.arias.or.cr/download/INGLES.pdf.
24 Id at 253. The murder rate in 2003 for Curundfi is 108.7 murders per
100,000 individuals, making it the highest murder rate in the city. Id.
25 Jackson, infra note 31.
26 Jesuit Refugee Service, supra note 18.
27 Id.
2
8 id.
29 Id. See also Jackson, infra note 3 1.
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pie and the structures of Curundti appear to be falling apart

under very dangerous conditions.
Aside from diminishing residents' sense of personal
security, arson also diminishes the number of housing units
available to them. 30 In the wake of crises caused by these
fires, the need for adequate housing becomes even more of
a concern for those displaced. Some members of the Panamanian press have criticized the reaction of the Ministry
of Housing to the fires because, according to reports, authorities bulldozed debris resulting from a recent fire before
residents were able to recover their belongings, including
zinc roofing that could be used to rebuild informal housing. 31 The Ministry reportedly plans to rebuild housing to
replace damaged units, but only residents who qualify will
be allowed to move back in. It is unclear whether residents
who lived on the grounds in self-built structures would
qualify to live in the new housing. 32 Efforts to revitalize
Curundfi must consider the quality of the existing relationships in the community. Violence and crime inevitably
damages those relationships. One factor that may affect the
cohesiveness of the Curundfi community is that the social
fabric is very much a patchwork, consisting of Panamanians, Colombians, and poor immigrants from other nearby
countries who arrived at various points in the neighborhood's history.33 For example, when interviewed about
crime in Curundfi, an immigrant cited that Panamanian
30

Jackson, infra note 31. The informal housing in Curundfi are often
wood structures and are therefore more susceptible to fire damage. Id.
31 Eric Jackson, Three Kids Killed, Alleged PerpetratorsHeld, Curundjj
Burns in GangRow, Police Show of ForceIneffective, THE PANAMA
NEWS, April 2007, available at
http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/vl 3/issue 07/news_03.html.
32

Id.

33 Janice E. Perlman, Marginality: From Myth to Reality in the Favelas
of Rio de Janeiro, 1969-2002, in MARGINALITY: FROM MYTH TO
REALITY IN THE FAVELAS OF RIO DE JANEIRO 1968-2005, 109 (forthcoming) http://www.megacitiesproject.org/myth to reality rio 1969-

2002.pdf.
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gangs were responsible for the crime in the neighborhood.34
Although historical lines along which community ties are
traditionally formed are not necessarily as pronounced in
Curundi as in communities with a strong presence of families who lived in that neighborhoods for decades, there is
still an opportunity for Curundfi residents to unite through
the shared experience of living in a neighborhood that has
been permitted to deteriorate before the country's very
eyes. 3 Indeed, the example of Rio de Janeiro proves that
people from different origins are capable of forming very
strong community ties.
II.

Public Housing Meets Gentrification:
Atlanta, Georgia and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

This section will discuss the governmentally sponsored
gentrification of the public housing projects Clark Howell
and Techwood Homes in Atlanta, Georgia and the Catacumba favela in Rio de Janeiro. Transitions in Atlanta
housing were the product of aggressive planning centered
around the Centennial Olympic Games in 1996, which
forced the city to improve conditions in and around downtown Atlanta. Clark Howell and Techwood Homes were
demolished and were replaced with mixed-income housing.
The Catacumba favela in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil was razed
in 1970 and inhabitants were moved to housing projects
such as Cidade de Deus, in outlying areas of the city. Cidade de Dues is now characterized as a favela because of

34 Jesuit Refugee Service, supra note 18.
35 See Newman, infra note 40, at 6. In the City of Atlanta, a shift in the

demographic of the Clark Howell/Techwood Homes communities
changed when Clark Howell became integrated. Whites fled the project and blacks from rural areas and other parts of the United States
moved into public housing projects in Atlanta. Likewise, the favela
communities in Rio de Janeiro are now composed of people from
different parts of the country and other parts of South America. Id.
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the extreme poverty and number of irregular housing units
on the grounds.
In both Atlanta and Rio, residents were isolated by the
transition process, their relationships to one another and the
city being largely disregarded. Also in both cities, residents organized and fought actively against displacement,
thereby forming valuable community ties. This section will
discuss the ways in which residents were isolated, it will
argue that perhaps isolation is partly responsible for governmental failures to revitalize these communities while
also maintaining the social fabric.
A. Techwood Homes and Clark Howell
Homes in Atlanta, Georgia
The City of Atlanta has undergone substantial
growth over the past two decades.36 Much of the housing
redevelopment was sponsored by the Atlanta Housing Authority with substantial involvement from city officials. 37
An analysis of the gentrification of Atlanta's housing projects of Techwood Homes and Clark Howell Homes may
provide insight into the possibilities for Curundfi because
the state of public housing in Atlanta during the time these
projects were demolished was similar in significant ways to
the current state of affairs in Curundi. Namely, both housing projects were in a state of disrepair, suffered from numerous vacancies, and saw their residents primarily
concerned with crime. Now the area is the site of a new
mixed-income community, a new YMCA, a new elementary school, and Olympic landmarks. Unfortunately, few of
the original residents of these communities are in a position
Mary Lou Pickel, Metro Atlanta 2 nd in growth nationwide, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Mar. 27, 2008.
37 Ronald Smothers, Barcelona Games Start, And Atlanta
is Staring,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1992, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EOCE5DA 143BF934
Al 5754COA964958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
36
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to enjoy these amenities since they have been relocated to
distant parts of the city.
The first public housing projects in Atlanta were
built during the Great Depression as an effort to stimulate
the economy through creating jobs.3 8 Due to the high demand for low-income residences during these years and the
high quality of housing units produced, applicants for public housing were carefully screened on the basis of several
criteria, including race. 39 Techwood Homes opened first in
1935 for low-income whites, originally housing 604 families.40 University Homes was built soon thereafter for lowincome blacks. Clark Howell Homes was erected in 1940
adjacent to Techwood Homes for low-income whites and
was the last housing project to be built in Atlanta during
this era.4 1
The City of Atlanta suffered tremendously when
thousands began to abandon the city center for the suburbs,
causing the concentration of poverty to increase significantly. The end of racial segregation in public housing also
played a role. The desegregation of Atlanta resulted in race
no longer being an acceptable criterion for placement in
38

HARVEY K. NEWMAN, ATLANTA HOUSING AUTHORITY'S OLYMPIC
LEGACY PROGRAM: PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS TO MIXED INCOME
COMMUNITIES, 6 (2002),

http://aysps.gsu.edu/publications/researchatlantaAHA%20%Olympic%
20Legacy%2OProg.pdf [Hereinafter Report]. The construction of the
projects provided employment opportunities to those affected by the
Depression. Id. See also DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, A HISTORICAL AND BASELINE ASSESSMENT OF HOPE VI,
VOL. 1 4-2. (1996).
39 Newman, supra note 40, at 6. Residents were screened on the basis

of
race, family composition, employment, and living habits. Id.
40
Id.When Techwood Homes was built, apartments had closets in
every room, new kitchen appliances, and built-in bathtubs, which was
quite a step up for many new residents who had just relocated from the
"'slum" of Techwood Flats. Id. See also DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 40.
41 , i
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housing.4 2 Thus, many whites fled formerly white only
43
housing projects that would soon be inhabited by blacks.
Despite the departure of those white residents, the need for
public housing in Atlanta continued to grow. 44 Urban renewal efforts and expressway construction during the
1960's and 1970's in Atlanta displaced thousands of poor
blacks.4 5 Additionally, many blacks had already begun
migrating in large numbers into Atlanta and other major
cities between 1940 and 1970.46 Although the demand for
public housing grew in Atlanta, the number of inhabitants
steadily declined.4 7 Meanwhile, the metropolitan area 4 8
continued to grow after 1970.49 To illustrate, the popula42Newman, supra note 40, at 6-7. Public housing applicants were also

no longer being screened according to family composition or employment.
Id.
43
1Id. at 7.
44 Id.

45Id at 6. Newman says that 67,000 people were displaced because
of

expressway construction and urban renewal, at least 77% of whom
were African-American and all of whom were described as "poor and
disadvantaged with special needs and special problems." Id. See also
Kevin Fox Gotham, Redevelopmentfor Whom andfor What Purpose,
in 6 RESEARCH IN URBAN SOCIOLOGY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 441-42 (Kevin Gotham ed., 2001) ("[A]s the

history of urban renewal, gentrification, and urban expressway building
shows, central city divestment and reinvestment are part of the dynamics of urban race relations, with African Americans and other minorities
having to bear the brunt of displacement and neighborhood destabilization.").
46 Newman, supra note 40, at 7. Newman's research showed that over
54 7 million blacks moved to cities during this time period. Id.
Id.

48 The Atlanta metropolitan area is defined by the United States Census
Bureau as the 5,392.8 miles encompassing Barrow, Bartow, Cherokee,
Clayton, Cobb, Coweta, DeKalb, Douglas, Fayette, Forsyth, Fulton,
Gwinnett, Henry, Newton, Paulding, Rockdale, Spalding, & Walton
Counties. See Department of Housing and Urban Development, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE ATLANTA METROPOLITAN AREA V

(2005),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/hl 70-04-21.pdf.
49
Newman, supra note 40, at 7.
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tion in the city was 496,973 in 1970, as compared to
394,017 in 1990. At the same time, the population of the
outlying suburbs grew to 1.5 million people. 50 Thus, the
population in public housing in Atlanta grew just as hundreds abandoned the city, resulting in a social and physical
isolation that persisted until the 1990s.
The decrease of the city's population and increase
in public housing tenants were met with an increase in the
level of poverty. Between 1980 and 1990, though the
number of poor people in the metropolitan area decreased,5 ' the percentage of poor people within the city
limits jumped from 82.7 percent to 84.1 percent. 52 Thus by
the 1990's, public housing expansion, mass migration, and
other externalities 53 left Atlanta with one of the highest
concentrations of public
housing per capita of any city in
54
the United States. In fact, Atlanta had the second highest
concentration of public housing in the nation, second only
to Newark, New Jersey.55 By the 1990s, housing projects
Techwood Homes and Clark Howell Homes were 56
recognized as some of the worst neighborhoods in Atlanta.
By the 1990s, Atlanta's entire public housing system had hit embarrassing lows in the areas of maintenance
and management. When Atlanta was selected to host the
1996 Centennial Olympic Games (Games) in 1990, the
proximity of several potential competition sites to dilapidated public housing projects forced city officials to quick-

50 Id.
5' For a

definition of the Atlanta metropolitan area, see DEPARTMENT
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 50 at v.
52

Newman, supra note 40, at 9-10.

53 Id.
54 Newman, supra note 40 at 7. According to Newman, one often

residents of the City of Atlanta lived in public housing by 1990. Id.
55 Id.
56

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note

40, at 3-22.
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ly address a myriad of public housing issues. 57 By this
time, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) pronounced the city's public housing problem one
of the worst in the country because of exceedingly poor
management and maintenance by the Atlanta Housing
Authority (AHA).5 Thus, in 1990, the AHA and city officials seized the opportunity to use the Games as a catalyst
to create the Olympic Legacy Program (OLP) which was
an effort to reduce the concentration of poor people living
in Atlanta by converting public housing projects near
Olympic Game sites into mixed income communities.59
The combined 1,845 units in Techwood Homes,
Clark Howell Homes, and one other property 6 1 were the
first properties targeted by the OLP. Aside from decreasing
the concentration of poor residents in the city, other justifications cited for the OLP included (1) providing adult residents with expanded employment opportunities through
interaction with diverse residents sharing the apartment
complex; (2) improving education by providing children
with diverse learning environments; (3) providing children
with role models from different income levels; and (4)
decreasing the crime rate. 62 Despite its purported merits,
57

Newman, supra note 40, at 10-12.

58

See id. at 8. (In 1994 HUD threatened Atlanta and Chicago with the

prospect of having their housing authorities taken over by the federal
government. In 1994, HUD gave the Atlanta Housing Authority a
score of 39 of a possible 100.)
59
1Id. at 13.
60
Id. at 4. See also DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT supra note 40, at 4-2. (Techwood Homes and Clark Howell
Homes constituted 52.9 acres of land in Atlanta's center near Georgia
Institute of Technology).
61 The other property targeted was the East Lake Meadows
Community
in DeKalb County, Georgia. This paper discusses only the Clark How-

ell/Techwood Homes communities because they are located in the
Atlanta city center and were commonly regarded as one property. See
Newman, supra note 40, at 15.
62 See id. at 4.
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the OLP was subject to public scrutiny in part because its
implementation was precipitated by an increase in evictions
for minor lease infractions, an official AHA refusal to accept partial payments that had been acceptable before the
plan, and increased security concerns prompted by increasing vacancies on the properties. 63 Moreover, only 545 of
the 1,115 households in residence in 1990 received relocation assistance from the AHA. 64 Of that number, over
half 65 received Section 8 vouchers 66 and the next largest
group of residents were moved into other public housing
projects. Those who did not receive relocation assistance
most likely moved or were evicted before demolition commenced. 67 Before the Games commenced, the AHA had
relocated 1,576 families from these areas.68 These families
were often moved to outlying suburbs while renovations
took place. 69 After demolition, 1,442 units were constructed.7 °
63

1Id. at 12.

64Id. at 13.
65

367 residents received Section 8 vouchers. Id. "Section 8" require-

ments appear at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2000), which provides for lowincome housing assistance whereby private owners enter into contracts
with the federal government of the United States of America whereby
they are permitted to rent units to low-income residents where certain
conditions are met.
66 According to HUD data, residents receiving vouchers were widely
dispersed throughout the city and the eastern county of DeKalb, but
were still clustered in seven concentrated groups throughout the city.
Those who were not clustered are scattered across 87 neighborhoods in
the city. See Newman, supra note 40, at 18-19.
67 The AHA stopped keeping track of many of the families who were
evicted or moved independently. Additionally, 76 families were
evicted, 106 "skipped out" on rent and 14 moved without assistance. Id
at 18.
68 See id. at 5. The numbers of families relocated as a result of the
OLP: 114 from Techwood, 588 from Clark Howell Homes, 470 from
East Lake Meadows, and 434 from other projects.
69 See id. at 18.
70

Id. at 4.
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While the OLP has arguably attained the broad objective of decreasing the concentration of poverty in the
City of Atlanta, it has left many residents in the same condition or worse than when the project began. 7 ' Further,
although merely substituting Section 8 Vouchers7 2 for public housing decreased the concentration of poverty in certain areas, the overall number of poor living in the city has

not changed significantly, especially considering that over
80% of those receiving vouchers remained in the City of
Atlanta.7 3

Critics have questioned whether the OLP's primary
purpose was to improve conditions for residents in projects
like Techwood and Clark Howell or whether it was merely
a slum clearance project to make accommodations for private interests. 74 Like many public housing projects, Techwood and Clark Howell Homes suffered both geographical
and social isolation from larger society.75 Techwood and
Clark Howell were not surrounded by other important large
neighborhoods; they were surrounded by a major institution
of higher learning, Georgia Institute of Technology (Geor-

71 Praise

for the mixed-income community that has replaced Clark

Howell/Techwood and Centennial Place gives too little attention to the
fact that few of the original residents have benefited from the new
development. See Keating, infra note 80. For an example of the kind of
praise the Centennial Place community has received, see also Ken
Edelstein, A New Mixed-Income Village for Downtown Atlanta, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1996 at 5, Barney Simms, PoorAtlantans have more
choices now, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Sept. 14, 2007, at
Al, Newman supra note 40, at 18-19. (83% of those relocated from
Clark Howell and Techwood Homes remained inside the city, which
means that the actual number of poor people in Atlanta did not decrease
significantly.) Id.
72 Section 8 vouchers are provided pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f
(2000).
73 Newman, supra note 40, at 18-19.
74 See generally id. at 20.
71 Id. at 10-13.
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gia Tech), and by Coca-Cola Headquarters. 76 Both Georgia
Tech and Coca-Cola are major fixtures in the City of Atlanta and have extensive resources. 77 Over the last forty
years Georgia Tech had demonstrated their power several
times by expanding into nearby neighborhoods. Furtherpushed to remove
more, Coca-Cola executives had long
78
Clark Howell and Techwood Homes.
A closer look at the proactive measures taken by the
AHA prior to the implementation of the OLP provides
significant insight into the possible root of the Authority's
failure. The AHA invested very little in the residents of
Techwood and Clark Howell Homes despite the dire need
for resources among tenants. In 1993, the median household income for families in Techwood and Clark Howell

76

DEPARTMENT OF HOusING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note

59, at 4-20. See also, Newman, supra note 40, at 20.
77 Coca-Cola's net profits for 2007 totaled $5.981 Billion Dollars.
Forbes Magazine, Coca-Cola At a Glance, available at
http://finapps.forbes.com/finapps/j sp/fmance/compinfo/CIAtAGlance.js
p?sedol=2206657. Georgia Tech has one of the largest endowments
among colleges and universities in the United States at $1.3 Billion
Dollars. Georgia Institute of Technology, Recent Trends and Milestones, June 2007.
78 Larry Keating & Carol A. Flores, Sixty & Out: Techwood Homes
Transformed by Enemies & Friends,26 J. URBAN HIST. 275, 284
(2000). Keating and Flores explain the climate surrounding the integration of Clark Howell Homes:
The shift in racial composition alarmed Paul Austin, chief executive officer of Coca-Cola, Techwood's neighbor to the
west. In a memo to Robert W. Woodruff, the dominant figure
in much of the Coca-Cola company's success, Austin voiced
the fear that when Techwood and Clark Howell became 'all
black, the felony rate will triple.' To avoid the perceived
threat, Austin proposed demolishing the communities, removing the residents to the outskirts of the city, and redeveloping
the property with an ultra modem middle-income community.
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respectively were $3,960 and $3,960.' 9 Only 14% of
households in Clark Howell had actual earned income and
only 15% of Techwood households did.80
Furthermore,
AHA properties experienced a spike in crime during the
late 1980s. 8 1 Yet, AHA did very little to address the issues
of crime and poverty in communities. Structures, not people, appeared to be the AHA's primary focus. The AHA
had only a small security force to work in senior citizens'
buildings and only forty five police officers enrolled in the
AHA community policing program. 82 Further, AHA was
one of the housing developments evaluated that provided
residents with absolutely no drug treatment/prevention
programs; they were also one of five major U.S. cities who
83
offered no resident services or self-sufficiency programs.
B. Catacumba Favela to Cidade de Deus,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Cidade de Deus, a public housing project turned favela in Rio de Janeiro, was built to house the former inhabitants of the Catacumba favela 84 after they were displaced
by slum clearance policies promulgated by the former dictatorship government of Brazil85 . Catacumba was situated
79

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,

supra note

58
80 at 1-24.

id.

81Id at

2-12.

82 Id at 2-12. Exhibit 2-4.

83 id.
84 Janice Perlman, Marginality:From Myth to Reality in the Favelas of
Rio de Janeiro,1969-2002 (2002). According to Perlman, Cidade de
Deus also housed families from other razed favelas in Rio, but it was
rmarily populated by former Catacumba residents.
Perlman, supra note 35. Informal housing developments or shantytowns are often referred to as favelas in Brazil. Favelas are typically
thought of as squatter settlements established by families infringing on
public land to which they have no rights. Although it was established
as a public housing project in 1970 Cidade de Deus is now considered a
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in the upscale South Zone of Rio de Janeiro. Not surprisingly, the elite of the South Zone felt threatened by the
close proximity of the favela to their homes. Eventually,
the dictatorship responded by systematically evicting Catacumba's residents and relocating many of them to public
Carlos Lacerda,
housing on the outskirts of the city. 86
then governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro, established the
removal plan. Despite vigorous opposition from grass
roots community groups, 2,074 families in Catacumba were
to public housing projects
removed in 1970 and relocated
87
such as Cidade de Deus.
In the larger national context, favela eradication was
an ineffective tool for redressing poverty or the lack of
affordable housing in Rio. Despite the government's later
attempts to integrate favelas into the city through "formalizing" them with electricity, indoor plumbing, and public
roads, favelas continue to grow in number, size and complexity. 88 In fact, the number of favelas in Rio has nearly
doubled since 1969.89 Janice Perlman reports that
[I]n every decade between 1950 and 2000, Rio's
favela population grew much more rapidly than
the city as a whole with the exception of the 1970s
when favela eradication programs forcibly removed over 100,000 people into public housing or
sent them back to the countryside. Most striking
is that during the period 1980 to 1990, when the
favela due to the growth of informal housing on and near the original
6roperty grounds.
Id. Many Catacumba residents also went on to populate a strip of
favelas called Complexo del Mar6, located near the airport in Rio.
87 id.
88 Perlman, supra note 84, at 107. The Brazilian government cites three
factors as being responsible for the spike in population in favelas: (1)
migration from towns in the Brazilian countryside: higher fertility rates
among favela residents; and migration from favelas outside of the city
to favelas within the city.
"9Id.at 107.
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overall city growth rate dropped to 8% but favela
populations surged by 41%. Then, from 1990 to
2000, when the city's growth rate leveled off at
just less than 7%, favela populations continued to
grow by 24% resulting in a current all-time high
percentage of Rio's population. These numbers
demonstrate that Rio de Janeiro's housing needs
continue to climb. Much of this growth has been

attributed to immigration from migrants from the
countryside and, more recently, movement from
within the city.
Perlman studied the success rate of favela residents who
had been relocated thirty years after her 1968 study and
found that community ties were especially important in
predicting the success of residents. Her 1998 study revealed that former Catacumba residents who were relocated
in 1970 have enjoyed higher rates of success 90 than those
relocated from other favelas and housing projects largely
because of the strong community network Catacumba residents formed through organizing to resist eviction.9" She
suggests that after eviction and relocation Catacumba residents kept in touch with one another and were able to help
90 Pelman's study traced life trajectories across four generations: the

original interviewees, their parents, their children and their grandchildren. In her words, she Combine[d] qualitative and quantative methods
including direct observation, in-depth open-ended interviews, participatory re-creation of the community history in each community, (using
the DRP - Rapid Participatory Diagnostic - method), the application of
survey instruments (questionnaires), the collection of life histories, and
the reanalysis of existing data sets and research materials. We work
with the concepts of transgenerational transmission of poverty, inequality, marginality, exclusion, and social mobility.
Janice E. Perlman, LongitudinalPanelStudies in Squatter Communities: Lessonsfrom a re-study ofRio 'sfavelas: 1969-2003, WORLD
BANK WORKSHOP, URBAN LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
LONDON, May 28-29, 2003.

91Perlman, supra note 83, at 109.
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each other more than those in other communities. 92 Perlman tells the story of a woman named Marga 93 who was
one of the 17,000 families removed from Catacumba in
1970. 94 She was relocated to a housing project in the outskirts of the city called Conjunto de Quintungo, but said
that the former residents of Catacumba would remain her
life-long friends. 95 When Marga was forced to relocate due
to threats from a neighborhood gang in the housing project,
she stated that being so far away from her support network
was unmanageable and she hoped to be able to move back
96
to a neighborhood closer to the city sometime soon.
Perlman's findings suggest that while community ties are
not destroyed by demolition, if conditions were actually
improved in communities like Catacumba without moving
residents farther away from resources such as education
and employment, the ties could be leveraged to achieve
sustainable, livable communities.

92

Perlman, supra note 84, at 109-10. In the caption to figure 5.5. she

states that
The location in the midst of the upscale residential South
Zone gave residents abundant access to service and construction jobs as well as to the good schools and clinics in
the area. Despite their removal in 1970 to disparate housing
projects, their common struggles created strong communal
ties which persist to this day. Id.
93 Id. at 110-12. Marga was born and raised in Catacumba and grew up
to raise two young children while living in Catacumba. She was a
domestic worker, and as such, she lived with her employers during the
week with her children and then lived in the favela over the weekend.
Because of this living arrangement, her children were able to attend
better schools because she could use her employers' address. This was
not possible after relocation because of the sheer distance of her new
home to potential employers' homes. Some relocated families were
by as much as four hours of travel. Id.
separated
94
1d.

95

at 108.

See generally id. at 111.
96
Id. at 111-12.
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While the favela population continues to grow in
Rio, public housing projects like Cidade de Deus are themselves becoming favelas since these public housing projects
are dominated by informal settlements and characterized by
crime and desperate conditions. 97 Perlman's 1969 study9 8
suggested that people living in favelas were not truly mar-

ginal; rather they were stigmatized by their neighborhood:
"[i]t is my contention that the favela residents are not economically and politically marginal, but are excluded and

repressed; that they are not socially and culturally marginal,
99
but stigmatized and excluded from a closed class system."
She suggested that the formation of favelas demonstrated a
desire on the part of the people to establish a functional
way of life. 10 0 Perlman's more recent research shows that
the stigma attached to being from a favela is far more negative than the stigma attached to living in Brazilian public
housing. 10 1 However, this stigma reattaches itself once
public housing transforms into a "favela."
Social stigma
97

Id. at 142. See also James Brooke, Rio Slum Children Find Death in
'City
of God', N.Y. TIMES, November 3, 1980.
98
JANICE PERLMAN, THE MYTH OF MARGINALITY: URBAN POVERTY

(Univ. of Col. Press 1976).
99 Perlman, supra note 83, at 121.
100
Id. Perlman states that... the marginality ideology was so strong in
Brazil in the 1970s that it created a self-fulfilling prophecy. In particular, the favela-removal policy it justified perversely created the conditions it was designed to eliminate. In fact, the favela was an extremely
functional solution to many of the problems faced by its residents. It
provided access to jobs and services, a tightly knit community in which
reciprocal favors mitigated hardship, and above all, free housing. This
AND POLITICS IN RIO DE JANEIRO,

was clearly not the case in the housing projects ... to which favela

residents were consigned by the government. In the government projects, they were separated from kin and friendship networks; located far
from jobs, schools and clinics; and charged monthly payments beyond
their means. Relocation also diminished family earnings by eliminating many of the services and odd jobs family members could perform
after school, while caring for children, or when filling in time between
other tasks. Id.
101Id.
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affects everything from a resident's ability to find employment to the way in which she formulates her dreams. Thus,
the failure to provide acceptable housing with measures in
place to encourage the neighborhood maintenance ensures
10 2
that the residents will always be marginalized.
III.

Possible Answers for Curundfi: CommunityFocused Legal Responses to Public Housing
in Need of Community Revitalization

In examining the relationship between the gentrification of low-income communities and concentrated poverty, John A. Powell and Marguerite L. Spencer assert that
"with its displacement of low-income residents, gentrification and perpetuation of concentrated poverty are not opposite trends, but actually operate similarly and
recursively. Both push low-income people of color away
0 3
from resources, opportunities and vital institutions."'
Like many others' ° Powell and Spencer recognize that lowincome families have few options for relocation when they
are displaced because of their limited resources."' If few
places remain in the city where families can access affordable housing, they are forced to move to less desirable
locations where employment, education,
and other necessi1°6
access.
to
difficult
more
are
ties
Government has a special duty to address a wide
spectrum of issues that affect conditions in public housing
such as structural integrity, maintenance, crime, concentrated poverty, and social mobility of residents. While
government provision of public housing is a valuable and
necessary resource for low-income residents, with this
102 See generally Perlman,
103
104

supra note 83, at 126.
Powell & Spencer, supra note 2, at 441.
See, e.g., J. Peter Bryne, supra note 5 (complaining of the wealth

of scholarly discourse discouraging gentrification).
105

106

Powell & Spencer, supra note 2, at 442.
id.
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provision comes the governmental responsibility of maintenance and oversight. In the United States and abroad,
many public housing projects have become dilapidated
because of government neglect.'0 7 Such was the case in
Atlanta with Techwood and Clark Howell Homes before
they were demolished and in Cidade de Deus and other
Brazilian public housing projects after they were constructed.'10 Additionally, poverty is highly concentrated in
and around public housing. 10 9 Thus, the issue of poverty
must be considered when implementing public housing
policy. 110 Crime also remains a paramount concern to
public housing residents in most countries."' When government bodies fail to give adequate attention to the value
of human capital in public housing residents, they become
complicit in a system that creates a permanent class of
people who will always live in public housing. By failing
to involve residents in the improvement process, authorities
place limitations on the progress that is made and alienate
the supposed beneficiaries from the benefits of revitalization.
Too often, the above negative factors are considered
intrinsic to the people of a community. The result is that
rebuilding does not give enough attention to the existing
strengths of residents because the residents are seen as the
107See

Florence Roisman, Keeping The Promise:Ending Racial Dis-

criminationAnd SegregationIn FederallyFinancedHousing, 48 How.
L.J. 913 (2004). See generally DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 76.
108 Because favelas are informal settlements, the Brazilian government
had no legal responsibility to maintain any properties on the Catacumba
favela before its destruction.
109
Florence Roisman, IntentionalRacial Discriminationand Segregation by the FederalGovernment as a PrincipalCause of Concentrated

Poverty: A Response to Schill and Wachter, 143 U. PAL. REV. 1351
(1995).
'

1

°See id. at 135.

See generally Purdy & Kwack, supra note 3.
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problem. 112 For example, in the United States, HUD addressed crime in housing projects and vilified residents by
imposing a zero-tolerance policy for its residents. In HUD
v. Rucker, the Supreme Court permitted local housing authorities to evict tenants of public housing when household
members or guests were in violation of anti-drug policies,
even if the tenant was unaware of the drug activity."" 3 In
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, government raids on narcotics dealers and gangs in favelas are common practice. 114 In Curund-i, the Panamanian Ministry of Housing responds to
arson in the community by bulldozing debris and promising
new housing for "qualified" families. 115 In these scenarios,
lawful citizens suffer a double assault, first from criminals
and then from the government. Often, positive results can
be obtained when the governments of high-crime areas
assist residents in organizing to minimize the occurrence of
and mitigate the effects of criminal activity; however, this
can occur only when residents are made to feel a part of the
community improvement
process, rather than objects of
1 16
harsh regulation.
Thus, the people in public housing rather than the
system in which they are trapped are considered to be the
problem. The policy models like those in Atlanta and Rio
de Janeiro, which primarily involved the construction of
new structures and citizen relocation, are ineffective in
112 Perlman, supra note 86, at 122.
113See Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S.
114 See e.g., Stuart Grudgings, Elite Police Squad Courts

in Brazil, REUTERS/BOSTON

GLOBE,

125 (2002).
Controversy

July 1, 2008, available at

http://www.boston.com/news/world/latinamerica/articles/2008/07/0
itepolicesquad courts controversy inbrazil/.
115
116

2 /el

Jackson, supra note 31.

In Rio de Janeiro, the Primer Entrega program, which means "first
job" is doing what the government has struggled to do, by providing
job training, extra-curricular education and artistic courses for people
living in a Rio favela. Primer Entrega seeks to change the conditions in
the favela by changing the lives of the people. Visit of Tiffany Williams to Cidade AltaFavela, Primer Entrega Program, June 2006.
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addressing the roots of the deplorable conditions governments allegedly seek to improve, because those programs
1 17
merely cause a geographic shift in concentrated poverty.
Further, in both Atlanta and Rio de Janeiro, the government
left significant numbers of families without housing or
forced families to relocate to parts of the
city that were far
11 8
away from their places of employment.
By contrast, if Curundfi faces a state-sponsored
overhaul, its population could benefit from policy implementation that acknowledges the unique value of social
networks and support systems to working-class communities that is often disrupted when they are forced to move
miles away from those resources.11 9 The conditions in
Curundfi reflect the need for comprehensive approaches to
rebuilding long neglected public housing properties both to
improve the quality of life for residents and the general
welfare for the city.
A. Existing Panamanian Governmental Programs
In October 2007, Panama's Minister of Housing
proposed legislation that would give inhabitants in 10,360
public housing units title to their land based on the number
of rent payments they had made to the state. 12 Residents
who paid rent for at least sixteen years would receive full
See Roisman, supra note 109. (noting that by failing to address
issues like social mobility, residents have few options to work themselves out of public housing.
118 See generally Newman, supra note 40, at 5.
119 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note
58, at v. With regard the relationships among neighbors in distressed
public housing, the report stated, "[d]espite the socio-economic difficulties faced by these communities and their residents, some also
benefit from a rich network of community resources including churches
and non-profit organizations whose staffs and members provide important services and political leadership." Id.
120 Winner, infra note 123.
117

413

4:2 TENNESSEE

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 561

title, and those who had paid rent at least 199 times would
receive partial title of between 25% and 75%. 121 This initiative simultaneously acknowledges that public housing
inhabitants acquire informal yet recognizable interests in
their communities that cannot be entirely disposed of merely because of their lack of property rights and the importance of formal property rights to the empowerment of
residents. However, the focus on homeownership does not
adequately address the fact that inhabitants in places like
Curundfi lack the financial resources to accomplish the kind
of structural improvement the community requires. Additionally, squatters have presumably never paid rent and will
not benefit from any transfer of title.
While the Ministry's legislation regarding transfer
of title has not yet been enacted, the Ministry of Housing
has proposed other programs intended to provide inhabitable housing to the poorest of Panamanians. 122 PROVISOL, the Program for Supportive Living, provides a $2,000
subsidy to families earning less than $300 per month toward the purchase of a home upon a determination of creditworthiness. 123 The Program for Integral Improvement of
Neighborhoods (PROBEMA), is a two part strategy that
seeks both to (1) modernize physical infrastructure and (2)
provide social programs and employment training. 24 It
does not appear that inhabitants of Curund-if could benefit
substantially from PROVISOL because a mortgage subsidy
is not helpful in a community where most of the housing is
substandard or uninhabitable. However, PROMEBA inDon Winner, Panama to Give Government Owned Apartments to
the Poor, PANAMA GUIDE, http://www.panama-guide.com (Oct. 4,
2007).
122 Ministerio De Vivienda - Republica De Panamd, Resumen Pr6sta121

mo De Innovaci6n 3 [Ministry of Housing, Republic of Panama,
Innovation Loan Summary], available at
7
.html.
http://www.mivi.gob.pa/paginasprincipales/programas0
123
id.

124 id.
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volves the improvement of existing structures and the promotion of property rights and not the elimination of a particular community. 125 This combination of goals is a more
comprehensive approach because it provides services to
residents, which suggests an acknowledgement that the
residents are important components of community improvement.
B. The Potential of HOPE VI as a Legislative Framework to Reinforce the Community Fabric
The United States has attempted to encourage housing authorities to be creative when attempting to address
the housing problem because authorities must address poverty, crime, structural maintenance, and community service
to receive funds. If implemented and enforced responsibly,
HOPE VI has the potential to be a useful tool to revitalize
neighborhoods because of the broad latitude granted to
housing authorities in planning. In 1993, the U.S. Congress
attempted to improve distressed public housing through the
Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere
Program (HOPE VI). 126 HOPE VI provides government
grants to overhaul severely distressed public housing
through rehabilitation, reconfiguration, demolition with onsite, off-site or Section 8 voucher replacement housing, and
development of additional low-income and market-rate
housing. 127 Some or all of these options can be combined
into the plan for a single development, but demolition has
Id.
126 HOPE VI was first enacted in 1993 and was subsequently revised in
1995. The revision to HOPE VI eliminated the requirement that housing authorities replace demolished unites on a 1:1 ratio. See Newman,
supra note 40, at 12.
127 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note
40, at 5-3, 5-4.
125
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been integral to most HOPE VI sites to date. 128 This is
unfortunate because development that focuses on demolition and relocation alienates targeted communities from the
planning process.
HUD asserts that HOPE VI funding can accomplish
the Department's goals by investing in "sites, buildings,
and people."' 29 Indeed, HOPE VI projects could include
efforts like those in PROMEBA and PROVISOL in Panama. However, it appears that the "people" HOPE VI
funds have been used to benefit may not always be public
housing residents. As of 1996, the implementation of social programs and resident involvement in HOPE VI projects has been marginal at best.' 3 0 The City of Atlanta's
use of HOPE VI funds demonstrates the potential for housing authorities to overemphasize the component of demolition and neglect the requirements for community and
residential services. 13 1 Both Techwood and Clark Howell
were listed among the worst for the level of resident involvement in 1996.132 In fact, Atlanta was found to have
actually discouraged resident involvement although residents were represented
by legal counsel during HOPE VI
133
proceedings.
Indeed, Atlanta paled in comparison to cities like
Charlotte where authorities built on relationships estab128

Id. at 1-26. Exhibit 1-7 shows that demolition on the table for all but

seven of the thirty four HOPE VI projects that participated in the study
while renovation was only proposed for eleven properties.
129 Id. at ii.

"' DEPARTMENT

OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note
58, at vi-vii.
131 Initial HOPE VI plans for Techwood and Clark Howell involved

renovation, but plans changed to demolition. See id. at 5-6, exhibit 5-2.
132 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note
58, at vii.
133 Id. at 5-13, 5-14, exhibit 5-4. Atlanta residents were forced to seek
legal representation to be involved in the HOPE VI process. Georgia
legal services negotiated a "Further Assurances Agreement," that called
for continual involvement of residents throughout planning. Id.
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lished from existing community organizations. Atlanta was
described as having only "a small array of programs to
support special projects or events" at the time HOPE VI
funding was obtained, 134 whereas resident involvement and

community organization seemed to be integral to Charlotte's process before and during planning. 135 Charlotte
employed a resident consultation model, involving several
existing community groups in the planning process as well
as at least 30 residents. 136 The residents' input was then
incorporated into Charlotte's HOPE VI plan.
Charlotte's policy preceding the implementation of
HOPE VI also demonstrates that community involvement
can serve as a vehicle to address crime without depending
37
on the city's police force or minimal security resources.
Even before the receipt of HOPE VI funding, Charlotte had
36 resident organizations sponsoring numerous services
through two integral programs, the Drug Abuse, Treatment,
Outreach, and Prevention Program (DATOP) and the Safe
Neighborhood Awareness Program (SNAP). 138 Both DATOP and SNAP have reduced crime by 15 percent in targeted developments. 139 Thus, Charlotte is reinforcing and
even strengthening the valuable community ties that Perlman emphasizes in her findings in order to preserve com34

Id. at 2-16, exhibit 2-5.
Id. at 5-14. HOPE VI requires that each participating city shall
make contributions for supportive services in an amount equal to 15
percent of the funding provided for supportive services and that these
contributions
shall be derived from non-Federal sources. Id. at 1-9.
3
115

16 Id. at 5-14.
37

1

Id. at 2-16, exhibit 2-5.

'38 Id. While DATOP does involve the eviction of tenants who have
found to be engaged in drug-related activity, it involves residents. The
program "trains and supports a youth advisory council aimed at developing drug education and prevention and provides on-site out-patient
treatment and after-care. Id. at 2-15. Another program sponsored by
the housing authority in Charlotte trains teens to recognize symptoms
of drug abuse so that they may help their peers obtain treatment. Id.
39

Id. at 2-14.
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munities. The community members are involved in the
preservation and rebuilding process of their neighborhood.
HOPE VI requires self-sufficiency resources for
residents, to encourage social mobility. Charlotte had already implemented two programs, Gateway and Stepping
Stone, before they obtained HOPE VI funding. 140 Both
programs have become national models for transitional
housing programs. 141 To further encourage social mobility,
Charlotte formed the Homeownership Institute of the Charlotte Housing Authority, which used HOPE VI funding to
educate selected residents about "all aspects of homeownership" over a period of 13 months. The program's success
rate is 75 percent-meaning that 75 percent of its graduates
have bought or will buy a home. 142 Again, this effort focuses on the potential of residents to overcome their obstacles to become even more useful members of their
community without completely removing them from their
social network.
HOPE VI is not by any means perfect, but it at least
provides housing authorities with a framework in which to
work to address the many facets of community improvement including using existing ties in communities to help
neighborhoods help themselves. By providing for community service, residential service, self-sufficiency support,
crime-prevention and educational services in the statute,
residents are empowered to form specific expectations of
the government. They may also be more encouraged to
become involved in the planning process, like the citizens
of Charlotte. Also, by providing for renovation, remodeling in addition to demolition, HOPE VI gives housing authorities room to explore and apply creative solutions to the
low-income housing problem. Communities like Curundfi
140 Id. at

2-16, Exhibit 2-5.

141Id.
142 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HOPE VI:

COMMUNITY BUILDING MAKES A DIFFERENCE

(2000).
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may benefit from broad legislation like HOPE VI because
they may employ the strength of their existing community
ties to work with the government to improve their conditions.
IV.

Conclusion

The world's poor are fighting to keep roofs over
their heads. Unfortunately, the people are too often perceived as the root of, and not solutions to, the affordable
housing crisis. Accordingly, it seems that governments too
often seek to remove people instead of thoughtfully addressing problems. In Atlanta, the Atlanta Housing Authority alienated the residents of Techwood and Clark
Howell Homes from the planning process and relocated the
majority of them to neighborhoods distant from their original homes. Now, a new mixed-income community, a dormitory, YMCA, elementary school and other resources sit
where Techwood & Clark Howell once were 143, but many
of the former residents live so far away that they cannot
enjoy these amenities.
In Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian
government razed favelas in an attempt to rid the city of the
problem, but thirty years later, the number of favelas is far
greater than it was in 1970. Further, public housing designed to house former favela residents have themselves
become favelas, carrying with them the debilitating stigma
that residents may have thought they escaped.
Curundfi sits in the center of a city that is rapidly
transforming itself before the world's eyes. Still, the incidence of violent crime and arson does not seem to be subsiding. Police raids and bulldozers are not solving the
problem. Thus, the Panamanian government today has the
opportunity to take a holistic approach to improving Curundfi for the benefit of its residents. Undoubtedly, the
entire city too can benefit from improvements in CurundAi.
143 Id.
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Instead of adopting the common approaches of demolition
and relocation, Panama should leverage the collective power of residents to prove that overcoming housing obstacles
does not require that they entirely deny the existing residents opportunity to enjoy the benefits that revitalization
brings.
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